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Showing 1 to 20 of 78 Records
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1967 (9) TMI 157 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pect is likely to make the people lose their faith in the virtues of our democratic set-up which is not a consummation to be desired, We also consider it proper to make it clear that too frequent reliance on section 149 of the Code as a matter of routine or habit by the Government departments for the purpose of shielding their indifference and unconcern towards timely provision of court-fee for causes to be taken to Courts, is liable to be construed as abuse and misuse of this section. It may be emphasised that S. 149 is not intended to serve as a panacea for all habitual and methodical delays in the matter of court-fee by the Government departments which can, by timely action, secure court-fee well within the prescribed period. (7) For the reasons foregoing, we extend time and hold that the appeal must be considered to have been presented within limitation. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs of this hearing. (8) Order accordingly.
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1967 (9) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... conceal the true purport of the claim. It is evident that the District Magistrate, Jaunpur was in possession of the property in dispute and if the Civil Court declared the title of the plaintiff, he would be entitled to secure recognition of his rights. 9. Before parting with the case we must observe that we have felt greatly perturbed by the course which this litigation has taken. The suit was filed in 1956. And after 13 years only the question of court-fee payable on the plant is decided. In the meanwhile the original plaintiff dies. The delay is largely attributable to the rigid attitude of the State which has by insisting upon a comparatively small claim, held up the proceedings for all these long years by raising contentions which had no merit. We trust the Court of first instance will take up this suit for hearing with the least practicable delay and dispose of the suit according to law. The State to pay in this appeal the costs of the heirs of the original plaintiff.
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1967 (9) TMI 155 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... all also be liable to fine' is that there is a liability to fine not that a sentence of fine must be imposed in every case of conviction under such section. Such an expression has been used in the Penal Code only in connection with those offences where the legislature has provided that a sentence of imprisonment is compulsory. In regard to such offences, the legislature has left a discretion in the Court to impose also a sentence of fine in appropriate cases in addition to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment which alone is obligatory. 6. In my opinion, the learned Judge was not at all justified in making an order of remand in the present case. I must, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Judge, and I send the case back to the lower appellate Court for rehearing of the appeal and for its disposal in accordance with law. The learned Sessions Judge will arrange to have the appeal posted for hearing before a judge other than Shri Bageshwari Prasad Griyagey.
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1967 (9) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is not easy without the approver's testimony, it will indubitably agree to the tendering of pardon. The Special Judge (or the Magistrate) must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety of tendering pardon in the circumstances of the case. The learned Special Judge did not bear these considerations in mind and took on himself something from which he should have kept aloof. All that he should have done was to have asked for the opinion of the public prosecutor on the proposal. But since the Public Prosecutor, when appearing in the High Court, stated that the prosecution also considered favorably the tender of pardon to Jagasia we say no more than to caution Magistrates and Judges in the matter of tender of pardon suo motu at the request of the accused. This practice is to be avoided. Since the prosecution in this case also wants that the tender of pardon be made it is obvious that the appeal must fail. It will accordingly be dismissed. 17. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 153 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s' could have been substituted in that clause for the words "shapes and sections". (49) An article becomes excisable only when it is clearly within the enumeration of excisble goods. In our opinion, the agricultural implements manufactured by the State Government are not. (50) In this view of the matter, it becomes unnecessary to investigate whether their manufacture involves a process in addition to those which clause (i) refers. (51) So, we quash the impugned demand made by the Inspector of Central Excise on January 27, 1962 and that made by the Assistant Collector of Excise on December 13, 1962. We set aside the order made by the Collector on January 6, 1963 and the order made by the Central Government in revision on April 8, 1965. We make a direction that all amounts collected by way of excise duty under item 26-AA in respect of the Agricultural implements manufactured by the factory owned by the State shall be refunded. (52) No costs. (53) Petition allowed
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1967 (9) TMI 152 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d notification should have provided for deduction from minimum wages the value of their amenities like lodging, water and light provided by employers to their employees in hotel industry. This argument overlooks the definition of "Wages" in Clause (h) of Section 2 of the Act. Sub-clause (i) of that clause expressly states that wages shall not include any house accommodation, supply of light, water or medical attendance. Hence no deduction is permissible from wages towards the value of amenities like lodging, water and light. (158) In the result, the only limited extent to which these petitions succeed is that the rates of minimum wages fixed by the impugned notification, are declared as not being applicable to children, adolescents certified to work as children, and apprentices. (159) All other contentions fail. Subject to what has been stated above, we dismiss these petitions. In the circumstances we direct parties to bear their own costs. (160) Order accordingly.
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1967 (9) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trust is administered at Burhanpur and the bulk of its properties, except the three pieces of lands situate in the District of Dhulia, are all situate in the Madhya Pradesh State. The fact that a part of its property is situate in Maharashtra State, though the trust is within Madhya Pradesh State would not mean that the trust would be governed partly by the Madhya Pradesh Act and partly by the Bombay Act. Such a division of the Trust and its administration is not contemplated by either of the two Acts. It is therefore clear that the present Trust does not fall within the ambit of section 28 and is not one of those trusts which can be deemed to be registered under the Bombay Act. That being so, it is obviously not a trust which fulfills the second condition of s. 88B of the Bombay Tenancy Agriculture Lands and the appellant cannot be said to be entitled to the certificate under that section. 8. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 150 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he principle of the dictum of Lord Cottenham should not, in justice and equity, be invoked to clothe the promoter with the mantle of fiduciary position with respect to the company under incorporation with the implication that when incorporated the company will succeed to the beneficial acts transacted on its behalf by the promoter. 19. As we already noted, the second defendant and another purchased these properties expressly stating that they did so as representatives of the company to be formed, that the funds therefore did not belong to them and that on incorporation the company assumed possession and built upon them. These facts clearly show that the company adopted the benefit of the purchase, if adoption is a requisite at all for passing of such benefits to the company on incorporation. On this view, it follows that the suit properties did belong to the plaintiff company. 20. App. No. 178 of 1962 is allowed with costs, App. No. 28 of 1962 is dismissed but with no costs.
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1967 (9) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sessing the rateable value. It is true -that the net rateable value as calculated by the High Court comes to ₹ 1,94,175 but the rateable value need not always be equal to the actual rent. As aforesaid the measure is what a, hypothetical tenant is expected to pay for a lease from year to Year taking the property as it exists with all its privileges, advantages and burdens. The leased premises no doubt consist of a large track of land but it must be remembered that under cl. (i)(f) of the lease the Club is in exclusive possession of only certain portions and the remainder has to be kept open to the public except on race days and when training of horses is held. A large portion of the land has thus to be kept open for being used as playgrounds for the public. It is therefore not surprising that the rateable value as determined by the High Court comes to an amount less than the actual rent payable by the Club. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n and carry out the provisions of the Act throughout the State. If an adverse decision is arrived at by the Court under s. 72 and if he is denied the right to appeal to the High, Court, it would be difficult for him, if he is of the view that the property is the property of the public trust and if the District Court rules otherwise, to carry out the provisions of the Act. The Charity Commissioner was made a party to the appeal, and he was entitled to support his order before the District Court. A person interested, as the Charity Commissioner is in the due administration of property, cannot be denied a right to appeal against an adverse decision in a proceeding to which he is a party, on the ground that he is pleading for acceptance of the view which he had declared as a quasi-judicial authority at an earlier stage of that proceeding. o p /o p The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs in favour of the Charity Commissioner. o p /o p Y.P. o p /o p Appeal dismissed, o p /o p
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1967 (9) TMI 147 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xed to the earth in that manner. The engine cannot be used except by fixing it to the earth. Therefore, it cannot be said that the intention, as disclosed by the fixture, is to make it a permanent part of the earth and so it is immovable property. The nature of the engine and the purpose of its fixtures, both show that it cannot be regarded as immovable property. No doubt, the evidence in this case is that the Fetter engine stood affixed to the earth from 1952. But this is because during that period the engine was used for that purpose the fixture was necessary. On that account, the fixture cannot be viewed as a permanent one. 5. On the view we have taken, namely, that the engine and the pump-set remained to be movable property, there was nothing wrong in the procedure applied to the attachment and sale thereof. This being the only point before us, the appeal is allowed, the result of which is that the suit will stand dismissed. Each party will bear its own costs throughout.
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1967 (9) TMI 146 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing led into an answer against his will. He may in normal circumstances be expected to state facts as he sees them, and should he state anything which discloses an undue favour towards the respondents, the manner and content of his answer will be of assistance to me in assessing the value of the same. 37. I, therefore, decline to grant the general permission under Section 154 of the Evidence Act to the petitioner to put this witness any question which can be put in cross-examination by adverse party. In the case of particular matters or particular topics which appear to me of material importance, I may grant permission to the petitioner's counsel to put leading questions, each matter being considered on its own merits. 38. The examination of the witness will continue in the light of this ruling. 39. As it is now past 5 P.M further examination is adjourned to 11 A.M on Monday the 18th of this month. The witness will be present in Court at that time. 40. Order accordingly.
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1967 (9) TMI 145 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itution, mere delay would hardly affect the maintainability of the petition. The High Court was not satisfied that there was delay and said "In any case having regard to the importance of the points raised and, assuming that there was delay, we would certainly condone the delay." In appeal we do not feel disposed to take a different view. If the High Court had any discretion in the matter-and it is not suggested that it had not-the exercise of such discretion ought not to be over-ruled by US Unless we are satisfied that the High Court had "acted on some wrong principle or committed some error of law or failed to consider matters which demand consideration". This is-the principle which the House of Lords in England have always followed as observed by Viscount Simonds in Zacharia v. Republic of Cyprus(1) and nothing has been shown to us as to why we should adopt a different principle. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not clearly expressed. A reasonable reading of that clause is that a person who enters into a contract without disclosing that he contracts on his own account is liable to be punished. It could obviously not have been intended by the Parliament to punish a person for failing to secure the consent or authority of the other party to the contract-an act which depends solely upon the volition of that other person. The apparent obscurity in the penal provision cannot however be utilized to restrict the prohibition contained in s. 15(4). What is penalised under s. 20(2) is entry into a forward contract by a member on his own account without disclosing to the non- member contracting party that the contract is on the member's own account. We therefore bold that the High Court was right in holding that the contract did not comply with the requirements of sub-s. (4) of s. 15 and was on that account invalid. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1958 Cal. 423. would not take into consideration the extra income derived from the use of the roof for the advertising hoarding over and above the actual rent while deciding what rent he can profitably offer for the building. Such a question not having been raised or decided this decision also cannot assist the appellants. In our view if the building or a part of it yields am extra income over and above the actual rent derived from it such income on the terms of s. 154(1) of the Act can legitimately be taken into consideration by the assessing authority while determining the annual rent on the ground that a hypothetical tenant would take such extra income into account while considering what rent he can afford to offer for such building. That being the correct position under s. 154(1) of the Act the High Court, was right in confirming the enhancement of the annual rent from ₹ 44,320 to ₹ 59,600. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Y. P. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (9) TMI 142 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... proved. But when a Judge in deciding a case follows a precedent, he only regards himself bound by the principle underlying the judgMent and not by the facts of that case. It is true that every Judge of a High Court before he enters upon his office takes an oath of office that he will bear true faith -and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that he will duly and faithfully and to the best of his ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of office without fear ,or favour, affection or illwill and that he will uphold the Constitution and the laws but there is nothing in the oath of office which warrants a Judge in ignoring the rule relating to the binding nature, of the precedents which is uniformly followed. The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside and the order passed by the District Court restored. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in this -Court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (9) TMI 141 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sessions trial, he has already suffered a sentence of one year and he has paid the fine of ₹ 500 which was imposed on him. The amounts which now form the subject-matter of the two proceedings are partly and the Petitioner who is a Govt. servant has already been subjected not only to the agony and humiliation of a criminal trial but he shall have to face the necessary consequence, namely, that he will lose his job and will find it hard to get any other. 24. In view, of these circumstances, we are of the opinion that, though there is no legal bar to he prosecution pending against the Petitioner, it is not necessary to subject him to fresh trials. We therefore set aside the decision of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, treat these revision applications as under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code and quash the proceedings in cases Nos. 42 of 1966 and 43 of 1966 pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jalgaon. 25. Order accordingly
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1967 (9) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there has been a termination of the award, Exhibit M-6, in the manner pleaded by the Union?
Held that:- The discretion of the State Government, under s. 10 of the Act, is very wide. It may be that the workmen. affected by the standing orders, may not always, and in every case, Succeed in obtaining a reference to the Industrial Tribunal, on a relevant point. These are some of the circumstances for giving a right and remedy, to the workman, under the Standing Orders Act itself, but there is no indication, in the scheme of the Standing, Orders Act, that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, to entertain an 'Industrial dispute', bearing upon the standing orders of in industrial establishment, and to adjudicate upon the same, has any manner been abridged, or taken away, by the Standing Orders Act. Therefore, on this aspect, we are in agreement with the conclusions, arrived at, by the Industrial Tribunal, and the High Court.
In view of our finding on the first point, that the award, Exhibit M-6 'had not been terminated. it follows that the reference. made by the State Government, dated March 20,1963, in his case, is incompetent, and the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same, in I.D. No. 8 of 1963. In the result, the order :of the High Court is set aside, and a writ of prohibition, restraining the second respondent, from proceeding with the adjudication, in I.D. No. 8 of 1963, will issue, and the appeal allowed, to that extent. Appeal allowed in part.
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1967 (9) TMI 139 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... so. In fact, the accountable person has agreed that the value of each share of the company is Rs. 258 on the date of death. The Tribunal therefore was right in accept- ing the application of the doctrine adumbrated in sections 9 and 27 of the Act, as was done by the second officer. One observation, however, has to be made before we answer the two queries referred to us. It does not appear from the record that the accountable person did really have an opportunity to prove as to what would be the fair price of the shares on the date of sale. This opportunity is indeed necessary in the interests of justice. Being confident that such a fair opportunity would be given by the revenue, we are not dwelling at length on this aspect and indeed it is not essential to do so to render our answers. We, therefore, answer both the queries in the affirmative and against the assessee. This tax case is therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1967 (9) TMI 138 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the nature of the bus-body-building contracts which was not objected to by the assessee in his appeal, and bring them to tax as sales of goods and thus enhance the assessment. There remains the last ground of the assessee relating to limitation. On this question we think the Tribunal took the correct view. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in enhancing the assessment did not act under section 16 as a case of escaped assessment but he was using his powers under section 31(3)(a)(i) of the Act. On that view the enhancement is not open to attack as out of time. Having, however, regard to our last observations in dealing with the first ground of the assessee, the tax cases are allowed for that limited purpose and the appeals are remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with our judgment. It will be open to the assessee and the revenue to adduce before the Tribunal further evidence if any. There will be no order as to costs in these tax cases. Appeals remitted.
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