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1968 (10) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... n over-rides the contractual stipulation that the interest would be payable at 1% per annum. The High Court was right in holding that interest was payable at the rate of 6 1/4% per annum only. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and it is declared that defendants 1, 2, 2(a) and 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay to the plaintiffs Rs. 6000 per annum on account of the plaintiffs' share of rent for Fasli years 1358, 1359 and 1360 and simple interest thereon at the rate of 61% per annum upto date. We direct that a decree be drawn up accordingly. The decree will carry future interest on the principal sum at the rate of 6% per annum. The aforesaid defendants will pay to the plaintiffs proportionate costs of the suit in the Trial Court. The parties will bear their own costs of the appeal in the High Court and in this Court. This decree will be without prejudice to the payments, if any, made by the defendants to the plaintiffs after the institution of the suit.
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1968 (10) TMI 115
... ... ... ... ..... ntion raised, held that the term "reward" in Section 161, Indian Penal Code, was manifestly intended to apply to a past service and that any other construction would lead to an absurdity. I respectfully agree with this decision. I do not, therefore, see any force in the contention of the learned Counsel. The convictions of the appellant under Section 161, Indian Penal Code, and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are confirmed. 7. So far, as the sentence is concerned, I am inclined to take a lenient view. The appellant is a middle-aged man who was getting a very meagre salary as a Clerk at the time he committed the offence. He has lost his job. He has been in jail for a week. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, I do not think it necessary to send him back to jail and, therefore, I reduce his sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. 8. The appeal is dismissed with the modification in the sentence.
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1968 (10) TMI 114
... ... ... ... ..... as placed upon this decision of the Supreme Court in the case already cited, namely (1964) 1 Andh LT 292 where it was held that the provisions of the two Acts are not analogous and that no reliance can be placed upon the said decision for the purpose of construing the provisions of the Madras Estates Abolition Act. 34. For the above reasons, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to continue the suit even after the estate vested in the Government. The second defendant had no right to remain in possession after August 1947. The plaintiff filed the suit within 12 years thereof for recovery of possession. It may also be noted that after the estate was abolished in 1964, neither the second defendant nor defendants 1, 3, and 4 who claim rights under him applied for any patta under Section 11 of the Act claiming to be ryots entitled to a Ryotwari patta. The decree of the court below is therefore, confirmed with costs payable to the plaintiff by the appellants. 35. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (10) TMI 113
... ... ... ... ..... urposes and that can be done only by a declaration under Section 6. So, if the direction under Section 17(4) cannot issue without the issue of a direction under Section 17(1), it would follow that the very purpose of issuing a direction under Section 17(4) would stand defeated for the simple reason that a direction under Section 17(1) cannot issue till after the declaration under Section 6 and unless a direction under Section 17(4) has been issued a declaration under Section 6 cannot be made without allowing an opportunity to file objection under Section 5-A of the Act. That would positively show that the view expressed by the Division Bench in the case referred to above cannot be sustained. 12. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that the direction under Section 17(4) of the Act does not suffer from any defect either of fact or law. No other point has been raised in these petitions. We, therefore, dismiss them but direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1968 (10) TMI 112
... ... ... ... ..... pleaded by an accused and evidence is adduced to support such a plea, but such evidence fails to satisfy the Court affirmatively that the accused has fully established his plea of the claimed Exception, he will still be en-titled to an acquittal, if, upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole (including the evidence given in support of the plea of the said general Exception), a reasonable consequential doubt is created in the mind of the Court as to whether the accused is really guilty of the offence with which he is charged. BY THE COURT 177. In accordance with the majority opinion, our answer to the question referred to this Full Bench is as follows -- The majority decision in AIR1941All402 is still good law. The accused person is entitled to be acquitted if upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole (including the evidence given in support of the plea of the general exception) a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court about the guilt of the accused.
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1968 (10) TMI 111
... ... ... ... ..... e carcasses which may come into its possession it leaves it to the Corporation to take adequate and effective steps for the purpose of disposal. Whether by virtue of the contracts given by the Corporation to other persons who are claimed to be rivals in business of the first respondent un-reasonable restrictions may be deemed to be placed upon their fundamental right is a matter on which no argument was advanced at any stage before the Trial Court or the High Court, though it was strenuously urged before us. Prima facie, the argument has no substance in any case, it cannot affect the validity of the statute or the provisions which have been declared to be invalid by the High Court. 24. The facts which give rise to the two other appeals are the same and for reasons already stated the claim made by the respondent must be rejected. 25. The appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the High Court set aside. The petitions shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs throughout.
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1968 (10) TMI 110
... ... ... ... ..... ied the resulting tax is somewhat higher but that does not offend against the equality contemplated by Article 304. That is the consequence of ad valorem tax being levied at a particular rate. So long as the rate is the same Article 304 is satisfied. Even in the case of local manufactures if their cost of production varies, the net tax collected will be more or less in some cases but that does not create any inequality because inequality is not the result of the tax but results from the cost of production of the goods or the cost of their importation. This ground, therefore, has also no substance. We do not think it necessary to set down here the provisions of the Haryana Amendment Act because they follow the scheme of the Punjab Amendment Act in substance and what we have said in regard to the Punjab Amending Act applies mutatis mutandis to Haryana Amendment Act also. 25. In the result these petitions have no substance. They are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee.
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1968 (10) TMI 109
... ... ... ... ..... decisions of this Court referred to. 12. If the rule of issue-estoppel is applied to the present case, it follows that the charge with regard to forgery must fail against all the appellants. The reason is that the case of Swami Nath is solely based upon the allegation that his thumb impressions were obtained on blank forms of promissory notes and receipts on January 7, 1955 by the use of force. If the finding of the Second Class Magistrate on this issue is final and cannot be reopened, the substratum of the present prosecution case fails and the charges of forgery under Sections 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code cannot be established against any of the appellants. 13. For these reasons we hold that this appeal must be allowed, the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated June 3, 1966 must be set aside and the convictions of each of the appellants and the sentence imposed upon them should be quashed. If the appellants are still in jail they should be set at liberty forthwith.
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1968 (10) TMI 108
... ... ... ... ..... r opinion, this will be the date when the right to sue accrued. The contract had already been completed in 1946. This suit was filed in 1958 and but for the acknowledgments of the defendants, it would have been time-barred even under Article 120. But in letters Ex. 28 dated 17th December 1951. Exh. 29 dated 11th June 1955 and Exh. 30 dated 3rd February 1956, the claim in the suit has been acknowledged and Dhavate and Rote have been informed that the amount could be received against joint receipt of Dhavate and Rote. In the last two letters, the amount has been described as 'Anamat' amount held on behalf of Dhavate and Rote. By virtue of these acknowledgments, the limitation is saved and, in our opinion, the suit of the plaintiff is within time. 13. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the District Court, Kolhapur, and restore the judgment and decree of the trial Court The defendants will pay the costs throughout. 14. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 107
... ... ... ... ..... ion by the court that it was reasonable to give such a judgment." 8. As the decree for the delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord is a nullity it cannot be enforced or executed either by the landlord or by the landlord's son Muni Subrat. The decree in so far as it directs the removal of the machinery from the premises is clearly valid and separable from the rest of the decree and may be executed by Muni Subrat. 9. In the result, it is declared that (a) the objections as to tire validity of the award cannot be entertained in the execution proceedings; (b) the decree in so far as it directs delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord is a nullity and cannot be executed either by Muni Subrat or by Mehtab Singh and (c) the decree in so far as it directs removal of the machinery is valid and may be executed by Muni Subrat. Subrat to the declarations mentioned above the appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs in this Court.
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1968 (10) TMI 106
... ... ... ... ..... against him and adduced all the evidence which he wanted to place before the Court. Section 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code says "that no error in stating either the offence B or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice." It also appears that the appellant never raised any objection either before the Special Judge or in the High COurt on the score that the charge was defective and that he was misled in his defence on the ground that no particulars of the persons from whom the bribes were taken were mentioned. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this point. For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of the High Court dated September 14, 1965 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (10) TMI 105
... ... ... ... ..... e sustained by them by reason of the plaintiff's default, the conclusion of the learned District Munsif is erroneous and is the result of wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. This has to be corrected by this Court under Section 25 of the Madras Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 10. I am inclined in the instant case to remand the suit to the lower Court for fresh disposal in the light of my observations in this judgment. The defendants-respondents are given leave to amend their written statement and plead that the amount is deposit and set out their right to claim damages and to have it, on proof thereof, equitably set-off against the plaintiff's claim in full or in part. The lower Court will assess the damage and give such relief to either of the parties as circumstances require. 11. The Civil Revision Petition Is allowed; but the case is remanded to the lower Court for a fresh trial in the light of the observations in the judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
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1968 (10) TMI 104
... ... ... ... ..... ellant. On the materials on the record, the Regional Transport Authority found that the appellant was an experienced and displaced operator. That finding was not challenged in appeal. The only point taken in the appeal was that the application of Ram Bichar Singh had abated and that the Regional Transport Authority had no power to allow her to continue the application. The Appellate Authority accepted the contention and set aside the order directing the grant of the permit to the appellant. The Transport Minister rightly set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and held that the Regional Transport Authority has power to permit her to prosecute the application filed by her deceased husband. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the Transport Minister. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Transport Minister is restored. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 103
... ... ... ... ..... e construction given should be a harmonious one. It may be that the legislature intended that s. 32(KK) should be deemed to have come into force on the 30th day of October 1956, on which day s. 32(FF) became a part of the principal Act. It is possible that the legislature did. not intend to give to that Section the same retrospective effect as it had given to s. 32(FF). It is not permissible for u to proceed on the basis that the legislature had enacted subs. (2) of s. 1 of the Amendment Act 1962 by oversight. o p /o p If any mistake had crept into that Section it is for the legislature to correct the same and it is not for this Court to proceed on the supposition that the same was enacted by oversight. o p /o p For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed and the orders impugned in the Writ Petition are quashed. o p /o p The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellants both in this Court as well as in the High Court. o p /o p R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1968 (10) TMI 102
... ... ... ... ..... he sales were exempt as being sales made in the course of export. The facts in the instant case are almost similar to the facts of that case. There also the sales tax authorities had denied the exemption to the assessee on the ground that the delivery of goods had been made to foreign buyers within the Indian territory. This court held that that fact did not alter the legal position. It was immaterial as to where the property in the goods passed so long as the export was occasioned by the contract of sale and the goods had in fact been exported. The present case, in our opinion, is covered completely by the decision of the Full Bench. We, therefore, answer question No. (1) in the affirmative. As regards question No. (2), we have already held that the reference of this question is unwarranted. The reference of question No. (2) being incompetent, we decline to answer the same. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (10) TMI 101
... ... ... ... ..... said considerations, in our judgment the impugned assessment orders made by the Sales Tax Officer for the quarters ending 30th June and 30th September, 1967, along with the consequential notices of demand, are liable to be quashed, and the petitioner is entitled to certiorari quashing the notice issued by the Sales Tax Officer in respect of the quarter ending 31st December, 1967, and to prohibition restraining him from taking assessment proceedings consequent to that notice. The petitions are allowed with costs. The assessment orders dated 8th January, 1968, for the quarters ending 30th June, 1967, and 30th September, 1967, made respectively under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act and the consequent notices of demand are quashed. The notice dated 18th February, 1968, issued by the Sales Tax Officer for the quarter ending 31st December, 1968, is also quashed, and he is restrained from taking assessment proceedings pursuant to that notice. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 100
... ... ... ... ..... that view with respect, we are unable to share the approach made in Sarju Pd. Pritam Lal v. Judge, Revisions, Sales Tax, U.P. 1963 14 S.T.C. 884., to the problem. The petitions are allowed. Learned Assistant Government Pleader says that the lot cooly charges had been made on a percentage basis and without reference to the actual labour charges paid with reference to the service rendered to each customer. That is not a matter which has been examined by the revenue. If the collection by way of lot cooly charges is in excess of the actual service charge incurred and paid by the assessee, we are not called upon in these petitions to express an opinion as to whether such excess can by any view of the matter, form part of the price. But we think that the revenue should have an opportunity to go into that question. It will, therefore, be at liberty to consider and dispose of the matter after notice to the assessees, and, if they so desire, hearing them. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 99
... ... ... ... ..... result, we allow the petitions, quash that part of the order of assessment in each of these cases, which charges to tax the import sales, such as are covered by Khosla and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes(1), and direct the assessing authority to investigate the character of the transactions claimed to be import sales, in the light of the original or certified copies of the record relevant to this question, to be filed by the relative assessees, and finally determine the tax liability or exemption of the transactions in the light of Khosla and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1966 17 S.T.C. 473. In the event of the assessing authority coming to the conclusion that the transactions are covered by Khosla and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1966 17 S.T.C. 473., that authority will, of course, have to refund the relative tax to the assessees concerned. No costs in any of these petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 98
... ... ... ... ..... In our opinion, there is justification for this view. There is also another approach to the question. Gold handed to the assessee could easily be converted into money at his hands and the same be applied as payment in cash for the purchase of jewels from the assessee. Payment by handing equivalent weight of gold had the import of dispensing with the necessity of that process. Viewed in that way too, the assessments or re-assessments on the view that the assessee effected sales of gold jewels, have to be accepted as valid. In all these cases, the revenue has imposed penalties. In the particular circumstances of this case, we are inclined to think, especially in view of the fact that the question we have decided is not entirely free from doubt, the levy of penalty was not justified. The petitions are, therefore, allowed except Writ Petition No. 1462 of 1967 in so far as they relate to penalties. In other respects all the petitions are dismissed. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1968 (10) TMI 97
... ... ... ... ..... learned judges apply equally to the case of a co-operative society wherein the liability of the members is limited. It is, therefore, held that the members of the society are not liable for the payment of the sales tax levied on the petitioner-society and no amount on this account can be recovered from them either by the attachment and sale of their properties or by their arrest or any other coercive method. For the reasons given above these petitions are accepted only to the extent that it is held that the members of the petitioner-society are not liable for the payment of the sales tax levied against it and no amount of sales tax can be recovered from them by any coercive method of attachment and sale of their properties or by their arrest or in any other method. The petitions with regard to other reliefs are dismissed leaving the petitioner to its remedies under the Act. In view of the partial success the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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