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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 78 Records
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1968 (11) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ween the parties. If so read, it is clear that the statement that the final payment will be made in accordance with the settlement is subject to the condition that the parties are able ,to arrive at a settlement. Otherwise the parties continue to be bound by the original contract subject to the extension of the time granted under the Delhi agreement for the payment of the price. As regards the additional payment demanded by the Russian Firm, there is no occasion for issuing any temporary injunction. If the Indian Firm does not comply with that demand the law will take its course. It is for that Firm to choose its course of action. In the result we allow Civil Appeals Nos. 2305 and 2306 of 1968 with costs of the appellant therein and set aside the temporary injunctions granted by the trial judge. The other appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. The costs to be paid by the Indian Company. V.P.S. C.A. Nos. 2305 and 2306/68 allowed. C.A.Nos. 2251 and 2252/68 dismissed.
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1968 (11) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that area for any sugar mill whether situated in Bihar or not. The contention of Shri Chagla that as no orders had yet been passed under cls. 6(c) and (d) of the ’order’ the ,appellant cannot be considered as an aggrieved party is not correct. As soon as a portion of the area reserved for the appellant was ordered to be taken away and added to the reserved area of the 5th respondent, the appellant’s interest was adversely affected. Therefore it is immaterial for the appellant what orders are passed under sub-cls. (c) and (d) of el. 6 of the ’order’, because it can no more get any sugarcane from the area in question. What hurts the appellant is the impugned orders and not the further orders that may be passed. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed and the orders impugned quashed. The State of Bihar as well as the 5th respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant both in this. Court as well as in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (11) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me Court in the case of A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala 1957 8 S.T.C. 561. It was ruled in that case The very fact of their non-liability to tax is sufficient to exclude them from the calculation of the gross turnover as well as the net turnover on which sales tax can be levied or imposed. If section 27 of the Act operates upon the charging section 3, it would operate on rule 8 as well. We must, therefore, interpret gross turnover for purposes of rule 8 to mean the aggregate turnover of such sales as are taxable or would be taxable but for an exemption provided in the Act. By the Court The turnover of sales outside Uttar Pradesh by the assessee cannot be included in the turnover of the dealer for the purposes of the first proviso to section 3(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The question referred to this Court is answered accordingly. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (11) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e is not that in the generally accepted sense they are articles of furniture. The contention is that their design and equipment do not preclude them from being used as furniture. It is one thing to say that although they cannot be generally described as furniture they can be used as such. That points to a compulsive use, a role for which they were never originally intended. That is not the same thing as saying that they are articles which in the popular or general sense are accepted as furniture. In our opinion, it has not been established that the articles in question in this reference are liable to be classified as furniture within the meaning of Notification No. ST-905/X dated 31st March, 1956. They should be treated as articles chargeable under section 3 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We answer the question referred accordingly. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (11) TMI 93 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal by which the freight charges were disallowed. We delete from the order of assessment the inclusion of those freight charges. It is seen from the order of the Commercial Tax Officer which is affirmed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal that a sum of Rs. 1,000 was added to the total turnover determined as an amount which had been suppressed. It is clear that the inclusion of this amount was quite illegitimate. The assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer was a best judgment assessment, and after the best judgment assessment had been made it was not possible for him to include another sum of money as some part of the turnover which had been suppressed. We quash the inclusion of that amount. The Commercial Tax Officer will now prepare an amended assessment order in accordance with this judgment. The petitioner will get his costs. Advocate s fee rupees one hundred (Rs. 100). Petition allowed.
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1968 (11) TMI 92 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... excuse and that finding he did not record. So, it is clear that his finding that an offence was committed under section 10(d) is equally unsupportable. The imperfection in the order of the Additional Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, to which we have referred, are also the imperfections which are discernible in the orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. They overlooked the deficiencies in the order of the Additional Assistant Commercial Tax Officer and the clear provisions of clauses (b) and (d) of section 10 of the Act. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Additional Assistant Commercial Tax Officer and also the orders made by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. We are informed by Mr. Aithala that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has been recovered. If it has been so recovered, what has been recovered shall be refunded to him. We make no direction in regard to costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (11) TMI 91 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her deductions claimable under the general sales tax law of the State. The Tribunal made the mistake of thinking that the deduction of the Central tax was claimed under clause (a) of rule 11(2) of the Central Rules which at the relevant point of time had been deleted from that subrule. What was overlooked by the Tribunal was that the deduction which was made by the Commercial Tax Officer was what had to be made under rule 6(4)(h) of the Mysore Rules read with section 9(3) of the Central Act and that clause (a) of rule 11(2) of the Central Rules had no relevance. So, we allow these two revision petitions and set aside the orders made by the Deputy Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In consequence, the determinations made by the Commercial Tax Officer who made the determinations of the taxable turnover in accordance with law stand restored. The petitioner will get its costs in these two revision petitions. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (11) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) ..................... (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. Applying the principles to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that the provisions of the Act in question do not arm the Sales Tax Authorities to collect licence fees from the appellants. But they proceeded to issue notice to the appellants and threatened them with action under the Revenue Recovery Act. It is not a case of voluntary payment. The authorities compelled the appellants to pay the licence fee. They paid the fees under a mistake of law. They are, therefore, entitled to recover the same and a suit lies in the civil court for recovery of the amounts. The second appeals are, therefore, allowed with costs and the suits will stand decreed. Leave granted. Appeals allowed.
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1968 (11) TMI 89 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his sales are not within a period of six months from the original date of purchase, such purchasing dealer becomes liable for payment of purchase tax. This being the scheme of the Act, we fail to see how the claim of the selling dealers who have furnished the certificate can be disallowed on the ground that they have failed to prove that the certificate was issued within six months from the date of sale or before the date of despatch. In the result, our answer to the question referred is in the negative, viz., that the Tribunal was not justified in law in disallowing either of the claims in any of these applications on the ground that the certificates in Form J were not shown to have been issued before the date of despatch or before the date of sale. Thus the references will be answered accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to his costs in each of these references, quantified at Rs. 250 in each and the refund of the deposits of Rs. 100. References answered accordingly.
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1968 (11) TMI 88 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 81., that the preparation of medicines in the prescription of the assessee did not amount to manufacture of medicines and pharmaceutical preparations within the meaning of the notification. Mr. G.C. Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant, has brought to our notice that the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2458 of 1966, Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Dr. Sukh Deo 1969 23 S.T.C. 385., has upheld the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. This means that the decision given by the Additional Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, was a correct decision in the case and so the impugned order of the 17th January, 1966, by the joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, has to be quashed. In the result, the Letters Patent appeal is allowed and the order of the Additional Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, Patiala, restored and the order of the learned Single judge is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. NARULA, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (11) TMI 87 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... liable to be called upon to be registered as a dealer, and the sale of salvage will not attract sales tax. We are, however, not in a position, at the moment, to forbid the revenue from proceeding with the matter. Initially, it has jurisdiction to examine the position, in order to see whether the circumstances we have mentioned are present. We, therefore, refrain from issuing a rule but in the expectation that the revenue will carefully look into the matter, and, if the facts are as set out by the petitioner and noticed by us, it will proceed on the footing that there is no liability to sales tax, and the petitioner will not be liable to be registered as a dealer. We consider that the revenue should have that opportunity. It means that the pool, or those who represent it, should co-operate with it and give such assistance as the revenue may require. Subject to the observations we have made, the petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (11) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay?
Whether this court will inquire into belated and stale claims or take note of evidence of neglect of one's own rights for a long time?
Held that:- Petition dismissed. The judgment of the Bombay High Court in 1958 clearly shows that the merits of the petitioners' claim were not being examined. I can however find no merit in the contention that because there is an invasion of a fundamental right of a citizen he can be allowed to come to this court, no matter how long after the infraction of his right he applies for relief. The Constitution is silent on this point; nor is there any statute of limitation expressly applicable, but nevertheless, on grounds of public policy I would hold that this court should not lend its aid to a litigant even under article 32 of the Constitution in case of an inordinate delay in asking for relief and the question of delay ought normally to be measured by the periods fixed for the institution of suits under the Limitation Acts.
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1968 (11) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board is a dealer within the meaning of section 2(c) of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, and section 2(d) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, in respect of its activity of generation, distribution, sale and supply of electrical energy?
Whether or not steam is salable goods and if they are salable goods is the turnover representing the supply thereof liable to be assessed to sales tax in the hands of the assessee?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. On the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court we are of the opinion that the arrangement relating to supply of steam in return for the water supplied by the mills on payment of actual cost was not one of sale but was more in the nature of a works contract.
In the result the answer of the High Court to the first question is discharged and it is held that the Electricity Board is a "dealer" within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the two Acts in respect of its activities of generation, distribution, sale and supply of electric energy.
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1968 (11) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts set out in the show cause notices, which facts have to be assumed to be correct for the purpose of these proceedings, the respondents can be held to have contravened section 12(1)?
Held that:- The fact that the exporter may be proceeded under section 12(2) for non-payment of the full amount payable by the foreign buyer, or that the Reserve Bank can in the eventualities mentioned in section 12(5) require the holding up of shipping documents or that the Reserve Bank by exercising powers under section 12(6) secure contracts and other evidence to discover the full amount payable do not throw any light on the construction of section 23A and section 12(1) except that the legislature is anxious that the "full export value" shall be received in this country. Section 23A read with section 12(1) calls in aid of customs authorities to achieve the same object, but ropes in along with the exporter the persons concerned in the prohibited export.
Unable to appreciate how the existence of section 167(37), section 167(72) and section 167(81) is of any assistance for the purpose of interpreting section 23A and section 12(1) of the Exchange Act. It may be —I do not decide it—that an exporter, like the respondents, will also be liable to be proceeded against under these items of section 167.
Taking the facts as alleged by the customs authorities to be true, as they must be taken to be true for the purpose of this application under article 226, it seems to me that no case for the issue of a writ of prohibition has been made out. In the result the judgment of the appeal court is reversed and that of the learned single judge restored.
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1968 (11) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the mills did not yield profits because of the Jalans having parted with the processing unit to Jhunjhunwalas?
Whether the closure of the mills was due to the Jalans having starved them of finance?
Whether a scheme sanctioned by the court being binding on the company, its shareholders and the creditors, anything done contrary to its provisions is ultra vires the company?
Held that:- The Jalans gave several reasons why the accounts could not be produced. Whether they were true or not, even if the accounts had been produced they could not have thrown any light as no separate accounts were kept of the income and expenditure of the unit in 1964-65. But then if the unit was the most profit-yielding unit and had made large profit in 1964-65 one wonders why Singhania should have applied for permission to sell or lease it. It is also difficult to believe that the Jalans would let out the unit at a norminal consideration only a month after they had restarted the mills as in the beginning at any rate they were genuinely interested in working the mills and implementing the scheme unless of course the allegation that Jhunjhunwalas were their nominees was true. But, as the appeal court has rightly said, no proof was offered in support of that allegation.
It was not as if the mills had to be worked even if their working resulted in loss. Assuming that the Jalans were under an obligation to bring in finance including their own monies, they could not be said to be under an obligation to bring in finance even if the working of the mills showed no reasonable prospect of profit. If the mills could not be worked except at a loss the company would be justified in ceasing to work them. The very object of the company being to manufacture cloth, if the mills had to be closed that would mean that the very object for which the company existed and which also was the assumption on which the scheme was framed ceased to exist.
The claim urged on behalf of schedule 'B' creditors that they had a charge irrespective of the proposed mortgage and were entitled to be treated as secured creditors cannot therefore be upheld.There is no question of the appellants having done something on the faith of an act, the court, the appellants and the other schedule ' B ' creditors having agreed to a postponement of repayment to them in consideration of an agreement between them and the company providing for a second mortgage in their favour.
On the findings by the appeal court that the company was commercially insolvent and that the scheme could not satisfactorily be worked with or without modifications, the only alternative for that court was to pass the winding-up order under section 392(2). The appeal court was right in ordering winding up of the company and we uphold that order
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1968 (11) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc.
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1968 (11) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Shares warrants and entries in register of members ... ... ... ... ..... force as between him and his daughter, notwithstanding that, vis-a-vis the company, he continued to be the holder of the shares in the absence of registration of the transfer. There remains the question whether what passed under the second settlement deed was only a life interest of the assessee in the shares. This aspect we have already dealt with. In our opinion, the first settlement deed, in so far as it retained in the assessee a life interest in the shares, cannot be regarded as being in the form requisite for a valid transfer of shares. Secondly, we think, by consent of all the parties, the second document was executed, the assessee s daughter having surrendered whatever interest she had in the shares under the first document. In the circumstances, therefore, the transfer under the 1959 settlement deed was of the entire interest in the shares to the assessee s daughter. We answer both the questions under reference against the assessee with costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 250.
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1968 (11) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income-tax Officer found that besides these shares, the assessee's wife and two sons held certain shares of the Associated Hotels of India Ltd and the Northern India Caterers Ltd. and he included the gross dividends thereof for the year 1953-54 and the net dividends thereof for the year 1934-55 in the total income of the assessee - since assessee has admitted that he is the real owner of these shares, the dividends had to be assessed in his hands
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1968 (11) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessee taking over business as going concern - payment made towards pension to some employees who had served for long - expenses were made to protect their goodwill(capital asset) and defending it against possible competition - even if expenditure was made to protect their capital assets, still it can be classed as a business expenditure
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1968 (11) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Expenditure-tax Act, 1957 - amount spent on the foreign education of son - share of the compensation is the separate property of the son, Mallikarjuna Prasad, and he is entitled to spend from that amount the expenses towards his education, which cannot be said to have been incurred by the joint family- therefore it is excludible from the taxable expenditure of the family
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