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Showing 21 to 40 of 76 Records
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1968 (12) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it was contained originally in the validly introduced Bill and cannot, therefore, be held to be void for noncompliance with the proviso to Art. 304. This section being valid, either the Prohibition Order of 1119 or the Prohibition Order of 1950 must be held to have been validly continued in force by this Act 5 of 1950 and to have continued to remain in force thereafter under the proviso to s. 17(4) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 24 of 1946. Under either of those Orders, the transactions entered into between the appellant and the respondent were prohibited and, having been entered into against the provisions of law, no party can claim any rights in respect of the three contracts in suit. The claim for damages for breach of those contracts by the respondent against the appellant was, therefore, not maintainable. The appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the suit is dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
Whether by sending the two cheques to the Reserve Bank of India in performance of the manner of Payment prescribed by Browne, the debt was discharged, and the money must be deemed to have been paid out to the subscriber Browne?
Held that:- Only after the direction of Browne regarding transmission of the fund was complied with, the obligation of the Railway Administration could be discharged and not till then. In our view, the High Court was in error in holding that the money in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India had ceased to be provident fund money and was liable to be attached.
It was somewhat faintly suggested that the Union of India had no interest in maintaining an application for removal of attachment. But the Union of India was a trustee for the subscriber of the money. When the amount lying with the Reserve Bank as the agent of the Railway Administration was attached the Union had clearly an interest to maintain the application for removal of attachment.
The order of attachment of the amount into which the two cheques drawn by the Railway Administration were converted on encashment was contrary to the terms of S. 3 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order that it may invoke its powers. In a matter like that it is the substance of the power, not the form of it, that has to be regarded. If, on the other hand, the Board in dismissing the petitions had in mind section 34(2)(b), Erode Yarn Stores v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 724. provides the answer. There, it was clearly held by this court that an appeal contemplated by section 34(2)(b) is an effective appeal, and not one which was rejected or refused to be entertained on the ground of limitation. The learned Judges in that case held that even in such circumstances the order dismissing the appeal or declining to entertain the appeal would not be a case where the order had been made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within the meaning of section 34(2)(b). With respect, we agree with that view. These petitions are allowed and the Board is directed to dispose of the petitions under section 34(1) afresh in accordance with law. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 90 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of any counter-affidavit on behalf of the State, I am inclined to accept the affidavit filed on behalf of the company regarding the use of those items of goods. Keeping in view the wide interpretation given by the Supreme Court in the two cases, referred to above, of the expression goods intended for use in the manufacture and processing of goods for sale in the Central Act, I am of the opinion that items Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 ought to have been also included in the certificate of registration under section 6A of the Act. 8.. For the reasons stated above, I allow this application in part and quash the order of the learned Commissioner (annexure 8) with regard to items Nos. 1 and 3 to 10 of the list as mentioned in paragraph 28 of the application and direct the sales tax authorities to include those nine items of goods in the registration certificate of the company under section 6A of the Act. There will be no order as to costs. MISRA, C.J.-I agree. Application partly allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... English notification and the Hindi notification. Shri V.B. Upadhya, on behalf of the assessees, urges that glass beads are used only for the purpose of making necklaces and other articles of ornament and for rosaries used for prayer. He contends that glass beads may fall under the head articles used for ornament or for prayer , and, therefore, may be excluded from the general meaning of glasswares . We may have been inclined to accept the contention if such a head was included in the notification. When there is no such head, we cannot take glass beads, which plainly are articles of glass, from the head glasswares to any supposed head. In the circumstances, the contention on behalf of the assessees must fail. Accordingly, we answer in the affirmative the question referred in these references. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 50 in each case. Counsel s fee is also assessed in the same figure. References answered in the affirmative.
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1968 (12) TMI 88 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the tax the liability to pay which is no longer in dispute in the appeal. The words admitted by the appellant to be due which occur in this proviso make it clear that the deposit directed by it is compulsory only in a case where in the appeal preferred under section 20, the appellant admits that some part of the tax assessed under the order of assessment made by the assessing authority is payable by him. And so, an appeal from the entire assessment excludes the element of an admitted liability. The fact that the return produced by the petitioner disclosed a turnover does not introduce any admitted liability at the stage of the appeal which is the really relevant point of time. The concept of any such admission does not fit into the fact that the entire order of assessment was under challenge in the appeal preferred by it. We set aside the order made by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and remit the appeal to it for a fresh disposal on its merits. No costs. Appeal remitted.
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1968 (12) TMI 87 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... usively liable to pay the tax. That proviso, it is clear, incorporates an enabling provision which makes the agent also liable to pay the tax. And that, that is so, is clear from the concluding part of the proviso which says that in a case where the agent has paid the tax the principal shall not again be taxed in respect of the same transaction. If the principal, as stated by the Tribunal, was not liable in a case where the business is carried on by an agent, it was unnecessary for that part of the proviso to exempt the principal from payment of the tax only if that tax had already been paid by the agent. If there was no liability on the part of the principal, that exemption was scarcely necessary. We therefore allow this revision petition and set aside the order made by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In consequence the order of assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer and the order made by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal stand restored. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 86 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly clear that no question of discrimination direct or indirect can arise in the case under consideration. In exercise of their right to pick and choose and having regard to the fact that palm jaggery trade required encouragement and special treatment, executive exemption was granted by the State Government under section 17 of the Act. The impugned G.O. is reflective of such a purpose. The contention of the petitioners that they have been discriminated against is without any basis whatsoever. The impugned G.O. therefore does not suffer from the imposition of any unreasonable restriction. It is not fallible because the President has not approved of such an interdiction and above all there is no resultant discrimination in the treatment of the two trades in question by reason of the Government Order. All the contentions of the petitioners fail and the writ petitions are therefore dismissed with costs, one set. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in W.P. No. 369 of 1968. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , however, urged by the learned Government Advocate that on the facts and circumstances of this case there could be no dispute whatsoever that some of the goods purchased by the dealer did not fall within the class or classes of goods entered in its certificate of registration and, therefore, the dealer in furnishing V Form in respect of those goods must be held to have knowingly and falsely represented when purchasing the goods that goods of that class were covered by its certificate of registration and the requirement of mens rea was satisfied. All that we need say on this point is that on the frame of the question referred to us we are only required to answer whether mens rea is an element of the offence defined in section 10(b) and we cannot further examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the case mens rea was present or absent. 5.. For the reasons indicated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. Reference answered in the negative.
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1968 (12) TMI 84 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he declaration of law made by this Court and to rely upon it when contending that the Sales Tax Officer was not competent to make the appropriation. It is only now after the Sales Tax Officer refused to accept that plea that the petitioner needed to approach this Court for an order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot say that the attitude adopted by the Sales Tax Officer was justified from any point of view. It is unnecessary, however, to pursue the matter further in view of the statement of Sri R.M. Sahai, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, that the State Government has issued instructions to all Sales Tax Officers within the State not to make any appropriation under section 8-A(4). The petition is allowed. The order appropriating the sum of Rs. 7,505.25 under section 8-A(4) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the notice of demand requiring the petitioner to pay the amount are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sale price under section 2(29) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, which is raised in the Special Civil Application, does not survive. If these charges are properly included in the sale price as price of the goods offered or sold in the hotel, then there is no question of the price being charged for something being done in respect of the goods. As the answer to the question raised is in the affirmative, in our opinion it is not necessary, nor it has been argued at the Bar, to determine the constitutional validity of section 2(29) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act on the ground whether the Legislature was competent to impose a tax or some charge for anything done by a dealer in respect of the goods. The result is that the references are answered in favour of the department. The assessee will pay costs in each case. The Special Civil Application No. 2642 of 1967 fails and is also dismissed with costs. Deposit not to be refunded. References answered accordingly. Application dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 82 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s that there can be a best judgment assessment under section 19(1) of the local Act. In a best judgment assessment the quantum of escaped turnover would be that which the assessing authority thinks is proved or is established. In other assessments the quantum of escaped turnover would be the one which the assessing authority finds proved whether on the admission of the assessee or on the material produced at the enquiry in which the assessee has participated. The third question is answered by saying that the imposed penalty of Rs. 2,000 is, in view of our answer to the first question, not legal. Our answer to the fourth question is that a penalty for escaped assessment under the Central Act can be imposed under section 19(1) of the local Act. 16.. As the assessee has substantially succeeded in the present reference, we direct that the Commissioner of Sales Tax shall pay costs of the reference to the assessee. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (12) TMI 81 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r order. We have the power to suitably amend the order made by the Tribunal, and since the Commercial Tax Officer himself did not record findings as to the existence of the ingredients which constitute an offence under section 10(d), any further expenditure of time by the Deputy Commissioner over the matter, would be quite unjustified. So, we set aside the order of remand made by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and we also set aside the order of the Commercial Tax Officer by which a penalty was imposed in respect of the offence under section 10(d) and the order of the Deputy Commissioner by which he confirmed the imposition of that penalty by the Commercial Tax Officer. The order of the Deputy Commissioner by which he set aside the order of the Commercial Tax Officer imposing a penalty under section 10(b) remains undisturbed. In consequence the penalties imposed by the Commercial Tax Officer in respect of both the offences hereby stand set aside. No costs. Orders set aside.
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1968 (12) TMI 80 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ption under section 4(1) cannot be held to be a tax for the purpose of section 9. Mr. R.M. Sahai, learned counsel for the Commissioner, urged that the exemption fee is nothing but a capitalised tax and in support of this contention he relied upon a decision of this Court in Firm Ram Prasad Banwari Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, Moradabad 1959 10 S.T.C. 48 A.I.R. 1958 All. 878. It is not necessary, however, to go into that question as we are of opinion that assuming that exemption fee is a capitalised tax, the same cannot be regarded as tax levied under an assessment order contemplated by section 9. We are, therefore, of opinion that it was not necessary for the assessee to have deposited the exemption fee before his appeal could be entertained against the order of exemption. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1968 (12) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the entry is wide enough to include fents, towels and bed-sheets. From the terms in which the entry is couched it is plain that it was intended to include all possible kinds of cloth and it cannot be disputed that fents and towels are only different kinds of cloth. So far as bed-sheets are concerned the entry specifically refers to them. It does not seem necessary in the circumstances to hold up the hearing of these references. We are clear in our minds that the turnover in question before us is covered by entry No. 5 of the notification. In our opinion, fents, towels and bed-sheets are to be treated as falling under entry No. 5 of Notification No. ST-905/X dated 31st March, 1956, and are, therefore, chargeable under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We answer the question referred accordingly in each reference. The Commissioner is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 50 in each case. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (12) TMI 78 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to make the best judgment assessment under section 14(4) in a case like the present one in which the notice issued by him under sub-section (3) was issued without the authority of law. In the view that we take, the orders of assessment made by Ramasetty are liable to be quashed and we quash them reserving liberty for the concerned assessing authority to proceed to make an order of assessment in all the cases before us in accordance with law. In the view that we take, it becomes unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the correctness of the view taken by the Collector and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal about the competence of the appeals which were preferred to the Collector. We reserve liberty for the petitioner to urge before the concerned assessing authority when he proceeds to make an assessment in respect of the assessment years with which we are concerned, all the contentions which are available to him including a plea of limitation. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 77 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d Judge that the turnover in respect of sales of the two brands of beer received by the assessee from the United Breweries Ltd., Bangalore, is not liable to sales tax. The next contention of the Government Pleader was based on rule 27(5) of the General Sales Tax Rules, 1125, and rule 32(13) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963. The submission on behalf of the revenue was that the assessee did obtain the declaration forms from McDowell Co. Ltd., Shertallai, to evidence the payment of tax and therefore the exemption cannot be allowed. In view of the decision in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co., Ltd. 1964 15 S.T.C. 641., it has to be held that such rules are only directory and not mandatory. But even that apart this point was not taken by the authorities when the matter was heard by them and the learned Single Judge was therefore right in overruling the contention. The appeal is without merit. We dismiss the same but we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessment orders and the reasons stated by him there provide ample proof that his finding that the petitioner was not taxable was not the result of inadvertent error or mistake. To justify interference under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act it is not sufficient that the order is vitiated by a mistake. It must be a mistake apparent on the face of the record. In other words, it must be a mistake which must be patent on the face of the record and does not call for a detailed investigation of the facts or law or require an elaborate argument to establish it. We are not satisfied that the error which the Sales Tax Officer sought to correct here was such an error. We hold that the Sales Tax Officer acted without jurisdiction in resorting to section 22. The petition is allowed. The orders made under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act in respect of the assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58 are quashed. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in each case. Petition allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or defect is removed before the assessment is completed, the Sales Tax Officer is bound to take the Form D into account. The Form D has to be filled in by an officer of the Government. It is not within the power of the assessee to have the form filled according to the manner which he prefers. He can only take the Form D received from the Government officer and file it before the Sales Tax Officer. If the Form D suffers from an omission or defect, and the assessee comes to know of it, he can request the Government officer to remove it. To enable the assessee to do so would be to act in the interest of justice and fairplay. The Sales Tax Officer should have afforded that opportunity to the assessee. The judge (Revisions), in our opinion, acted rightly in remanding the case so that that opportunity could be afforded to the assessee. We answer the question in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1968 (12) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plaintiff, to entitle it to get an order of interim injunction, has prima facie established that the defendant did not have the necessary share qualification on August 31, 1964, to make him eligible for directorship and that the defendant, in law, had no right to function as a director?
Whether Sunil Kumar Ganguli ceased to be a director on August 31, 1964, because it is the claim of the defendant that it was in the place of Sunil Kumar Ganguli that he was elected as a director?
Held that:- When once from the records produced by the company it is evident prima facie at this stage that the defendant is not shown as a shareholder and that he has not been appointed a director, as claimed by him, and that Sunil Kumar Ganguli did not cease to be a director from August 31, 1964, in our opinion, the appellate court was perfectly justified in granting the injunction restraining the defendant from functioning as a director. The appellate court was also perfectly justified in drawing an adverse inference against the defendant about his having become a shareholder, having due regard to the fact that he had instituted a suit for rectification of the share register only as late as November 21, 1966, though he claimed to have obtained a transfer of shares as early as October 30, 1963. His plea that he delivered the transfer deed to Kishorilal Goenka and that the latter assured him that the necessary changes had been effected in the registers of the company, are all matters to be investigated in the trial of the suit.
We are in entire agreement with the conclusions arrived at, at this stage, by the appellate Bench as we are satisfied that a correct approach has been made by it for considering the matters arising at the interlocutory stage of the proceedings. The result is Civil Appeal fails, and is dismissed.
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