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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 76 Records
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1968 (12) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Enforcement of orders of courts ... ... ... ... ..... ording in the Act as to the effect of the order in that case was entirely different and not as in the present case. Under the circumstances, that authority will not have any relevance to the point at issue, liven then the question under the new Act of 1959 may have to be decided. This order will govern the cross-objections filed by the appellants. Mr. Government Pleader has asked for costs of this hearing. As, however, the position of law was not very clear under the Act of 1959, we do not think it is desirable to award costs in these matters. By our order dated November 1, 1968, we had given fifteen days time to both the appellants and the respondent to pay the court-fees on the appeal memo and cross-objections. More than one month has passed till now. Even though the question had to be argued the parties ought to have been ready for payment of the court-fees. We, therefore, think that it is reasonable to grant only ten days for payment of the court-fees to both the parties.
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1968 (12) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company – Membership of ... ... ... ... ..... l or equitable nature. It is not that the appellants have no right whatsoever. I have already mentioned that in a compulsory winding up, it is the duty of the liquidator to do all things necessary for winding up the affairs of the company and distribute its assets, and this is subject to the control of the court. Under section 457(3), any contributory may apply to the court to direct the liquidator to take any steps which will be beneficial to the winding up. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the appellants have no right to make an application under Order 21, rule 90, to set aside the sale of the Lillooah property , because it cannot be said that their interests are affected by the sale . The learned judge in the court below was right in holding that the appellants had no locus standi. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed, but no order is made as to costs. Certified for two counsel as against their own clients. Arun K. Mukherjea, J. mdash I agree.
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1968 (12) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Was there a fiduciary relationship between the appellant and the old company, and if so, did the appellant-company, by availing themselves of this fiduciary character, gain a pecuniary advantage of ₹ 1,50,000 ?
Is the suit barred by limitation ? and
Are the plaintiffs as shareholders of the old company entitled to maintain the suit ?
Held that:- We agree with the High Court that the appellant stood in a fiduciary relationship towards the old company and was bound to protect its interests. The onus is upon the appellant-company to establish affirmatively that the transaction was righteous and that it did not gain any pecuniary advantage by availing itself of its fiduciary character. We are inclined to think that the appellant-company has discharged this difficult burden of proof. The transaction was just and fair and that the appellant did not gain any pecuniary advantage by availing themselves of their fiduciary character or under circumstances in which their interests were in conflict with those of the old company. In saying so we must not be understood to say that we encourage transactions of this type. Having regard to their fiduciary character the appellant-company might well have avoided entering into the transaction.
The High Court passed a decree for money and net for recovery of immovable properties. A suit for such a relief would be governed by article 120. Even if the suit is treated as one for recovery of possession of the properties, it would be governed by article 120 and not by article 144. The old company could not ask for recovery of the properties until they obtained a reconveyance from the new company. The cause of action for this relief arose in 1939 when the properties were conveyed to the new company. A suit for this relief was barred under article 120 on the expiry of six years. After the expiry of this period the old company could not file a suit for recovery of possession. It follows that the suit is barred by limitation.
The law in our country is very different. Here the winding-up precedes the dissolution. There is no statutory provision vesting the properties of a disnlved company in a trustee or having the effect of abrogating the law of escheat. The shareholders or creditors of a dissolved company cannot be regarded as its heirs and successors. On dissolution of a company, its properties, if any, vest Li the Government. It follows that the plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain this suit.
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1968 (12) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... idered by Madon J. and rejected. In March, 1968, also Mrs. Bhide had mooted the scheme. From time to time, adjournments were taken for considering the value of the scheme and later in August, 1968, it was given up and withdrawn. These appellant is a teacher doing tuitions in foreign languages and, as he says, has apparently no practical experience of business and it is difficult to imagine how he came to moot the scheme. He does not say that at his back there are a substantial number of creditors who agree with him. On the other hand, at least 350 creditors, whose claim amount to Rs. 3,50,000, were present at the meeting before the liquidator and expressed the opinion that, in the circumstances obtaining, the price offered was fair enough. Moreover, the Industrial Finance Corporation, whose stakes are the largest, does not agree to the proposal. Having regard to all these facts no case for stay of sale is made out. The notice of motion, therefore, stands dismissed with costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order made by the Central Government in No. 2(4)-CL.I/63, Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Company Law Administration, on April 11, 1963, is liable to be struck down as not having been made in accordance with law?
Held that:- We do not think that any reasonable person, much less any expert body like the Government, on the material before it, could have jumped to the conclusion that there was any fraud involved in the sale of the shares in question. If the Government had any suspicion about that transaction it should have probed into the matter further before directing any investigation. We are convinced that the precipitate action taken by the Government was not called for nor could be justified on the basis of the material before it. The opinion formed by the Government was a wholly irrational opinion. The fact that one of the leading directors of the appellant-company was a suspect in the eye of the Government because of his antecedents, assuming without deciding, that the allegations against him are true, was not a relevant circumstance. That circumstance should not have been allowed to cloud the opinion of the Government. The Government is charged with the responsibility to form a bona fide opinion on the basis of relevant material. The opinion formed in this case cannot be held to have been formed in accordance with law.
In the result we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order.
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1968 (12) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Seized goods ... ... ... ... ..... for the appellant that in any event the appellant was entitled to a notice before there was an extension. Arguments were not advanced but Counsel for the appellant only desired that contention should be noticed in the judgment. It is for that reason that this contention is noticed. 8.In view of the decision of the Supreme Court the present appeal is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court according to contentions of Counsel for both parties. The appeal is therefore allowed. The judgment of the trial court is set aside. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. 9.A writ of Mandamus will go commanding the respondents to forbear from giving any effect to the order No. 1/C. E. of 1966 dated 1 August 1966 fully mentioned in the petition. There will also be an order asking the respondents to return the seized goods as fully mentioned in the petition to the appellant. The respondents are directed to comply with the directions for return of the seized goods by 31 January 1969.
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1968 (12) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Packing is not a process of manufacture - Chinaware, procelainware, glass and glassware - Packing whether amounts to manufacture - Order - Merger
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1968 (12) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Firm - registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 ... ... ... ... ..... t any rate, for the period subsequent to his execution of this document, his position as a full-fledged partner of the firm did not suffer from any defect whatsoever. For the year of account, therefore, there was a validly constituted firm in operation and the documents presented before the Income-tax Officer could be regarded as an instrument under which the firm was validly constituted. In our opinion, therefore, although the basis on which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal had decided in favour of the assessee no longer survived, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Incomc-tax v. Dwarkadas Khetan and Co., for the reasons, which we have already discussed, their decision that the firm was entitled to registration was correct. In the result, therefore, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative
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1968 (12) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Bad debts - claim for deduction - held that an income which suffers tax in an earlier year, if it is lost to the assessee in a subsequent year cannot be claimed as a deduction in the subsequent year
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1968 (12) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Ginning and pressing factories which remain idle for part of year - agreement for pooling between cotton ginning and pressing factories, the members were bound to keep their machinery in good working condition for use at any moment - term " used " in section 10(2)(vii) must be interpreted in the wide sense, it covers passive as well as active user
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1968 (12) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Litigation Expenses - allowability ... ... ... ... ..... . It will thus be seen that the expenditure incurred in that case was to safeguard the business from coercive governmental action and saving it from being taxed. The expenditure incurred was for the purpose of the running of the business. In the case before us, however, the litigation undertaken by the assessee was not for challenging the governmental action in cancelling the licence, nor for challenging the Prohibition Act, which had the effect of causing a stoppage of its business, but for loss or damage on the basis of its business already having been stopped. In our opinion, therefore, this submission of Mr. Dwarkadas cannot be sustained. In the result, therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal that the litigation expenditure could be allowed as an admissible revenue expenditure is not correct and the question, therefore, will have to be answered in the negative. We order accordingly. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1968 (12) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Scope of a "finding" - applicability of the second proviso to section 34(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1968 (12) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Transfer of shares of deceased partner to HUF - whether the inference of the Tribunal, that the shares in question constituted the stock-in-trade and that the profit on sale is a trading profit, is legal
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1968 (12) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Initiation of proceedings under sction 34(1)(b) of the IT Act - limitation for reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das) and that a finding or direction by an appellate authority in an order relating to the assessment of one year does not warrant avoidance of the bar of limitation under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, against the initiation of proceedings for assessment for another year. Since the provision of section 34(3) is not capable of being availed of in the present case for saving the bar of limitation and since, but for the said provision, the proceedings initiated under section 34(1)(b) in the present case were clearly beyond the time-limit prescribed therefor, under section 34(1), our answer to the question, which is in the following terms, must be in the negative Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, initiation of proceedings under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, for the year 1951-52, was in accordance with law. We answer accordingly. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee.
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1968 (12) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Contribution from Govt. and outside parties for capital expenditure - contention of the appellant-company that this amount should be taken as a reserve for the purpose of capital computation for business profits tax purposes - held that amounts entered in the books of the assessee as ``contribution from outside parties for capital expenditure`` must be treated as reserve
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1968 (12) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Financing of another`s business by giving loans and bank guarantee to protect assessee`s business - loss claimed by the assessee on the loan transaction - allowability
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1968 (12) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
M and K who were members of HUF entered into a partnership after partition of family - Whether finding of `genuineness` of partnership involves that partnership is valid in law - Held, no
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1968 (12) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Agricultural income - Assessment of income - Whether the partition decree could be ignored on the ground that the coparceners and their wives still lived and ate jointly and did their business of cultivation jointly - Held, no
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1968 (12) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income escaping assessment - reason to believe - issuance of notice ... ... ... ... ..... n the present case includes a challenge to the existence of the belief, Mr. Mitter contends that a belief may exist even in the absence of any reason for such belief. The belief in such a case may be entirely fanciful or a mere pretence to use the language used by the Supreme Court in one of the cases mentioned above. My attention was drawn in this connection to a decision in the case of Income-tax Officer v. S. Veeriah Reddiar, where such a distinction seems to have been drawn. In view of my decision on the other question, I do not think it is necessary for me to decide this point in the present case. I must, however, confess to some difficulty in appreciating how there can be a belief when there are no reasons as the foundation thereof. This nice question of epistemology may, however, be left for consideration in a future case. For the reasons given above, this application must fail. The rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessee is a limited liability company and was incorporated in the erstwhile State of Rampur. It carries on the business of manufacturing sugar - whether the assessee-company was not entitled to set off its share of loss in the agricultural company in the respective years against its income - Held, yes
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