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Showing 1 to 20 of 34 Records
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1968 (6) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arise at all on the facts of this case. Sections 11 and 12 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which deal with the definition of inland instrument and foreign instrument are purely for the purpose of that Act and it cannot have any relevance for deciding the question whether, when a suit is instituted in India on a promissory note executed and endorsed in Singapore outside India the Singapore Money-lenders Act would apply or not. It appears to me, therefore, that the Courts below have unnecessarily gone into the question whether the instruments in question in this case are inland instruments or foreign instruments. But whether, because of the Singapore Money-lenders Act, the suits can be maintained or not is a different point which has got to be decided upon different considerations. That question may be gone into by the trial Court without reference to what the lower appellate Court has decided in this case. 5. With these observations, the two appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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1968 (6) TMI 65 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mplaint within 30 days 'from this date.' (Underlining here in single quotation marks-Ed) is mine). It is thus clear that the thirty days time allowed by the Court was from the date of the proclamation and not from the date of its publication as envisaged by Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was obligatory that an absconding person should be given thirty days time from the date of publication of the proclamation for his appearance before the Court. Therefore the error committed by the Magistrate cannot be construed to be a mere irregularity which can be cured under Section 587 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. In the result the proclamation ordered is quashed, and these revision petitions are allowed. 6. Mr. Hegde the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the property of the petitioners have been attached. If that is so, the petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits resulting from this order quashing the proclamation.
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1968 (6) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cuments of title during movement of goods, the only condition required by the proviso to section 6 (2) was that the assessee should produce certificate in Form E-I obtained from the registered dealer from whom the goods were purchased. There was no indication either in section 6(2) or the proviso thereto that C Forms as such should be obtained and produced. It was, therefore, held that even if the rule had provided that the exemption under section 6(2) would be given only if a certificate in Form C was produced, the rule would be ultra vires. All that the revenue could require the dealer to do was to prove that the second sales were to registered dealers and the proof might take any form, not necessarily declarations in Form C. We are in agreement with the said view. In the result, our answer to the reference is in the affirmative. The reference is accordingly disposed of. The State shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1968 (6) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt order after he had knowledge of the stay order, we think it will be sufficient if we sound a note of warning that if the stratagem of ante-dating the orders after the order of stay or injunction was received, is adopted by over-zealous authorities or even of serving the order when all proceedings are stayed, it would expose them to contempt proceedings and involve them in serious consequences. In the result, the Writ Petition No. 1989 of 1965 is allowed and the order of the Commercial Tax Officer is quashed, with a direction that the petitioner be given an opportunity to raise the several pleas raised before us and to adduce material or evidence in support of its several contentions, and when raised, the same be determined in accordance with the principles set out in this judgment. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. W.P. No. 1975 of 1966 is dismissed without costs. C.M.P. Nos. 11391 and 11392 of 1967 Ordered. Ordered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 62 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Act. Here again, there was an amendment of the Sales Tax Act by which the higher rate was retrospectively substituted. The High Court of Madras reached the conclusion that since under the modified order of assessment made by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the tax was payable only at the lower rate, the rectification of that order of assessment was a condition precedent to the demand for the payment of the difference which had by then been refunded to the assessee. But, in the case before us, unlike the assessments in the two cases on which Mr. Katageri depended, the order of assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer required no rectification, and, as it stood, when the impugned demand was made it made the petitioner liable to pay the tax which was subsequently refunded to him. It would, therefore, be futile to suggest that there was any necessity for the rectification of that order of assessment. So, we dismiss this revision petition. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1968 (6) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sequent period, there is nothing in that decision or the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 763 of 1967Since reported as State of Madras v. N.K. Nataraja Mudaliar 1968 22 S.T.C. 376., which would entitle the assessees to the reliefs they seek. The decision of the Supreme Court is to the effect that by reason of section 9(3) of the Central Act, the entire machinery provided in the State Act, including the Rules, in relation to single point taxation, will apply to Central purposes as well. That means, if the single points of charge do not synchronize, i.e., the one contemplated by the Central Act and the other provided in the State Act are not identical, no charge will be attracted and that this will be the case even after the amendment by Act 31 of 1958. The result is, these writ petitions are allowed but only in respect of the assessment year 1958-59. No costs. C.M.Ps. Nos. 16364, 16366 and 16368 of 1967 and 1175 of 1968 ordered. Writ petitions partly allowed.
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1968 (6) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erned and especially of the relevant provisions regarding the authorization, the turnover of sales under section 24 has to be of the goods exported, whether in the course of export out of the territory of India or otherwise. The purpose behind authorization is not to create the tax liability on the excluded sales but rather one to give exemption, and for that limited purpose even if a wider and extended meaning is given by the Legislature, we cannot hold that there is anything repugnant in the context, which would justify our departure from the statutory definition. In the result we must hold that the Tribunal was right in its view that the turnover of sales of the opponent must include the sale of the goods in question, which were exported by it from the State. We, therefore, answer the aforesaid reframed question in the affirmative and this reference is accordingly disposed of. The State shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 59 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... set in. We cannot agree with this contention of the learned AdvocateGeneral for the simple reason that the essential character of this institution is one of maintaining animals to save the lives of these voiceless animals and it does not carry on any business activity with any profitmotive and merely because incidental sales are done of the animal products, it could not be considered as carrying on business of selling these goods. In the result the answer to the questions referred to us are as under As regards question (1) our answer to the first part is in the negative, i.e., the opponent-institution is not a dealer. The second part of the first question, therefore, does not arise for our consideration. As regards the second question our answer is in the negative, i.e., that such sales are not liable to tax under either of the two Acts. We dispose of this reference accordingly. The State shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 58 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... narily comprehended. But, in whatever sense these words are understood, what is clear is that the words pure silk textiles mean textiles for the manufacture of which only pure silk yarn is used. But, if the material used consists of both pure silk yarn and artificial silk yarn, the assertion that that saree is a pure silk saree cannot be true or accepted. The expression pure silk cannot be so understood whether the meaning to be given to it is the popular meaning, or the meaning given to it in trade. A merchant does not in his trading operations describe a saree, which admittedly contains pure and artificial silk yarn, a pure silk saree. Even if he does, the purchaser who wants a pure silk saree does not buy it. These appeals succeed. We, therefore, set aside the orders made by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, and restore the orders made by the Deputy Commissioner. The appellant will be entitled to costs in these appeals. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 one set. Appeals allowed.
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1968 (6) TMI 57 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om the list of toilet articles in entry 21A. If we were to accept the argument of the learned Advocate-General that shaving-brushes are the items which would be useful like the shaving-soap, razor and razor-blades for dressing or grooming a man, it would be clear that even razor and razor-blades would fall in toilet articles. In that event, the Legislature ought to have excluded those articles as it had excluded the other items, on which there is a lower incidence of duty, and that itself makes it clear that the Legislature never intended to give such a wide meaning to the expression as is contended for by the learned AdvocateGeneral. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in giving the expression a restricted meaning and in holding that a shaving-brush would not fall in toilet articles . Our answer to the question, therefore, is in the negative. The reference is answered accordingly. The State shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommissioner. It is clear that the Assistant Commissioner has not directed the Sales Tax Officer to adopt the ratio proportion mentioned for arriving at the appropriate figure for deduction purposes under section 11(1)(a) and rule 6(1) and he has merely referred to this method in passing as an equitable method. No directions in fact having been given by the Assistant Commissioner to the Sales Tax Officer, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion in the course of this judgment as to whether the Assistant Commissioner was justified in adopting the ratio proportion method for arriving at the correct figure of the turnover. In our opinion, therefore, question No. (4) does not arise for consideration. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Q. No. Answer. (1) In the affirmative. (2) In the negative. (3) In the affirmative. (4) Does not arise. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the State of Gujarat. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 55 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s to the purchasers at the auctions, then such refunds would also be allowed as deduction in the year in which they are made. We cannot agree with the Tribunal that whether the amount or any part of it is ultimately payable to the State or to be refunded to the purchasers, it still retains its character as sales tax and nothing else. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Punjab Distilling Industries case 1959 35 I.T.R. 519., these amounts were an integral part of the commercial transaction of sales by auction carried on by the assessee and when they were received they were the moneys of the assessee and remained thereafter the moneys of the assessee as its trading receipts. The Income-tax Officer was justified in bringing to tax the amount of Rs. 32,986 and the answer to the question referred to this court must be in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee is to pay the costs of this reference. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1968 (6) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a job work contract and the construction as per the specified design and it did not involve any element of sale of a prepared jali or of raw materials. It was clearly one and indivisible works contract in which both the tests as evolved by their Lordships in the Gannon Dunkerley s case 1958 9 S.T.C. 353. were fulfilled, viz., that there was no agreement to sell any movable cement jali for a price and that the property therein did not pass as movables, pursuant to any such agreement. Such a contract for a job-work as per the approved design would not amount to any composite contract of sale, but would clearly be one indivisible works contract. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in treating the transaction as such. In the result, our answer is that it is an indivisible works contract and not a composite contract involving sale of cement jali for an estimated value thereof. The State shall pay the costs of this reference to the opponent-assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 53 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... position No. 4. It states When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. 6.. I hold that the writ petition is maintainable. The question whether it is filed within three years from the date when the mistake became known to the petitioner is not of any importance in this case, as admittedly it is filed within 3 years from the date of decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Lakshminarasimhiah(1). 7.. I quash exhibits P-1 to P-5 and direct the respondents to refund to the petitioner the amount already paid by him under these orders and restrain the collection of any further amount under the above orders by the respondents. The writ petition is allowed but without any order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (6) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the levy under the State Act, so that if under a State Act, the levy has to be made in a particular manner, that will also have to be made in the same manner for the purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act. In this case, it is averred that the petitioner is an exporter, having purchased watery coconuts from registered dealers. If this statement is true and we are not in a position to determine it as there is no material placed before us except a mere averment, then he will not be liable to tax, because he is not the first seller. This is a matter which has got to be decided by the assessing authority. The assessing authority will, therefore, make the final assessment in the light of the above observations. The writ petition is disposed of with the above observations as also a direction that the final assessment will be made within a month from the date of receipt of this order, for which period the taxing authority will refrain from collecting the tax. Ordered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... page 3445, which states that it is used for agricultural implements, as building material or timber for beams, door and window frames as it is not corroded by ants or moth and as the wood also does not get spoilt in water. It is also used as firewood. Thus, the Tribunal was right in mentioning all these uses of babul wood. That itself makes it clear that babul wood, which was standing timber when the tree was standing on land and which became fallen timber and was purchased as such, continued to retain its essential character of timber . Thus, it cannot fall under any residuary article as it falls under specific entry 32 of Schedule C. In that view of the matter, our answer in the present reference so far as question No. (1) is concerned is in the negative while so far as question No. (2) is concerned it is in the affirmative. This reference is accordingly disposed of. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference to the State of Gujarat. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s done by the assessees as tyres for bullock-carts, and the sale was also effected by the assessees as tyres for bullock-carts and under these circumstances, it is clear that these particular tyres referred to in the bill would necessarily be spare parts of bullock-carts. It is true that it is not open to any party to convert the goods of one category into goods of another category by giving wrong description to the goods but this is not a case of wrong description but this is a case of legitimate description by the assessees, who were dealers in this particular commodity, and who stocked the goods as such and sold them as such and hence it is clear that in this particular case, the old tyres fell within the description of spare parts of bullock-carts and would be covered by entry 6 of Schedule A to the Act. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative. The State of Gujarat will pay the costs of this reference to the assessees. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1968 (6) TMI 49 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... manufacture given in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, in relation to tobacco, such a dental creamy snuff which completely retains its essential character as snuff and which has only certain flavouring agents, preservative and water added, to change its physical condition in order to make it more acceptable to the customers when intended to use as snuff for application to the gums, there is no reason to hold that the snuff has lost its essential character and a totally different article has been produced which cannot claim exemption. In view of this settled legal position we are of the view that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the snuff sold by the assessee was not tobacco. In the result our answer to the first question must be in the affirmative and, therefore, question No. (2) would not arise for our consideration. The reference is, therefore, answered accordingly. The State shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (6) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... t is more than doubtful whether he is competent to register the charge under section 109. However, as it is not necessary to decide that question for the purpose of this appeal, I do not propose to decide it but I consider it only proper to express the gravest doubt which I entertain on the subject. It may not be out of place to mention that the learned trial judge has also expressed the same doubt in his judgment, where he says I can visualise that there could be initial difficulties in effecting registration but there is no evidence that the company requested the Registrar to register the mortgage. On the question whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the relevant exemption order, I agree that there is total lack of evidence on this question. It is not, therefore, possible for the court to hold that the appellant-company is entitled to exemption. In the view I have taken, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed and I concur in the order my Lord has made.
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1968 (6) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company – Incorporation of. Government company ... ... ... ... ..... ons, and the judgment is an elaboration of this proposition. If that be so, the question is no longer substantial. The other ground on which this case has been discharged is that the admitted case of the petitioner is that his service is founded on the written contract which is still subsisting and that, accordingly, neither article 311(2) nor article 226 was applicable to enforce the contract of service and that whatever might be the grievances of the petitioner, he must seek his relief under the general law and such remedy has been preserved by the judgment. On this alternative ground, therefore, which does not involve a constitutional question, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. In these circumstances, though the question might be one of public importance with which contention I have agreed in the judgment itself, it cannot be said to come under the terms of article 132 of the Constitution. The certificate prayed for cannot, therefore, be granted and is refused.
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