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Showing 1 to 20 of 78 Records
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1969 (12) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therein in clear terms that the property belonged to Sri Srinivasachariar, the father of the assessee, and that it is he who had put up the foundations of the houses therein. The document further stipulates, that if the assessee or his brother desires to alienate the property given to them, they should give preference to the other brother for purchasing the same at the prevailing market price. Reading the document as a whole, there is hardly any doubt that the property dealt with under that document was the individual property of Srinivasachariar. That being so, the property got under that document by the assessee became his individual property. It is not the case of the assessee that he had surrendered that property to the family. 5. In our opinion the High Court was fully justified in holding that the income obtained from that property is the individual income of the assessee. 6. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed-no order as to costs in this appeal.
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1969 (12) TMI 119 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cording to his own understanding. He is not bound to obey any departmental instructions issued by his superior officers while discharging his quasi-judicial functions as assessing authority under the Act. If the Commissioner in the past expressed any opinion about the scope of the expression 'entertainment' as defined in the Act in his administrative capacity, that opinion cannot bind the statutory authority viz., the Commercial Taxes Officer who has got to perform his duties under the Act as a quasi-judicial authority. The letter of the Commissioner relied upon by the petitioner to divest the Commercial Taxes Officer of his authority under the law cannot help him, I do not think that the petitioner can take any advantage out of the letter issued by the Commissioner in his administrative capacity to explain the term 'entertainment' as used in the Act. 28. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition fails and it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1969 (12) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r on the basis of which the Land Claims Officer had cancelled the original allotment. 8. It is clear that the Chief Settlement Commissioner without having the original Khasra-Girdawari before him and without considering the relevant evidence came to the conclusion that the entries produced before the Land Claims Officer in support of their application for cancellation of the allotment were not genuine . There is in the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner no reference to any evidence which may support this conclusion. The order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner being quasi-judicial in character and his satisfaction not being decisive of the matter, the High Court, in our view, was justified in holding that the conclusion of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, that the respondents 1 to 3 were guilty of fraud, was based on no evidence and the Court was competent to set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. 9. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (12) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... detained under the Prevention Detention Act. This would be a total repudiation of the rule of law and an affront to our Constitution. The legal position relating to the point in issue was again recently considered by this Court in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 1970 CriLJ 1136. Therein it was observed that 'public order' is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of "public order" is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of "law and order". 9. We are of the opinion that the grounds stated in support of the detention cannot amount to a disturbance of the maintenance of 'public order'.
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1969 (12) TMI 116 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g Act of 1969. He submits that since the very question whether such amendment of the law would make the transactions in question exigible to tax is one which is capable of giving rise to considerable argument, the mistake sought to be rectified ceases to be a "mistake apparent on the record", thus making it unable to correction under rule 38 of the State Rules. We are unable to accept this argument. It is true that the impugned notice clearly indicates that it is issued pursuant to the amendments made in the law aforementioned. But the fact that elaborate arguments could be constructed as to the interpretation to be placed on a statutory provision, which in one sense renders an earlier rectification of a mistake, would not, in our judgment, make such a mistake one that is not apparent on the record. Hence we reject this contention also. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1969 (12) TMI 115 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the account of the Managing Director's deceased father. That circumstance lends support to the contention of the Managing Director that he has made entries in the name of the petitioner benami for his benefit with his own funds. It is unnecessary to go further into this question as this is not the proceeding in which this question of benami can be gone into. There is bona fide dispute about the status of the petitioner both as a creditor and share-holder. Though this petition has been ostensibly presented for the purpose of winding up the company, the real object seems to be to bring pressure upon the Managing Director by the petitioner for settlement of her private claims arising out of family quarrels. It would be, in my opinion, proper exercise of the discretion of the court to refuse to accede to the request of the petitioner, as this application, seems to be an abuse of the process of court. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. 9. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (12) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d by the Allahabad High Court in Kundan Lal's case, (supra) it is expected that the court would ordinarily give an opportunity to the applicant to comply with Clause (b) of the proviso and could reject the application if the same were still not complied with. That should be particularly so in an application made before Clause (b) was incorporated into the proviso. As seen earlier before the executing court all the parties had proceeded on the basis that the clause in question did not apply to the present proceedings. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion, that in the interest of justice the High Court should have remanded the case to the executing court leaving it to that court to exercise its discretion under Clause (b). 6. For the reasons mentioned above we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and. remit the case to the executing court for dealing with the same in accordance with law. The costs of this appeal shall be costs in the cause.
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1969 (12) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ere treated as separate acts which affected individuals but did not affect the community at large. 5. In the present case all acts of molestation were directed against the family of Phanindra C. Das and were not directed against women in general from the locality. Assaults also were on individuals. The conduct may be reprehensible but it does not add up to the situation where it may be said that the community at large was being disturbed or in other words there was a breach of public order or likelihood of a breach of public order. The case falls within the dictum of Justice Ramaswami and the distinction made in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case 6. The result therefore is that however reprehensible the conduct of Arun Ghosh may be, it cannot be said to amount to an apprehension of breach of public order for which alone his detention could be ordered. He is entitled to be released and we order accordingly. He will be released forthwith unless required in some other connection.
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1969 (12) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. If, however, the notification under Section 4 was vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land had title thereto may challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sums of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after the issue of the notification under Section 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands. 18. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. The proceeding is remanded to the High Court with the direction that the petition be readmitted to its original Number and that in be heard and disposed of according to law after considering the affidavits in reply and the other evidence produced by the parties. Costs of the appeal will be the costs in the petition.
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1969 (12) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iff's suit is barred by Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure. In view of our above.conclusion, we have not thought it ,necessary to go into the controversy whether Order 2, rule 2, -Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to a suit under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel 'for the appellant that we should allow to the appellant mesne profits at least from the date of the suit. No claim for mesne profits was made in the plaint. Therefore we cannot go into that ,question in this appeal. For the mesne profits, if any, due to the plaintiff, he must take separate steps according to law. In the result this appeal is allowed and the trial court's decree -is modified by including therein the lands mentioned in Schedule I -of the plaint. In other respects the decree of the trial court is sustained. The appellant will be entitled to his costs both in this 'Court as well as in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (12) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vernment of India Act, 1935. 9. The expression 'conditions of service' means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it in matters like pension etc. 10. But for the incorporation of Article 311 in the Constitution even in respect of matters provided therein, rules could have been framed under Article 309. The provisions in Article 311 confer additional rights on the civil servants. Hence we are unable to agree with the High Court that the guarantee given under Article 311(1) includes within itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in that Article. 11. In the result this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1969 (12) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
Holder of a civil post under the Union - Held that:- The corporation which is Hindustan Steel Limited in this case is not a department of the Government nor are the servants of it holding posts under the State. It has its independent existence and by law relating to Corporations it is distinct even from its members. In these circumstances, the appellant, who was an employee of Hindustan Steel Limited, does not answer the description of a holder of " a civil post under the Union' as stated in the article. The appellant was not entitled to the protection of Art. 311. The High,, Court was therefore right in not affording him the protection. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1969 (12) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the relief to respondent I should have been reinstatement or compensation?
Held that:- There is no difficulty in holding that the order of reinstatement passed by the Tribunal was liable to be quashed and that the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with it merely on the ground that it could not do so as it was a case where the Tribunal had exercised its discretion.
Allow the appeal, quash the order of the Tribunal and the High Court and instead direct the appellant company to pay to the 1st respondent ₹ 3840 as and by way of compensation.
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1969 (12) TMI 107 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in one State or the other. The same view has been expressed by a Full Bench of this court in National Carbon Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.(1), where this court held that in order that a sale should be a sale during the course of export, all that was necessary to show was that the sale occasioned the export and the further consideration as to whether the sale was completed or where the property in the goods passed from the seller to the buyer was wholly immaterial. That being the legal position we have no hesitation in saying that under the circumstances of this case, the sales in question were inter-State sales and were liable to Central sales tax. We, therefore, answer question No. (3) in the affirmative. As all the questions have been answered against the assessee, the Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (12) TMI 106 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... courts as well. No such difficulty, however, arises in the instant case, because the stand and the conduct of the assessee consistently reflects upon the fact that the goods in question were treated and considered as declared goods . In such a view of the things, it is not open to the assessee, just for the purpose of gaining a concessional rate, to metamorphose the goods into goods other than declared goods and claim entitlement as to concession under section 8(3)(b) of the Act. Once it is irrefutable that the goods are declared goods , as it is the case of the assessee himself, then section 8(3)(a) of the original enactment will operate and in the instant case the assessee would not be entitled to the concessional rate. This is a case where goods were purchased not for purposes of resale but for purposes of being used by the assessee in the manufacture of goods for sale. The Tribunal, therefore, came to the correct conclusion. The tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (12) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stinguishable. In support of the submission that clause (a) of section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act is attracted, the assessee has referred to Tata Iron and Steel Co. 1960 11 S.T.C. 655 (S.C.). and to State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. State of Mysore 1963 14 S.T.C. 188 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 548. Both these cases, however, were decided on the basis that the contract between the parties expressly contemplated a movement of the goods from one State to another. We are of opinion that the sales in question cannot be described as inter-State sales as defined in section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The property in the goods must be taken to have passed at Kanpur, and that is clear from the terms of the contract between the parties. The sales are intra-State sales. We answer the question referred accordingly. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (12) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the writ of prohibition asked for cannot be issued. Even otherwise this court in Annamalai Chettiar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1965 16 S.T.C. 687. has held that such materials discovered in the course of inspection or raid can be relied on for the purpose of further assessments and the only necessary prerequisite is that a fair opportunity should be given to the assessee to inspect, take notes or copies of such account books or material discovered and retained by the revenue. In the light of the above decisions, which have settled the propositions of law, these writ petitions have to be dismissed. It is however made clear that the revenue in each of these petitions will give sufficient and adequate opportunity to the petitioner-assessee to inspect the accounts and records seized from him and enable him to take copies of the said accounts if necessary and if he so desires. With these observations, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (12) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it an irrational conclusion on the relevant facts noticed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has decided that the intention of the assessee was to indulge in a transaction which is in the nature of a sale. Accepting, therefore, the finding of fact by the Tribunal below that the transactions related to sales of new unused articles to the sister concerns of the petitioner and others, we have no hesitation in holding that the order of the Tribunal and the findings rendered therein are correct. It is not as if the surplusage of the goods occurred by inevitable accident or in the usual course. It appears to us that such surplus capital goods were acquired with a definite purpose of supplying the same to its sister concerns, and such an intention being inhered in the conduct of the petitioner, the turnover brought to tax has been rightly brought to tax as assessable turnover. This tax revision case therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (12) TMI 102 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dated 23rd June, 1954. There is nothing inconsistent or unreasonable in continuing G.O. Ms. No. 376 dated 23rd June, 1954, along with G.O. Ms. No. 1091 dated 10th June, 1957. If the Government s intention was not to exempt kalamkari goods, nothing would have prevented them from expressly or by necessary implication getting rid of G.O. Ms. No. 376 dated 23rd June, 1954, which as we have already found, continues to have the force of law even after the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force. The Government has not done so. We are therefore not prepared to accept the argument that because of G.O. Ms. No. 1091 dated 10th June, 1957, G.O. Ms. No. 376 dated 23rd June, 1954, would be deemed to have been impliedly repealed. There is no language employed in G.O. Ms. No. 1091 dated 10th June, 1957, which would create that effect directly or indirectly. Since no other contention was raised, the revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (12) TMI 101 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecision in State Trading Corporation while interpreting rule 2(d-1)(b). For all these reasons I would answer the question by saying that in the circumstances of the case, it was the assessee which was the importer within the meaning of rule 2(d-1)(b) with regard to the turnover of kerosene oil. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which is assessed at Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure. By the Court For the reasons contained in our respective judgments we are of opinion that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case the assessee was an importer within the meaning of rule 2(d-1)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules and, therefore, liable to sales tax on the turnover of kerosene oil. The question referred is answered accordingly. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Question referred answered accordingly.
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