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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 72 Records
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1969 (3) TMI 105 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e meaning of the Act and are liable for registration under Section 22 of the Act and for payment of appropriate tax as provided under the Taxation Act." We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciations of their Lordships of the Orissa High Court. In this view, it is un necessary to discuss fully whether the premi ses in question is an "enclosed premises'" within the meaning of Section 2 (18) of the Act, although it may be relevant to note that on the material placed before us, we are not in a position to hold that the "mining areas" in this case is an "enclosed premises. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the "dumpers" in question are not such as would come within the purview of the ex emption contained in Section 2 (18) of the Act. 20. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is clearly disentitled to relief. 21. In the result, this petition deserves to fail and is dismissed with costs. 22. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... owever, pressed for the petitioner being allowed to take the padakanukas which are receivable by the Mahant of which he will keep an account as was directed by this Court when disposing of the stay petition on December 13, 1968. Counsel for the respondent agrees to this and has also agreed to keep accounts of whatever amount is spent on feeding the sadhus and on the management of the math property. He has further given an undertaking that the inquiry which is being conducted under Section 46 of the Act will be concluded within a period of three months. It may be made clear that the Assistant Commissioner who is in charge of the day-to-day administration temporarily of the math and its endowments shall be fully entitled to take necessary steps for recovery of all debts and claims which could have been recovered by the Mahant from various debtors etc. 12. The writ petition, however, fails and it is dismissed, but in view of the entire circumstances we make no order as to costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 103 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t there was no necessity for submitting this return when there was no termination of contribution in respect to any workman. But such return must be submitted in the prescribed form to indicate clearly whether there had been any termination of contribution or not. In an appropriate case there may be a nil return. But, for not submitting such return in such circumstances an offence was committed in a technical sense. 9. The petitioner has been convicted under all these three counts of charge and he has been fined ₹ 30/- on each count of charge. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I find no reason to interfere with the conviction on any of the three counts of charge. As for sentence I maintain the sentence under Section 85(a)/73(A) of the Act and also under Section 85(g)/73(A) of the Act. But no separate sentence is passed under Section 85(g) of the Act read with Regulation 26 of the E.S.I. Regulation. Subject to this reduction of sentence the Rule is discharged.
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1969 (3) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ana" could not be confined to gunny bags and must be regarded as including other containers of the nature mentioned. This is particularly so because in the notification the word "container" is used.) 6. On this view the exception to the exemption in the notification which is clearly severable has been and can be rightly struck down as unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination. It has been pointed out on behalf of the Respondent that the amount of tax was duly determined (vide the assessment orders copies of which have been shown) and refund should have been ordered as the amounts of tax had been paid for the assessment years in question. It will be for the High Court to hear both sides on this matter and make appropriate directions for refund of such amounts as have been shown to have been paid by the Respondent on account of tax on "bardana" for the two assessment years. The appeals, however, fail and are dismissed with costs, one hearing fee.
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1969 (3) TMI 101 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nus should form part of wage. The order of the Court below cannot stand. 2. Mr. P. S. Ramachandran, however, contended that the petitioner is a mechanic and therefore not a labourer within the meaning of Section 60(1) proviso (h) of the Civil Procedure Code and the bonus paid to him cannot be deemed to be beyond the pale of attachment. But whether he is a mechanic or a labourer has not been gone into by the Court below, and this has to be ascertained as a question of fact. Both the parties, therefore, agree that there is no material on which I can base my decision whether he is a mechanic or a labourer. It is advisable that this matter is remitted after setting aside the order of the lower Court for a further consideration in the light of the observations made above. Accordingly, the order of the lower Court is set aside and the matter remitted to the file of the District Munsif of Coimbatore for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of my judgment. No costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 100 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e petitioner is merely in the position of an informer or a relater and the situation is such that it becomes the duty of the Court to act in public interest or to uphold the Constitution." 44. Similar dicta are to be found in the decisions of almost all the High Courts. An examination of those cases however, shows that most of them have failed to provide a full exposition of the relevant principles and many of the dicta are ambiguous. It may be that one day the question is directly raised in an appropriate case and is exhaustively dealt with by the Supreme Court. Till then no useful purpose will be served by dealing with this matter at length, especially when we have not had the benefit of full argument from the counsel and we have also decided to dismiss the petition. 45. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. I.D. Dua, C.J. (Concurring) 46. I agree. S.K. Kapur, J. (Concurring) 47. I agree. 48. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 99 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... apparent view that it is necessary that the connection between payment and the debt should appear on the face of the writing required by the proviso to Section 20(1) of the old Limitation Act. With utmost respect, I agree with this observation. 6. It therefore follows that not only there was a payment within the period of limitation as is contemplated under the first part of Section 19 of the present Act, but there is also an acknowledgment of the actual debt due and payable by the respondent to the petitioner. Thus the two limbs which I cast earlier which do form part of Section 20 of the Limitation Act are satisfied and the ingredients therein are fulfilled. The learned Judge erred in relying upon the decision in Narasinga Rao Garu v. Rangayya AIR1943Mad133 , the facts and the ratio of which has no application to the present case under consideration. 7. The judgment and decree of the Court below is therefore set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed with costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 98 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to sue. It should be borne in mind, that the plaintiffs case is that the right to sue was kept concealed form her. It is obvious that the relevant point of time is when she had the competence to sue; and the test should be whether she was entitled to extension of time by reason of fraud practiced on her at the relevant point of time. According to the Is defendant, the plaintiff attained majority in 1942. In the absence of a specific plea that there was any fraudulent representation in 1942n or thereafter, no question of the extension of time under Section 18, can really arise. Neither of the contesting parties defined the position correctly and the lower Court also had not clarified it and had not formulated the question precisely. We are of opinion that in any view of the matter, the suit is barred by time. 30. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellant will pay to the State the Court-fee due on the memorandum of appeal. 31. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 97 - HIGH COURT ORISSA
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... ... ..... Order 22, Rule 10 (1), C. P. C. 5. Mr. Mohanty contends that this prayer was not pressed before the Court below. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge does not indicate that the prayer was not pressed. 6. In the result, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, so far as it rejected the prayer to allow the tenants of the petitioners to harvest the paddy, is confirmed. His order, whether it rejected or was silent, as to the impletion of parties is set aside. The petitioners are allowed to be impleaded as defendants. The Civil Revision is allowed to this extent. on the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs. 7. It appears that on 8-12-65 interim stay was taken by the petitioners. That prayer regarding harvesting of the crop has now been abandoned by the petitioners. The learned Subordinate Judge is to make an enquiry, if a properly constituted application is filed before him, whether the petitioners removed the crop and were liable to deposit the same in Court.
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1969 (3) TMI 96 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s capable of having a very wide connotation and may include any legal proceedings commenced by one person against another in order to enforce a civil right. In this context also, it cannot be disputed that an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is a suit falling within the scope of the word 'suit' used in Section 6 of the Limitation Act. In these circumstances, the appellant No. 1, who was a minor on the date of the accident, is entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, and consequently the application filed by him before the Claims Tribunal, Indore, is held to be within time. For these reasons, the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal deserve to be set aside. This appeal, is therefore, allowed, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is sent back to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law. The appellants shall be entitled to costs of this appeal. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 100/-, if certified.
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1969 (3) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . 9. If the claim of the respondents to retain any part of the property after the death of Jwala is negatived, it would, be perpetrating gave injustice to deny to the widow and the two daughters their share in the property to which they are in law entitled. In our view, the case was one in which the power under Order 41, Rule 33, CPC ought to have been exercised and the claim not only of the three sons but also of the widow and the two daughters ought to have been decreed. 10. The appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is modified. There will be a decree for possession of the lands in suit in favour of the three sons, the widow and the two daughters of Jwala. The interest of the three sons is one-half in the lands in suit and the interest of the widow and the two daughters is the other half in the lands. The plaintiffs will be entitled to mesne profits from the date of the suit under Order 20, Rule 12, CPC. The appeal will be allowed with costs throughout.
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1969 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... shore's case, 1967 2 S.C.R. 56 A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 801 a case arising under the Act From the principles laid down by this Court in the above two decisions, follows that where the whole of the property mortgaged is an estate, there can be no doubt that the procedure prescribed by Chapter IV has to be followed, in order that the amount due to the creditor should be determined by the claims officer and the decision of the claims officer or the Board has been made final by the Act." For the reasons mentioned earlier we are of the opinion that the decision of the majority of the judges in the Full Bench decision in Sidheshwar Prasad Singh v. Ram Saroop Singh, 1963 B.L.J.R. 802 is not correct. The true effect of the decisions of this Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's case, 1962 2 S.C.R. 441 and Krishna Prasad's case 1962 Supp, 3 S.C.R. 564 is as explained by Kamla Sahai, J. in that case. In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... ther entitle it to be heard by the Collector or the Court even though the Collector has all the rights of being a party to the proceeding. ( 14. ) In the result therefore the orders passed in Revision Application Nos. 277 662 663 664 and 665 of 1967 shall be set aside and we direct that the applicant in each of these applications shall be allowed to be on record of the case though not as a party defendant to the proceeding as the Collector in the case. The applicant shall be allowed to appear for adducing its evidence in the case as contemplated in sec. 50(2) of the Act so much so as to enable it to cross examine also the witnesses examined by the claimant and also advance arguments in the manner for that limited purpose. ( 15. ) Similar orders are passed in the other Revision Applications Nos. 547 548 & 549 of 1966 and that way the orders passed by the Court below shall stand so modified. ( 16. ) In the circumstances we make no order as to costs in all the applications.
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1969 (3) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rosecution adduced prima facie evidence showing that the relationship of master and servant existed between the work-men and the management. The appellant, did not produce any rebutting evidence. In the cross-examination of PW1, it was suggested that the workmen were employed by independent contractors, but the suggestion is not borne out by the materials on the record. We hold that the persons employed are workers as defined in s. 2(1). The High Court rightly held that the company's premises at Eluru were a factory. In the Courts below the appellant produced (1) am order of the Chief Inspector of Factories, Madras and (2) a letter of Superintendent of Central Excise I.D.O. Vijayavada. Mr. Setalvad conceded, and in our opinion rightly that these documents throw no light on the question whether in 1966 premises were a factory within the meaningof s. 2 (m). We,therefore say nothing more with regard tothese documents In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l. 210. The suit by or against the manager will deemed to be one brought by him or against him as representing the family if the circumstances of the case show that he is the manager of the family and the property involved in the suit is family property, see Mulgaund Co-operative Credit Society v. Shidlingappa Ishwarappa 1941 I.L.R. Bom. 682. See also Venkakanarayana v. Somaraju A.I.R. 1937 Mad, 610 (F.B.). It is not not necessary, where the manager is the plaintiff, that the plaint should state in distinct terms that he is suing as manager or where he is the defendant that he is being sued as manager. A Karta can represent the family effectively in proceeding though he is not named as such, see Mani Sahoo v. Lokanath A.I.R. 1950 Or. 140.. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court restored. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellants in all the courts. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (3) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the order dated September 28, 1961, the Board of Revenue refused to entertain the appeal on the ground of limitation without considering the question as to whether the appellant had made out a case for condonation of delay, if any. In our view, the Board of Revenue had not acted judicially in through out the appeal. The High Court was therefore not right in upholding the order of the Board of Revenue which ignored the, provisions of. Sections 34 and 149 (2) of the Ryotwari Act and the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. A sounder view of the law was taken by another Division Bench of the same High Court in Brijrajsingh's case, Misc. Civil Case No. 22 1962, decided on 183-1963 (MP) noted above. 13. For the reasons given the appeal is allowed, the order of the Board of Revenue is quashed and the matter sent back to the Board for disposal of the appeal according to law and in the light of the observations made by us. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal.
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1969 (3) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t was urged that the appellants had to pay the amount of interim standard rent twice over once when they deposited it in the Court and again when they satisfied the demand to avoid execution of the distress warrant. The landlord undoubtedly cannot obtain the amount twice over. But that does not mean that when the tenant has not made the amount available to the landlord the application for distress was not maintainable. o p /o p The argument that the erroneous order passed by the Court of Small Causes preventing the landlord from recovering the amount of municipal taxes could have been got corrected by approaching the superior courts and so long as that order stood, no distress could be levied, ignores the fact that the appellants had persuaded the Court of Small Causes to pass that order. In our judgment, there was no bar to the respondent maintaining the application for distress. o p /o p The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. o p /o p G.C. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1969 (3) TMI 88 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed to prove that he had let out the same to the defendant at any time within twelve years of the date of the institution of the suit, it could not, in our opinion, be inferred that the defendant's possession must have been adverse to that of the plaintiff nor could the plaintiff's dispossession or discontinuance of possession be presumed. With great respect we are of the view that the case of AIR 1946 All. 389 (supra) was not correctly decided, 36. Our answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is as follows -- If a plaintiff claims possession against a defendant alleging him to be his tenant and fails to prove the tenancy set up by him, Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, will not apply, and the only Article that can apply is Article 144 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. 37. Let the record of the case be laid before the learned single Judge together with the above answer to the question referred to this Full Bench.
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1969 (3) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a corporation is an agent of he State
Held that:- The fact that a minister appoints the members or directors of a corporation and he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are binding on the directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the corporation does not render the corporation an agent of the Government. Such an inference that the corporation is the agent of the Government may be drawn where it is performing in substance governmental and not commercial functions.
The definition of the employer, on the contrary, suggests that an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Government means either the industry carried pn directly by a department of the Government, such as the Posts and Telegraphs or the Railways, or one carried on by such department through the instrumentality of an agent. The contention that the appropriate Government to make the aforesaid reference was the Central Government and not the State Government has no merit and cannot be sustained.
The second contention that the questions referred to were regulated by the company's standing orders and an application for a modification of the said standing orders relating to those questions was actually pending before the certifying authority .under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act precluded a reference thereof under section 10 of the Act requires no discussion as it is covered by the decision in Management of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [1967 (9) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT] and Management jf Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union [1968 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT] . Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ies wore not put in the hands of the appellant but he saw them at the time when he was making the representations and curiously enough he used those replies in his defence. In other words, they were not collected behind Ma back and could be used to his advantage and he had an opportunity of so using them in his defence. We do not think that any prejudice was caused to the appellant in this case by not examining the two retired Superintending Engineers whom he had cited or any one of them. The case was a simple one whether the measurement book had been properly checked. The pleas about rain and floods were utterly useless and the Chief Engineer's elucidated replies were not against the appellant. In these circumstances a fetish of the principles of natural Justice is not necessary to be made, We do not think that a case is made out that the principles of natural justice are violated. The appeal must fall and is accordingly dismissed, but we will make no order as to costs.
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