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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 86 Records
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1970 (11) TMI 113 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI AND NAGALAND
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... ... ..... whether the sanctioning authority at all considered the facts of the case before lie accorded the sanction. That apart, the sanction in the instant case appears to have been made as recommended by the S. R. P., which shows that it was simply a stereotyped order of the Additional District Magistrate without applying his mind to the facts of the case. 8. In the circumstances I hold that the sanction order, which appears in the record of the case, is not a sanction order as contemplated Under Section 39 of the Arms Act, and since there was no sanction in accordance with law the Court had no jurisdiction to try the accused at all and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner must be quashed. 9. In the result the petition is allowed and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner Under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, are quashed. 10. Since the petition is allowed on this important point, I do not think it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the learned Counsel.
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1970 (11) TMI 112 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cash credit in question with any undisclosed income of the assessee, it is clear that no question of law arises out of our order and we decline to make a reference on any question to the High Court." The application has been made under section 66(2) of the Act for directing the Tribunal to refer the question of law, set out above, to this court for opinion Under section 28 of the Act, there is no statutory obligation on the Income Tax authorities to impose a penalty in very case. A case for the imposition of penalty has to be found on the material on the record and it is essentially a question of fact whether in a certain case penalty is called for or not. The Tribunal gave valid reasons in support of its order cancelling the order of penalty imposed by the Income Tax Officer and upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We agree with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that no question of law arises. We, accordingly, dismiss this petition with no order as to costs.
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1970 (11) TMI 111 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ugatory by the contrary interpretation, and the property of the debtor which could be attached and sold in execution of the decree not made available for the satisfaction of the debt. I am fortified in this view by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Buta Ram v. Sayyad Mohammad ILR (1935) Lah 328 AIR 1935 Lah 71, where the opposite view as accepted by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kochuponchi Varughese's Case AIR 1952 ker 467 (supra) an the cases cited therein for the aforesaid reasons was not followed. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in Buta Ram's case ILR 16 Lah 328 AIR 1935 Lah 71 The executing Court erred in relying on Kochuponchi Varughese's case AIR 1952 ker 467. 6. The revision petition is consequently allowed with costs and the condition attached to the order releasing the property from attachment whereby the petitioners were directed to pay ₹ 3,000/- before the attachment was lifted is set aside. 7. Petition allowed.
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1970 (11) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he Swetamberies are held to have the right to worship it according to their tenets by placing Chakshus in the idol or by erecting their Dhwajadand or Kalash over the Temple. 20. Lastly it is urged that the High Court ought not to have entertained the cross objection by extending the time for worship from 1 hour to 3 hours. In our view the directions of the High Court are not unreasonable nor do they in any way affect the right of the Respondents to worship because the directions clearly enable the Swetamberies who wish to worship the deity within that period without disturbing the Digamberies to be at liberty to do so and likewise it will be open to Digamberies to go and worship in the temple during the period it is kept open. In view of the acute controversy between these 2 sects and their reluctance to arrive at an amicable settlement the directions given by the High Court are manifestly reasonable just and proper. In this view the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (11) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with rules of law. Lastly an effort was made to agitate the point that s. 3 (2) (d) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. This question is no longer at large. In The Union of India & Others v. Messrs. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal & Others( 1960 2 S.C.R. 627) the attack on s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 which was similar in terms to s. 3 of the Act on the ground of excessive delegation was repelled. It was held- that the Central Government had been given sufficient and proper guidance for exercising its powers in effectuating the policy of the statute. In the result the writ petition and the appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing-fee. Appeals dismissed
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1970 (11) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acts of this particular case, I think it will not be proper to saddle the other Plaintiffs, namely, Surajmull Nagarmull and Howrah Trading, with the costs of this litigation and D.N. Jalan who is the real Plaintiff and at whose instance the suit has been prosecuted should be made liable for the costs. I have to observe that the unsatisfactory nature of Mr. Kar's evidence has been responsible to an extent for the prolongation of the trial. I have also to bear in mind that the other appearing Defendants have made common cause with the Defendant No. 13 and have not called any witness of their own. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this particular case D.N. Jalan should pay half of the costs of the appearing parties. I, therefore, direct and order that the Plaintiff No; 3 D.N. Jalan do pay to the appearing Defendants half of the taxed costs. The appearing Defendants will be entitled to one set of costs. ( 259. ) Certified for two counsel.
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1970 (11) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... able", which may be taken to import conditions 1 to 7 given in the penultimate column of the prescribed form. There Would still be non-compliance with condition No. 2 reproduced before. Even if it was not necessary to use the same language the number of clear working days had to be specified which was not done in the contracts in dispute. Condition No. 2 cannot be regarded as inconsequential because it must be stipulated how many working days notice has to be given by the buyers to place goods alongside "export vessel in the Port of Calcutta". Literal compliance with the prescribed form may not be essential but if the contract does not, contain all the terms and conditions set out in the form the contract will be void under the provisions set out before; (See the ratio of the decision in Radhakrisson Gopikisson v. Balamukand Ramchandra. For the reasons given above the appeals must fail and they are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. G.C. Appeals dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 106 - IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... ferent and much more valuable. The appellant put into the transaction (i) the £40,000 paid to her brother for his prospective right to receive one-half of the net proceeds of sale of the land or a tenancy-in-common (ii) her own similar right (iii) the lodgment of £10,000. She took out of the transaction the fee simple of the entirely of the land. She also sold immediately a portion of the land for a good profit and was able to retain the rest in the expectation of eventually selling it at a very high profit. In my opinion this transaction went beyond mere realisation and so is not excluded from the operation of section 26(a). There may be doubts as to the proper method of assessing the taxable profit, but I agree with Kitto J. that the assessment made has not been shown to be excessive. Lord MacDermott has asked me to add that he agrees with this judgment and would dismiss the appeal for the reasons I have given. Solicitors M.L. Moss & Son; Coward, Chance Co.
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1970 (11) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e latter, after being made aware of The nature of the offence against the appellant, is a clear indication that the decision of the military authorities was that the appellant need not be tried by a. court-martial and that his trial can take place before the criminal court. Under these circumstances there was no occasion to follow the procedure under r. 126 or r. 4 as the military authorities had made abundantly clear that the appellant need not be tried by the court-martial, That being so, it would have been altogether superfluous for the magistrate to give the notice as required by the said provisions, Rules 5 and 8 have no application to the facts of this case. We agree with the High Court that there has been a substan- tial compliance with the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules and hence the trial of the appellant and his, conviction by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge are valid and legal. In the result, the. appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the Magistrate without applying his mind only mechanically issues the order giving permission the investigation is tainted cannot help the appellant before us. 16. Counsel for the appellant wanted to raise an additional ground by producing certain documents and relying on certain rules of the Mysore medical Department to show that the appellant in counter-signing the certificate issued by the medical Officer of Bidar, P.W. 27, was only doing a professional act by way of private practice and that he was entitled to payment of fees therefor. Such a case require investigation into facts, which were not brought forward in the trial and never mentioned either before the Special Judge or before the High Court. We therefore refused permission to counsel to urge the additional grounds. 17. In the result, the appeal fails and the conviction is maintained. The Appellant's bail bond is cancelled and he must surrender himself for serving our the sentence awarded by the High Court.
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1970 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... so subject to review by the superior courts in accordance, with law. The power conferred being judicial the absence of an express, precise standard for determination of the question would not render the section unconstitutional. Detention pursuant to an order of remand which appropriately falls within the terms of s. 344 is accordingly not open to challenge in habeas corpus. After we had reserved orders the petitioner forwarded to this ;Court through jail supplementary affidavit containing written arguments. We have gone through the affidavit but we do not find any new point requiring discussion. It only discloses a further attempt to reopen the majority decision of this Court in Rai Narain's case (supra) by relying on the minority judgment and by submitting that S. 344(1A), Cr.P.C. offends Art. 19(1)(d) of the Constitution. All that we need Say at this stage is that the majority view is binding on us. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rmination of the character of the Inams respectively held ’by them. It, is needless to point out that the Tribunal constituted under the Act will be entitled to decide that a particular property is neither an existing Inam estate’ nor a part village Inam estate nor a whole inam village in Puddukkottai and completely out of the coverage of Acts XXVI and XXX of 1963. We a1so make it clear that the disposal of these writ petitions now does not preclude the Inamdars from agitating The question that a particular property is not an Inam at all and does not under any of the aforesaid four categories or falls under one or other of the categories as may be urged for the inamdars." We agree with the High Court that the contention in question can be more appropriately gone into in the manner suggested by the High Court. In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed. But ,under the circumstances; we make no order as to costs in these appeals. Appeals dismissed
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1970 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
Whether education cess could be levied by the State Legislature under Entry 62 of List II?
Held that:- As Counsel for the State. informed us that since the judgment of the High Court the Schedule has been amended by the State Legislature, but he did not very properly ask us to determine the question whether under the a mended Schedule the cess is leviable. We express no opinion on the question whether the State is competent to levy the cess after amendment of the Schedule to the Mysore Elementary Education Act, 1941. It will be open to the State to agitate the question if hereafter the education cess is sought to be levied under the authority of the amended Schedule. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 100 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing only to proviso (a). (2) On the second question, our answer is that by reason of the deletion of the proviso to section 18B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1953, right to set-off was extended not to all classes of goods but only to those goods which are used in the manufacture or processing of any goods specified in entries 19 to 80 (both inclusive) of Schedule B to the Act for sale. (3) On the third question, our answer is that the items which are referred to in this question are neither processing materials nor raw materials within the meaning of those expressions found in proviso (a) to rule 11(1A). (4) On the fourth question, our answer is in the affirmative, if the items mentioned in this question are found used in the manufacture or processing of any goods specified in entries 19 to 80 (both inclusive) of Schedule B to the Act for sale. We, therefore, dispose of this reference accordingly. The opponent shall bear the costs of the applicant. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 99 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... regard to the context, collocation and the object of the expression registered dealer in clause (ii) of section 8 of the Bombay Act and having regard to the policy of the Act, the said expression would also include a dealer registered under the Central Act on whom special liability to pay sales tax has been imposed under section 4 of the Act. A dealer who purchases goods from a dealer registered under the Central Act, who is liable to pay sales tax on the sale of the said goods by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Bombay Act, would, therefore, be entitled to deduct from his turnover of sales of goods, resales of goods so purchased by him on or after the appointed day if the goods, at the time of their purchase, were goods specified in Schedule C. Our answer to the question as reframed by us is, therefore, in the affirmative. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The department to pay to the assessees the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 98 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 332, Indian Penal Code. As far as the offence of mischief under section 426, Indian Penal Code, is concerned, there was no question of any private defence at all. The accused concerned in it had gone out of the mill and had damaged the jeep, for which there is consistent evidence. However, the lower appellate court had not chosen to discuss the evidence with regard to the complicity of each of the accused in the various offences with which they were charged in the case. It had chosen merely to refer to the overt-acts of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 and not the rest of the accused. How far the rest of the accused are liable individually for the overt-acts of each of them or constructively liable, if there was rioting, have not been considered. The order of acquittal is, therefore, set aside and the case as against all the accused is remanded to the lower appellate court to consider the evidence as against each of the accused and dispose of the case according to law. Case remanded.
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1970 (11) TMI 97 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntry 14 of Schedule A, but this expression is used by us with a limited purpose of showing that the article in question does not invite tax liability if it satisfies the conditions and exceptions mentioned in entry 14 and, therefore, the mere use of the word exemption should not be construed as expressing any opinion on the question whether section 5 of the Act takes out of the purview of the Act all those entries which are mentioned in Schedule A or as to the legal effect of granting exemption to those articles. 23.. In the result, we find that the view taken by the Tribunal is correct and, whatever we have said above regarding the service of jalebis, dal and shak applies equally to tea supplied by the assessee to its customers to be carried home. Therefore, our answer to the question which is referred to us is in the negative. This reference is accordingly disposed of. The applicant shall bear the costs of the opponent in this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1970 (11) TMI 96 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... goods tax should be levied and collected only under the Central Sales Tax Act and not under the State Act. In this case, the Tribunal followed the said decision of its own and set aside the tax imposed on the relevant turnover by the assessing authority. In view of what we have held above, the order of the Tribunal in so far as it relates to the disputed turnover in that behalf is concerned, must be held as bad in law and cannot be permitted to stand. The tax even on that turnover will have to be levied and if the assessee has a right to claim refund, he may do so after he pays the tax. The Tribunal was not justified in not allowing the turnover to be taxed at all. The order of the Tribunal, therefore, is set aside to that extent. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. T.R.C. No. 16 of 1969 is allowed as stated above and with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Writ Petition dismissed. Tax revision case allowed.
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1970 (11) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the proceedings but the actual service of the notice which is contemplated by the law. The service having been found to be invalid, the assessment under section 21 cannot be sustained. Moreover, we are also not satisfied that any knowledge of the proceedings under section 21 can be imputed to the assessee on the basis of the notice of 8th March, 1963, because there was no reference in that notice to any proceeding under section 21 having been initiated. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question by saying that the service of the notice under section 21 on 30th March, 1962, was not valid, and the further question as to whether the assessee could be said to have had the knowledge of the proceedings under section 21 is immaterial. Similarly the assessee s telegram dated 15th March, 1963, sent in pursuance of a subsequent notice issued on 8th March, 1963, does not alter the position. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mphasised that a particular word used in the Sales Tax Act must be given its popular meaning. We have already pointed out that so far as the U.P. Sales Tax Act is concerned, the word carpet is confined to a woollen fabric manufactured by the process of weaving and knotting. In this State there is no such thing as a cotton carpet. On the material before us we are satisfied that the term carpet in the notification in question has not been used to include all varieties of material which is used for covering floors and stairs. For all these reasons, we answer the question by saying that durrets are not covered by the term carpets as used in the notification of 5th April, 1961, set out in the question referred, but should be treated as unclassified goods taxable at the rate of 2 per cent. under section 3 of the Act. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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