|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 142 Records
-
1970 (3) TMI 122 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ted 13th August, 1960, should be ignored merely because different transactions more than Rs. 5,000 in value were the subject-matter of the declaration. The question is answered in the negative. 11.. The second question also requires slight modification. It should be (2) Whether the declaration form, if not filed with the return, is to be rejected. The answer would be in the negative. On the analysis made by us, if the dealer can give sufficient reasons why it was not filed with the return it can be accepted before assessment is made and even at the appellate stage. It would vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case. 12.. In the writ application our conclusion is that rule 6(a)(ii) proviso, as it stood at the relevant time, is ultra vires the Act. 13.. In the result we accept the reference and allow the writ application. There will be no order as to costs. The reference fee be refunded. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly and petition allowed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 121 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... assess the dealer to the best of his judgment. The limits of the power are implicit in the expression best of his judgment . Judgment is a faculty to decide matters with wisdom truly and legally. Judgment does not depend upon the arbitrary caprice of a judge, but on settled and invariable principles of justice. Though there is an element of guess-work in a best judgment assessment , it shall not be a wild one, but shall have a reasonable nexus to the available material and the circumstances of each case. 6.. From the aforesaid analysis we are clearly of opinion that the learned Tribunal acted contrary to law in making an enhanced estimate of the suppressions by raising it to Rs. 27,00,000 from Rs. 14,11,354.67. We would accordingly answer question No. (A) in the negative and question No. (B) in the positive. 7.. In the result, the references are accepted but in the circumstances without costs. Reference fees be refunded. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
-
1970 (3) TMI 120 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y a decision of a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. The Excise and Taxation Officer, Simla, and Another 1966 17 S.T.C. 555. Exactly on identical facts his Lordship came to the conclusion that there was no separate agreement for sale and the supply of foodstuff constituting an integral part of an agreement of the aforesaid nature does not constitute sale. The judgment of the Single Judge was affirmed in appeal, in State of Punjab and Another v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. 1967 20 S.T.C. 1. 6.. On the aforesaid analysis we would answer the first question in the negative. The second question is irrelevant as the same concept is involved in the first question. We answer the second question in the negative. 7.. In the result, the references are accepted but in the circumstances without costs. The dealer is entitled to the refund of the reference fees in all the cases. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
-
1970 (3) TMI 119 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e appellate authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to entertain the declaration if he is satisfied with the explanation so furnished. The assessing authority as well as the Tribunal rejected the declaration form on the erroneous view that unless it is attached to the return, it could not, in law, be accepted. That view is no longer sustainable. The Tribunal therefore shall have to consider whether the dealer has made out a case for acceptance of the duplicate form at the appellate stage as laid down in the aforesaid decision. 6.. Our answer to the question would be that the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the declaration form C filed at the first appellate stage without further examining the question whether there were justifiable reasons for filing it at that late stage. 7.. The reference is accordingly accepted, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Reference fee be refunded. ACHARYA J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (3) TMI 118 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... different from coal. Coal dust is also the mineral known as coal, but in a different shape. The various particles have been reduced by friction or use to a very small size so as to render coal into dust. Coal is not treated or processed in order to produce coal dust. It has come in the affidavits that coal dust is sold for burning bricks just as coal is used for such a purpose. It is clear that coal dust has the same combustible property as coal has. It is used for similar purposes as coal. We doubt if, in the popular sense, one would say that coal dust is not the same commodity as coal. In our opinion, coal dust is included within the word coal as used in entry 33 of the notification dated 31st March, 1956. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, and in favour of the assessee. The assessee would be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1970 (3) TMI 117 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o accepted the offer of the highest bidder and completed the contract, the auctioneer would not fall within the definition of dealer in section 2(g) of the Act. In that case the auctioneer recovered the money from the highest bidder under the special instructions from the seller. It was held that this would not constitute him a dealer. In the instant case even the sale price was recovered by the Government representative direct and the assessee was not entitled to demand the money from the intending purchasers. The decision of the Madras High Court would apply to the facts of the present case. The assessee could not, in our opinion, be deemed to be a dealer as defined by the Act. We would answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee would be entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100 for each case. The fee of the learned counsel is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (3) TMI 116 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... g heard. The aforesaid position of law is no longer in doubt. The matter is concluded by Commissioner of Wealth-tax, West Bengal v. Tungabhadra Industries, Calcutta 1970 75 I.T.R. 196 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 352. , where their Lordships expressed a similar view under section 27(6) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, corresponding to section 24(5) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. 8.. The Tribunal, after the case goes back, would hear the parties and decide whether the accounts have been properly maintained. If there was suppression of relevant materials and if the enhancement is justified, the Tribunal would further decide whether there was a reasonable nexus between the suppression and enhancement. 9.. In the result, the references are accepted, the questions are answered in the affirmative, and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for disposal as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Reference fees be refunded. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1970 (3) TMI 115 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and the Rules framed thereunder. The question which has been urged before us and decided by us does not seem to have been urged in that case and as such the said decision cannot be construed as a decision on the legal contentions now raised in these cases. In the view we have taken that all the orders passed by the Tribunal dismissing the appeals for default of appearance of the appellants are inconsistent with the provision contained in section 36(3)(a)(iii) and as such Since reported as Oversea Mica Exports v. Secretary, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, A.P., Hyderabad, and Another 1970 25 S.T.C. 425. invalid, the subsequent orders passed by the Tribunal refusing to restore the appeals dismissed for default have also to be held invalid. In the result, the above tax cases and writ petitions are allowed and the Tribunal is directed to restore the respective appeals to its file and dispose of the same in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n the circumstances we hold that the notifications issued under section 3-A with regard to bricks are invalid. The turnover of bricks, however, is taxable at the general rate provided in section 3 of the Act. In some of these petitions it has been prayed that the excess tax be directed to be refunded. At the hearing the learned counsel stated that this relief is not pressed at this stage as the petitioners would apply to the assessing authority for refund. No order need hence be passed on this relief. In some of the petitioners cases assessment proceedings are pending. In other cases assessment orders have already been passed. We direct that the respondents shall not assess the petitioners on their turnover of bricks under section 3-A or the notifications issued thereunder. They may be assessed under section 3. The respondents shall suitably modify the assessments already made and impugned in the petitions. The petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 113 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of its effectiveness on a particular class of consumers who are accustomed to take it. 7.. There is another broad principle on which the dealer must succeed. A taxing statute must be clear and precise in its incidence of taxation. If any of the provisions is ambiguous, the doubts must be resolved in favour of the subject. The Legislature by using tobacco products created a confusion. No definition was given as to clearly limit its meaning. In such circumstances it is difficult to hold that preparations of tobacco cannot be said to be tobacco products. According to us no distinction can be made between tobacco preparations and tobacco products. 8.. We would accordingly answer the question by saying that the Tribunal was not justified in not treating mitha gundi as a tobacco product. 9.. In the result, the application succeeds and the reference is accepted. There will be no order as to costs. The reference fees be refunded. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (3) TMI 112 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t is necessary to look at the substance of the transaction and if it is found that there was no agreement between the parties, it is not a sale, although the price is payable for the goods delivered and although the property passes for valuable consideration. See New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax 1963 14 S.T.C. 316. 7.. Judged by these tests, it must be said that in the present case there was no sale of the diamond. The assessee had no independent volition in the sale of the diamond by public auction. Such sale was compulsory. The assessee had no choice either in the matter of selecting the purchaser or the price. It is also worthy of note that the assessee himself was free to offer his own bid at the auction. The second question must, therefore, be answered in the negative. 8.. For the reasons stated above, we answer both the questions in favour of the assessee. The assessee will get his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (3) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he series of sales, including inter-State sales. If there is no inter-State sale of particular declared goods, the same goods would suffer tax at the appropriate point of sale within the State. We do not think that there is anything in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer 1967 20 S.T.C. 150. which is of assistance to the petitioners. We are not persuaded that the Central Ordinance or the Amending Act violates Article 301 of the Constitution. Nor do we think that the contention that the local Amending Act is confiscatory is made out. It is not disputed that the tax on that part of the Central turnover which represented excise duty, had been collected from the customers. The tax having been levied and paid on that basis, which has been validated retrospectively, it is neither unreasonable nor confiscatory. Krishnamurthi and Company v. State of Madras 1969 23 S.T.C. 1. also supports this view. The petitions are dismissed but with no costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 110 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ax and they do not fall under entry 8-A of the Fifth Schedule. If old and worn out wearing apparel are purchased by the appellant they do not revert to the category of textiles, but they retain the character of wearing apparel liable to sales tax. Therefore, in our opinion, the view taken by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was right. It was urged by Sri B.V. Katageri, learned counsel for the appellant that in the case of ready-made garments, it is the first seller that is liable to tax at a single point and in the instant case there is no evidence that the appellant is the first seller. This is not a matter which was urged before the authorities below and there is no material before us to decide that question. It is open to the appellant to urge the same when the matter next arises and we do not think it necessary to remand the matter since the disputed tax amount is a paltry sum of Rs. 37.06. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 109 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sub-rule (1) to the date of cancellation. It is clear from the said sub-rule that while the certificate of recognition will operate from the date of receipt of application its cancellation cannot have retrospective operation. The certificate of recognition granted under sub-rule (1) will be valid till the date of its cancellation. It is clear that the impugned order in so far as it is brought into effect from 1st July, 1961, is clearly ultra vires of the powers of the first respondent. To that extent the impugned order is quashed. We make it clear that the order of cancellation will be valid from the date of cancellation. No costs. Order quashed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 108 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oked to levy penalty for the non-payment of the tax due under the Central Act. For the above reasons, we hold that the writ petition should succeed, and it is accordingly allowed. In view of this conclusion, we consider it unnecessary to make any orders on S.T.R.P. No. 22 of 1969. It is, therefore, disposed of accordingly. Therefore, although the petitioner has sought for the relief in the nature of a direction to forbear the respondent from proceeding to recover the penalty, we think it necessary to quash the impugned notice of demand dated 20th June, 1968, in so far as it relates to the levy of penalty under section 13(2)(b) of the State Act for the non-payment of the tax assessed under the Central Act. It follows, therefore, that the proceedings taken by the respondent subsequent to the issue of such notice demanding penalty, should also be quashed. They are quashed accordingly. In the special circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 107 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tion does not fall under sub-section (1) of section 18, and therefore the dealer cannot be said to have contravened the provisions of the said sub-section by making such collection. In order to attract the penalty provided under section 18-A, the pre-requisite condition is that the dealer should have contravened the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). On the undisputed facts, the sale of chillies by the petitioner as commission agent of grower principals was not exigible to tax under the Act and it was so held by the appellate authority under the Act. The collection made by the petitioner from the purchasers falls outside the scope of section 18. There is no contravention of section 18. Consequently, the first respondent had no jurisdiction to take action under section 18-A of the Act as against the petitioner. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and the impugned notice No. DR/CT/W-35/B dated 3rd July, 1969, is hereby quashed. No costs. Petition allowed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 106 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is an example of an accessory to a motor vehicle. The motor vehicle can be run without a speedometer but for its convenience, a speedometer is helpful. A printing machinery cannot be worked without printing types. As held by the Tribunal, printing types are essential without which the printing machinery cannot be worked. If printing types are articles which are essential for working the printing machinery, the printing types cannot be considered as something that adds to the convenience or effectiveness of the printing machinery and therefore, in our opinion, printing types cannot be classed as accessories to the printing machinery. In that view, the Tribunal and the authorities below are in error in assessing the printing types under section 5(3)(a) read with serial No. 20 of the Second Schedule of the Act. The turnover of the petitioner in respect of sales of printing types ought to be assessed under section 5(1) of the Act. Petition is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
-
1970 (3) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sale of standing trees is not sale of goods chargeable to sales tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. As in the present case it was expressly provided that the timber agreed to be sold shall be severed under the contract of sale. The timber was therefore "goods" within the meaning of section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act and the expression "sale of goods" in the Constitution in entry 54 in List II having the same meaning as that expression has in the Sale of Goods Act, sale of timber agreed to be severed under the terms of the contract may be regarded as sale of goods.
-
1970 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
whether sales made by the petitioner of its vehicles from its stock-yards in various States of India can be held liable to be taxed as inter-State trade or commerce as defined in section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act?
Whether the vehicles which are not actually sold to any customer at Jamshedpur but are sent out from Jamshedpur to the stock-yards of the company in different States of India and from there they are supplied to dealers for sale to consumers can be taken to be inter-State trade in the sense that the movement of the vehicles from Bihar into another State?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The appropriation of the vehicles was done at the stock-yards through specification of the engine and the chassis number and it was open to the appellant till then to allot any vehicle to any purchaser and to transfer the vehicles from one stock-yard to another. Even the Assistant Commissioner found that on some occasion vehicle had been moved from a stock-yard in one State to a stock-yard in another State. It is not possible to comprehend how in the above situation it could be held that the movement of the vehicles from the works to the stock-yards was occasioned by any covenant or incident of the contract of sale. As regards the so-called firm orders it has already been pointed out that none have been shown to have existed in respect of the relevant periods of assessment. Even on the assumption that any such orders had been received by the appellant they could not be regarded as anything but mere offers in view of the specific terms in exhibit I (the dealership agreement) according to which it was open to the appellant to supply or not to supply the dealer with any vehicle in response to such order.
-
1970 (3) TMI 90 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Shares – Power, to issue of at discount, Meetings and proceedings - Restriction of exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, etc., Oppression and Mismanagement, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
|
