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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 142 Records
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1970 (3) TMI 82 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... y in the Court of Appeal emphasised the retrospective character of sub-section (6) and gave an express direction pursuant to the subsection carrying out that retrospective effect. It seems to me that the principle laid down by the Court of Appeal in that case is fully applicable here, bearing in mind the evidence that the company is solvent and no subsequent charges have been created. It is clear that no-one can be prejudiced by the retrospective order sought and I think it would be right that the company should now be put in the same position retrospectively as if the legal charge of December 12, 1969, was duly created and the particulars duly delivered for registration on December 31, 1969. I understand from Mr. Lindsay, who appears for the Registrar of Companies, that the registrar will find no difficulty in acting upon an order in those terms. I propose, upon the usual undertakings by the company to which I need not refer further, to make the order sought in the petition.
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1970 (3) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... s may constitute only lapses or offences mentioned in section 633 or are easily separable. In the case before me, it is not possible, on the material on record, to arrive at satisfactory conclusions with regard to the knowledge or complicity or honesty or reasonableness of the action of any one of the three of the applicants before me or with regard to the fairness of the claim of any of them to be excused for any lapse or offence. These matters can only be decided satisfactorily after a fuller probe into all the facts and circumstances alleged against each applicant separately. I, therefore, decline to interfere under section 633(2) of the Act with whatever may be apprehended or anticipated by the applicants who are, however, left free to apply under section 633(1) of the Act if and when a proceeding, if any, is instituted against any or all of them as a result of the investigations pending against them. This application is dismissed with costs. The interim order is vacated.
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1970 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the company judge was not justified in rejecting the prayer for an adjournment?
Registrar's petition did not disclose any ground for admitting the winding up petition and much less for advertising it?
Whether the appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court was not competent to summarily dismiss the appeal?
Held that:- As we are in agreement with the appellant's contention that the appellate Bench of the High Court was not competent to summarily dismiss the appeal, we have not thought it necessary to go into the other contentions advanced on its behalf.
It is clear that appeals other than those mentioned therein are not to be placed for admission. In other words, they are entitled to be admitted as a matter of course. Therefore, the appellate Bench erred in summarily dismissing the appeal. It was bound to entertain the appeal and dispose of the same on merits. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (3) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Clandestine removal from warehouse - Tobacco ... ... ... ... ..... prosecution evidence itself shows that in this case no serious attempt was made to prove that the remains of tobacco if any, in the three rooms could not correspond to the tobacco that had been stored in that godown. 13.Under the rules it is possible for the Excise Department to raise the entire demands against the accused even in respect of tobacco which has been destroyed, unless they are satisfied that tobacco was destroyed by unavoidable accident. If the goods had in fact been destroyed due to reasons, which may not be said to be unavoidable accident, the accused may not be able to claim remission of duty, but it cannot be said that he has done something to evade payment of duty and thereby committed an offence under section 9(b) of the Central Excise and Salt Act. 14.We are, therefore, of opinion that the prosecution in this case has failed to establish its case that the accused took any steps to evade payment of excise duty. This appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
If the respondent is accused of any other specific acts of smuggling, there will be no bar against the continuation of prosecution proceedings in respect of them?
Held that:- In the present case, the matters appear to have been complicated by the fact that, at the earlier stages, the authorities were under the impression that there was one single conspiracy. We are unable to find any material to suggest that the prosecution have deliberately prolonged the investigation or delayed bringing the case before the court. We may also add that we are not impressed by the argument advanced by Mr. Jethmalani that the respondent could have been charged for this conspiracy even in the earlier case in which he was convicted on 31st January, 1969 under the provisions of Section 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the two conspiracies, according to the prosecution, are two entirely separate and distinct ones and are not based on allegations of identical acts having been committed by the offenders. In this case, therefore, it appears to be appropriate that the respondent should be tried for the conspiracy on the basis of which proceedings are being taken which have been quashed by the High Court.
We, however, consider that it is sufficient to make a direction that the Magistrate will allow a period of not more than two months to the prosecution to produce evidence to make out a prima facia case against the respondent, calculated from the date on which the copy of our order is received by the trial Court. On the expiry of the period of two months, the Court will proceed either to frame a charge or to discharge the respondent.
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1970 (3) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the statements, if any, alleged to have been made by the two Mohammads and Ghulam Rasool were inadmissible in evidence as having been made while they were in police custody?
Whether there was no material on record to connect him with the alleged smugglers or with the smuggled gold or with the act of smuggling and there was no basis for a reasonable belief that he was a person concerned in the importation of the gold?
Whether the maximum penalty which could be imposed under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act was only ₹ 1,000/-?
Held that:- A faint argument was made that the statements of the two Mohammads or Ghulam Rasool were inadmissible in evidence as having been made before a police officer as in our view there is no substance in this point because the statements were recorded by a Customs Officer duly investigating into a case where allegations were made about the smuggling of gold. At that stage no criminal case had been started against them in respect of such smuggling and it is difficult to see how such statements can be said to be inadmissible in evidence.
As regards to penalty it is a matter of no moment as the order of the Collector passed on 9th August, 1959, clearly showed that the confiscation had been ordered under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, read with Section 19 of the Act as made applicable by Section 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the personal penalty was imposed under these provisions of law. Thus if the gold smuggled weighed 692 tolas of which the value would not be less than rupees one lakh a penalty of ₹ 50,000/- was certainly not out of proportion to the gravity of the offence
No substance in the argument that the appellant could not be said to be a person concerned in the smuggling of gold even if it were to be held that he had paid ₹ 16,000/- to the other three persons for bringing the gold into India. If the Collector was free to proceed on the basis of the statements recorded which went to show that gold of the value of rupees one lakh was smuggled into India at the instance of and for the benefit of the appellant who had paid out a large sum of money for the purpose, it is difficult to see how he could be said to be a person not interested or concerned in the act of smuggling. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the inspection had been done by the Deputy Superintendent during their absence and a notice under Rule 160 had been issued without any legal authority?
Held that:- As already mentioned, it is not as if the Collector merely confirmed the demand under Exhibit A in toto. On the other hand he modified it in favour of the appellant to some extent. It is such an exhaustive order passed by the Collector—Exhibit Q—that was the subject of consideration in the first instance, by the Central Board of Revenue, in Exhibit T, and later, by the Central Government, in Exhibit V. Under these circumstances, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the orders—Exhibits T and V—require to be interfered with.
The appellant had made no grievance before the Collector of Central Excise that they should be allowed to examine witnesses nor did they urge that a copy of the report of the Deputy Superintendent had not been made available to them. They did not make any request for cross-examining the Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise. In view of all these circumstances, in our opinion the High Court was justified in holding that the appellants had a proper opportunity of contesting the demand made by the department and the there had been no failure of natural justice in the proceedings conducted by the respondents.
What the Collector has done in this case is to give the appellants an opportunity of satisfying, if they can, the authority concerned, that there was no justification for the issue of the two notices, Exhibits K and L under R. 223-A. The order does nothing more than this. If the appellants are able to satisfy the authority properly, the result may even be that no action will be taken under Rule 223-A. No scope for any conflict between the orders of the Collector, Exhibit Q dated March 3, 1958 and Exhibit N, dated February 6, 1958 because the two orders relate to different types of proceedings initiated against the appellants. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an assessment made by a subordinate officer in accordance with the instructions issued by the Collector to whom an appeal lay against the order of that subordinate officer can be called a valid assessment in the eye of law?
Held that:- In the present case, when the assessment is to be made by the Deputy Superintendent or the Assistant Collector, the Collector, to whom an appeal lies against his order of assessment, cannot control or fetter his judgment in the matter of assessment. If the Collector issues directions by which the Deputy Superintendent of the Assistant Collector is bound no room is left for the exercise of his own independent judgment.
These appeals must succeed on the ground that the impugned orders were vitiated for the reasons given and deserve to be set aside. The assessing authorities, namely, the Deputy Superintendent or the Assistant Collector shall make fresh assessment of duty in accordance with law and thereafter the question of refund will be decided by the appropriate authorities
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1970 (3) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Residence ... ... ... ... ..... be deducted from the total income of the assessee. In the result, our answers to the questions are as follows Question No. 1 In the affirmative. Question No. 2 In the affirmative. Question No. 3 Tax was not payable on Rs. 1.04,912 paid as interest on 3 sterling promissory note in the year of account 1953. Similarly, tax was not payable in respect of the interest paid for the 3 sterling promissory note in the year of account .1951. Expenditure of interest relating to 3 sterling promissory note was deductible from the dividend income earned in India. The interest paid on 3 Indian rupee promissory note was not deductible from the dividend income earned in India in the year of account 1951 when the assessee-company has been assessed as non-resident. Interest paid in respect of this promissory note in the year of account 1953, was deductible expense from the total world income of the assessee-company, as it was assessed for that year as resident. The Commissioner will pay costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 53 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Trust - income from business - income from property - claim for exemption under section 4(3)(i)
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1970 (3) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Levy of penal interest under clause (iii) of third proviso to section 139(1)(v) of Income-tax Act, 1961- best judgment assessment
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1970 (3) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessee was allotted shares by company - non payment of further calls on due dates - claim for deduction of the amount paid as interest from the due dates - since interest paid was solely for the purpose of earning the dividend income, it cannot be treated as capital expenditure
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1970 (3) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessee is a private limited company. It carries on business as a money-lender, and also of an art silk mill - money advaced by assessee to company and acquired the shares of company for amount of loan - company went into liquidation - claim for deduction of the amount of loan against business income
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1970 (3) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Whether the petitioner, the Kerala Financial Corporation, is an "individual" coming under section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act for purposes of assessment to wealth-tax
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1970 (3) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reassessment u/s 147 - Whether there is any obligation on an assessee to disclose at the time of his assessment any transfers made by his wife of assets, gifted to her by the assessee, which might have resulted in capital gains -
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1970 (3) TMI 47 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Writ application has been filed, in which the impugned notices issued for reassessment are, attacked as being without jurisdiction inasmuch as the order under section 25A has not been set aside and still stands good for all subsequent years - assessment cannot be reopened under sections 147 and 148 of the Income tax Act, 1961
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1970 (3) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Allowable expenditure - assessee suffered a loss by reason of the riots -expenses incurred by the assessee in assisting the prosecution of certain persons who were accused of having rioted and caused the death of its manager while he was engaged in the business of the assessee - expenses are allowable u/s 10(2)(xv)
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1970 (3) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Whether payment of gratuity to employees on death, retirement or termination of service on basis of current salary are allowable for deduction when employer is following Mercantile System of accounting
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1970 (3) TMI 44 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty levied under section 28(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1922
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1970 (3) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Finding of fact arrived at by the tribunal may be defective in law if there is no evidence to support it or if the finding is unreasonable or perverse, but it is not open to the assessee to challenge such a finding unless he has applied for a reference of the specific question u/s 66(1).
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