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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 76 Records
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1970 (8) TMI 103 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fficult for him to swear to another affidavit. If the Court is to be satisfied that the parties had authorised him to sign and verify the petition on their behalf, it is their affidavit that is essential to prove such authorisation and not the affidavit of the person who has come forward that he has got a representative capacity. 14. For the reasons, I answer the reference by holding that if some of the parties to the writ petition do not personally sign and verify it, but authorise somebody else to sign and verify on their behalf either a Power of Attorney or an affidavit sworn by them in the presence of an attesting Officer or functionary recognised by law stating the reasons for their inability to sign and verify the petition personally and authorising another person to sign and verify on their behalf, should be filed. 15. Before I part with the case, I must express my thanks to the learned Principal Government Pleader who has rendered me valuable assistance on my request.
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1970 (8) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e the effect of divesting the title which the wife acquired under the document under which the property was purchased in her name. Therefore, the admission of the plaintiff in this case, as extracted already, is the clearest possible evidence of his intention that the wife should be the owner of the property and if so, the case set up by the plaintiff of benami fails miserably and totally. It is this aspect which the courts below have failed to bear in mind. 4. Under these circumstances, the second appeal is allowed, so far as it relates to the recovery of possession of the plaint B schedule property is concerned. The judgments and decrees of the courts below is so far as they relate to the recovery of possession of the plaint B schedule property are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff will stand dismissed in respect of the claim for recovery of possession of plaint B schedule property. There will be no order as to costs in this second appeal. No leave. 5. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (8) TMI 101 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here kudikidappukarans occupied dwelling houses after the commencement of the Act. That certainly is not the case of the respondent and that cannot be the case. It is the Act as it stands when its provisions are sought to be invoked by a Kudikidappukaran that must apply. No doubt, I can see the difficulty in the way of the plaintiff if the definition as amended applies. But that is inevitable. In the light of what I have staged above, it follows that defendants are kudikidappukars and therefore a decree for redemption, can be granted only subject to their rights secured under the provisions of Kerala Act 1 of 1964. They will be entitled to all the rights under that Act including the right to fixity in regard to Kudikidappu recognized in S. 75 of the Act. The decree for redemption granted by the court below will be modified to the extent indicated above and the Second Appeal is allowed to that extent. But in the circumstances of the case, I direct both parties to suffer costs.
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1970 (8) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Simpson 31 E.R. 1272 at 1282. But the surety is a guarantee; and it is his business to see whether the principal pays and not that of creditor. 5. As laid down by the Supreme Court, in the absence of some special equity the surety has no right to restrain an action against him by the creditor on the ground that the principal is solvent or that the creditor may have relief against the principal in some other proceedings and before payment, the surety has no right to dictate terms to the creditor and ask him to pursue his remedies against the principal in the first instance. In view of the said categorical pronouncement of the Supreme me Court, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the decree-holder in this case has to proceed against the first defendant, the principal-debtor at the first instance. I therefore accept the views of the Courts below and dismiss the appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs. No leave.
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1970 (8) TMI 99 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be to deceive the public into believing that they are the goods or the business of another (See Wright Layman and Umney Ltd. v. Wright (1949) 66 R. P. G. 149, judgment of Lord Greene M. R. and Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd. (1918) 65 R. P. C. 242, judgment of Lord Simons). 30. The fact that there is another registered trade name 'HIRA MOTI' in respect of Ganjies does not in my view equate the case of the plaintiff. 31. For the aforesaid reasons I am of the opinion that prima farie the plaintiff has made out a case for the reliefs claimed. This application must, therefore, succeed. 32. There shall, therefore, be an order for injunction restraining the defendant from selling or offering for sale under the trade mark or name "SACHA MOTI" Ganjies without sufficiently distinguishing the same from the products of the plaintiffs and representing the same to be the products of the defendant. 33. Costs of this application will be costs in the cause.
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1970 (8) TMI 98 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay in filing application - extending the time to deposit the rent in respect of the premises - time limitation - HELD THAT:- There is no provision contained in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which is contrary to the provision of Section 5. Although Section 17 prescribes a time for making the deposit as well as deals with the question of an application for extension of that time and the conditions under which the same can be granted, it does not in my opinion deal with the condonation of delay in making the said application as has been provided for by and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus the provisons "relating to limitation" contained in Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act are not contrary to and/or inconsistent with the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
In the instant case, the alleged mistake is stated to have been occasioned by the ignorance of the lawyer that the Receiver was discharged but there was no reason for this ignorance. The applicant himself was aware of the fact of the discharge of the Receiver. The lawyer also should have noticed that two of the deposits made by the applicant were made within the prescribed time. Thus if the lawyer was not negligent and exercised reasonable diligence he could not have been guilty of the aforesaid mistakes and could not have advised the applicant as he is stated to have done. It is significant that the name of the lawyer is not disclosed in any of the affidavits.
Even if it were held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the present application no sufficient cause has been shown in the present application by the applicant to enable the Court to condone the delay in making the present application - the applicant was not prevented from making this application by any mistake within the meaning of Section 17(1)(c) of Limitation Act 1963.
Application dismissed.
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1970 (8) TMI 97 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tric Supply Corporation Ltd., the order being reported in Nageswararao v. Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., Rajahmundry, 1957 A.L.T. 728. For the said reasons, the petition for winding up of the Narasaraopet Electric Corporation Ltd. is ordered. Intimation of this will be sent to the official liquidator and the Registrar of Companies. An advertisement of this order shall be made under Rule 113 in the Indian Express and the Andhra Prabha within 14 days of this order. The official liquidator will take charge of the assets, books and other papers of the company forthwith under Rule 114. The petitioners will, under Section 445, file with the Registrar certified copy of this order within 30 days from the date of this order. The petitioners to deposit advertisement charges within seven days. The official liquidator will take directions of this court for any legal assistance necessary. The costs of this petition will come from the estate. Advocate's fee ₹ 500.
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1970 (8) TMI 96 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... these assessments will not injuriously affect the right of the department because assessments will have to be made afresh in respect of all the years mentioned in the petition in accordance with the principles declared in this judgment. We see no reason for not giving relief to the petitioner Company in respect of all the orders which are challenged in this petition and in respect of all the notices of demand mentioned in the petition. 32. Under the circumstances, the rule in this petition will be made absolute. The impugned order dated May 2, 1967, and the various notices of demand which are all mentioned in the letter of the Inspector of Central Excise dated June 6, 1967, exh. Y to the petition, and the orders of assessments leading to these notices of demand are declared to be invalid and are set aside. The respondents will not enforce the claims made in the above impugned order and assessments and notices of demand. The respondents will pay costs fixed at ₹ 3,000.
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1970 (8) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... their share in the property. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the finding of the Court below in this regard. The plaintiff would only be entitled to recover the moneys advanced under Exs. A-1 and A-2 provided the action was brought within the prescribed period of limitation of six years. But since the action has been brought beyond that period, they will not be entitled to recover the moneys due under Exs. A-1 and A-2. 16. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and decrees under appeal and allow the appeals with costs in A.S. No.28 of 1967. The court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal in appeal No.381 of 1967 will be paid by the 1st respondent. S.R. No.1448/67 has been filed by the 6th defendant in O.S. No. 54 of 1964 by way of abundant caution and therefore no orders are necessary and it may be returned. Since the appeals are allowed the application filed by the plaintiff for amendment of the decree of the trial Court is dismissed. 17. Appeals allowed.
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1970 (8) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is fact beyond reasonable doubt. As observed earlier it is of course not necessary to prove formal service of the order by official routine and knowledge of the exact order aliunde would suffice. In case of doubt, however, benefit ought to go to the person charged. We are far from satisfied that these two appellants are shown to have been aware of the exact terms of the stay order, which they were bound to obey even In the absence of a direction to that effect from their superior officers. They have also offered unqualified apology. Their appeals are allowed and the order of fine imposed on them set aside. 9. In the final result the appeal on behalf of the Executive Officer, appellant No. 2 and of Ahmad Khan and Hoti Lal, appellants Nos. 4 and 5 are allowed and their conviction and sentence set aside. The fires, if paid, will be refunded. The app on behalf of the Municipal Board, appellant No. 1 and of Shri Kanhaiyalal Sharma, Demand Inspector, appellant No. 3 are dismissed.
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1970 (8) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the Act 15 of 1957 which supersedes the notification issued in 1951 under the Act of 1923, nor is the continuance of the notification inconsistent with any provision in the new Act. The notification must, therefore, be deemed to have remained in force and the State Government was competent in exercise of the power conferred upon it by Section 4 of Act 15 of 1957 to include within the area of Town Committee any local area contiguous to the same. 5. We are here dealing only with the validity of the notification issued by the State Government, and not with the validity of the demand for licence fee or other taxes levied by the notified Town Committee. Nothing in this judgment will affect the right of the Company to challenge the validity of the demand for such taxes in appropriate proceedings. 6. The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. The petition is dismissed with costs throughout. In all these three appeals there will be one hearing fee.
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1970 (8) TMI 92 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... port of a police officer not based on his personal knowledge cannot be read as evidence in the case. 18. Whatever I have observed above mutatis mutandis applies to the other proceedings which related to squares Nos. 33 and 35. 19. In the result I allow both the revision applications and set aside the orders of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Karanpur in the two proceedings and remand both the cases to him for proceeding further in the matter according to law and in the light of the observations made above. The learned Magistrate will have the same interim arrangements regarding the land as were earlier made by him. The lands will continue to remain under attachment till the disposal of the two proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the opposite party had taken away ₹ 10,000/- after the order was passed by the learned magistrate and before the stay order was granted by this Court. He may move the learned magistrate for appropriate relief.
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1970 (8) TMI 91 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t, valuation or division of assets, debts and liabilities to be made hereunder..... shall be referred to a single arbitrator." It may be added here that following the said English decision the Madras High Court in N. C. Padmanabhan v. S. Srini-vasan, and the Calcutta High Court in Madan Mohan Dey v. Satya Gopal Pal (unreported judgment of A. N. Sen J., D/- 7-10-1966) in Award No. 105 of 1966 (Cal) have held that the dispute relating to dissolution of firm on the ground that it is just and equitable to do so should be decided by the court and the court should exercise its discretion in not staying the suit in spite of the arbitration clause. Reference may also be made to the Bench decision of this Court In Sailendra Nath Kumar v. Chillar M. Ram, ILR (1951) 2 Cal 140. 6. For all the reasons stated above there will be no order on this application. The undertaking of the respondent is vacated. The costs of this application will be costs in the pending Suit No. 3471 of 1969.
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1970 (8) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... "is not defined in the Land Acquisition Act. But by the General Clauses Act 10 of 1897 the expression "local authority" is defined as meaning "a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund". By virtue of S. 10 (2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, the market committee is a local authority within the meaning of the Bombay General Clauses Act. A local authority being by virtue of S. 3 (26) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, a body which is entrusted by government with control or management, inter alia, of a local fund, there is no scope for the argument that the market committee constituted under Gujarat Agricultural Markets Act, 1963, is not a local authority within the meaning of S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 5. ) The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (8) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therefore the price realised at the auction was inadequate. The Division Bench was, in our view, right in holding that the appellant had failed to 'show inadequacy of the price or that such inadequacy was occasioned by the said material irregularity. When it was realised that the contention as to the inadequacy of price cannot be sustained, counsel tried to argue that the said sale fetched ₹ 8,000/- only as the proclamation for sale had set out the value of- the appellant's share at that amount only. No such grievance was made before the trial court, nor was such a grievance incorporated in the memorandum of appeal before the High Court. Also, no such ground has been taken in the special leave petition before this Court. Obviously, the appellant could not raise such a contention before the High Court, much less before this Court. Thus, the contentions raised by counsel for the appellant fail and consequently the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (8) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pt an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall abate on the death of the appellant." From this section it is clear that an appeal under s. 417 can only abate on the death of the accused and not otherwise. Once an appeal against an acquittal is entertained by the High Court, it becomes the duty of the High Court to decide the same irrespective of the fact the appellant either does not choose to prosecute it or unable to prosecute it for one reason or the other. The argument that while introducing sub-s. (3) into s. 417, Cr. P.C., the Parliament overlooked the provisions. contained in s. 43 1, does not deserve consideration. The language of s. 431 is plain and unambiguous. Therefore no question of interpretation of that provision arises. In view of our finding on the merits of the case, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single judge of the High Court and restore that of the Sessions Judge. The appellants on bail. Their bail bonds do stand cancelled.
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1970 (8) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
Order of acquittal set aside - Held that:- While imposing sentence a Court might take notice of the fact that a person is being vicariously punished for an offence and if he shows that it is possible that the contravention of the Act took place without his knowledge or neglect a sentence of imprisonment may not be imposed. In this case he was abroad at the time of contravention and it is possible that the contravention took place without his knowledge or because of lack of diligence. It seems to us that on the facts of this case a sentence of fine of ₹ 2,000/- will meet the ends of justice.
The learned counsel for the respondent State urges that this is not a case fit for review because it is only a case of mistaken judgment. But we are unable to agree with this submission because at the time of the arguments our attention was not drawn., specifically to sub-s. 23C(2) and the light it throws on the interpretation of sub-s. (1).
In the result the review petition is partly allowed and the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 1969 modified to the extent that the sentence of six months’ rigorous. imprisonment imposed on Girdharilal is set aside. The sentence of fine of ₹ 2,000/- shall, however, stand.
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1970 (8) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... General and the Advocate General will be persons aggrieved because they are interested in maintaining the professional rectitude. The Attorney General and the Advocate General have the right of pre-audience. Such right determines that they are leaders of the profession in their respective fields. They will ask formatting the proper standards of professional ethics. It is from that point of view that the Attorney General and the Advocate General will be aggrieved persons when they will find that them interest of the Bar, the, public interest have not been proper safeguarded by decisions of the Disciplinary Committee of-the Bar Council. For these reasons I am of opinion that the Advocate General of the State of Maharashtra is competent to appeal as a person aggrieved under section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Bar Council of India is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1970 (8) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rther it was established therein that some of the officers who competed with him had earlier challenged his seniority and consequently his right to be the Chief Conservator and that dispute was pending. Under those circumstances this Court held that there -was contravention of the principles of natural justice. For the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the High Court that the impugned order is invalid. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. The Court by order dated November 18, 1970 and January 19, 1971 on an application for review filed by the respondent vacated its order dismissing the writ petition. Instead, the proceedings were remanded to the High Court for decision on such points as were not, dealt with and decided in the judgment of that court. Ed. Appeal allowed. Proceedings remanded.
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1970 (8) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o determine compensation. Subsection (5) of section 33 of ',.he Act states that in determining the amount of compensation the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24 and other relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act These provisions indicate that if the Collector will determine an amount higher than what the State Government may by general orders specify, the approval of the State Government will be necessary. There is no ceiling fixed by the Government. Finally, there is an appeal to the Court from the decision of the Collector. The decision of the Court will finally determine the amount of compensation. We are of opinion that there is no restriction on the, powers of the Collector in the matter -of determination of compensation, although the approval of Government may be necessary in the Government interest. All the contentions advanced by the petitioners fail. The petitions 'are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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