|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 90 Records
-
1971 (1) TMI 129 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lf is at best a technical objection and the same can. I think be without any difficulty removed by granting to the plaintiffs the necessary leave as contemplated by the Rule. I am told that such a request was made in the trial Court itself, but there was no occasion for that Court to grant that prayer because of the view that the joinder of causes of action was held not to offend the provisions of Order 2, Rule 4. Although I have taken the view that it does offend the provisions of Order 2, Rule 4 of the Civil P. C., I propose to get over the objection by granting to the plaintiffs the leave in question at this stage. The second objection does not therefore survive. 19. In the view I have taken, the Civil revision application is partly allowed and the suit shall be returned to the trial Court for being proceeded with and disposed of according to law in the light of this judgment. The costs of this Civil Revision Application shall abide and follow the final result of the suit.
-
1971 (1) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... set aside the order of the trial Court and decreed the plaintiffs claim holding that the will executed by Jaimal was true and genuine and that it was the last will executed by him. The High Court has affirmed that decision. The concurrent finding of the 1st appellate Court as well as the High Court that the will executed by Jaimal on November 13, 1937, is genuine is a finding of fact and the same cannot be assailed in this Court. Nihali having succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on the strength of that will cannot claim any rights in those properties over and above that given to her under that will. The life estate given to her under the will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore the appellant cannot claim any title to the suit properties on basis of the will executed by Nihali in her favour. 3. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ortgage and not a lease are first, that there is no provision for renewal; secondly, there is no provision for payment of customary dues; thirdly, the property was to be enjoyed by the defendants by way of interest on their advance after payment of land tax to the State, fourthly, the payment of land tax is not a deduction from rent or perquisites; fifthly, there is a provision for surrendering the property with a registered release at the cost of the transferees on the receipt of the consideration of kanam and the balance amount; sixthly, when the consideration is paid back the counter-pattam deeds and prior deeds would be returned; and finally, there is liability to pay interest on the advance and possession and enjoyment of profits of the property is in lieu of interest. 20. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was correct in its conclusion as to the nature of the transaction being a mortgage and not a lease. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 126 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
... ...
... ... ..... f jail. So also in the present case, it would be an empty and meaningless formality for the court to release the prisoner with the money, and allow the Enforcement Officer to arrest him at the entrance of the court premises under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The 2nd respondent, it appears, has made a confessional statement to the Enforcement Officer on 1-8-1970, confessing his guilt under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. But that has been retracted by an affidavit dated 10-9-1970, stating that it was extracted from him by physical torture. The admissibility or otherwise of the confession also need not engage the attention of the Magistrate, as it is for the officer enquiring into the matter under the Act. to sit in judgment over it. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and direct him to order delivery of the money to the petitioner Enforcement Officer on getting the necessary acknowledgment from him.
-
1971 (1) TMI 125 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
... ...
... ... ..... been defined as the day on which the Act came into force under section 2 (7) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act. It would therefore follow that the application may be preferred within a period of 90 days next after the day on which the Act came into force. The day next after the date on which the Act came into force is 2-1-1964. 2. In sub-section (1) of section 12 it is provided that In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Applying this provision, 2-1-1964, which is the day next after the commencement of the Act, has to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. The result would be that the execution petition for delivery filed by the decree-holder is within time and the decision of the lower appellate Court is correct. The second appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... down in these decisions it has to be found out as to whether the respondent Sukhadia did any act which can be construed to be out of the ordinary or with a view to entering into an election bargain with the voters. In all the three instances relied on by the appellant at Raigar Colony, Tekri and Baluchistan Colony, it is manifest that there were long standing public grievances and the Government from time to time made suggestions and recommendations for redress of the grievances and amelioration of the condition of the people. It cannot be said that on the eve of the election there was any sudden or spontaneous out-burst of public activity in the shape of diverting public money to win electors on the side o# the respondent Sukhadia by throwing baits or giving them any particular and specially favoured treatment. 61. For these reasons we are of opinion that the appellant is not entitled to succeed. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that excepting for the difference in the dates and the details of the lands in respect of which the lease was claimed the texts of the two orders are identical. One cannot but remark that orders rejecting such applications appear to be made on a formula which is well known to the department. In our view Departments cannot be allowed to perform their tasks so perfunctorily in disposing of claims of parties to valuable rights and it is incumbent on them to indicate the grounds on which the revision applications are disposed of unless the State Government had already in its order of rejection given the grounds and the Union Government referred to such grounds in its capacity as a revising authority. 12. In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of April 4, 1967 is quashed. The Central Government Is directed to decide the revision application afresh in the light of the observations made. But in the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs of this appeal.
-
1971 (1) TMI 122 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he above provision is necessary in order that the Reserve Bank of India may have an effective control over deposits received by non-banking financial companies. The restrictions imposed thereunder are reasonable and have been made in the interests of the investing public. 45. The next contention of Mr. Nambiar relates to Clause 5 of the notification which deals with the particulars to be furnished in advertisement soliciting deposits. We do not consider anything unreasonable in this clause. 46. We are, therefore, of opinion that the impugned provisions falling under Chapter III-B of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and the notification dated October 29, 1966, issued by the Reserve Bank of India are valid and that there is no substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners. 47. The writ petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs (one set). Counsel's fee ₹ 250. C.M.P. Nos. 14437 to 14439/69 for leave to raise additional grounds ordered.
-
1971 (1) TMI 121 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ffence was committed although he has not stated so while dealing with the question of sentence and has rightly held that it appeared that accused No. 1 was negligent in supervising the laboratory and was not directly responsible for the manufacture of the tablets. Sentence is in the discretion of the trial Court and unless it can be said to be a sentence, which is grossly inadequate, this Court cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Magistrate. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances, it appears that accused No. 1 was negligent and had not tried his best to satisfy himself that the tablets, which were being produced in the laboratory, were up to the pharmaceutical standards. He trusted his subordinates and the staff of the company and thereby committed the offence by negligence. It cannot, therefore, be said that the sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate is so inadequate as to justify interference by this Court. 4. Rule, therefore, is discharged.
-
1971 (1) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er unit the claims of the sole tenderer who had filed a forged bank guarantee was not considered and the unit was settled by negotiation at the highest available price. Lastly in the case of six units no tenders had been received and these were settled by negotiation at the best available prices. The five writ petitions concerned only seven units in respect of which tenders of the petitioners had not been accepted. 17. In our view, the counter affidavit showing the manner in which the units were disposed of completely demolishes suggestions of fraudulent preference of one tenderer to another. As the petitioners have not been able to satisfy us that the amendments effected in 1969 either in the Act or in the rules are against the exercise of a monopoly in the business of Kendu leaves by the Government of Orissa and as they have further failed to make out any case of arbitrary or mala fide action on the part of the State authorities, the petitions must be dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... at Mahabir Prasad being one of the heirs of Saroj Devi there can be no abatement merely because no formal application for showing Mahabir Prasad as an heir and legal representative of Saroj Devi was made. Where in a proceeding a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on the record in another capacity, it is only necessary that he should be described by an appropriate application made in that behalf that he is also on the record, as an heir and legal representative. Even if there are other heirs and legal representatives and no application for impleading them is made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the proceeding will not abate. On that ground also the order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. 6. The appeal is allowed and the proceeding remanded to the High Court to be dealt with and disposed of according to law. Defendants will pay the costs of this appeal. Costs in the High Court will be the costs in the appeal.
-
1971 (1) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat purpose we adjourned the petition to the 7th of this month. When the matter was taken up on that date, the learned Advocate General informed us that the Government was unable to accept our suggestion. That day the hearing of the case was completed. Bearing in mind the serious consequences that our order is likely to have on those 24 students, we again asked the Advocate-General to explain to the Government the hardship that is likely to be caused to the selected students for no fault of their own and inform us the decision of the Government before the 14th of this month. The Government’s reaction was not favourable. Hence there is no alternative before us but to allow the writ petition, quash the impugned selections and direct the Stale of Tamil Nadu to appoint a fresh selection committee for making selections in accordance with our order dated September 23, 1970. The State of Tamil Nadi, shall pay the costs of the petitioner in this writ petition. Petition allowed
-
1971 (1) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Chagla appearing for the State of Rajas-than conceded that the claim made by the District Board in respect of the contribution due from the respondent 'is not sustainable as the same had to be collected by the Government but he tried to make a distinction between the claim in respect of the contribution due and that in respect of the cess collected by the respondent from his sub-grantees and tenants. No provision of the Act has been brought to our notice which either requires the Thikanedars to pay the cess collected by them from their sub-grantees and tenants to the District Board or which confers any right on the District Board to demand the payment of the same. In fact a perusal of the provisions quoted above clearly shows that the liability of the Thikanedar is to pay the cess collected by him to the Government 9. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the suit from which this appeal arises was not maintainable. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that purpose we adjourned the petition to the 7th of this month. When the matter was taken up on that date, the learned Advocate General informed us that the Government was unable to accept our suggestion. That day the hearing of the case was completed. Bearing in mind the serious consequences that our order is likely to have on those 24 students, we again asked the Advocate-General to explain to the Government the hardship that is likely to be caused to the selected students for no fault of their own and inform us the decision of the Government before the 14th of this month. The Government's reaction was not favourable. Hence there is no alternative before us but to allow the writ petition, quash the impugned selections and direct the Stale of Tamil Nadu to appoint a fresh selection committee for making selections in accordance with our order dated September 23, 1970. The State of Tamil Nadi, shall pay the costs of the petitioner in this writ petition. Petition allowed
-
1971 (1) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed requiring the proprietors of the theatres to pay tax on the aggregate amount of the net 4 05 value of the ticket and the entertainment duty that the proprietor was called upon to pay the difference. Till January 11, 1962 the proprietor acted pursuant to the memorandum dated March 18, 1960 issued by the Collector and collected the duty and paid it over. The Government of Gujarat later advised that the method of collection notified by the Collector was not the correct method. But the 'Act contains no provision for reopening assessments already made. When pursuant to return by the proprietor, payments were made and accepted under S. 4 (2) (b), the tax may be deemed to be assessed and paid, and the State cannot thereafter reopen the concluded assessments and seek to levy tax or duty which has escaped. The appeals fail except as to the amount claimed to be due for the period between March 18, 1960 and January 11, 1962. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1971 (1) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the year 1943 because Padampat Singhania said that there was demand in the month of October, 1943 and therefore limitation would start from that date. The view of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts is that there must be an unqualified demand for the whole sum before the limitation can star in case of demand for return of the amount deposited. (See Jogendranath Chokerbutty v. Dinkar(1) Ram Motigaur v. Naranji ( 2 ) and Subbaih Chetty & Ors. v. Visalakshgi Achi) ( 3 ) . That is the correct position in law. Counsel for the appellant did not contend to the contrary in view of the consensus of opinion of the different High Courts. It is also important to bear in mind that a demand in the year 1943 for a part of the amount would not be effective because there were common partners in the firms of the respondent and the appellant. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was correct in decreeing the suit. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t the settlement had been made with a view to causing considerable loss to the State Government. In our opinion neither the revenue authorities nor the High Court took into consideration the absence of any proof having been adduced with regard to the actual rate of settlement prevailing at the time when the settlement of the disputed land was made. We are altogether unable to understand how the rate of ₹ 3,.00 per katha was considered to be very low when no material had been produced to show what the current rate of rental prevailing at the relevant time was of land similar to the disputed land. Therefore one of the principal matters which weighed with the authorities and the High Court was based on pure assumptions and conjectures and on no evidence whatsoever. On this ground alone the impugned orders should have been quashed. The appeal is allowed and the impugned orders are hereby set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to his costs in this court. Appeal allowed.
-
1971 (1) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... es, given to the defendant as conclusive of the question whether the loft was in the occupation of the defendant as a tenant. The Court observed that on a consideration of the clauses of the agreement it was unable to reach a conclusion whether the agreement was intended to operate as a lease or as a licence but since exclusive possession was given it must be regarded a lease. The High Court considered all the covenants and the attendant cir-- cumstances and reached the conclusion that having regard to the exclusive possession given to the defendant it was intended to confer an interest in the loft and on that account the agreement operated as a lease and not as a licence. We have carefully considered the covenants in the light of the relevant surrounding circumstances. We are unable to disagree with the view taken by the High Court that by the terms of the agreement an interest was created in the loft in favour of the defendant. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (1) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as the facts of this case are concerned." It was wholly unnecessary, as was pointed out by the learned Judge himself, to consider the question of admissibility under s. 36 of the Act. His decision really rested on the conclusion that a fact which is admitted did not require proof. The case is not an authority for the proposition that secondary evidence of a document is to be treated on the same footing as an unstamped or insufficiently stamped original document. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. The respondents moved an application C.M.P. No. 87 of 1971 under Order 47 Rule 3of the Rules of this Court for a direction that a relief for future mesne profits from the date of the suit be added to the decree. On the fact of this case we cannot allow the application. The respondents in their own plaint had stated that they would file a suit for future mesne profits and it was because of this that the courts below did not grant any such relief. Appeal dismissed.
-
1971 (1) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a contract or a clause of it is incorporated in the award is a question of construction of the award
Whether 547 vehicles said' to have been sold to the company under sale:-note 197, dated August 2,/6, 1946?
Whether 600 vehicles which had been taken out of Moran Depot for operational purposes were part of the sale under sale-note 160?
Whether the amount of such rent was fixed by the umpire without any evidence?
Whether the amount of costs awarded by the umpire to the respondents was disproportionate?
Held that:- This is not a case where the umpire, in the words of Lord Dunedin, "tied himself down to a legal proposition" which on the face of the award was unsound. The award ,makes it clear in so many words that he took into account the entire evidence, including the documents relied on by counsel and then only came to the conclusion that it did not assist the company in its contention as to the scope of the sales.
Once it is found that he was competent to decide the dispute as to whether the said 547 vehicles were not the subject-matter of the sale and 291 of them were removed unauthorisedly, he must, to do justice between the parties in respect of disputes referred to him, order the company either to return them or to pay compensation for them. Since the first course was not possible after all these years, the second was the only and the obvious course. The dispute raised by the respondents that 291 vehicles were not included in the sale was: co-extensive with and connected with the dispute that the company was bound to return them if it was found that they were not covered by the sale. On this reasoning it is not possible to say that the umpire went beyond his jurisdiction either in rejecting the company's claim No. VI or in accepting the corresponding counter-claim No. VI of the respondents.
Having held that sale-note 160 covered only those vehicles which were actually lying in Moran Depot on July 10, 1946, it was not incumbent on the umpire to decide the number of operational vehicles outside the depot. Consequently, if he was satisfied that even though the company was not entitled to the said 600 vehicles claimed by it, yet the authorities had delivered a substantial number of them, and for any deficiency, had also delivered non-operational vehicles, there would be no purpose in going into the details of vehicles delivered to the company. Even though, as the judgment of the Trial Court discloses (para 223), there was evidence, both oral and documentary, that the company had collected a number of vehicles lying at places outside the Depot, and the vehicles so collected were recorded by the company, yet the company had withheld the production of those records. In view of these facts it is impossible to say that the umpire had acted without evidence, or that he behaved in the manner of a conciliator, or gave findings on conjectures and surmises.
Under the contracts of sale the company was, bound to pay to the Government ground rent and other charges which the Government in its turn was liable to pay. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the umpire could award only that amount which the Government had actually paid and that the umpire should, therefore, have taken an account from the Government. It was never the case of the company that the Government had claimed ground rent higher than the compensation it was liable to pay.
It appears from the award-that the umpire fixed the amount of costs after considering the statements of expenses incurred by the parties for the hearing before him tendered by the respective counsel for the parties. Considering the huge amounts claimed by the parties, the volume of evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced by them, the number of days occupied in recording that evidence and in arguing the case, we are not prepared to say that the discretion which the umpire exercised in the matter of costs was exercised in breach of any legal provision or unreasonably which can justify the Court's intervention. Appeal dismissed
|
