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Showing 1 to 20 of 63 Records
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1972 (5) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... police have been giving excuses not only for his non-production but also for not proceeding with the case. The learned advocate for the Respondent State has taken us through the affidavit filed by the investigating officer in-charge of the case, and has pointed out the various difficulties in the committal proceedings being commenced. In any case, he has given an undertaking that the case of Kanu Sanyal and Patnaik who are required for trial in other States will be separated if they are not available before the 1st June, 1972, for the committal proceedings to go on. The State will request the court to separate their cases and thereafter proceed with the committal proceedings. In any case, on behalf of the State, he undertakes that these proceedings will commence by the 21st June, 1972, and that steps to proceed expeditiously would be taken. 2. In view of the fact that the arrest and detention of the Petitioner on the various charges is not illegal, this petition is dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s report to the State Government within ten weeks from the date of detention. 9. In this case, the Board did not consider it essential to hear the petitioner in person before submitting its report. So, unless the petitioner requested for a personal hearing, there was no obligation on the part of the Board to give a personal hearing to him. The Board considered all the relevant materials relating to the case of the petitioner and it came to a conclusion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner in its report dated September 6, 1971. On the same day the petitioner sent a representation to the Board that he may be heard in person. That representation reached the Board only on September 8, 1971. Thereafter the Board heard the petitioner in person on September 18, 1971, but found no reason to revise its previous opinion. So it submitted a supplementary report to the Government on September 18, 1971, to that effect. 10. We, therefore, dismiss the petition.
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1972 (5) TMI 76 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ; 3/- per sq. ft. of plinth area. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff has been paid on this basis. The plaintiff now wants to claim on the basis scheduled rates but it is not so entitled in view of the specific terms of the contract. We. therefore. find that the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the plaintiff's claim. 81. The result. therefore. is that the plaintiff is found entitled to obtain a decree for damages resulting from the fraudulent misrepresentation. which is proved. As stated above. this decree would be for the amount of ₹ 2.02.960.00. This appeal, is therefore, allowed to that extent and the decree of the trial Court is accordingly set aside. There shall be a decree against the respondent-Board and in favour of the plaintiff for ₹ 2.02.960.00 together with proportionate costs throughout and interest at the rate of 6% on this amount from the date of the suit till the date of the payment. Decree accordingly. 82. Appeal allowed partly.
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1972 (5) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... d set aside. In the premises the appeal is allowed. Banerjee, J. passed his order in this case following his judgment dated 8th of September, 1969, in matter No. 454 of 1967 (6) (Messrs. M. Abhechand & Co. v. S. K. Srivastava & Ors.) For the reasons mentioned hereinbefore, we are unable to accept the conclusion reached by Banerjee, J. in the said judgment. The order of Banerjee, J. in the instant case, is therefore, set aside and there will be order quashing the show cause notice dated 1st of December, 1965, and all proceedings taken thereunder. Respondents are restrained from proceedings taken thereunder. Respondents are restrained from proceeding further with the said show cause notice. Let writs in the nature of certiorari and mandamus issue accordingly. The rule nisi issued under Article 226 of the Constitution is made absolute to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs, A.K. Mukherjea, J. I agree.
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1972 (5) TMI 74 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by anger. However wrong-headed a prosecutor may be if he honestly thinks that accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be initiator of a malicious prosecution." 21. Absence of reasonable and probable cause may sometimes entitle the Court to draw an inference of malice but where the prosecution is found to be based on a reasonable belief no inference whatsoever of malice can be drawn against the prosecutor. In short, the circumstances of this case show that the respondent was not actuated by any malice when he filed the complaint against the appellant. 22. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the appellant has failed to establish that the respondent had no reasonable and probable cause for prosecuting the appellant, nor has he been able to establish that the respondent in so doing was actuated by malice. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Sandhawalia, J. 23. I agree. 24. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... opinion of the Court, necessarily implied that such a representation must, when made, be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, for otherwise "the obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation loses both its purpose and meaning." In Prof. K.L. Singh v. State of Manipur Court held that an unexplained delay of 17 days was enough to render the detention illegal. In Baidya Nath Chunkar v. State of West Bengal (W.P. No. 377 of 1971 decided on March 14, 1972) unexplained delay of 29 days in considering the representation was held to have vitiated the detention of the detenu. The different cases mentioned above were referred to by this Court in the case of Kanti Lal Bose v. State of West Bengal (W.P. No. 8 of 1972 decided on May 5, 1972) and it was held that unexplained delay of 28 days in considering the detenu's representation would invalidate his detention. 8. I, therefore, accept the petition and make the rule absolute.
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1972 (5) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... been satisfied and therefore the agreement had not lapsed. Respondent No. 1 could have enforced that agreement and the appellant had no right to bring a suit for specific performance against Chhoti Begum by virtue of the subsequent agreement dated August 11, 1953. The suit for specific performance was liable to be dismissed both on the ground that the respondent had a right of pre-emption and that the appellant could not enforce the agreement dated August 11, 1953 in the presence of the earlier agreement dated August 19, 1952. The High Court had affirmed that view. On behalf of the appellant an attempt was made by Shri M. C. Chagla to assail the above decision but we are unable to find any error in the judgment of the first appellate court or the High Court of a nature which would justify interference by us. Therefore the appeal arising out of the suit for specific performance also fails and it is dismissed. In that appeal the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
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1972 (5) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e built-up area in the lay outs surroundings the acquired land, we find that it is only eighty per cent of the land which can be sold as building site. On these calculations if the average price of the plots sold in the locality is taken to be -/12/- per sq. ft. the overall price of the acquired land without roads and drains would work out to a little less than -/9/- per sq. ft. To put the matter in a different way, the value of -/10/-per sq. ft. found by the Additional Judge would work out to a little over -/12/- per sq. ft., if only the area which could be built upon is considered saleable as building site. We, therefore, find that the price at -/10/-per sq. ft. allowed by the Additional District judge is not unreasonable; if anything, it errs on the generous side. 9. We have no manner of doubt that the High Court had taken all the factors into consideration while assessing the value. 10. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (5) TMI 70 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the legal representatives faintly suggested that the amount of compensation be enchanced to ₹ 1,50,000/- but his submission was wholly misconceived as his clients never filed any appeal or cross objection against the order of the learned Single Judge and they are consequently not entitled to any enhancement nor is there any justification to vary the amount. All the counsel appearing before us agreed that the liability of the garage man must also be included in the order of the learned Single Judge. 20. As a result we dismiss the appeals with the modification that besides the insurance company the seller Gurcharn Singh and the mechanic Ram Lal found liable by the learned Single Judge Gulari Lal respondent No. 8 (herein referred to as garage man ) would also be liable to pay the amount of ₹ 31,500/- as compensation awarded to the legal representatives of the deceased. The parties will bear their respective costs of the appeals before us. 21. Order accordingly.
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1972 (5) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o either of them. For, that ground relate to an assault on an individual, undoubtedly with lethal & dangerous weapons, by the petitioner and his associates. Such an act, as is expressed in ground No. 2, cannot, however, be said to place public order in jeopardy, actual or likely, much less the security of the State. It is clearly an act which infringes the law and order, but cannot be said, being in relation to a particular individual only, to endanger public order. Ground No. 2, therefore, was clearly extraneous to any of the heads, endangering which gives ground for invoking the power under the Act. That being so, in view of the well settled position that an extraneous ground vitiates the order since it is impossible to predicate whether without it the requisite satisfaction could have reached, the impugned order cannot be upheld. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, the petition succeeds and is allowed. We direct that the petitioner be released from his detention forthwith.
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1972 (5) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... titioner had made no grievance in the writ petition about the delay in the consideration of his representation. It was observed that if any such plea had been taken, the Court would have had to consider whether the Government had any explanation to offer for the delay. The above case, in our opinion, cannot be of much assistance to the respondent State. As stated earlier, the counsel arguing on behalf of the petitioner had been permitted to take additional grounds. One of those grounds specifically dealt with the point that the respondent had made an inordinate delay in considering the representation of the petitioner and, as such, had contravened Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The learned Counsel for the respondent State thereafter looked into the official file and could furnish no explanation for the failure of the State Government to consider the representation of the petitioner till September 8, 1971. 10. We, therefore, accept the petition and make the rule absolute.
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1972 (5) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as also to be upheld. No doubt, mere refusal to give work does not by itself amount to lock-out but in the present case it cannot be disputed that when the employers closed the Sijua and Bhelatand collieries respectively on September 25 and 26, 1963 they knew that this change in the weekly days of rest was, not acceptable to a considerable section of the workmen who had not come to work on Sunday September 22, 1963. The closure of the place of work in the two aforesaid collieries on the two days in question was thus deliberate. Coal having been declared a public utility service, as observed by the Regional Labour Commissioner in his order, notice as contemplated by s. 22 of the Act was necessary. Such a notice having not been given, the lock-out was clearly illegal under s. 24 of the Act. The High Court was in our opinion right in the orders made by it in the writ petitions. All the six appeals thus fail and are dismissed with costs. Only one set of costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... upheld. In S. K. Kedar v. State of West Bengal (WP No. 35 of 1972 decided on May 2, 1972) the allegation against the detenu was that he and his associates while removing railway material charged bombs and ballast upon R.P.F. party as a consequence of which the members of R.P.F. party fired in self-defence. The activity of the petitioner was considered to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the detention order was upheld. The facts of the present case are much more akin to those of Tapan Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. v. State of West Bengal (supra). The past activities of the petitioner as revealed in the grounds of detention, in our opinion, showed a propensity to disturb public order. The authority concerned, in the circumstances, could have validly made the order for the detention of the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The petition consequently fails and is dismissed. V.P.S. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... all of them were taken and urged before the Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge, they have not been fully and properly considered. No similar allegation was made in so far as he High Court was concerned though it was said that the Court at Neemuch in Madhya Pradesh would have no jurisdiction to try the offence. As this objection was not urged we cannot permit any such contention to be raised before us. 8. As the third contention raised before us namely that since on the prosecution case Miroo had handed over the revolver to Chhaganlal after receiving it from the accused, it cannot be said to have been in constructive possession of the appellant, is dependent on the evidence to be adduced at his trial, the learned advocate for the appellant did not press this ground. 9. In the view we have taken except for the direction that the charge be amended by the substitution of the words "on or before" by the words "on or about", this appeal is dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 20(3) of the Constitution. In that case, the breach of those Regulations took place before the commencement of the new Act. Even then the prosecution under the new Act was held to be valid on the ground that the Regulations were deemed to have, been made under the new Act. In the present case, the offence of being in possession of and carrying a sword without licence took place after the commencement of the new Act of 1959. The said notification, by virtue of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act having to be deemed to have been made under S. 4 of the Arms Act, 1959, the notification was in force on the date of the alleged offence. The offence thus fell under the Arms Act, 1959, and that being so, acts set out in ground No. (2) were covered by cl. (d) of S. 3(2) of the Act. Consequently, that ground cannot be said to be extraneous to the Act. This being the only contention arising for our consideration and it having failed, the petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he was admitted in 1970 whereas any eligible candidate out of the present respondents who may be held entitled to admission in accordance with the judgments of the High Court cannot qualify for any Post-Graduate Degree unless he starts attending the course which will mean that another period of two years will have to lapse before he can get the Post-Graduate degree if he passes all the examinations etc. The High Court, while granting the relief, ought to have kept in view the injustice that would result in a matter like this and which would make the grant of the writ almost futile. It is true that a good deal of time has lapsed owing to the pendency of the appeal in this Court but even the judgment of the High Court was delivered on November 6, 1970 by which time the same difficulties would have been apparent. 6. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court is hereby set aside. The writ petition shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (5) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sions. It is true that the suit temple had some physical characteristics and features which are generally to be found in a public temple. It was also established that persons who were outsiders in the sense that they did not belong to the Thoguluva family used to come and worship at the temple and made offerings there. There were also some jewels and other articles in the temple. But the determination of the question whether the temple was public or private did not depend on some facts or set of facts alone. The entire evidence, both documentary and oral, had to be, considered as a whole keeping in view the principles already noticed by us. We are satisfied that the learned District Judge came to the correct conclusion that the suit temple was private in character. For all the above reasons the appeal is allowed, the judg- ment of the High Court is set aside and that of the District Judge restored. The appellant will be entitled to costs in this Court. Appeal allowed. V.P.S.
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1972 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... procedure becomes operative and effective retrospectively in a new garb without a change in the substance beneath it. if no one can have a vested right in a procedure which does not, by itself, violate a constitutional guarantee, one could not, a fortiori, insist that it should not bear a particular descriptive label which is thereto alucidate the meaning only. After all, we are concerned with the real meaning and effect of the words used and not with what they may be made to appear to convey by a merely clever play with words. The unmistakable effect of what was laid down by the Act 40 of 1971 was simply that the option to proceed to evict unauthorised occupants of public properties in any way out- side the Act was shut out retrospectively. This was clearly within the legislative competence of Parliament. For all the reasons given by my learned Brother Ray as well as for a few more given above I respectfully agree with orders made by my learned Brethren. Appeals dismissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mplete and cosequently there was a resulting trust. As they have failed to establish the same, for the purpose of this case, we have to proceed on the basis that the dedication was only partial and the properties retained the character of private properties. Therefore the, widows of V. Rm. Shanmugam Pillai had a beneficial interest in those properties see Kalipada Chakraborti and anr. v. Palani Bala Devi and Ors ( 1953 S.C.R. 503). As seen earlier they had alienated their interest in those properties. For the reasons already mentioned, the plaintiffs are precluded from questioning the validity of those alienations. It is not open now to them to contend that the alienations in question are invalid. It is not necessary for as to decide in this case whether their successors can challenge those alienations. Suffice it to say that the plaintiffs are precluded from challenging those alienations. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dimissed.
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1972 (5) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
Whether s. 43 of the Act contemplates a show cause notice which has not been given and that in any event this section clothes the authority granting the licence with unguided and uncanalised power to withdraw the licence and is, therefore, violative of Art. 14 and also Art. 19 of the Constitution as it encroaches on the appellant's fundamental right of carrying on trade or business? - Held that:- Appeal dismissed.
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