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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 53 Records
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1973 (10) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... received information that the appellant had been supplying ammunition to the dacoits. This was certainly evidence. It may explain why the accused was searched. But, what the Informer stated about the connection of the appellant with the dacoits was mere hearsay unsupported by any direct or admissible evidence. The High Court had also held that "in the circumstances of the case" the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment was deserved. 4. Ordinarily, this Court does not interferes on a question of sentence. But, as the High Court and the Courts below seem to have been affected by inadmissible evidence in awarding two years' rigorous imprisonment to the appellant whom no previous conviction is shown, we think that the ends of justice would be met by reducing the sentence to one year's rigorous imprisonment. Subject to this modification this appeal is dismissed. The appellant shall surrender to his bail and undergo the remaining part of the sentence.
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1973 (10) TMI 60 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... point of difference on which any reference could be made to arbitration before the filing of the suit, the proceedings in Court could not be stayed. The ratio in the aforementioned cases applies to the present case. Defendant No. 1 failed to state the differences between the parties in the application filed by him under Section 34 of the Act, which he ought to have done. In the circumstances, the proceedings could not be referred to the Arbitrator. The trial Court has erroneously held that the dispute exists between the parties under the agreement which for its resolution requires reference to the arbitration. In my view, the approach of the learned trial Court was erroneous. I, therefore, upset the finding of the trial Court. 10. For the reasons recorded above, I accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge and dismiss the application under Section 34 of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. 11. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (10) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ferent from that of a grant. Rule 13 finds place in Part I-A of the Rules with the title 'General'. Under Section 5(2)(a) of the Act, the licensing authority shall not grant a licence unless it is satisfied that the rules made under this Act have been substantially complied with. We, therefore, do not find any justification in making a distinction between grant and renewal of a licence under the provisions of the Act read with the Rules. Rule 13 is, therefore, clearly applicable to grant as well as to renewal of a licence. 23. With regard to the last submission of Mr. Setalvad, in our view, there is no manifest error of law in the order of the Board and there was no scope for interference by the High Court with the order under Article 226 of the Constitution. 24. In the result the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court stands dismissed. The appeal is allowed with costs.
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1973 (10) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e the licence may revoke it. But having regard to the object and context of Section 4, we are of opinion that it should not be regarded as an over-weighing consideration. It will normally be difficult for the Government to ignore the Board's expert advice. We are satisfied from the object and context of Section 4 that Parliament intended to make consultation of the Board an imperative condition to revoking a licence. 22. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The petition of the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution is allowed and the notice No. 11795-EL 1/61/19 PW dated 17-8-1962, the order of revocation No. 11795/EL 1/61-30/PW dated 17-5-1963 and the order No. 11795-EL 1/61-31/PW dated 17-5-1963 directing the appellant to hand over the Undertaking to the Board are quashed. The appellant shall not get his costs here as well as in the High Court, as the point on which the appeal is allowed was not raised in the High Court.
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1973 (10) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... Section 135 except with the previous sanction of the Collector of Customs. The Collector gave the sanction for prosecution of an offence under Section 135. The contention is that as the notice under Section 124 as contemplated under Section 110 is not proper, the owner of the goods is immune from taking any further proceedings either by way of confiscating or levying penalty or criminal prosecutions. On that basis it is next contended that no prosecution could ever lie and the sanction given by the Collector should be quashed. We are of the view that Section 110 can only be restricted to the seizure and detention of the goods for the period specified and has nothing to do with the other powers conferred on the authority under Section 124 or other provisions of the Act. The submission that no prosecution would lie cannot be accepted. In the result, all the writ appeals are allowed and the writ petitions will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (10) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n other words, we should not undertake to determine what is, really and substantially only a question of sufficiency of grounds of detention. Some vagueness seems often unavoidable and can almost invariably be discovered if we search assiduously for it among grounds of satisfaction relating to future course of conduct of an individual about which the detaining authority has to attempt a reasonable and honest forecast. It is only where a vagueness or indefiniteness is disclosed which either makes the satisfaction quite illusory and unreasonable or which really disables a detenu from making an effective representation that a detention is vitiated on such a ground. I am not at all satisfied that this is the position in the case before us. The consequence of the views held and expressed by me above is that I would dismiss these writ petitions. ORDER In view of the majority judgment, the rule nisi is made absolute. We direct the immediate, release of the petitioners from custody.
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1973 (10) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ord some rent receipts and Municipal receipts, A(2)-II to A(5)-II.. Ex. A-11 stands in the name of Mst. Hakimunnissa. It evidences payment of platform tax by her to the Municipality. It is true that the date on it was not decipherable; but it was obvious that this document concerned the disputed house and related to a period when Mst. Hakimunnissa was alive. This evidence further strengthened the conclusion that Mst. Hakiinunnissa in her life time, and, after her death, her daughter Bibi Hazra, were in enjoyment of and dealing with the house in dispute as owners thereof. Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances and the probabilities of the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the plaintiffs appellants had failed to prove that Mst. Hakimunnissa in whose name the sale-deed (Ex.D/1) stood, was not the real purchaser but only a benamidar of her husband. I in the result, we affirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the- purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence." We, therefore, reach the conclusion that the appellants' arrival in this Court has been an exercise in futility' The appeal must, therefore, fail and is hereby dismissed. There is some force in the submission that the first respondent had throughout in his pleadings set out a case against the joint family character of the Properties and it was only at the stage of the evidence that he fell back on the alternative case that has got him through. We, therefore, direct that the appellants shall be directed to pay only half the costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r country. Indeed, the education of. the sentencing judge, particularly in the context of economic offenses, is a yawning gap in our criminal system and the, near-escape of the accused before the trial court in this case, prevented only by the Criminal Revision to the High Court, permits us to observe that the magistracy in the country has yet to realise that "there are occasions ’when an offender is so anti-social that his immediate and sometimes prolonged confinement is the best assurance of society’s physical protection."(1) Or, we may add, even in less severe situations heavy enough fine to drive him out of the trade if he tried the trick again. There is. injustice to the community the invisible but immense victim of the crime-in the court’s misplaced sympathy for the culprit. In the result, the writ petition proves a damp squib and the criminal appeal a futile venture in exculpation and extenuation. We dismiss both. K.B.N. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 52 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted to an authority by the legislature, such authority cannot, unless expressly empowered, exercise it with retrospective effect. (14) The word "person" in Section 53 of the Act includes a corporate body, such as, a co-operative society. (15) Under Section 91 of the Act, the State Government has the power to relax the outside limit prescribed in the proviso to Section 53 (3) of the Act and grant sanction to the competent authority to extend the period of supersession beyond three years and to the extent specified in the order. (16) Members of a co-operative society cannot just assemble and hold an election. An election can be held only as prescribed in the Act and the rules framed thereunder (Rule 41). 43. The petition is allowed. The orders passed on May 24, 1971 October 24, 1972 and May 26, 1973 by the State Government are quashed. We direct that an election shall be held forthwith under the provisions of the Act and the rules. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1973 (10) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the cloth sold Included the cost of Its packing was not based on any evidence, nor was It warranted by the circumstances of the case. The learned judges observed We think It absurd to call as containers the materials in which bundles of cloth are packed in the usual course of trade. It is a well-known courtesy observed by the traders that goods purchased are wrapped or packed before they are delivered to the customers and they charge nothing extra for such wrapping or packing-the case of containers made of metal, glass, etc., being quite different. It is on those materials that a slightly different view had to be taken in that case. We, therefore, agree that the view of the Tribunal that in the first two cases wherein gunny bags and tea-chests are the containers the assessment is proper and that in respect of the F.A.C.T. manure bags the assessment has to be deleted. These tax revision cases are, therefore, dismissed in the circumstances without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 50 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mittedly, in the instant case, there has not been such a transfer of the entire ownership of the business. The equity of redemption is still with the company. The provisions of section 17 would apply only where there is a complete transfer of the business such as where the business has been sold in its entirety. Moreover, the moment it is conceded that the finding of the learned single Judge to the effect that the corporation was entitled to remain in possession of the properties till the whole of the mortgage amount was paid and that the sales tax authorities could attach and sell the equity of redemption only, was unassailable, we fail to see how the second contention on the basis of the provisions of section 17, could even arise at all. Thus viewed from any angle, we find that the contention of the learned Deputy Advocate-General is without any merit. No other point was urged. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 49 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nover in accordance with law. The dealer had challenged the order of the Commercial Tax Officer before the Deputy Commissioner as arbitrary. The Commissioner was also of the opinion that the order of the Commercial Tax Officer was arbitrary. In these circumstances, what the Commissioner should have done was to set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and remand the appeal for fresh disposal. The Commissioner was not right in setting aside the orders of all the authorities below directing the Commercial Tax Officer to make a fresh order of assessment. For the reasons stated above, in modification of the order under appeal, we make the following order The order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in the Appeal Petition No. AP/DR/MST/269/ 69-70 is set aside and the case is remitted to the Deputy Commissioner for disposal of the said appeal afresh in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1973 (10) TMI 48 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... No. 54 refers to radio-gramophones, including component parts of radio-gramophones. A manufacturer of a component part of a refrigerator selling his article to a manufacturer of refrigerators is entitled to the benefits of section 5(3A) as both the conditions required by the said sub-section are satisfied. Similarly, a manufacturer of component parts of a wireless reception instrument is entitled to the benefits of the concessional rate but a manufacturer who manufactures component parts of component parts of either refrigerators or wireless reception instruments is not entitled to the concessional rate. In the instant case, condition No. 1 required to be satisfied is not satisfied as the assessee s articles of manufacture do not answer the description of the goods mentioned in the Second Schedule of the Act. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal is right. 6.. Accordingly, these revision petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, no costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 47 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble for prosecution and penalty. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the applicant as managing partner of the firm was liable to pay the tax. He was, therefore, rightly prosecuted. In the case of State v. BasdeoA.I.R. 1951 All. 44., only one partner of the firm was convicted under the Defence of India Rules, while the other partners were acquitted. A Division Bench of this Court held that there was nothing illegal in Basdeo being convicted even though his father and brother were fortunate in being acquitted, as their acquittal cannot at all affect his liability for the offence. It was further observed There is no law that when an offence is committed by a firm, either all or none of the partners must be prosecuted. In the light of the above discussion, the prosecution of the applicant cannot be considered to be illegal. He was rightly convicted. The sentence too is not severe. There is no force in this revision. It is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 46 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fficer v. Sha Sukraj Peerajee 1968 21 S.T.C. 5 (S.C.). Therefore, we are of the opinion that the petition deserves to succeed partly. We, accordingly, quash the order dated 29th April, 1971 (petitioner s annexure A-3), as also the demand notice (petitioner s annexure A-4) partly, stating that although the liability of the members or partners of the transferee-firm is there, an attempt should be made to recover the amount from the members or partners of the transferorfirm in the first instance and, in the alternative, from the members or partners of the transferee-firm. To that extent, we would modify the said order and the notice and issue a writ of mandamus accordingly. Consequently, this petition succeeds partly and is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the circumstances of the case, we order that there shall be no order as to costs of this petition in view of the divided success. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Ordered accordingly.
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1973 (10) TMI 45 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be dealt with on the basic principles, and taking into consideration the very object on the basis of which subsection (1-A) of section 5 of the Act has been incorporated, we have no doubt in our mind that the only proper interpretation is that the dealer making the sale at the first stage, who has to furnish a certificate, must be a registered dealer and thereafter the certificates are required only to connect the subsequent sale with the first sale. The words registered dealer in the proviso relate to the registered dealer who has effected the sale at the first stage. For the reasons given above, we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single judge and quash the impugned order of the departmental authorities levying sales tax on the goods sold by the assessee, which fall under the notified items and on which sales tax has been paid at the first stage. As the point in dispute was not free from difficulty, there would be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (10) TMI 44 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sion petition challenging the correctness of the view taken by the Tribunal. The expression firewood has not been defined in the Act. When the expression is not defined in the Act, it has to be interpreted in accordance with the sense in which it is understood in common parlance. Either in common parlance or in the commercial sense, the expression firewood is never understood as comprehending sawdust. Supposing a contract is entered for supply of one ton of sawdust and the vendor supplied one ton of firewood, can it be said that he has performed his part of the contract? Obviously, no court will hold that the vendor has supplied sawdust as contracted. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal, in our opinion, is patently erroneous and cannot be sustained. In that view, this revision petition is allowed, the order of the Tribunal exempting a turnover of Rs. 3,000 is reversed, and the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is restored. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (10) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... covered as a tax by the revenue authorities. Once the liability accrues by reason of running of interest, we find it difficult to follow how it will not become a liability in the nature of a tax dischargeable by the assessee. In Writ Petition No. 7734 of 1972, a further argument was raised by the petitioner to the effect that he was not liable to pay interest because the respondents had refused to accept the amount of tax tendered by him. The contention in the petition in this respect is vague and has been sworn on the basis of record which has not been described. The allegation has been denied in the counter-affidavit, and the rejoinder affidavit does not make any positive averment of the alleged tender. The respondents could not have prevented the payment if the petitioner had made the deposit in the Government treasury. The point, therefore, does not arise on the material on record. In the result, all these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (10) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... energy and (2) they must answer the description of electrical goods. In the instant case the articles in question, viz., wooden gittis, switch-boards and battens, are not worked by electricity. They are used in laying or controlling wires carrying electrical energy. In themselves they are not worked by electricity and, secondly, in common parlance also they do not answer the description of electrical goods. On the same considerations this court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lucknow v. M/s. B.C.M. Franklin and Co., Bareilly 1973 31 S.T.C. 251 1972 U.P.T.C. 716., has held that electrodes are not electrical goods even though electricity is consumed while making use of electrodes. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the revising authority is correct. We accordingly answer the question by saying that wooden gittis, switch-boards and battens are not electrical goods. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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