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Showing 1 to 20 of 101 Records
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1973 (4) TMI 127 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 0. During course of argument Mrs. Padhi appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that in view of the declaration of the hereditary right of Archakship of the plaintiff No. 2, he is entitled to perform the seba puia of the deity and other duties of the office. Her clients are not interested in prohibiting him to go inside the temple and to perform sebapuia of the deity and to carry out other duties of the office. The declaration of hereditary Archakship in favour of plaintiff No. 2 vests him with a civil right and any interference with that right will certainly give him a cause of action for getting appropriate remedy in appropriate Court of law. It is hoped that the respondents here shall not interfere with the right of plaintiff No. 2 as hereditary Archak. His claim for arrear salary, for the reasons stated above, has been rightly rejected as being beyond the scope of the doctrine of restitution embodied under Section 144, Civil P. C. 11. Appeal dismissed without costs.
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1973 (4) TMI 126 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ade conferring a discretion to the Court to consider whether a bona fide dispute or question arises in a suit which under the provisions of the Act is required to be decided or determined by the competent authorities under the Act and if no such bona fide dispute or question or issue arises, then it will not be obligatory for the Court to raise such an issue and refer it to the authorities under the Act. 6. As however, in both these cases an issue as regards tenancy had been raised, in view of the provisions of Sections 85 and 85-A, it was obligatory upon the Court to refer this issue to the authorities under the Act for determination. 7. In the result, both these revision applications are allowed. The rule is made absolute in each of these cases. The trial Court is directed to refer issue no.4 for determination by the authorities under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Each party will bear its own costs of these revision applications. 8. Revisions allowed.
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1973 (4) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt which tried the original offences or a court to which the trial court was subordinate, that could make such an order. The court of the Additional District Magistrate would not seem to be subordinate to the High Court as provided by section 195(3), Cr-P.C.' Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab( 1956 S.C.R. 125). Two courts below having in their judicial discretion declined to direct the prosecution of the appellant, on revision the High Court was, in our view, not all justified in itself directing the filing of the complaint. At best, if it considered the orders of the two courts below tainted with a serious legal infirmity or manifest error resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, it could have, after quashing those orders, sent the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of the matter in accordance with law' As a result of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation in allowing this appeal and setting aside the order of. the High Court. Appeal alloWed.
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1973 (4) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... we must deal with the appeal made to us that the justice should be done irrespective of technicalities. Justice has got to be done according to law. A Tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot go beyond the procedure laid down by the statute for its functioning. If it does so it would be acting without jurisdiction. We are, therefore, satisfied that the learned Judge was right in holding that though a general recount had been ordered and an account taken of the valid votes given for both the candidates, it was not possible to take into account any vote in favour of the appellant because of his failure to comply with section 97. Nor are we satisfied that we would be justified in ordering that this case should, be reconsidered by a larger Bench. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant will pay the first respondent's costs. Special Leave petition 1347/72 preferred against Application No. 648/72 in. Election Petition O.S. No. 2/1971 is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (4) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... breathe life into those provisions which were already void. Counsel also contended that the maximum period of detention prescribed by the amended Section 13 and by Section 17A(2)(d) did not satisfy Article 22(7)(b) since the period fixed by Parliament therein is three years or until the expiry of the Defence of India Act, whichever is later, an event uncertain as no one can anticipate when the emergency would be terminated. However, in the view we have taken of Section 17A of the Act we need not go into them as in accordance with the practice followed by this Court we need not decide more than what is necessary. We, therefore, do not express any views on the aforesaid contentions raised by counsel. It is, therefore, enough for us to declare Section 17A as not having satisfied the requirements laid down in Clause (7)(a) of Article 22 and therefore bad. 40. The consequence is that the petition succeeds and we direct that the petitioner be released forthwith from his detention.
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1973 (4) TMI 122 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... does not mean that the provision in a taxing statute should not be read reasonable. It is true that the Legislature cannot delegate its legislative functions to any other body. But subject to that qualification it is permissible for the Legislature to delegate the power to select the persons on whom the tax is to be levied. In the very nature of things, it is impossible for the Legislature to enumerate the goods, on dealings in which sales tax or purchase tax should be imposed. It is also impossible for the Legislature to select the goods, which should be subjected to a single point sales or purchase tax. Before making such selections several aspects, such as the impact of the levy on the society, economic consequences and the administrative convenience will have to be considered. These factors may change from time to time. Hence in the very nature of things, these details have got to be left to the executive." I agree that these writ petitions be dismissed with costs.
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1973 (4) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... art of their business premises, in our opinion, they cannot be held guilty in a criminal court of an offence under the Essential Commodities Act for violation of any such mandate. According to the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence, which reflects fair play, the dealer must know with reasonable certainty and must have a fair warning as to what his obligation is and what act of commission or omission on his part would constitute a criminal offence before he can be called upon to answer a charge and be liable to be convicted in a criminal court for any violation of a legal mandate. This approach is in conformity with the general requirement that the act or default should be associated with a legally blameworthy condition of mind. On the view that we have taken, the High Court seems to us to have been fully justified in recording the respondents' acquittal and we see no cogent ground for disagreeing with it. 10. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1973 (4) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a view to show that the bar under Section 57 of the Divorce Act would be effective. Even after getting the two dates in the course of the evidence no body thought of Section 57,which may either be because counsel appearing for Mr. Horo then or Mr. Horo himself did not believe the dates given by Mrs. Jaipal Singh to be accurate or because they did not want to make any capital of the snap answers given in the course of the evidence since the point was not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue. The judgment clearly suggests that it was open to agitate the matter before the High Court hearing the petition on the basis of Section 57. But the point was not pressed and must be deemed to have been given up. That was why this Court did not allow the point to be raised in appeal. In these circumstances it is not open to re-agitate it between the parties in a subsequent proceeding. 10. No other point was pressed before us and therefore the appeal will have to be dismissed with costs.
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1973 (4) TMI 119 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the accused because they very well knew the nature of the offence and the constituents and the ingredients of the offence of which they were charged. 11. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalore and convict the three respondents Kama, Jora and Navla under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, read with Clause 3/4 of the Inter-Zonal Wheat and Wheat Products (Movement Control) Order, 1964, and sentence each one of them to three months' simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 100/-, in default of payment of fine, each of them is further sentenced to one month's simple imprisonment. The order confiscating the wheat seized from the accused-respondents, passed by the learned Magistrate- is also restored. 12. The District Magistrate, Jalore, is directed to take steps to get the accused-respondents arrested and send them to jail for serving out the sentences awarded to them.
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1973 (4) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... has to be put up with in the larger interests of their own happiness and of the healthy, normal growth and development of their offspring, whom destiny has entrusted to their joint parental care. Incompatibility of tamprament has to be endeavored to be disciplined into compatibility and not to be magnified by abnormal impluses or impulsive desires and passions. The husband is not disentitled to a house and a housewife, even though the wife has achieved the status of an economically emancipated woman; similarly the wife is not a domestic slave, but a responsible partner in discharging their joint, parental obligation in promoting the welfare of their children and in sharing the pleasure of their children's company. 'Both parents have, therefore, to cooperate and work harmoniously for their children who should feel proud of their parents and of their home, bearing in mind that their children have a right to expect from their parents such a home. Appeal allowed in part.
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1973 (4) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rder of the trial court is not included by the appellant in the paper book and we do not know the reasoning of that court for granting stay. But on the view that we have taken that omission is of little consequence. 10. Finally, as a result of the decision of the High Court the only consequence is that the suit will now have to be tried by a competent court on the merits in accordance with law. Keeping in view the long delay after the institution of the suit and the fact that the suit is for a very heavy amount by way of damages for breach of contract, it will, in cur opinion, be more satisfactory on the whole to have the suit tried in a competent court of law in the normal course rather than by a lay arbitrator who is not bound either by the law of evidence or by the law of procedure. This course can certainly in no way be considered unjust or prejudicial to the appellant as to require interference by this Court. 11. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs
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1973 (4) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rthermore, the contract itself not being in accordance with Section 175 of the Government of India Act is void and the appellant is entitled to the refund of his money. We are unable to understand the reasoning of the High Court when it proceeds as though the appellant was trying to enforce the contract. We can see no justification for the lower Court refusing to allow interest for the plaintiff's amount at least from the date of his demand, or the latest from the date of suit. 10. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the appellant's suit will stand decreed, as prayed for, with the interest thereon from the date of suit till the date of realisation at 6 per cent. The appellant will also be entitled to his costs from the respondents in all the three Courts. It is unfortunate that due to sheer cussedness on the part of some officials the State has had to waste such a lot of money in litigation and also pay interest, but then they have had the use of the money so long.
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1973 (4) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appear to a. judicial mind, these are facts of life which are to be faced. The girls who were molested that night would not have come forward to give evidence in any regular enquiry and if a strict enquiry like the one conducted in a court of law were to be imposed in such matters, the girls would have had to go under the constant fear of molestation by the male students who were capable of such indecencies. Under the circumstances the course followed by the Principal was a wise one. The Committee whose integrity could not be impeached, collected and sifted the evidence given by the girls. Thereafter the students definitely named by the girls were informed about the complaint against them and the charge. They were given an opportunity to state their case. We do not think that the facts and circumstances of this case require anything more to be done. 12. There is no substance in the appeal which must he dismissed. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
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1973 (4) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Article 39(b) or (c), the law will not, as stated in Article 31C, receive immunity from a challenge under Articles 14, 19 or 31. 2251. The 29th Amendment Act is valid. The two Kerala Acts mentioned therein, having been included in the Ninth Schedule, are entitled to the protection of Article 31B of the Constitution. 2252. I would direct each party to bear its own costs. 2253. As I am coming to the close of my judgment, drafts of judgments of several of my esteemed colleagues are trickling in. As I look at them, I hear a faint whiser of Lord Dunedin. And then I thought I began this judgment by saying that I wanted to avoid writing a separate judgment of my own. Are first thoughts best? ORDER 2263. The Constitution Bench will determine the validity of the Constitution (Twentysixth Amendment) Act, 1971 in accordance with law. 2264. The cases are remitted to the Constitution Bench for disposal in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs incurred upto this stage.
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1973 (4) TMI 113 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee were not accepted as correct and complete, nor did the account books produced before the assessing authority disclose the turnover in question. It was only after the assessing authority made an investigation with the cotton dealers in and around Tiruppur that the fact that the assessee had purchased cotton and taken delivery of the same at Tiruppur came to light and it was only after this transaction was pointed out by the assessing authority, the assessee gave some explanation as to why the turnover had not been included in the monthly returns, or in the books of account maintained at the Tiruppur branch, and gave details of such turnover. In our view, these facts clearly lead to the inference that, but for the investigation made by the assessing authority, the turnover would not have come to light. In our view, section 12(3) of the Act has properly been invoked in this case. The tax case is therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (4) TMI 112 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion only to inter-State sales made to registered dealers. Whether the legislature has made the above distinction deliberately between cases of exemption and cases where the concessional rate of tax is levied, is not clear........ It is seen that subsequent to the decision of this court in T.C. No. 223 of 1967 (Subramaniam Brothers v. State of Madras 1973 32 S.T.C. 139. holding that the Government cannot be treated as a registered dealer on the provisions of the statute as it then stood, the legislature has chosen to amend section 6(2) by Central Act 61 of 1972 with effect from 1st April, 1973. As per the amended provision, all second and subsequent inter-State sales to a registered dealer or to the Government are entitled to the benefit of exemption. This also shows that before the amendment of section 6 by Central Act 61 of 1972, the Government was not treated as a registered dealer. Therefore, the tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (4) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee contends that the assessee has not in fact collected tax on the sales of automobile parts on the ground that the sales are not taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act and that, in fact, no tax could have been levied or collected but for the Central Act 28 of 1969. But as the claim for exemption under section 10 not having been made before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had no occasion to consider the tenability of that claim. For the application of section 10 certain factual basis has to be established by the assessee. It has to be found out whether the assessee has not in fact collected any tax in respect of the disputed turnover for the grounds set out in the said section. We, therefore, feel that it is proper that the Tribunal should consider the point. The order of the Tribunal is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for further consideration in the light of what has been stated above. There will be no order as to costs. Case remanded.
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1973 (4) TMI 110 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion of the learned counsel for the assessees is that even though there is some work done on the processed canvas cloth, the cost of such work, namely, stitching the ends and eyeletting would be very negligible and that, therefore, it should be considered that tarpaulin is only processed canvas cloth. Whether the work is negligible or not, the processed canvas cloth is not sold as such, but tarpaulin is sold as a separate finished product apart from the processed canvas cloth. We are clearly of the view that the Tribunal is right in holding that tarpaulin sold as a finished product cannot at all be treated as a textile falling under item 4 of Schedule III. Tarpaulin as a finished product is a different marketable commodity and it cannot be said that it is either sold as a textile or it continues to have the properties and characteristics of cloth. The result is the Tribunal s view is upheld and the tax case is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (4) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nly to the prior order for body-building. We find that the Tribunal merely proceeded to decide the case on the basis of the assessee s statement without probing further into the matter with reference to the various records and the correspondence between the customers and the assessee in relation to the body-building works undertaken by the assessee. We therefore consider that it is necessary for the Tribunal to decide afresh on the question of the assessee s liability on the two turnovers, viz., Rs. 35,253.10, which according to the assessee represents only sales of materials, and Rs. 47,800, which is claimed by the assessee to be pure labour charges, but which, according to the revenue, represent portions of the receipts relatable to the body-building contract. The tax case is, therefore, allowed with a direction to the Tribunal to consider the matter afresh, with costs. The order of the Tribunal setting aside the penalty will stand. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1973 (4) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plains the entries found in the anamath records which were taken from his residence, the assessing authority is entitled to proceed on the basis of the anamath records and make the best judgment assessment. We are of the view that the Tribunal has not considered the merits of the case at any length. We cannot, therefore, accept the view taken by the Tribunal that the anamath records have not been shown to be connected with the assessee. The entire matter has to be considered afresh. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal as also the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with a direction that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner will restore the appeal on his file and dispose of the same in accordance with law and after giving opportunity to the assessee to put forward his case and also to produce such of those materials which he may be inclined to file and also the oral evidence. The revision is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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