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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 71 Records
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1973 (5) TMI 105 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ught so wrongly--they could not stop the work. Same view has been expressed in an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Lekhraj Sathramdas v. N.M. Shah, (AIR 1966 SC 334). In paragraph 5 it is observed "..... writ of mandamus may be granted only In a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge that statutory-obligation. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep the subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limits of their jurisdictions." A writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. In my considered judgment, therefore, in this case the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 6. In the result, the writ application fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order for costs. S.K. Jha, J. I agree.
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1973 (5) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... empt on the part of the prosecution to falsely implicate innocent persons., It is inconceivable that Suresh accused could have dared, as claimed, in the circumstances of this case, to accompany the dead body upto the police station. Bearing in mind the feelings of hostility between the two groups, the presence of Suresh accused amongst those carrying the dead body to the hospital seems to be a highly unrealistic suggestion which should have been rejected by the trial court without, any serious notice. 11. In our view, the appraisal of the evidence by the High Court is fair and just and in coming to its conclusion the High Court has not gone against the decisions of this Court. The impugned judgment and order is not open to any serious challenge and must, therefore, be upheld. The High Court has not out-stepped its statutory jurisdiction and has not acted beyond its competence as a court of appeal from the order of acquittal. This appeal accordingly must fail and is dismissed.
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1973 (5) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... existing record. On re-trial the trial court will have to consider the evidence led at the re-trial and arrive at its conclusion on that record. The expression of opinion on the present evidence with respect to the commission of the alleged offence would not be binding and would, therefore, hardly be relevant. But it may nevertheless leave an unconscious impression on the mind of the court holding the fresh trial. This aspect also seems to lend some support to the view that normally re-trial should not be ordered unless there is some infirmity rendering the trial defective. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, in our opinion, the High Court had committed a serious error in directing re-trial on the basis of its re-assessment of the oral evidence on the record, while exercising its power of revision at the instance of a private complainant. We are, therefore, constrained to allow this appeal, quash the impugned order of the High Court and restore that of the trial court.
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1973 (5) TMI 102 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to have acquiesced in the making of the constructions in question, and the present suit would be barred by estoppel. Firstly, no such plea seems to have been pressed before either of the Courts below. Secondly, such a plea is not even legally maintainable. Section 3 (c) of the Act aforesaid specifically requires permission in writing, and acquiescence by the landlord cannot be placed on the same footing as permission in writing. Moreover, there would be no estoppel in such matters. In J.R. Sethi v. D.D. Jain, AIR 1972 SC 1727 while considering the provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was held that the lessor is not debarred from determining the lease or filing a suit for ejectment merely because the lessee has made constructions to the knowledge of the lessor. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no substance in the various submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1973 (5) TMI 101 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er, differed from this finding of his. 1 have held that instead of the firm, plaintiff No. 8, as it appeared from Ext. 26, had money lending licence in his individual capacity, which was effective only for five years beginning from the 18th January, 1940. There was no evidence on the record to hold that the plaintiff No. 7 had money lending licence at the relevant time to advance loan under Ext 7/a on the 4th February, 1946. Therefore, I have held that the plaintiffs could succeed only with regard to the loan advanced by plaintiff No 8 under Ext. 7. In consequence, I also differ from the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge under issue No. 8, wherein I have held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree only with regard to their claim Under Ext. 7. The judgment and the decree of the Court below are, therefore, modified accordingly, and the appeal is allowed in part. In the circumstances the, parties shall bear their own costs of this Court. Anwar Ahmad, J. I agree.
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1973 (5) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ce is concerned, we are wholly unable to find any cogent ground for interference. The conduct and behaviour of the appellant in going to the temple and representing that Mohini was like his daughter merely serves to add to the depravity of the appellants conduct, when once we believe the evidence of Mohini with respect to the offence under s. 366, I.P.C. Though the appellant has been acquitted of the offence of rape, for which he was also charged, we cannot shut our eyes to his previous improper intimacy with Mohini on various occasions as deposed by her. They were not taken into account as substantive evidence of rape on earlier occasions for reasons best known to the prosecution and the charge under s. 376, I.P.C. was not framed with respect to the earlier occurrences. But the previous conduct of the appellant does clearly constitute aggravating factors. The sentence is in our view, already very lenient. This appeal must, therefore, fail and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (5) TMI 99 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is open to the sates tax authorities either to proceed under Section 7 (3) or under Section 21 of the Act. The view that in such circumstances an order of assessment cannot be passed under Section 21 of the Act has thus been overruled. Since the writ petition proceeded on several other grounds upon which the learned Single Judge did not pronounce any opinion, it is necessary to send the case back. 3. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the case is remanded back to an appropriate Single Judge for decision of the writ petition in accordance with law. We make no order as to costs.
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1973 (5) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for a judicial review in respect of the orders passed by the Government) in any way limits their powers under section 15(1) (a). We are of opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error insofar as the implication of their observation is that in exercising their powers under section's 15 the administrative authorities concerned are exercising quasi-judicial functions and that it was necessary to have a speaking order. We find that the madras Court in Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. v. B. R. Venkatachalapathi 85 L.W. 349 after a very elaborate and instructive discussion has taken a similar view in respect of the powers of appointment of non-hereditary trustees under section 47 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which more or less corresponds to section 15 of this Act. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court set aside. The appellant Will pay the respondent's costs. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of' 55 for the purpose of selection, because that was the view of the High Court also previously intimated to the Punjab Government on which the Haryana Government thought fit to act. that the Punjab Government later on fixed a lower score is no reason for the Haryana, Government to change their mind. This is essentially a matter of administrative policy and if the Haryana State Government think that in the interest of judicial competence persons securing less than 55 of marks in the competitive examination should not be selected for appointment, those who get less than 55 have no right to claim that the selections be made of also those candidates who obtained less than the minimum fixed by the State Government. In our view the High Court was in error in thinking. that the State Government had somehow contravened rule 8 of Part C. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
whether the conviction of the appellant on basis of a finding for an offence under s. 9(a) was justified.
mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence;
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1973 (5) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f a similar mode of recovery for taxes and revenue arrears does not transmute taxes into revenues for the purposes of section 530. Although all taxes are part of revenue in the generic sense, it appears that section 530 has treated them separately, inasmuch as apart from mentioning taxes, cesses and rates, it also mentions revenue separately thereby indicating that the legislature used the word taxes as distinct from revenue, cesses and rates. The word revenue as used in the section as such has to be interpreted in a restricted sense, as excluding taxes, cesses and rates, which are specifically mentioned in the section. The acceptance of the wider connotation of the word revenue as occurring in the section would render the words taxes, cesses and rates superfluous and redundant and, as such, we cannot accede to the construction sought to be put on the word revenue by the appellant. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (5) TMI 94 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssee, as already mentioned, where in similar circumstances and on similar facts this court had come to the same conclusion. In this view of the matter, question No. (3), referred to this court, must be answered against the Commissioner and in favour of the assessee and it must be held that the Tribunal has rightly held that the sales of timber worth Rs. 49,418.29 had taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and were not liable to be taxed under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, even in the absence of any written contract on the point laying an obligation on the assessee to transport the goods to West Bengal. 11.. I, accordingly, refrain from answering the first two questions, as they do not arise out of the order of the Tribunal and answer the third question of law referred to us in the affirmative. The assessee-dealer shall be entitled to its costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred only). UNTWALIA, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 93 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counts are maintained by the assessee. 6.. Escapement has admittedly been detected for the quarter ending December, 1960. The question for consideration is as to whether on the Since reported as State v. Kanhiyalal Jain 1973 32 S.T.C. 21. basis of the escapement noticed, the assessments for all the four quarters relating to the accounting period can be reopened. For the reasons which we have given above, it would follow that once the accounts are liable to be discarded, the proper view to be taken would be that the assessments for all the relevant quarters may be reopened on the basis of escapement or suppression found during that quarter within the accounting period. Our answer to the second question, therefore, shall be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it was permissible to reassess all the quarters covered by the relevant accounting year. We direct parties to bear their own costs of these references. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his point, because the matter is now concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chowringhee Sales Bureau P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1973 31 S.T.C. 254 (S.C.) 87 I.T.R. 542 (S.C.) 1973 U.P.T.C. 59. In that case the assessee was an auctioneer. It had collected sales tax on the sales made by it but had not paid the same to the Government. The Supreme Court held that the amount collected by way of sales tax was part of the assessee s income. In the instant case, the assessee is following cash system of accounting and, as such, the surplus of Rs. 1,30,045 in the sales tax account would be treated as his income. As and when this amount is paid to the Government, it will be allowed to the assessee as a deduction. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of income-tax will get his costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (5) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... use to exercise his authority arbitrarily or capriciously when called upon to exercise the same by a party interested. But the question in this case is whether the Deputy Commissioner has refused to exercise his jurisdiction here as alleged by the assessees. We are of the view that the Deputy Commissioner has not rejected the assessees claim on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to deal with it. He has refused to give the relief to the assessees on the ground that they have not chosen to question the assessment at any stage before, and that the assessment made was on their own invitation. We cannot say that the order of the Deputy Commissioner In this case amounts to a refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under section 32. In the result, we set aside the order of the Tribunal so far as it relates to the deletion of the turnover of Rs. 5,99,468. The tax case is, therefore, partly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 90 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the year 1965-66 has been passed, after compliance with the observations of the appellate authority, there is no material on the basis of which the date with effect from which the liability of the assessee is to arise under the Act, can be determined. It is clear, therefore, that this order of the appellate authority fixing the liability of the assessee to pay tax with effect from 15th March, 1966, is based on no material whatever. In fact, the finding given in this case, that the liability to pay tax arises with effect from 15th March, 1966, by taking the figure of the turnover for the year 1965-66 as Rs. 54,000, runs counter to the finding of the appellate authority in the other case in which he found that there is paucity of material to find out the turnover for the year 1965-66. For the reasons given above, we answer both the questions referred in the negative. The assessee will have his costs of the proceedings. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (5) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mill. We are of the view, in the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to infer a sale of bamboos by the assessee to M/s. Seshasayee Paper Boards Ltd. Whether delivery was effected directly from the forest or from the assessee s godown, it will not change the legal position that the assessee is discharging the obligation which he has entered under the coupe contract in supplying bamboos to M/s. Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd. We do not, therefore, agree with the Tribunal that the sum of Rs. 37,314.05 represents the sales effected by the assessee during the assessment year. We, therefore, set aside the assessment on this item of turnover. As regards the first item, we direct the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal afresh in the light of what has been stated above. The tax case is partly allowed and there will be no order as to costs. It is open to both the parties to adduce any additional evidence, if any, in support of their respective cases. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 88 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case, the Commissioner of Sales Tax has not passed an order of assessment. He has merely directed a fresh assessment. The provisions of sub-section (2a) of section 11 do not say that an order of remand cannot be passed after four years. As far as a fresh assessment by the original authority is concerned, the proviso to section 11(2a) brings in a fresh period of four years starting from the date of the order of remand. That period had admittedly not expired when the Sales Tax Officer passed the fresh order of assessment which is the subject-matter of Civil Writ Petition No. 460-D of 1960. That being so, both the revisional order dated 24th September, 1960, as well as the fresh assessment order were passed within the time allowed bylaw. Consequently, this appeal has to succeed and the judgment of the learned single judge granting these two writ petitions reversed. The said writ petitions are consequently dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 87 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e collected by adding the purchase price to the taxable turnover of the dealer. 5.. Our answer to the question referred to us shall, therefore, beOn the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the dealer who purchased acids and chemicals free of sales tax on the strength of his registration certificate and by giving declaration to his selling registered dealer that goods were intended for resale has not violated those declarations when he used the acids and chemicals in preparation of the mixtures for sale and that the dealer has no liability to pay tax in accordance with the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Act. The question is, therefore, answered in favour of the revenue. The amount of tax was very small, but an interesting question having been raised had got to be answered. We, however, do not propose to make any order for costs against the assessee in this reference. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 86 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... missioner of Commercial Taxes and he directed to compute it afresh. We find that even if the principles behind rule 27A of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941, had been applied in determining the propriety of the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, in the revision application there was no illegality in the order of the Member, Board of Revenue. As mentioned hereinbefore rule 27A of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941, does not appear to have been specifically mentioned and this question does not arise really from the order of the Member, Board of Revenue. In the premises, we decline to answer this question and as we find that in effect there is no illegality in the order, we also decline to reframe the question in any manner. In the premises question No. (1) is answered in the affirmative and question No. (2) is not answered because it does not arise in the facts of this case. There will be no order as to costs. HAZRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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