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Showing 41 to 60 of 68 Records
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1974 (1) TMI 28 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Authorities, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... ner, no such direction can be issued. But, as the retention of the amount by the income-tax department is illegal, it would be appropriate to direct the respondent to return the amount to the excise authorities at Salem from whom the said amount was seized. As I am allowing this writ petition on the ground that the seizure in this case is illegal, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds raised by the petitioner. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Income-tax Officer (Assessment-4), Circle II, Bangalore, dated March 6, 1973, exhibit 4, is hereby quashed and a writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing the respondent to return the amount of Rs. 1 lakh to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Salem, from whom it was seized under a warrant of authorisation issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, Bangalore, dated December 8, 1972. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200.
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1974 (1) TMI 27 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... allowable under Part VI of the Act is clear from sub-section (1) of section 74 of the Act. The debts and encumbrances allowable under Part VI of the Act take priority over the estate duty payable. If estate duty is either a debt or encumbrance allowable under section 44 which occurs under Part VI of the Act, section 74(1) could not have stated that the debts and encumbrances allowable under Part VI shall rank above estate duty for which charge is created. Therefore, it is clear that estate duty payable on the estate of a deceased person is neither a debt nor an encumbrance liable to be deducted under section 44 of the Act. In that view, the contention urged by the learned counsel for the accountable person has to be rejected and the question referred has to be answered in the negative and against the accountable person. We answer the question accordingly. The accountable person will pay the costs of the department. Advocate s fee, Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (1) TMI 26 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... urt seems to be that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. They are intended not to supplement the law, but to supplant it. Where the rule is clear that the assessee has the benefit of applying to the Income-tax Officer to invoke his jurisdiction in the matter of extending time by condoning the delay, it cannot be said, falling back upon canons of natural justice that a duty is cast on the statutory authority to notify to the defaulting assessee to apply for invoking the statutory authority s jurisdiction. We agree with the view indicated in the Madras decision that a defaulting assessee has no occasion for pleading for natural justice because there can be no premium attached to the default. We, accordingly, agree with the Tribunal and would answer the question referred to us by saying In the facts and circumstances of the case, rejection of the claim of the assessee for registration was justified in law. There would be no order as to costs. B. K. RAY J.--I agree.
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1974 (1) TMI 25 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Capital Gains Tax, Income Tax, Question Raised Before Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... which is equally subject to review by this court. That being so, the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal refusing to refer to this court the first two questions, or rather the set of questions to which these amount, on the ground that they were concluded by findings of fact, was clearly erroneous and misconceived. Equally so, its decision refusing to refer the question of limitation to this court. It was a pure question of law involving, as it did, the interpretation of section 149 of the Income-tax Act. That this section has relevance in the matter cannot be disputed and then how does the issue become merely academic, as stated by the Tribunal, is not easily understandable. In my opinion, therefore, this application must be allowed and the Tribunal required to state a case on the questions I have set out above and refer it to this court for decision. I make an order accordingly. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs in this application. MIAN JALAL-UD-DIN J.--I agree.
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1974 (1) TMI 24 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Bona Fide, Gift Tax, Income Tax Authorities, Market Value, Reason To Believe, Reassessment Proceedings
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1974 (1) TMI 23 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er of Income-tax, Commissioner of Income-tax v. AR.M.M. Firm and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Venkatasubbiah Chetty. If this view is correct, as the author thinks it is, in regard to the second limb of clause (a) of sub-section (2)(i), then we fail to understand as to why the same position should not apply to the first limb of clause (a). All the arguments employed by the learned authors would be ineffective, the moment this position in regard to banking and money-lending debts is accepted and it is held that the successor-firm would be entitled to an allowance if and when any of such loans so taken over become thereafter irrecoverable. The same position, in our view, with equal force applies to the cases falling under clause (a) of section 36(2)(i) of the new Act. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question is in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (1) TMI 22 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Income Tax Act, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... t amount has been treated as a genuine loan. With this conclusive finding made final in the absence of any further proceeding taken against the said appellate order, there was no foundation for the belief of the Income-tax Officer that such an amount had escaped assessment, be it for the assessee s default or not. Action under either clause (a) or clause (b) was not available to be taken. Our conclusion to the questions referred to us shall, therefore, be (1) Section 147(a) of the Act was not at all applicable clause (b) also was not applicable. If at all it could be a case under clause (b) and not under clause (a) of section 147 (2) There was no basis for treating the issue of the notice under section 147(b) of the Act and (3) Even if there was any basis for the issue of the notice under clause(b) of section 147, the notice is barred by limitation. The assessee shall have his costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 300 (three hundred). B. K. RAY J.--I agree.
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1974 (1) TMI 21 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment Notice, Notice For Reassessment, Reassessment Notice, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... it was urged that whatever be the position in regard to the assessment for, 1963-64 and subsequent years, the proposed reassessment for 1962-63 is beyond the time limit provided by the section. This was on the ground that on the statement in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit, only the assessments for 1964-65 to 1967-68 were set aside by the Commissioner, and that, therefore, the assessments for 1962-63 and 1963-64 remained intact. It was, therefore, contended that no reassessment proceedings could be resorted to in respect of these assessment orders. We think that these contentions should appropriately be urged in the first instance before the Income-tax Officer. The materials are neither full nor adequate, nor the stage appropriate for us to pronounce on these aspects. We have called attention while dealing with Writ Appeal No. 536 of 1973 to the observations of the Supreme Court in Income-tax Officer v. Bachu Lal Kapoor. We dismiss this writ petition, but without costs.
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1974 (1) TMI 20 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Income, Speculative Transactions ... ... ... ... ..... is point the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court with which we respectfully agree. Since in this case the Tribunal has recorded a finding that there was no such contract of ready goods in existence to safeguard the loss of which through future price fluctuation the forward contracts of sale and purchase were entered into, the question, viz, whether such subsequent transaction could also be a transaction of forward contracts of sale does not arise for consideration. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Income-tax AppellateTribunal did not commit any mistake in holding that the assessee s case was not covered by section 43(5), proviso, clause (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the department. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference to the department, which we assess at Rs. 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (1) TMI 19 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Charitable Purpose, Cinema Business, Entertainment Tax, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ome to the conclusion that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 97,685 could not be treated as income of the assessee taxable in his hands under the Act. That being so, I need not discuss the other question whether a part of it could be excluded from the income of the assessment year 1957-58. I may, however, reiterate that before the order dated March 25, 1957, was made by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes the money in no sense was the income of the assessee. If at all it could be treated as his income, it could be after the passing of the said order and, therefore, the whole amount could be taxed in the assessment year 1957-58. For the reasons stated above, the question of law referred to this court is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee, and against the revenue. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 only. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (1) TMI 18 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Service Of Notice ... ... ... ... ..... F that the petitioner was aware of the fact that the notice. was offered to some other person in the household which the latter refused to accept. It is true that the address found in annexure E was not in strict accordance with the address furnished in column 10 of the memorandum of appeal. But this itself is not sufficient to hold that the intimation has been sent in the proper address unless due to defect in the address it is established that the addressee could not be located. In this case it is clear from the petition (annexure F ) filed by the petitioner himself that despite the defect in the notice the postal authorities could locate the addressee. The petitioner cannot, any more, make any grievance of the fact that the words Khaspa Street had not been mentioned in the address in annexure E . On the facts stated above we find no reason to grant any relief to the petitioner. The writ application is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. ACHARYA J.-I agree.
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1974 (1) TMI 17 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... ion 271(1)(c) of the Act on the footing that it had concealed its true income. The ambit of the dispute was wide enough. The Explanation in section 271(1)(c) being the law applicable to the point must be deemed to have been canvassed before the Tribunal. The question as raised does arise out of the appellate order. Anwar Ali s case 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC) was considering the law as it stood before the amendment in question was brought into the statute book and, therefore, could not provide the guideline for disposal of a case covered by the amendment. We do not think the assessee s stand, that such a question cannot be canvassed before us because it never arose out of the appellate order, can be sustained. Our answer to the question referred to us shall, therefore, be that the Tribunal was not right in law in deleting the penalty by applying the principles of the Supreme Court decision in Anwar Ali s case 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC). We make no order as to costs. B. K. RAY J.--I agree.
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1974 (1) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Hundi Loans, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... purposes and so that the decision of the trustees as to the objects of the trust or the beneficiaries shall be final and binding on all persons claiming under this trust and shall not be questioned in any court of law or otherwise howsoever. This clearly shows that the executants of the deed specifically authorised the trustees to spend the trust funds in connection with various objects enumerated therein and which according to them were charitable objects. We do not see how the clauses which the executants thought really amounted to public charity, would become innocuous merely because it is found that in law they did not result in public charity. In our opinion the two clauses were neither rendered innocuous nor invalid merely because legally they did not result in public charity. In the result we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The department will be entitled to receive its costs from the assessee which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1974 (1) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... -tax Officer had made an independent enquiry. He even waited to start the proceeding until the result of the petitioner s representation against the report was disposed of by the mining authorities. He acted merely upon the information or the report received from the mining authorities and solely relying upon that information he issued notice under section 147(a). Therefore, in my view, proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could not be initiated against the petitioner. Accordingly, the impugned notices must be cancelled by a writ of mandamus. In the result this rule is made absolute. The impugned notices are quashed. Issue a writ of mandamus. Let the copy of letter dated January 30, 1969, and recorded reasons of the Income-tax Officer be kept on records and marked as exhibit H . If any assessments have been made in pursuance of the impugned notices, those assessment orders will also be quashed. Let the operation of the order be stayed for a fortnight.
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1974 (1) TMI 14 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
A Partner, Withdrawal Of Development Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... change its identity from the fond hope, expectation or speculation of the assessee. The findings of the Tribunal are based on extraneous matters not on record or on a misreading of whatever evidence is on record, and, lastly, it is contrary to the law as to what is capital loss and what is not. In the result, therefore, we would answer the reference that the loss sustained by the assessee is attributable to capital and not to revenue and thus against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Before concluding the judgment, we may observe that in making a correct statement of facts under s. 256(1) the initial responsibility that rests with the Tribunal, it cannot absolve itself of, merely because the contesting parties do not suggest any amendment to the one proposed by it. That burden never shifts, nor can it be transferred, but has only to be discharged faithfully and conscientiously--even though unaided. B. K. PATRA J.-I agree.
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1974 (1) TMI 13 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penal Interest, Penal Interest, Reduction Or Waiver, Reduction Or Waiver, Revision By Commissioner, Revision By Commissioner, Waiver Of Interest, Waiver Of Interest
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1974 (1) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
This is an appeal challenging five notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - ITO had allowed depreciation at a particular rate, if he subsequently learns that another ITO had allowed depreciation at a lower rate on similar machinery - whether ITO can reopen the assessment under section 147(b)
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1974 (1) TMI 11 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Return is filed after the due date but before the assessment - Reasonable cause - Whether, in the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the cancellation of penalty by the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law ? " - held that ITO was not justified in levying the penalty
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1974 (1) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
" (1) Whether the plaintiff paid the suit amount under a bona fide mistake that the notice of demand related to her own assessment as alleged by her ? (2) Whether the payment had been made by the plaintiff voluntarily as a legal representative of her husband to discharge her legal liability as alleged by the defence or whether the plaintiff paid the suit amount on account of coercion as alleged ? (3) Whether section 72 of the Contract Act can be invoked by the plaintiff in this case to get a refund of the suit amount ? (4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation as alleged by the defendant ? (5) Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ? "
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1974 (1) TMI 9 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Firm – registration - " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal upholding refusal of the Income-tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee under section 185(1)(a) of the Act on the ground that no genuine partnership was brought into existence, is justified in law ? " - " On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal upholding refusal of the Income-tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee under section 185(1)(a) of the Act is not justified in law and the firm is entitled to registration under the Act. "
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