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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 70 Records
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1974 (10) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by a benignant interpretation of the legal limits on election expenditure Section 77 clamps down. This election case is also a caveat on election methodology. True, large monetary inputs are necessary evils of modern elections, but "once we assuage our conscience by calling something a 'necessary evil', it begins to look more and more necessary and less and less evil" Sydney Harris-quoted by Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) in "Democracy in India and the Judicial Process"-Lajpatrai Memorial Lectures, 1965-Asia Publishing House-P-60. The manumission of the electoral process from money power is the dharma of our Republic. 35. In the hope that a fresh election for Chamarajpet would be held early and in the expectation that the candidates, independents and Party-nominees alike, would keep within the pecuniary limits set by the law as laid down by this Court, we allow the appeal in part, as above indicated. Parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1974 (10) TMI 112 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y finding that the Member, Board of Revenue had ample jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act, read with the aforesaid notification, to pass the order directing the Excise Department to make payment to the petitioner at the rate of 42 paise per L. P. litre for the supplies made between the 11th July, 1968 and the 31st March, 1971 and the said order is not illegal or arbitrary on merits, it has to be held that there is no merit in C. W. J. C. No. 1417 of 1973 filed by the State and the Commissioner of Excise. Accordingly, it is dismissed. So far as C. W. 3. C. No. 1361 of 1973 filed by Messrs. S. K. G. Sugar Ltd. is concerned, it is allowed and I direct issuance of a writ in the nature of a writ of mandamus upon the respondents to implement the order, dated the 11th May, 1973, passed by the Member, Board of Revenue (Annexure "8" to the said writ application). In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in either case. S.N.P. Singh, C.J. 21. I agree.
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1974 (10) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ity in view of its finding regarding the other sections, it may be necessary to consider the validity of this section in the view that we have taken holding that the sections themselves are not bad but only the notifications issued thereunder. But we were informed at the bar by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Mysore that a subsequent amendment of the Act has made provision regarding compensation applicable to acquisitions under section 12 of the Act on the same terms as under the Land Acquisition Act. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to express any opinion on the validity of section 15. In the result the appeals are allowed in part. We hold that sections 3, 9 and 12(1)(a) and (b) are valid but the three notifications, already referred to, are bad as the affected persons were not given an opportunity of making representations against them. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. P. H. P. Appeals allowed in part.
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1974 (10) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and a half years. It was for this reason that, despite the earlier Order dated 12th December, 1968, the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561 A. This the High Court was perfectly entitled to do and we do not see any jurisdictional infirmity in the Order of the High Court. Even on the merits, we find that the Order of the High Court was justified as no prima facie case appears to have been made out against respondents Nos. 1 and 2. 3. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een the transaction just now mentioned and dealt with in that case and the one in the present case is that in the former the charge was enforceable eo instanti and enforceability of the charge did not depend upon a particular event in which case the charge would crystallise. In other words, that case was not one of the floating charge, but a case of mortgage, for, there was transfer of an interest in specified immovable property, or in any case, there was creation of a right over or in respect of specified property, as recited. The essence of the difference between the two transactions, the one in the case cited by the learned Advocate-General and the other here, is that the character of a floating charge, which, on the happening of an event, would crystallise and result in the trustee or Receiver taking possession, was not present at all in the former case. 6. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us against the Revenue with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 2,500/-
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1974 (10) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... "proceed to rectify a mistake." 24. In the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the notice requiring the petitioner to show cause against the proposed rectification on 25-3-1974 was served upon it in the evening of 22-3-1974. The time at petitioner's disposal for raising and filing its objection was wholly inadequate. Consequently there has been a violation of principles of natural justice and the impugned order deserves to be quashed. We find no force in the submission. The petitioner, in fact raised whatever objections that he wanted to, before the Sales Tax Officer and also had full opportunity to place its case before us. After hearing the petition at length, we find that there are no merits in his objection. He has, therefore, not been prejudiced in any manner. The impugned order cannot be quashed on this ground. 25. As we find no force in any of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1974 (10) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... ations I in Raghavan v. Subbrama Sastrigal, 1971 KLT 231, are inconsistent with the principles enunciated in this judgment those observations cannot be regarded as laying down correct law. ( 21. ) In the light of the preceding discussion it must be held that there is no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the provision contained in the bonds Exts. A3 and A5 entitling the foreman Bank to recover from the appellants in a lump sum the whole of the balance amount due under the kuris inclusive of the amounts of the future instalments with interest at 12 per cent amounts to a penalty and is not legally enforceable. We hold that the said provision is perfectly valid and enforceable in law. The other objections which had been put forward by the appellants (defendants) before the courts below were not pressed before us. ( 22. ) In the result, the judgment and decrees passed by the court below will stand confirmed and these appeals are dismissed with costs.
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1974 (10) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was not responsible for anything done by the said Sangh. 17. We do not find any substance in this contention, also. The contents of paragraph 10 are to be read as a whole and as a part of the series of incidents enumerated in the preceding paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. The truth or otherwise of what is mentioned in those paragraphs cannot be tested objectively by judicial standards. We have to accept the correctness of the incidents and the facts stated therein. The petitioner has been painted in all these incidents as the prime-mover of the gear which resulted in disturbances accompanied by violence, looting and mischief on a wide scale. These particulars are neither vague, nor are they irrelevant to the object of the detention. On the basis of these activities, the detaining authority could reasonably gauge the tendency of the petitioner to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in future. For all the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uld be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. 'He can do so by cross examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government servant. Unless the statements are given to the Government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. It is unjust and unfair to deny the Government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during investigation and produced at the inquiry in support of the charges levelled against the Government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the requirements of giving the Government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. For these reasons the appeal is dismissed. The State will pay costs to the respondent.
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1974 (10) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... om. A particular fundamental right cannot exist in isolation in a watertight compartment. One fundamental right of a person may have to co-exist in harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light of the Directive Principles in the interests of social welfare as a whole. The Court’s duty is to strike a balance between competing claims of different interests. o p /o p So far as the fourth submission is concerned, the objection is on the score of adequacy of compensation which cannot be agitated against a legislation which admittedly relates to agrarian reform and is, therefore, under the canopy of protection of Article 31A of the Constitution and objection on the score of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31 is not entertainable. Hence this submission also fails. o p /o p In the result all the appeals arc dismissed with costs. o p /o p P.H.P. o p /o p Appeals dismissed o p /o p
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1974 (10) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his finding was seriously attacked on behalf of the petitioner and it was contended that there was no evidence at all on the basis of which the learned Trial Judge could arrive at such a finding. There is prima facie considerable force in this contention of the petitioner, because the finding of the learned Trial Judge that these allegations were true appears to be based primarily on the reports of the proceedings in the Parliament which are no proof of the contents of the allegations made in the course of such proceedings and it does seem to be a little difficult to sustain it. However, as pointed out above, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of this finding and to pronounce upon it. Since we are of the view that the first respondent is guilty of the corrupt practice set out in section 123(6) of the Act, we allow the appeal and set aside the election of the first respondent. The first respondent will pay to the petitioner costs throughout. V.P.S, Appeal A11owed.
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1974 (10) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 'here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters- The petitioner's petition should, therefore have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal. This appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1974 (10) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s usually made when the incumbent substantively holding that post is on leave or when the permanent post is vacant and no substantive appointment has yet been made to that post. Such an officiating 'appointment comes to an end on the return of the incumbent substantively holding the post from leave in the former case or on substantive appointment being to that permanent post in the later case. In the instant case it is clear that due to justifiable reasons, the appointment of respondents 3 and 4 substantively to the 14th and the 15th vacancies was deferred and petitioner no. 1 was made to officiate in a temporary capacity against the substantive vacancy. But such an officiation came to an end on the substantive appointment of either of respondents 3 or 4. For the reasons aforesaid we hold that the petitioners have made out no case entitling them to any relief asked for by them in this writ, petition. It accordingly fails and is dismissed without costs. Petition dismissed
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1974 (10) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt Custodian of Evacuee Property( 1962 1 S.C.R. 749.) which can be of any help to the respondents. This appeal, therefore, would have to be allowed. But there is one further question to be decided. Once it is declared that this property is an evacuee property it is obvious that the sum of ₹ 42,000/- paid by the 1st respondent to Mrs. Naqvi and deposited by her in the Allahabad Bank, Lucknow cannot also be an evacuee property. Either the one or the other can be an evacuee property. This sum must he held to be in trust for the 1st respondent. This principle is not disputed by Mr. G. L. Sanghi appearing on behalf of the appellants. While the appeal would be allowed there would be an order directing that the 1st respondent would be entitled to withdraw the sum of ₹ 42,000/- deposited by Mrs. Naqvi in the Allahabad Bank, Lucknow along with any interest that might have accrued on it. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order ,as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (10) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g does not help the unfortunate chargeholders at all. Lastly, learned Counsel for the appellants suggested that the mortgages made subsequent to the charge by a decree in favour of the Motes were struck by the doctrine of Lis Pendens. The Bombay High Court had repelled this contention on two grounds firstly, the properties which were subsequently charged with the payment of the debts to the Motes were not the subject matter of suit No. 741 of 1938; and secondly, there was no Darkhast or execution application pending at the time when the simple mortgages in favour of the plaintiff respondent Oswal were created in 1949. 1 agree with these reasons for holding that the doctrine of Lis Pendens had no application on the facts of the case before us. The result is that, finding myself in agreement with the views expressed and the conclusions reached by the Bombay High Court, I would dismiss these appeals. But, in the circumstances of this case, the parties must bear their own costs.
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1974 (10) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... terest from then on. We make it clear that the entire costs incurred in the suit in India, i. e. in the trial court will also be payable but in regard to the appeals in the Delhi High Court and in this Court the decree-holder will be awarded proportionate costs. of course, the decree-holder lost in his attempt to execute the foreign decree in India and we leave the costs of those proceedings well alone. in the light of these directions the executing court will quantify the amount currently recoverable and proceed to levy execution. The appeal is substantially dismissed but is also allowed in part as above indicated. C. A. 2248 of 1968 is dismissed but no order as to costs. We have, through the chemistry of jut adjustment mixed in the crucible of law and equity, endeavoured to end a feud over money; but who knows whether Time, the supreme devourer of systems temporal, will spare this principle of 'good conscience' from the sepulchre of buried values ? Appeals allowed.
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1974 (10) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a representation. As recited in the communication under cover of which the grounds of detention were served on the detenu, those factual details were withheld by the detaining authority because in its opinion, their disclosure would have been against public interest. 30. In our opinion there is no room for the argument in the present case that the factual details about the alleged espionage activities of the petitioner were withheld from any ulterior motive. 31. Be that as it may, the details withheld were not an essential constituent of the grounds of detention. The basic material or the substance of the primary facts in a clear, succinct and intelligible form, which was sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation, was duly communicated to him. 32. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any defect which would warrant an interference by this Court. The petition fails and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged.
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1974 (10) TMI 96 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n being satisfied that there was reasonable cause for preferring the appeal beyond time. We are afraid, the provisions of Section 5 will not be applicable to appeals provided in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, which is a special Act which provides for appeals and prescribes a special period of limitation for appeals. The authority exercising power of appellate authority under Section 35 is not a court and, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 could not be invoked. Moreover, in view of the provision of Section 29 also it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 4 and 5 are attracted to appeal provided under Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In view of this legal position, the Collector of Central Excise was justified in rejecting the appeal on the ground of limitation. The revision authority has merely confirmed the order of the Collector of Central Excise, and we do not think that there is any justification for interfering in this Petition.
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1974 (10) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ial or quasi judicial function there is no power in that authority to review an order made by it ID the discharge of such function, unless a power in that behalf has been expressly conferred upon it. 9. That apart a licence can be revoked or suspended under rule 181 only if the licensee is found to have committed a breach of any of the conditions thereof or any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules or has been convicted of an offence under section 161 read with section 109 or any of the conditions enumerated in rule 181 was present so as to warrant the cancellation of the petitioner’s licence 10. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Collector, Central Excise, dated 8.5.68 (Annexure 5’), the order, dated 24.3.69 passed by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi (Annexure ‘6’) and the order of the Government of India, dated 17.12.70 (Annexure 7) are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs
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1974 (10) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction we find it difficult to hold that biscuit would be included in the item confectionery . The distinction between confectionery and biscuit was considered in Parry and Co. Ltd. v. Perry and Co.A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 460., a case under the Trade Marks Act, and it was held that the essential characteristic of biscuit is different from that of confectionery and it cannot be said that biscuit and confectionery are identical though there can be fancy biscuits in which confectionery can be put on the top. In common parlance and in trade circles also a distinction is always drawn between biscuit and articles which are called confectionery . In our opinion the rate of tax applicable to confectionery cannot be applied to biscuits. In the result the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed not to assess the petitioners with regard to the turnover of biscuits at the rate applicable to confectionery. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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