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1974 (4) TMI 122
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the tenant committed a default under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act by sending rent via money order that reached the landlord after the expiry of 30 days.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Tenant's Default under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act:
The primary issue was whether the tenant committed a default under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act by sending the rent via money order that reached the landlord after the expiry of 30 days. The material facts reveal that the tenant, Munna Lal, was in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 35 for the period from 25th November 1962 to 24th June 1963. The landlord served a notice on 23rd July 1963 demanding the arrears. The tenant remitted the amount by money order on 7th August 1963, but the money order was returned with an endorsement of refusal dated 26th August 1963. There was no evidence that the money order reached the landlord within the stipulated period of 30 days.
The trial court decreed the suit for arrears and ejectment, holding that the tenant failed to pay the arrears within one month of the notice. The lower appellate court, however, presumed that the money order must have reached the landlord within the stipulated period and thus held that there was no default.
In appeal, the single judge was inclined to accept that the tenant did not default in paying Rs. 89.75 but faced the decision in Govind Rao v. Kanhaiya Lal, which held that the post office is an agent of the remitter until the money is handed over to the payee. The single judge referred the matter to a larger bench due to doubts about this precedent.
The Full Bench considered the statutory agency under Section 44 of the Indian Post Office Act, which recognizes the post office as the agent of the remitter. The Full Bench also reviewed the decision in Govind Rao v. Kanhaiya Lal and subsequent approvals, emphasizing that the post office remains the agent of the remitter until the money is paid to the payee.
The Full Bench examined the principles from the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., which held that the post office could be an agent of the payee if there was an express or implied request to send money by post. The Full Bench concluded that if there is an implied request by the landlord for payment through a money order, the payment to the post office is considered payment to the payee unless countermanded under Section 44 of the Post Office Act.
In the present case, the tenant informed the landlord via a registered letter that the arrears were being sent by money order, and the landlord did not object. The Full Bench held that the tenant had an implied authority to remit the rent by money order, and once the money was handed to the post office, the tenant was discharged of the obligation. Any delay in transit was beyond the tenant's control, and the landlord could not complain.
Conclusion:
The Full Bench answered the referred question by stating that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the tenant could not be said to have committed a default under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act in respect of the payment of Rs. 35, which he sent to the landlords by money order within time but which reached the landlords after the expiry of thirty days.
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1974 (4) TMI 121
Issues: Determining whether the temple in question is a religious trust under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act or a private endowment.
Analysis: The case revolves around the dedication of properties to a temple in Bihar through various deeds executed by family members. The key issue is whether the temple qualifies as a religious trust under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act. The initial deed in 1921 divested the family members of any interest in the properties, appointing outsiders as panches to oversee the temple's management. Subsequent deeds in 1928 and 1934 reiterated similar provisions, emphasizing the appointment and dismissal of shebaits from the family based on their capabilities. The court highlighted the complete divestment of the family's title to the properties, making them properties of the deity, with family members serving as shebaits and managers.
The Subordinate Judge initially viewed the 1921 document as creating a trust with public interest, but the High Court disagreed. The High Court emphasized that the temple's location within compound walls near the founders' house did not automatically indicate a public purpose. They also noted that the involvement of panches was limited, and there was no clear intention to involve the public in the temple's management or worship. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation, citing a previous judgment emphasizing factors indicating a public endowment, such as the installation of idols in a separate building and the presence of appointed pujaris. The court found that the family's limited role as shebaits, subject to external control by the panches, indicated public involvement in the temple's management, aligning it with the Act's definition of a religious trust.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court's decision, deeming the temple a religious trust due to public interest. The court highlighted the public's association with the temple's management, emphasizing the role of outsiders in overseeing the shebaits and the provision for public participation in worship. The judgment set aside the High Court's decision, reinstating the Subordinate Judge's ruling and ordering the respondent to bear the appellant's costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 120
Issues Involved: 1. Presumption of due service of notice. 2. Effect of refusal to accept a registered letter on the tenant's knowledge of the notice.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Presumption of Due Service of Notice
The primary question was whether a presumption of due service arises when a registered letter containing a notice is returned with endorsements of refusal. The court examined the provisions of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, which are identical. These sections state that service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying, and posting by registered post, unless the contrary is proved.
The court noted that Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is divisible into two parts: the mode of service and the time of service. A two-fold presumption arises: (i) that the service is deemed to have been effected, and (ii) that it is deemed to have been effected at the time the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. This presumption is rebuttable as indicated by the phrase "unless the contrary is proved."
The court rejected the argument that the presumption of service is conclusive and emphasized that the presumption is rebuttable. The court referred to several decisions, including Harihar Benerji v. Ramsashi Roy and Regina v. County of London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee, Ex parte Rossi, which supported the view that the presumption under Section 27 is rebuttable.
The court concluded that the presumption of service arises when a registered letter is properly addressed, prepaid, and posted. However, this presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing that the letter was not delivered. The court also emphasized that the endorsement of refusal on a returned envelope strengthens the presumption of service under Section 27 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Issue 2: Effect of Refusal to Accept a Registered Letter
The second question was whether a tenant who refuses to accept a registered letter can be deemed to have knowledge of its contents, particularly in the context of Section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Section 12(2) of the Act requires a notice demanding rent to be served in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The court held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with an endorsement of refusal, a presumption arises under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that the notice was tendered to the tenant and refused. Consequently, the tenant is deemed to have knowledge of the contents of the notice. The court emphasized that the provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act do not alter this legal position.
The court summarized its conclusions as follows: 1. A presumption of service arises under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act or Section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act when a registered letter is properly addressed, prepaid, and posted. 2. The presumption is rebuttable. 3. The mere production of an unopened envelope with an endorsement of refusal does not rebut the presumption. 4. The court may raise a presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act based on the endorsement of refusal. 5. The presumption under Section 114 can be rebutted by the addressee with evidence. 6. The court may exhibit the returned envelope and the endorsement to support the presumption of service. 7. The provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act do not affect the presumption of service.
The court answered the referred questions affirmatively, stating that a rebuttable presumption of refusal can be raised under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the tenant can be deemed to have knowledge of the notice when refusing to accept the registered letter. The case was remanded for final disposal in accordance with these legal principles.
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1974 (4) TMI 119
Issues: 1. Propriety of convicting accused persons after initial acquittal. 2. Justification of singling out three accused for punishment. 3. Re-evaluation of evidence in appellate court. 4. Application of rule of benefit of reasonable doubt. 5. Conviction under Section 149, IPC. 6. Question of sentence reduction.
Analysis:
1. The appeal in question pertains to the propriety of convicting accused individuals after an initial acquittal. The Supreme Court deliberated on the issue of whether the Court of Appeal could convict individuals who had been initially presumed innocent and acquitted by the trial court. The Court examined the circumstances of a confrontation between two groups, the complainants and the accused, which led to violence and injuries. Despite the trial court's acquittal based on skepticism towards prosecution witnesses, the High Court convicted three out of twenty-three accused individuals. The Supreme Court analyzed the legal principles surrounding the reversal of acquittal and the strength of evidence required for such a decision.
2. The Court further delved into the justification for singling out three accused individuals for punishment out of the total twenty-three. The High Court had found that the injuries on the convicted three individuals, along with other evidence, were sufficient to establish their guilt. The Supreme Court scrutinized the reasoning behind this selective conviction and whether the injuries and other corroborative evidence warranted overturning the initial acquittal. The principle of law regarding the re-evaluation of evidence by the appellate court was emphasized in this analysis.
3. The judgment also addressed the re-evaluation of evidence by the appellate court, highlighting the power of the appellate court to reassess the probative value of oral and circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had correctly considered the additional probative reinforcement required to convict the three appellants. The Court affirmed the appellate court's authority to re-evaluate evidence while upholding the constraints on overturning an acquittal.
4. The application of the rule of benefit of reasonable doubt was a crucial aspect of the analysis. The Supreme Court criticized the lower court's approach of elevating bare possibilities of doubt to justify acquittal. Emphasizing the need for credible testimony and reasonable doubts, the Court underscored the appellate court's duty to correct erroneous evaluations by lower courts to ensure justice.
5. Regarding the conviction under Section 149, IPC, the Court discussed the constructive liability of the appellants in the context of the unlawful assembly and the substantive offence. Citing precedents, the Court upheld the conviction under Section 307, read with Section 149, based on the involvement of unidentified individuals in the crime.
6. Finally, the judgment addressed the question of sentence reduction considering various circumstances, including the time elapsed since the incident and the period spent in jail by the accused. The Court modified the sentence to three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307, read with Section 149, and one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147, IPC, to ensure the ends of justice were met.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's judgment provided a comprehensive analysis of the issues surrounding the conviction of the accused individuals, re-evaluation of evidence, application of legal principles, and the appropriate sentencing in the case.
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1974 (4) TMI 118
Issues Involved: 1. Whether the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) is a "commercial establishment" under Section 2(5) of the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Definition and Scope of "Commercial Establishment": The primary issue was whether the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) qualifies as a "commercial establishment" under Section 2(5) of the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954. The Act defines "commercial establishment" as any premises wherein any trade, business, or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary thereto is carried on. This includes societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and charitable or other trusts carrying on any business, trade, or profession or work in connection with or incidental thereto.
2. Activities and Objectives of the Federation: The Federation is a company registered under Section 26 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Its primary objectives include promoting Indian business in various sectors, encouraging friendly relations among the business community, securing organized action on business matters, disseminating commercial and economic knowledge, and providing arbitration services. The Federation's activities also include conducting national and international exhibitions, setting up museums or showrooms, and securing the interests of Indian business communities abroad.
3. Legal Proceedings and Contentions: The Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments, Delhi, directed the Federation to register under the Act, which the Federation contested, claiming it was not an "establishment" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Act. The High Court ruled in favor of the Federation, stating that its premises were not a "commercial establishment." The appellants argued that the Federation's activities amounted to a profession or business, while the Federation maintained that its activities were of general utility and predominantly charitable.
4. High Court's Findings: The High Court dismissed the contention that the Federation's activities constituted a profession, noting that advice was tendered in the interest of trade and business in general, not for any specific consideration. The court also rejected the argument that the Federation's activities amounted to work incidental or ancillary to trade or business, emphasizing that the definition referred to specific business or trade carried on in premises.
5. Supreme Court's Analysis: The Supreme Court examined the scheme and relevant provisions of the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954. It noted that the definition of "commercial establishment" is broader than that of "shop" and includes premises where any trade, business, or profession is carried on. The Court referred to a previous decision in R.K. Mittal's case, which held that the Federation's activities were in the nature of business or trade.
6. Appellants' and Respondents' Arguments: The appellants relied on the R.K. Mittal case to argue that the Federation's activities constituted business or trade. The respondents contended that the Federation's activities were primarily charitable and of general utility, with income derived solely from subscriptions and occasional exhibitions, which were incidental to its primary charitable objectives. They also argued that the definition of "industry" in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was broader than that of "commercial establishment" in the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954.
7. Supreme Court's Conclusion: The Supreme Court overruled the preliminary objection that the appellants should not be allowed to raise new contentions. It held that the Federation's activities, including systematic assistance to members and non-members, arbitration services, and publication of periodicals and bulletins, constituted business activities. The Court affirmed that a systematic activity could be a business activity even if no dividends were declared or profits shared. It concluded that the Federation's premises were a "commercial establishment" within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Judgment: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and dismissed the writ petition. No order as to costs was made.
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1974 (4) TMI 117
Issues Involved: 1. Domicile of the deceased (Krishnan) at the time of death. 2. Applicability of English law versus the Travancore Ezhava Act in succession matters. 3. Validity of Ex. 56 order and its operation as res judicata. 4. Allegations of fraud in obtaining Ex. 56 order. 5. Procedural fairness and principles of natural justice in the foreign proceedings. 6. Jurisdiction of the English court over minors.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Domicile of the deceased (Krishnan) at the time of death: The core issue was whether Krishnan was domiciled in England or Travancore at the time of his death. The trial court and High Court initially found that Krishnan was not domiciled in England, but the Supreme Court concluded otherwise. The Supreme Court examined Krishnan's intentions through his letters and actions, noting a shift in his intentions post-1939. Despite earlier intentions to return to India, Krishnan's later actions and statements, particularly those to Miss Hepworth, indicated a settled intention to remain in England. The Court emphasized the importance of conduct over mere declarations, ultimately determining that Krishnan had acquired a domicile of choice in England.
2. Applicability of English law versus the Travancore Ezhava Act in succession matters: The determination of Krishnan's domicile was crucial for deciding the applicable law for succession. The High Court had ruled that the succession to Krishnan's movables should be governed by the Travancore Ezhava Act, while the Supreme Court held that English law would govern the succession to both the movables and moneys left by Krishnan, as he was domiciled in England. The sale proceeds of the house in Sheffield were to be distributed according to English law, which the parties did not dispute.
3. Validity of Ex. 56 order and its operation as res judicata: The trial court and High Court found that Ex. 56 order, which declared Krishnan domiciled in England, was obtained by fraud and did not operate as res judicata. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the evidence did not support the allegation of fraud. The Court noted that the administrators, Arksey and Mary Woodliff, had no motive to commit fraud and were competent to testify about Krishnan's domicile. The Supreme Court concluded that Ex. 56 order was valid and operated as res judicata for the major respondents who had submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court.
4. Allegations of fraud in obtaining Ex. 56 order: The High Court had found that Ex. 56 order was obtained by fraud, but the Supreme Court rejected this finding. The Supreme Court emphasized that fraud must be proven by new and material facts not before the original court. The evidence presented, including letters and affidavits, did not demonstrate that the administrators or the first defendant had misled the English court. The Court highlighted that the administrators acted in good faith and that there was no indication of knowingly false evidence being presented.
5. Procedural fairness and principles of natural justice in the foreign proceedings: The High Court had ruled that the proceedings in which Ex. 56 order was obtained were opposed to natural justice, particularly concerning the minors. The Supreme Court, however, found that the natural guardians of the minors were given notice, and the court had appointed a guardian ad litem for the minors. The Court held that this satisfied the requirements of natural justice, as the minors had an opportunity to contest the proceedings through their natural guardians.
6. Jurisdiction of the English court over minors: The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the English court had jurisdiction over the minors, given that their guardians did not submit to the jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the English court did not have jurisdiction over the minors, as they did not submit to the court's jurisdiction. However, this did not affect the validity of Ex. 56 order concerning the major respondents who had submitted to the jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the sale proceeds of the house in Sheffield should be distributed according to English law. However, it set aside the High Court's decision regarding the movables and moneys, ruling that these should also be governed by English law. The appeal was allowed, and the amount specified in Schedule-C, minus the sale proceeds of the house, was to be distributed between the first and second defendants in equal shares. No order was made as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 116
Issues: Petition for writ of mandamus to restrain denial of quota of levy sugar under Levy Sugar Supply Control Order, 1972; Discrimination in termination of agency agreements for distribution of levy sugar.
Analysis: The judgment addressed two main issues. Firstly, the petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the respondents from denying their quota of levy sugar under the Levy Sugar Supply Control Order, 1972. The background highlighted the historical control of sugar production, pricing, and distribution by the Government of India under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Order in question requisitioned sugar from producers for supply at a price determined by the government. The petitioners, appointed as retailers for certain localities, had agreements with the State for distribution of levy sugar. However, the State terminated these agreements as part of a policy to eliminate retail sellers dealing in controlled sugar, replacing them with Model Shops and Co-operative Societies for fair distribution. The Court found the relationship between the petitioners and the State to be purely contractual, leading to the dismissal of the petition as the petitioners had no legal right to trade in levy sugar.
Secondly, the issue of discrimination in the termination of agency agreements for distribution of levy sugar was raised. The petitioners alleged discrimination among the 160 dealers selling levy sugar, with 24, including them, being singled out. The State's preference for Co-operatives in distribution led to the replacement of private retailers with Model Shops, causing the petitioners to lose their distribution rights. The State justified its actions by emphasizing the need for fair and equitable distribution through Model Shops and Co-operative Societies. The Court agreed with the State's stance, stating that there was no discrimination as the agency agreements were terminated based on contractual provisions, and the State's actions were in line with its distribution policy. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, with each party bearing their own costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 114
Issues: 1. Jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to restrain parties from proceeding with arbitration under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. 2. Interpretation of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act in relation to the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. 3. Conflict between the Bombay Rent Act and the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act regarding jurisdiction over disputes. 4. Exclusive jurisdiction of the Officer on Special Duty under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
Detailed Analysis: 1. The judgment involved a dispute between a Co-operative society and tenants regarding possession of premises. The Co-operative society filed an arbitration case under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, while the tenants filed a suit in the Small Causes Court seeking an interim injunction. The main issue was whether the Small Causes Court had the jurisdiction to restrain parties from proceeding with arbitration under the Co-operative Societies Act.
2. The petitioner argued that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to grant such an injunction under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, which prohibits restraining parties from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. The petitioner contended that the Officer on Special Duty under the Co-operative Societies Act was considered a court, and thus the Small Causes Court acted without jurisdiction.
3. The judgment highlighted the conflict between the Bombay Rent Act and the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act in terms of jurisdiction over disputes. The Court emphasized that the Small Causes Court should have refrained from granting the injunction, considering the differing scopes of the two Acts and the potential for multiple judgments on the same issue.
4. The judgment also discussed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Officer on Special Duty under the Co-operative Societies Act for resolving disputes between the society and its members. The Court noted that the determination of the dispute would depend on the specific facts and materials related to the premises and the rights of the parties involved, emphasizing that the Officer on Special Duty was the appropriate forum for such disputes.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the revision application, setting aside the injunction granted by the Small Causes Court and emphasizing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Officer on Special Duty under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act for resolving disputes between the society and its members.
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1974 (4) TMI 113
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the quota rule and seniority rule post-15-1-1959. 2. Preparation of a new seniority list as per the Supreme Court's directions. 3. Validity and fairness of the new seniority rule under Article 16 of the Constitution. 4. Impact of the new seniority rule on the promotees, especially the 73 spillover promotees.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Quota Rule and Seniority Rule Post-15-1-1959: The Supreme Court held that the quota rule, which allocated 66 1/2 % of the posts to direct recruits and 33 1/2 % to promotees, collapsed with the decision to promote a large number of Income-tax Officers from Class II to Class I. Consequently, the seniority rule, which gave weightage to promotees of 2 to 3 years, also broke down. The court directed the government to devise a just and fair seniority rule in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, effective from 16-1-1959.
2. Preparation of a New Seniority List: The court mandated the preparation of a fresh seniority list, setting aside the list prepared on 15-7-1968. The new list was to be prepared in light of the court's observations, with the seniority list from 1951 to 15-1-1959 being prepared according to the quota rule of 1951 read with the seniority Rule 1(f)(iii). For the period post-16-1-1959, the list was to be prepared according to a new rule framed by the government.
3. Validity and Fairness of the New Seniority Rule under Article 16: The new seniority rule, effective from 16-1-1959, was framed by the President under Article 309 of the Constitution and was challenged as unjust, unfair, and violative of the promotees' fundamental rights under Article 16. The rule stipulated that seniority among promotees and direct recruits would be in the ratio of 1:1, determined by a roster. The court found that the government had followed the directions given in the judgment and that the new rule was a necessary substitute for maintaining the continuity and regulation of the service cadre.
4. Impact on Promotees, Especially the 73 Spillover Promotees: The promotees argued that they should be absorbed on a "priority basis" and that their seniority should not be prejudiced. The court clarified that the 73 spillover promotees, who had no quota posts for absorption on 16-1-1959, were to be governed by the new seniority rule, which allocated alternate posts to promotees and direct recruits. The contention that their appointments should be regarded as valid under Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules and that their seniority should be determined by their dates of appointment was rejected. The court held that the new seniority rule was just and fair, considering the overall context and the necessity of integrating the service cadre.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court accepted the new seniority list prepared by the government as per its directions and found the new seniority rule to be just and fair. The court emphasized that the rule was necessary for maintaining the continuity and proper regulation of the service cadre, and it did not violate Article 16 of the Constitution. The seniority list filed on 15-2-1973 was accepted as correct, and there was no order as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 112
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the will dated 17-11-58. 2. Splitting of cause of action under Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. 3. Proof of assets and stock-in-trade worth Rs. 12,500 handed over to defendant Harinarain. 4. Appropriation of payments towards interest or principal.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Will Dated 17-11-58: The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove the will dated 17-11-58 in accordance with the law. During the appeal, the plaintiff-respondents produced a copy of the probate dated 15-11-61 granted in their favor by the Court of District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur, which was admitted in evidence by the order of this Court dated 9-1-74. According to Williams on Executors, the probate is conclusive evidence of the validity and contents of a will. Thus, the grant of probate conclusively establishes the legal character of the person to whom the grant is made, and it is conclusive evidence against the whole world of the validity and due execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of the testator. Consequently, the genuineness of the will cannot be challenged by the defendants, and the first contention raised by the appellants was overruled.
2. Splitting of Cause of Action Under Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C.: The defendants contended that the suit was barred under Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. due to splitting of cause of action, as three suits were filed simultaneously based on the deed of dissolution. However, the Court noted that Order 2, Rule 2 applies only where the cause of action is one and does not apply where one transaction gives rise to several causes of action. The Court emphasized that the deed of dissolution gave rise to three separate and distinct causes of action. Furthermore, the defendants failed to produce the plaints of the other two suits, which is necessary to establish the identity of the cause of action. The Court also noted that the three suits were filed simultaneously on the same date in the same Court, and the bar under Order 2, Rule 2 does not apply when suits are filed simultaneously. The Court concluded that the present suit is not barred under Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C., and the plaintiffs were not required to include all causes of action in one suit.
3. Proof of Assets and Stock-in-Trade Worth Rs. 12,500 Handed Over to Defendant Harinarain: The defendants argued that there was no reliable proof that assets and stock-in-trade worth Rs. 12,500 were handed over to Harinarain. The deed of dissolution and the deed of guarantee indicated that Harinarain took the liability for payment of Rs. 12,500 in lieu of stock-in-trade worth that amount, and Harishchandra stood surety for the repayment. The defendants had regularly paid monthly installments of Rs. 400 each for one year against interest on the amount. The Court found that a heavy burden lay on the defendants to prove that assets worth Rs. 12,500 were not handed over to Harinarain, and the solitary oral statement of Harinarain was insufficient to discharge this burden. Thus, the last contention was found to be without merit.
4. Appropriation of Payments Towards Interest or Principal: The plaintiffs argued that the Court below erred in appropriating the amount of Rs. 4788 received from the defendants towards the principal amount of Rs. 12,500. The Court noted that the plaintiffs received Rs. 4800 by way of monthly installments of Rs. 400 each from 1-11-52 to 1-10-53, which should first be applied in payment of interest and then towards the principal amount. The general rule is that in the absence of any appropriation by the debtor at the time of payment, the payments should be attributed first to interest. The Court recalculated the amount due to the plaintiffs, concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for Rs. 15,018.31.
Conclusion: The appeal filed by the defendants was dismissed with costs. The cross-objection filed by the plaintiffs was allowed, and the decretal amount was enhanced from Rs. 10,993.25 to Rs. 15,018.31. The plaintiffs were entitled to interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and from the date of the decree to the date of realization of the principal sum of Rs. 10,301.68. The parties were to give and take costs of the cross-objection according to their success and failure.
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1974 (4) TMI 111
Issues: - Interpretation of Government resolutions regarding the disposal of lands for cultivation. - Rights of adjoining landowners based on historical resolutions. - Validity of lease granted by Government to a cooperative society. - Consideration of social policies in granting leases. - Authority of Government to modify policies regarding land disposal. - Discretion of Government in granting leases based on public policy. - Adjudication of rights based on historical resolutions and current circumstances.
Analysis: The judgment by the Supreme Court involved the interpretation of Government resolutions regarding the disposal of lands for cultivation. The case revolved around the rights of adjoining landowners based on historical resolutions and the validity of a lease granted by the Government to a cooperative society. The Court examined the evolution of Government policies from the 19th century to the mid-20th century concerning the allocation of lands for cultivation. It was noted that the Government had the authority to modify policies regarding land disposal based on its social objectives and needs of the people.
The Court specifically analyzed the 1931 resolution and the 1953 memorandum, which outlined the priorities for granting leases of tank bed lands. The 1953 memorandum emphasized giving preference to cooperative societies of local landless backward class people. The judgment highlighted that the Government's policies could change over time, and any order modifying previous decisions did not deprive individuals of their rights. The Court emphasized that the rights to cultivate land were precarious and seasonal, not creating permanent estates for the adjoining owners.
Regarding the lease granted to the cooperative society, the Court found that the High Court's decision, based on the 1931 resolution, was incorrect as it did not confer perpetual cultivation rights to the landowners. The Court emphasized that the Government had the discretion to grant leases based on public policy considerations. The judgment clarified that the High Court's decision was unsustainable, and the lease granted to the cooperative society was valid.
Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of the composition of the cooperative society and stated that it was not within the scope of the case to adjudicate on that matter. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and left the decision of granting leases to the lands in question to the Government, allowing it to evolve public policies in that regard. The Court allowed the Civil Appeal and directed the appellants to be awarded costs by the contesting respondents in the various appeals.
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1974 (4) TMI 110
Issues Involved: 1. Legality and validity of the partnership. 2. Entitlement to compensation from the State of Bihar. 3. Application of res judicata. 4. Contribution to the capital and ownership of the electrical undertaking. 5. Bar under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, estoppel, and waiver. 6. Sufficiency of court fees. 7. Distribution of compensation money.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality and Validity of the Partnership: The case revolves around whether the partnership formed to purchase the electrical undertaking was legal and valid. The Supreme Court found that the partnership was indeed formed before the auction and that all partners contributed to the capital as per their shares. The first respondent's claim that he paid the entire auction money himself was deemed dishonest. The evidence, including receipts and bank records, supported that the partners contributed their shares. The partnership deeds of July 10, 1945, and August 31, 1950, were executed and registered, confirming the partnership and the respective shares.
2. Entitlement to Compensation from the State of Bihar: The first respondent, Murli Prasad, sought a declaration that he was the sole licensee and entitled to the entire compensation paid by the State of Bihar for the assets of the Chhapra Electric Supply Works. The Supreme Court ruled that all partners who contributed to the purchase of the undertaking were entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares. The Court dismissed Murli Prasad's claim of sole entitlement.
3. Application of Res Judicata: A preliminary objection was raised regarding the application of res judicata due to the abatement and dismissal of related appeals. The Supreme Court overruled this objection, stating that the subject matter of Title Suit No. 68 of 1954 and Title Suit No. 94 of 1956 were different. The issues in the two suits, although overlapping in some respects, were not identical. Therefore, the bar of res judicata did not apply.
4. Contribution to the Capital and Ownership of the Electrical Undertaking: The Supreme Court found ample evidence that all partners contributed to the capital in accordance with their shares. The first respondent's claim that he alone paid the entire amount was refuted by documentary and oral evidence, including receipts and balance sheets. The Court concluded that the partners had a legitimate claim to the assets and the compensation money.
5. Bar under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, Estoppel, and Waiver: The Supreme Court addressed whether the suit was barred under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act due to estoppel and waiver. The Court found that the first respondent's conduct and admissions did not bar the suit. The partners' contributions and the partnership's operations were conducted openly, with balance sheets sent to both the partners and the government.
6. Sufficiency of Court Fees: The issue of the sufficiency of court fees was raised, but the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to delve deeply into this matter, focusing instead on the substantive issues of partnership and entitlement to compensation.
7. Distribution of Compensation Money: The Supreme Court directed that the compensation money be distributed among the partners according to their shares as specified in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950. The Trial Court was instructed to give necessary directions to the Receiver to distribute the balance of the compensation amount after paying the outstanding liabilities of the Chhapra Electric Supply Works.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, reversed the High Court's judgment and decree, and dismissed Title Suit No. 94 of 1956. The Court held that Murli Prasad was not solely entitled to the compensation money and that all partners were entitled to share the compensation in proportion to their respective shares. The Trial Court was directed to oversee the distribution of the compensation money.
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1974 (4) TMI 109
Issues Involved: 1. Legality of private tenancy agreements in contravention of a general order under Section 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. 2. Validity of the occupation of accommodation by a tenant under a private agreement made in violation of a general order. 3. District Magistrate's authority to enforce an allotment order and evict a tenant under Section 7-A of the Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Private Tenancy Agreements: The court examined whether a private tenancy agreement made in contravention of a general order under Section 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 is valid. The court noted that the Full Bench in Udhoo Dass v. Prem Prakash had previously held that such agreements were not void. However, the current judgment respectfully differed from this view, stating that a general order issued by the District Magistrate under Section 7(2) has the force of law. Consequently, any private agreement of tenancy made in violation of such a general order is forbidden by law and is therefore void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. The court emphasized that subordinate legislation, such as a general order, constitutes 'law' within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act.
2. Validity of the Occupation of Accommodation: The court discussed whether the occupation of accommodation by a tenant under a private agreement made in violation of a general order is legal. It concluded that such occupation is illegal and the tenant's possession is that of a trespasser. The accommodation, in legal terms, is deemed vacant, allowing the District Magistrate to pass a special order under Section 7(2) for its allotment. The court highlighted that allowing private agreements in contravention of general orders would defeat the purpose of the Act, which aims to control rent and prevent arbitrary eviction.
3. Authority of the District Magistrate to Enforce Allotment Orders: The court analyzed whether the District Magistrate can enforce an allotment order and evict a tenant under Section 7-A of the Act. The judgment clarified that the District Magistrate has the authority to take action under Section 7-A to evict a tenant who occupies accommodation in contravention of a general order and to enforce an allotment order, regardless of whether the allotment order was passed before or after the unauthorized occupation. The court stated that criminal action under Section 8 and civil action under Section 7-A are complementary remedies provided by the Act to rectify breaches of general or special orders issued by the District Magistrate.
Conclusion: The court answered the referred question in the affirmative, holding that a person to whom accommodation has been let out by the landlord in contravention of a general order under Section 7(2) of the Act is liable to be proceeded against under Section 7-A at the instance of the person in whose favor an allotment order has been passed by the District Magistrate, even if the allotment order was passed subsequent to the unauthorized letting and occupation.
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1974 (4) TMI 108
Issues Involved: 1. Whether minorities based on religion or language have the right to establish and administer educational institutions for imparting general secular education under Article 30 of the Constitution. 2. Whether Articles 30(1) and 29(1) of the Constitution are mutually exclusive. 3. The extent of the State's power to regulate minority educational institutions. 4. Whether minority educational institutions have a fundamental right to affiliation with a statutory University. 5. The validity of specific provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, as amended, in relation to minority educational institutions.
Analysis of the Judgment:
1. Right of Minorities to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions: The Court held that religious and linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. This right is not limited to institutions aimed at conserving their language, script, or culture but includes institutions imparting general secular education. The Court emphasized that the words "of their choice" in Article 30(1) indicate the broad discretion and freedom minorities have in selecting the type of educational institutions they want to establish.
2. Mutual Exclusivity of Articles 30(1) and 29(1): The Court clarified that Articles 30(1) and 29(1) confer distinct rights and are not mutually exclusive. Article 29(1) deals with the right of any section of citizens to conserve their language, script, or culture, while Article 30(1) specifically grants minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The Court stated that the scope of Article 30(1) is not confined to institutions aimed at conserving language, script, or culture but extends to general secular education as well.
3. State's Power to Regulate Minority Educational Institutions: The Court acknowledged that the right to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30(1) is not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulations by the State. Such regulations must be in the interest of the institution as a minority educational institution and should aim at ensuring the efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order, and the like. The regulations should not impinge upon the right of minorities to establish and administer their educational institutions effectively.
4. Fundamental Right to Affiliation: The Court held that there is no fundamental right to affiliation for minority institutions. However, it emphasized that any law or regulation providing for affiliation must not abridge the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Affiliation must be a meaningful exercise that allows minority institutions to impart general secular education and equip their students for ordinary careers. The Court stated that affiliation should not involve terms that would make minority institutions surrender their rights under Article 30(1).
5. Validity of Provisions of the Gujarat University Act: The Court examined several provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, as amended, in light of Article 30(1):
- Sections 40 and 41: These sections, which provide for the conversion of affiliated colleges into constituent colleges of the University, were held to violate Article 30(1) as they would result in minority institutions losing their character and becoming part of the University. The Court struck down these sections as they would take away the fundamental right of minorities to administer their educational institutions.
- Section 33A: This section, which mandates the inclusion of representatives of the University, teachers, non-teaching staff, and students in the governing body of affiliated colleges, was held to violate Article 30(1). The Court stated that the right to administer includes the right to choose the governing body, and any law interfering with this right would be unconstitutional.
- Section 51A: The provision requiring approval from the Vice-Chancellor or an authorized officer for the dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of staff members was partially upheld. The Court upheld the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to the staff but struck down the blanket power of approval conferred on the Vice-Chancellor or authorized officer as it would interfere with the disciplinary control of the managing body.
- Section 52A: This section, which provides for arbitration of disputes between the governing body and staff members, was held to violate Article 30(1). The Court noted that such provisions would introduce litigious controversy and interfere with the administration of minority institutions.
In conclusion, the Court affirmed the broad rights of minorities under Article 30(1) to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, including those imparting general secular education, while recognizing the State's power to impose reasonable regulations. However, it struck down provisions of the Gujarat University Act that interfered with the fundamental rights of minority institutions to administer their educational institutions.
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1974 (4) TMI 107
Issues Involved: 1. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. Transfer of undertaking and applicability of the settlement dated August 25, 1965. 3. Entitlement of workmen to continue employment and computation of benefits. 4. Entitlement to retrenchment compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Closure of the undertaking under Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issues referred under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court clarified that proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) are generally in the nature of execution proceedings where the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer. This calculation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, previously adjudged or otherwise duly provided for. The Court emphasized that the Labour Court cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal, which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determining the plaintiff's right to relief and the corresponding liability of the defendant.
2. Transfer of Undertaking and Applicability of the Settlement Dated August 25, 1965: The Court examined whether the undertaking of the River Steam Navigation Company Limited had been transferred to the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and if the settlement dated August 25, 1965, was binding on the Corporation. The scheme of transfer sanctioned by the Calcutta High Court provided that the Corporation would take over as many of the staff and labour of the Company as possible, but the exact number was left to the discretion of the Corporation. The Court noted that the scheme did not compel the Corporation to employ the workmen and that the settlement was not binding on the Corporation.
3. Entitlement of Workmen to Continue Employment and Computation of Benefits: The Court addressed whether the 420 employees who were parties to the settlement dated August 25, 1965, were entitled to continue in the employment of the Corporation and, if so, what amount they were entitled to. The Court held that the Labour Court could not undertake an investigation into whether the workmen had any right to a benefit and whether the Corporation was liable to satisfy the same. Such an investigation would be appropriate for determination in an Industrial Dispute on a reference under Section 10 of the Act and could not be regarded as merely 'incidental' to the computation under Section 33(C)(2).
4. Entitlement to Retrenchment Compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act: The Court examined whether the 92 employees mentioned in List No. II, who were not parties to the settlement, were entitled to retrenchment compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court held that the claim of the employees for compensation under Section 25FF was directed not against the Corporation but against the Company of which they were formerly the employees. The scheme of transfer showed that the employees who were not taken over by the Corporation were to be paid by the Company all money due to them under the law.
5. Closure of the Undertaking under Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act: The Court addressed whether the undertaking of the Company had been closed within the contemplation of Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act and, if so, what amount of compensation the workmen mentioned in both lists were entitled to. The Court held that the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon this issue as it was not entertainable under Section 33(C)(2).
Conclusion: The Supreme Court concluded that the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the questions referred to it under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's view that the Labour Court had jurisdiction was overturned. The Court emphasized that any investigation into the alleged right of the employees to be continued in service by the Corporation and the determination of the nature of relief the workmen were entitled to should be addressed in an Industrial Dispute on a reference under Section 10 of the Act, not under Section 33(C)(2).
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1974 (4) TMI 106
Issues Involved: 1. Legality of the enhancement of electricity rates under a notification issued by the State Government. 2. Right of the petitioners to be heard before the enhancement of electricity charges.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Enhancement of Electricity Rates: The petitioners challenged the increase in electricity rates imposed by the respondent, a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, based on a notification dated 24th May 1972, issued under Section 3(2)(aa) of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1947. The court examined the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, particularly Sections 57 and 57-A and the VIth Schedule, which provide a comprehensive procedure for the enhancement of electricity rates. The court noted that the licensee had a unilateral right to adjust rates, provided the rate charged did not yield a profit exceeding the amount of reasonable return, as defined in the VIth Schedule. The court referenced the Supreme Court's rulings in Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. N. S. Bathena and Jindas Oil Mill v. Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd., which affirmed the licensee's statutory right to unilaterally adjust rates.
The court found that the enhancement was proposed following the procedure outlined in the VIth Schedule, with the necessary notice and data provided to the State Government. The State Government approved the enhancement after scrutinizing the financial and technical data. Despite the invalidation of Section 3(2)(aa) of the U.P. Act by the court, the enhancement remained valid as it was based on the VIth Schedule's provisions. The court concluded that the public notice issued by the licensee on 11th June 1972 was valid and effective, independent of the invalidated state notification.
2. Right of the Petitioners to be Heard: The petitioners argued that they were entitled to a hearing before the enhancement of electricity charges. The court examined whether the principles of natural justice required such a hearing. It noted that the Electricity Supply Act and the VIth Schedule provided an exhaustive procedure for rate adjustment, including scrutiny by the State Government or the Board and, if necessary, by a rating committee. The court emphasized that the statutory framework was designed to protect consumers' interests through rigorous examination of the licensee's financial and technical data.
The court held that the statute did not expressly or impliedly provide for a notice to consumers before rate enhancement. It referenced the Supreme Court's rulings in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha and New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., which established that the principles of natural justice do not override statutory procedures. The court also noted practical difficulties in notifying a large number of consumers, reinforcing the legislature's deliberate exclusion of such a requirement.
The court distinguished the petitioners' cited cases (AIR 1962 SC 1217, AIR 1967 SC 1766, and AIR 1970 SC 1896) as involving quasi-judicial proceedings where affected parties had a direct interest and had made representations. In contrast, the electricity rate enhancement involved a unilateral right of the licensee, with the consumer's interest safeguarded by the statutory procedure.
Conclusion: The court dismissed the writ petitions, affirming the legality of the electricity rate enhancement under the VIth Schedule of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, and rejecting the petitioners' claim for a hearing based on the principles of natural justice. The petitions were dismissed with costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 105
Issues: 1. Validity of orders of the Collector directing handover of land to rightful owners under the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949. 2. Maintainability of Civil Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution. 3. Power of the Collector to deprive petitioners of their fundamental rights. 4. Lack of evidence of leases before the Collector. 5. Ownership of disputed lands by Gram Sabhas or panchayats. 6. Challenge to the Collector's power to proceed under the Act. 7. Questions to be determined by the Collector before passing further orders.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses a batch of Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions concerning the orders of the Collector directing the handover of land under the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949. The Court notes common questions of fact and law in these cases, allowing for a single judgment to dispose of them collectively.
2. The issue of the maintainability of the Civil Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution is raised. The Court dismisses the preliminary objection, stating that the technical objection is overruled, allowing the appeals to proceed.
3. The judgment delves into the power of the Collector to deprive petitioners of their alleged fundamental rights to hold land. The Court notes the lack of concrete evidence to support the Collector's orders, emphasizing the need for proper investigation before making such determinations.
4. Notably, the absence of leases presented before the Collector distinguishes the present cases from previous judgments. The Court highlights the denial by appellants and petitioners of receiving land under the Act, raising doubts about the ownership claims of the alleged private owners.
5. The judgment also touches upon the ownership of disputed lands, suggesting that a significant portion may vest in Gram Sabhas or panchayats. This raises questions about the legitimacy of orders directing possession to assumed private owners.
6. A crucial aspect of the judgment involves the challenge to the Collector's power to proceed under the Act. The Court emphasizes the need for a thorough examination of the source and extent of the Collector's jurisdiction before passing further orders, given conflicting assertions and pieces of evidence.
7. Lastly, the Court outlines specific questions for the Collector to consider before making any decisions, including the validity of leases, compensation proceedings, legal status of alleged lessees, claims by Gaon Panchayats, and the appropriateness of further legal proceedings between parties.
In conclusion, the Court allows the appeals and Writ Petitions, quashing the orders of the Collector and halting further proceedings under the Act until the status of the lands in possession is clarified. The judgment emphasizes the need for a comprehensive investigation and proper determination of legal rights before any further action is taken, with each party bearing their own costs in the proceedings.
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1974 (4) TMI 104
Issues Involved: 1. Maintainability of the appeal under Article 136. 2. Applicability of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. 3. Classification and capacity to pay by the Press Trust of India (PTI). 4. Procedural fairness and natural justice in Wage Board recommendations. 5. Specific objections by Indian National Press.
Detailed Analysis:
Maintainability of the Appeal under Article 136: The preliminary objection raised by the respondents was that the appeal is not maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution since the Central Government's order is a piece of subordinate legislation and not a judicial order. The Court noted that the Wage Board's functions could be administrative, judicial, quasi-judicial, or legislative. The Court held that the Wage Board's functions are not necessarily legislative and could be subject to judicial review if proper safeguards are adopted.
Applicability of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution: The petitioners argued that the Wage Board's recommendations and the Central Government's order violated Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The Court allowed the substitution of shareholders in place of deceased petitioners to maintain the challenge under Article 19. The Court held that a shareholder could challenge the order if it imposed an unreasonable burden on the company's resources.
Classification and Capacity to Pay by the Press Trust of India (PTI): The PTI argued that it was discriminated against in the classification and fixation of wages. The Wage Board placed PTI in Class II instead of Class III based on its gross revenue, which PTI contended was arbitrary and without basis. The Court found that the classification was arbitrary and discriminatory, as PTI was placed in a higher category without sufficient justification. The Court noted that the Wage Board failed to consider PTI's financial capacity adequately and imposed a heavy financial burden.
Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice in Wage Board Recommendations: The PTI argued that the Wage Board recommended wages higher than what the employees had asked for, without giving notice to the employer, thus violating principles of natural justice. The Court agreed, stating that the Wage Board's recommendations were unreasonable and beyond the financial capacity of PTI. The Court emphasized that the Wage Board must consider the representations of both employers and employees and fix wages according to the employer's capacity to pay.
Specific Objections by Indian National Press: The Indian National Press argued that there was a deficit between its average net profits and the yearly wage burden. The Court found no merit in this argument, noting that the petitioner was placed in the appropriate class based on its gross profits. Therefore, the Court dismissed Writ Petition No. 37 of 1968.
Conclusion: The Court allowed Writ Petition No. 40 of 1968 by PTI, striking down the Central Government's order dated October 27, 1967, as it applied to PTI. The Court directed PTI to pay wages agreed upon with its employees' union until new wages are fixed by another Wage Board. No orders were made in Civil Appeal No. 2102 of 1968, and no costs were awarded.
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1974 (4) TMI 103
Issues Involved: 1. Legality of the Charge-Sheets and Formal Enquiry 2. Reasonable Opportunity to Defend 3. Personal Hearing and Mode of Enquiry 4. Private Enquiries by the Enquiry Officer 5. Vagueness of the Show-Cause Notice 6. Commissioner's Findings Contrary to Enquiry Officer 7. Oppressiveness of Multiple Charge-Sheets
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Charge-Sheets and Formal Enquiry The appellant argued that there were no formal charge-sheets and hence no regular enquiry. The court found no substance in this submission, stating, "The appellant was under no misapprehension as to the nature of the enquiry started against him." The court noted that the first charge-sheet, though described as a memo, clearly indicated disciplinary action. The subsequent charge-sheets explicitly referred to the first as a charge-sheet, and all contained detailed particulars. The court concluded that the appellant was aware of the nature of the disciplinary action and that the enquiry was formal.
2. Reasonable Opportunity to Defend The appellant contended that he was denied inspection of relevant records and copies of documents. The court found no substance in this complaint, noting that the appellant was not entitled to preliminary reports unless relied upon by the Enquiry Officer. The court emphasized, "It is obvious that the appellant was not entitled to a copy of the report made by Mr. Srivastava or any other officer unless the enquiry officer relied on these reports."
The appellant also argued that he was denied the assistance of an advocate. The court rejected this, stating, "The appellant was not entitled under the Rules to the assistance of an advocate during the course of the enquiry." The court found that the appellant was the best person to explain his assessment orders and that the absence of a lawyer did not deprive him of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
3. Personal Hearing and Mode of Enquiry The appellant claimed there was no personal hearing as the enquiry did not follow the trial format. The court dismissed this, stating, "There is, however, no set form for disciplinary enquiries." The court found that the enquiry, based on eliciting replies to questions about assessment records, amounted to a personal hearing and provided a reasonable opportunity to defend.
4. Private Enquiries by the Enquiry Officer The court noted that the Enquiry Officer made private enquiries about the appellant's properties without involving him. The High Court took exception to this, and the Supreme Court agreed, stating, "It held that finding on charge No. 2 in the third charge-sheet was vitiated." However, this lapse did not significantly impact the overall findings.
5. Vagueness of the Show-Cause Notice The appellant argued that the show-cause notice was vague. The court found no substance in this argument, noting that the appellant had received the Enquiry Officer's report and had the opportunity to comment on it. The court stated, "It was not necessary for the Commissioner to make a precise summary of the evidence against the appellant and furnish him the reasons or grounds for arriving at the provisional conclusion."
6. Commissioner's Findings Contrary to Enquiry Officer The appellant contended that the Commissioner unjustifiably made a finding contrary to the Enquiry Officer regarding the assessment of a specific firm. The court noted that the Commissioner is not bound by the Enquiry Officer's findings and found no significant prejudice to the appellant.
7. Oppressiveness of Multiple Charge-Sheets The appellant argued that issuing multiple charge-sheets rendered the enquiry oppressive. The court found no substance in this contention, noting that the third charge-sheet was an aggravated form of the first and that the appellant was given enough opportunity to defend himself. The court stated, "All that we can say is that by reason of the third charge-sheet the enquiry was prolonged for sometime, but the essential facts being the same, there was no basis for complaint that the enquiry had become oppressive."
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the appellant was lawfully dismissed after a proper enquiry. The court found no merit in the appellant's arguments regarding the legality of the charge-sheets, the opportunity to defend, the mode of enquiry, the private enquiries by the Enquiry Officer, the vagueness of the show-cause notice, the Commissioner's findings, and the oppressiveness of multiple charge-sheets.
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1974 (4) TMI 102
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the continuation of the disciplinary inquiry against the appellant. 2. Validity of the appellant's continued suspension under sub-rule 5(b) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Continuation of the Disciplinary Inquiry: The appellant challenged the continuation of the disciplinary inquiry instituted by the Memorandum dated 8th March 1965. Initially, the inquiry was based on four charges, but charges Nos. 1, III, and IV were dropped by a subsequent Memorandum dated 9th December 1971, leaving only Charge II and three new charges.
- Court's Finding: The appellant's counsel conceded that it was not possible to assail the validity of the continuation of the inquiry. Therefore, the court held that the second part of the impugned order, which directed the continuation of the inquiry, was valid.
2. Validity of the Appellant's Continued Suspension: The primary contention was whether the President had the authority to continue the appellant's suspension under sub-rule 5(b) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
- Background: The appellant was originally suspended on 11th April 1963 due to a criminal investigation. He was later dismissed from service on 26th October 1967 following his conviction. However, his conviction was set aside by the Supreme Court on 19th March 1971, leading to the setting aside of the dismissal order on 9th June 1971. The President's order on 9th June 1971 also directed the continuation of the appellant's suspension until the termination of the disciplinary proceedings.
- Legal Provisions: - Rule 10(1): Allows suspension where a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or pending. - Rule 10(3): Provides for the continuation of suspension if a penalty is set aside in appeal or review. - Rule 10(4): Provides for suspension if a dismissal order is set aside by a court and further inquiry is decided. - Rule 10(5)(a): States that an order of suspension continues until modified or revoked. - Rule 10(5)(b): Allows for the continuation of suspension if another disciplinary proceeding is commenced during the existing suspension.
- Court's Analysis: - Sub-rule 5(b) Applicability: The court held that sub-rule 5(b) requires that the government servant must be under continuing suspension at the time the new disciplinary proceeding is commenced. In this case, the appellant's suspension ended with the dismissal order on 26th October 1967, and it did not revive automatically when the dismissal was set aside. - Sub-rule 4 Applicability: The court found that the inquiry continued under the impugned order was not based on the same allegations that led to the original dismissal. Thus, sub-rule 4 did not apply. - Sub-rule 5(a) Applicability: The court rejected the contention that the suspension continued under sub-rule 5(a) after the dismissal, as the relationship of master and servant had ended with the dismissal.
- Conclusion: The third part of the impugned order continuing the suspension was outside the authority of the President and could not be justified under any sub-rule of Rule 10. The court quashed this part of the order and directed the respondents to pay the appellant's arrears of salary from 26th October 1967, deducting the subsistence allowance already paid.
Judgment: The appeal was partly allowed. The court issued a writ of mandamus quashing the third part of the impugned order dated 9th June 1971, which continued the appellant's suspension. The respondents were directed to pay the appellant arrears of salary from 26th October 1967 after deducting the subsistence allowance. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
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