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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 97 Records
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1974 (7) TMI 128 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the new Act the release application has to be decided by the prescribed Authority. Considering that the prescribed Authority is not a party to the writ petition, no direction can be issued to him, but it is hoped that if the matter is to be decided by the prescribed Authority and not by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer he will consider it proper to comply with the above direction of this Court F.A.F.O No. 251 of 1972 and Civil Revision No. 875 of 1972 are allowed and the orders impugned therein are set aside. It is ordered that the injunction application and the application for restoration of possession shall now be disposed of afresh from the stage of the grant of the interim injunction order. It is further ordered that there shall be no disturbance of possession till the matter has been finally decided by the Court below or by the authority dealing with the release application, whichever is earlier Costs of all the five cases of all the Courts shall be on the parties.
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1974 (7) TMI 127 - KERALAHIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act the report of the Public Analyst in the prescribed form containing the result of analysis is admissible in evidence unless it is superseded by the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory. By virtue of this section the report of the Public Analyst is per se evidence. The accused has been given a right under Section 13(2) to challenge the correctness of the report; and if the accused does not exercise this right the report of the Public Analyst constitutes a good piece of evidence in the case. The respondent, the accused, in the present case has not challenged the correctness of the analysis or the genuineness and validity of the report of the Public Analyst. To my mind it .appears that the decision of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 235 and 236 of 1964 has no application to the particular facts of the instant case. The statements and observations made in that judgment have to be understood bearing in mind the facts in that particular case.
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1974 (7) TMI 126 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... because of a wrongful intervention outside the limits of the Court . It is well settled that unless there is proof of loss, no claim for damages or compensation can at all be sustained. Mere allegation of wrong is not the whole cause of action. It is the resultant effect that furnishes cause of action. Therefore, the damages that was suffered by the plaintiff, was the part of the cause of action i.e., "the wrong done" and that arose within the jurisdiction of Akola Court. Though therefore, the complaint of the plaintiff was against the action by defendant No. 2 being without the limits of Akola Court, it follows that as he was affected by that action for all purposes in his business within the jurisdictions of that Court all the requirements of Section 19 of the Code have been fully answered and the suit was properly laid in Akola Court. 16. In the result there is no merit in the present revision and the same would stand dismissed with costs. 17. Revision dismissed.
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1974 (7) TMI 125 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the decree passed in that suit, was not entitled to set back possession in restitution proceedings on the case being ultimately decided in his favour by the Privy Council and he had, therefore, to file a suit for possession within limitation. In the instant case, however, suit No. 377 of 1953 being decided in their favour, respondents 7 to 10 who had been dispossessed in consequence of the ex parte decree passed in that suit would have, as already pointed, out above, succeeded in getting possession in restitution proceedings and in these circumstances their non-institution of a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would not be fatal for them. 27. The grounds on which the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition not having been assailed, as already observed above, and the various submissions made in support of the appeal having failed, the appeal, in our opinion, deserves to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 124 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 973 From the oral evidence it is clear that the plaintiff was never in possession of the first floor of the suit property while the first defendant (Lilavathi Ammal) has always been in possession through her tenants and was collecting rents. Therefore, she would be entitled to the injunction prayed for. 26. Issue No. 3 in C. S. No. 157 of 1973 No arguments have been addressed as to why the suit as framed is not maintainable and I answer this Issue in favour of the first defendant (Lilavathi Ammal). 27-28. Issue No. 7 in C. S. No. 6 of 1973 and Issue No. 5 in C. S. No. 157 of 1973. In the result, C. S. No. 6 of 1973 shall stand dismissed while C. S. No. 157 of 1973 is decreed in favour of the first defendant (Lilavathi Ammal) in C. S. No 6 of 1973 and plaintiff in C. S. No. 157 of 1973. Having regard to the fact that the parties are related to each other as husband and wife, I think that this is a fit case in which each of the parties must be directed to bear his or her costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 123 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing was not ₹ 1,500/- per month but only ₹ 600/- per month. The fact that the tax assessed by the Corporation authorities on the basis of rental of ₹ 1,500/- per month, was reduced in revision does not mean that the rent of the building in question was something less than ₹ 1,500/- per month from 1-4-1961, This material is sufficient to establish that the just and proper assessment of compensation of this building is ₹ 1,500/- per month from 1-4-1961 as claimed by the appellant-claimant. We are of opinion that he is entitled to the same. 8. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator, in so far as it pertains to the period from 1-4-1961 up-to-date, in case No. LAQ. 101 of 1970-71 and fix the amount of compensation payable to the appellant-claimant at ₹ 1,500/- per month for that period. We confirm the Award in regard to the period from 8-7-1954 to 1-4-1961. No order as to costs. 9. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (7) TMI 122 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... said share in the register of members of the company. The appellant-company is denying that right of the plaintiff and the suit is, therefore, perfectly maintainable. It was also contended by Mr. Dutt that such a decree under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act would be binding only upon the parties to the suit or persons claiming through them under Section 35 of the said Act. Mr. Dutt, therefore, contended that for the protection of the company it was necessary for it to have indemnity from the plaintiff or from his transferor, Ballavdas, and unless such indemnity was given, the company would not be protected. In our view the decree of this court would be sufficient protection to the company, and in the facts and circumstances of the present case no question of further protection of the company can arise at all. 14. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. 15. I agree.
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1974 (7) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s will interpret the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men. But this is beside the point. The point is rather that this power must be lodged somewhere and under our Constitution and laws, it has been lodged in the judges and if they have to fulfil their function as judge's, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere. 33. We think that Section 3 is based on public policy. As we said, it is intended to protect a weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power. Although the section is primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy. The respondent could not have waived the benefit of the provision. 34. The language of the section as already stated, is prohibitive in character. It precludes a court from entertaining the suit. We think the High Court was right in its conclusion. 35. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 120 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... luation under Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In the circumstances of the present case the assessable value is to be fixed taking into account 8% sole agency commission, which should also be deducted.
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1974 (7) TMI 119 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... determine the wholesale cash price and demand excise duty on the basis thereof. 17. Therefore, the order in this Rule would be without prejudice to the authority of the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Calcutta VI Division to make fresh determination of the wholesale cash price and again make an assesssment for the period commencing from September, 1967 in accordance with law. 18. I accordingly made the Rule absolute in part. I quash the assessment order, dated the 25th May, 1971 of the Assistant Collector, Central Excise (Annexure V’). Let a writ of Mandamus issue commanding the respondents from making any fresh assessment of excise duty in respect of goods covered by A.R. Nos. 5, SK 67-68, dated the 12th July, 1967, 7/SK/67-68, dated the 26th August, 1967. The respondents would be at liberty to make fresh assessment of excise duty on the goods covered by remaining A.R. Form I and RT-8 Forms in accordance with law. 19. There will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 118 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the word goods or the word wafer as known to the market and since wafers are known as biscuits in the duty levied is proper. In support of his contention he cites a ruling in S.B Sugar Mills v. Union of India (AIR 1968 S.C. 922) where it was held that as the Act does not define goods the legislature must be taken to have used that word in its ordinary dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is known to the market. Thus, I am of the opinion that wafer is a kind of biscuit and as such is liable to excise duty. Therefore the action taken by the first respondent cannot be quashed in these writ petition. 5. emsp Incidently, after dictating this judgment I can across a tin of wafers manufactured by the petitioner who describe themselves as a manufactures of Wafer Biscuits . 6. emsp Hence, these writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100/- in each.
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1974 (7) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent it has to be found out that the order affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right or liability?
Whether there has been a determination of any right or liability?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The amendment order is not purely of discretion. Even with regard to discretionary orders the appellate court can interfere where the order is insupportable in law or is unjust. The High Court considered the second application for amendment to be a new claim based on the new set of facts which became barred on the date of the application for amendment. In exceptional cases an amendment has been allowed where the effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, because the court found that consideration of lapse of time is out weighed by the special circumstances of the case. The High Court rightly found that there were no special circumstances to entitle the appellant to introduce by amendments such claim.
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1974 (7) TMI 116 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and Haryana High Court in Chandra Industries v. Punjab State 1972 29 S.T.C. 558. and by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hind Ceramics Limited v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal 1973 32 S.T.C. 419. The principle laid down in Subhash Chandra Ghosh v. State of Orissa 1970 26 S.T.C. 211. fully applies to the facts of this case. 4.. The petitioner is to be treated as a registered dealer with effect from 14/16th February, 1962, and it cannot be assessed as an unregistered dealer for the impugned three quarters nor can penalty be imposed upon it for the two quarters ending on 30th June, 1962, and 30th September, 1962. 5. On the aforesaid analysis, the question referred is answered in the negative that no penalty is called for in respect of the two quarters ending June and September, 1962. 6.. The reference is accepted with costs. Hearing fee of Rs. 100. Reference fee deposited be refunded to the petitioner. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 115 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of machinery . In Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow v. Chandok Traders 1973 32 S.T.C. 614 (All.). , hair clipper was held as coming within the definition of machinery . It would thus be seen that the dictum of the Judicial Committee has been consistently followed as to the meaning of machinery to be used in common parlance. 6.. In the case of sugarcane crushers, fixing of three iron rollers close to one another is a contrivance and through this contrivance juice is obtained by crushing sugarcane. It is immaterial whether the crusher is worked upon by power, human labour, bullock or any other animal. 7.. On the aforesaid analysis, we would answer the question in the affirmative by saying that sugarcane crusher or sugarcane crushing mill is a type of machinery and comes within entry 60 of the taxable list. 8.. In the result, the reference is accepted but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (7) TMI 114 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l Creamy Snuff which contained 55 per cent of snuff came within the definition of tobacco as defined in item 4 of the First Schedule of the 1944 Central Act. 14.. On the aforesaid reasoning, we are clearly of opinion that during the relevant period gudakhu comes within the definition of manufactured tobacco and as such was tax-free. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Tribunal reached the correct conclusion. It is not necessary to refer to the large many authorities cited on either side which do not throw any light on the question in issue. 15.. We would accordingly answer the question referred in the affirmative by saying that gudakhu is covered by the expression tobacco as defined in section 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, and is exempted from tax under the Act and the 1956 Act. 16.. In the result, the reference is discharged with costs. Hearing fee of Rs. 200. B.K. RAY, J.I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 113 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been a business. (ii) It cannot, however, be dissociated from the petitioner s business of mining quarries. Running the canteen constitutes an integral component part of the mining business. The intention of the petitioner in doing business to earn profit is to be determined with reference to the entire business of mining quarries. (iii) Despite the compulsion of law under the mining rules that the petitioner is to run a canteen and supply food to workers on no-profit basis, the petitioner did not discontinue its business in mining operation. Freedom of contract in setting up a canteen is not wholly excluded. In such a case the transactions of selling food to the workers would constitute a sale. 14.. On the aforesaid analysis, question No. (1) is answered in the negative and question No. (2) in the affirmative. 15.. In the result, the references are discharged, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 112 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at stated hours. The revenue, therefore, was not entitled to split up the transaction into two parts, one of service and the other of sale of food-stuffs and to split up also the bill charged by the hotelier as consisting of charges for lodging and charges for food-stuffs served to him with a view to bring the latter under the Act. Applying this principle in the present case it appears that on perusal of annexure A to the petition which is an admission form to the boarding house, it is clear that the charge for staying in the boarding house includes charge for meal to be taken and even if the boarder does not take the meal he will not be entitled to the rebate. In view of the Supreme Court s decision, the assessment is not in accordance with law. I, therefore, set aside the order of assessment as also the appellate order. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. The security already filed is permitted to be withdrawn after two months. Petition allowed.
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1974 (7) TMI 111 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... further facts as to in what manner the original timbers were sized and if such sizing changes the essential character of the timber. 10.. The question referred to us is modified as follows Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) is applicable inasmuch as the assessee purchased round logs on the basis of his registration certificate free of tax to resell them in Orissa but instead of doing so he converted them into sized wood and then resold the same. We answer the question by saying that on the finding recorded by the Tribunal it is not possible for us to say whether the timbers were converted into a different commercial commodity by the act of sizing them. 11.. In the result, the reference is accepted as indicated above. In the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs. The reference fee deposited be refunded to the petitioner. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 110 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... emphasis on any goods or class of goods in section 5(1), entry 1J and section 9(3) has no bearing on the question of violation of the undertaking given in form No. XXXIV under rule 27(2). The infringement attracts the operation of the proviso. There is no substance in this contention. 13.. On the aforesaid analysis, we sum up our conclusions thus (i) Black gram and green gram are different from dal produced out of them. Both cannot be treated as same goods. (ii) Though the dal after conversion was sold inside Orissa it was not sold in the same form in which the goods were originally purchased on the basis of the declaration. The proviso is clearly attracted. 14.. We would answer the question referred in the affirmative by saying that the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, is attracted. 15.. In the result, the reference is accepted. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 109 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cane has not been defined in the Act and, therefore, one has to construe that word in the popular or commercial sense in which it is understood. If a party enters into an agreement for the supply of sugarcane and the vendor supplies sugarcane setts, can it be said that the agreement has been performed in accordance with the terms of the contract? Conversely, if a party enters into an agreement for purchase of sugarcane setts and the vendor supplies sugarcane, can it be said that the agreement has been performed? There can be only one answer and that is, sugarcane setts are not understood in the commercial sense as sugarcane. Therefore, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Sakthi Sugars Limited case(2). Following the said decision, we answer the second question against the dealer and in favour of the department. In the result, for the reasons stated above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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