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Showing 1 to 20 of 113 Records
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1974 (9) TMI 137 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... illegal. In this view of the matter the appeal fails and stands dismissed with costs. 19. During the course of the hearing, we are told that in spite of the decree in the trial Court as well as in the appellant Court, the respondent has not been allowed to join service and is not reinstated nor paid any salary or allowance. The incident now is more than fifteen years old and the present litigation is pending in Courts for upwards of ten years. It is distressing to find that in spite of judicial pronouncement and without obtaining stay order from the Court, the degree has not been implemented by the State. We hope that State will make amends even now and immediately reinstate the respondent. He appears to be hardly 44 years or 45 years of age and can still render more than ten years of useful service to the State. Needless to add that the respondent has certainly suffered enough and it is time that some amends are made to him and he is allowed to resume his service and career.
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1974 (9) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... so violation of the principles of natural justice nor was the finding perverse. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner is an appellate jurisdiction and is of wider scope unlike that of the Tribunal in an application under section 33 of the I.D. Act. The Commissioner is competent to rehear the matter completely and come to its own conclusion after re-appreciation of the evidence. There is no legal bar in entertaining additional evidence if that is necessary in the interest of justice. The rule of law which has been laid down by this Court with regard to jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in an application under section 33 of the I.D. Act in interfering with the order of dismissal passed in a domestic enquiry, is not applicable to the case of an appeal before the Commissioner provided for under section 41 of the Shops Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission ff. the learned counsel. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rcised fairly, reasonably, and impartially. Capricious or dishonest preferences on purely personal grounds are necessarily excluded here. We have no doubt that the Tribunal will reconsider claims in conformity with needs of public interest as they exist at the time of reconsideration by the Tribunal. We do not think that these cases justify interference by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution. 36. The result is We allow Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1974 and set aside the order and judgment of the High Court as well as of the State Appellate Tribunal and direct it to reconsider the cases of the parties concerned in the light of the law on the subject as laid down and explained by us. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 6852 of 1974 for an interim order has become infructuous and is hereby dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. 37. We dismiss Civil Appeals No. 2254 of 1969, and Nos. 1481-83 of 1970 with costs. One hearing fee.
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1974 (9) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ption is drawn through the well known hypothetical reasonable man. Reckless disregard of consequences and mala fides stand-equal, where the actual state of mind of the actor is relevant. This is so in the eye of law, even if there might be variations in the degree of moral reproach deserved by recklessness and mala fides. 10. The Bombay, as also, the Central, General Clauses Acts, help only in so far as they lay down that negligence does not necessarily mean mala fides. Something more than negligence is necessary. But these Acts say "honestly" and so, for the interpretation of that word, we have explained the legal meanings above. 11. In the facts of this case we hold that the defendant was aware of possible harm and yet cared to do nothing about it. The action was, therefore, reckless, and therefore in the eye of law mala fide, and therefore unprotected by Section 167 of the Act. 12. For these reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant will pay costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 133 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... of gift (Ext. 5) in her favour executed by defendant No. 1, she could divest herself of this title only by a proper document satisfying the condition of law. The document in question, namely, the deed of surrender has already been shown and held to be invalid; therefore, no interest passed in favour of the defendant No. 1 under the said document. The plaintiff, therefore, must be held to be possessed of her full title in the suit property and entitled to the reliefs claimed for in the suit. 14. In view of these clear findings regarding the invalidity of the deed of surrendar in question, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of the finding of the court of appeal below on the question of fraud and coercion, etc. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the court of appeal below and restore that of the trial court but for reasons different from those of that court. The appellant shall be entitled to her costs also.
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1974 (9) TMI 132 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... defective. But so far as the impugned notice in this case is concerned, it does not suffer from any such defect as it clearly directs the petitioner to appear before the Collector. 17. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary under Section 124 of the Act that the authority giving show cause notice under Clause (a) of this Section should be the same which can undertake adjudication proceedings under Section 122. The function of issuing a show cause notice and the function of conducting adjudication proceedings under Section 122, are quite different and if Section 124 is intimately connected with any other section of the Act, it is Section 110 under which the goods are seized. 18. Since this is the only point which is pressed and argued in this petition and since rest of the points are not pressed at this stage, we are of the opinion that this petition should fail. The same is dismissed and rule is discharged with costs. 19. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s it was received nor even at the time of the confirmation and continuation of the detention, the Government had failed in one of its obligatory duties With regard to the detention of the prisoners and, therefore, for that reason also the detention becomes illegal." Here in the present case the representation of the Petitioner was received by the State Government before it confirmed the order of detention, but it did not consider the representation and thus "failed in one of its obligatory duties with regard to the detention" of the petitioner. The subsequent consideration and rejection of the representation of the petitioner could not cure the invalidity of the order of confirmation. The detention of the petitioner must, therefore, be held to be illegal and void. We accordingly set aside the order of detention and declare the detention of the petitioner to be illegal and void and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. P.B.R. Petition allowed.
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1974 (9) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he exception the Rule would have included also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. Any application for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal is therefore included in applications for enlargement or abridgement of time. 6. This practice of the Chamber Judge hearing applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal within the time appointed by the Rules of this Court has been followed ever since 1966. Cursus curiae est lex curiae. The practice of the Court is the law of the Court. See Broom's Legal Maxims at p. 82. Where a practice has existed it is convenient to adhere to it because it is the practice. "The power of each Court over its own process is unlimited; it is a power incident to all Courts". See Cocker v. Tempest 7 M& W 502. 7. We are therefore of opinion that applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal are within the Chamber business under Order VI Rule 2(14).
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1974 (9) TMI 129 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an order if the order could be sustained on any other provisions of the statute. The question therefore is whether the demand in this case could be sustained under Rule 9-B? It is not in dispute that there has been an earlier levy of excise duty on the petitioner on the basis that the count of yarn manufactured by it was 33.9 NF. As a result of the test reports, additional levy has been made and the differential duty is sought to be levied in addition to the duty already collected. That will squarely come under Sub-rule (5) of Rule 9-B. Rule 9-B contemplates a provisional levy being made pending testing of a sample and a final levy being made after the test reports are received by the concerned authority. We have to, therefore, hold that the demand made in this case will have lo be taken as one made under Rule 9-B. 12. The result is that all the contentions raised by the petitioner fail and the writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 150.
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1974 (9) TMI 128 - HIGH COURT PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... and was guilty of laches in coming forward to contest the proceedings, he would be entitled to a hearing on merits On the other hand, if the question of deliberate laches or unexplained delay in approaching the Collector after being aware of the proceedings under the Act is not involved, a person whose interests are likely to be affected by such declaration of surplus area has a right to be heard and is entitled to claim a decision on merits by approaching the Collector for this purpose notwithstanding the fact that his name is neither mentioned in Form D nor in the revenue records as a person interested. 11. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed and the order of the Collector dated 31st October, 1966 is quashed. The Collector is directed to decide the surplus area case of the petitioner after giving him full opportunity of hearing. Having regard to the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Balraj Tuli, J. 12. I agree. D.S. Tewatia, J. 13. I agree.
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1974 (9) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1972. The petitioners did not move after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The petitioners came to the court after the issue of notice under Section 9 of the Act. 11. In the present case the facts show in bold relief that the appellants came to Court nine years after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 12. Land Acquisition proceedings commence with the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Objections are invited under Section 5A of the Act. Thereafter a declaration under Section 6 of the Act is made. Any challenge to a notification under Section 4 and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act should be made within a reasonable time thereafter. The length of the delay is an important circumstance because of the nature of the acts done during the Interval on the basis of the notification and the declaration. 13. The High Court rightly dismissed the applications on the ground of delay. 14. The appeals are dismissed with costs. There will be one set of costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itioners are, therefore, not entitled to either of the two reliefs sought by them and the rule must be discharged but that is on the ground that the acts complained of are not shown to cause any interference with the fundamental rights available to them and not on the ground that prisoners possess no fundamental rights. The rights claimed by the petitioners as fundamental may not readily fit in the classical mould of fundamental freedoms, but "basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even though as a matter of human experience some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right.... To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the movements of a free society. Per Frankfurter J. in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25".
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1974 (9) TMI 125 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
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... ... ..... ly restrained from doing so to facilitate the working of the said arrangement under section 392. The same reason justifies the removal of R. L. Anand from the Board of Directors of the holding company and restraining him from functioning as a director of the subsidiary under section 392 and the removal of R. P. Anand from the post of General Manager of the subsidiary. ( 29. ) Shri Parpia contended that section 392 does not enable the Court to enforce the arrangement sanctioned under section 391. There is no question of enforcing the said arrangement at all. It is only the obstructions offered by the members of the Anand family to the working of the said arrangement which are being removed under section 392. Had these obstructions not been offered, no order under section 392 would have been necessary. The order under appeal-is, therefore, justified under section 392. ( 30. ) For the above reasons, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 124 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... e appeal, the Board clearly acted in violation of principles of natural justice. ( 24. ) For reasons aforesaid I must hold that the Board had not acted in accordance with law in rejecting the petitioner's application for an order dispensing with deposit of the amount of penalty by an ex parte order dated 30. 5. 70 and the said order must be set aside. If that order fails the subsequent order of the Board dated 7. 11. 70 passed thereon must also fail along with the order dated 1. 2. 72 of the Central Government as passed on the revisional application. Said orders are also therefore set aside. The appeal and the application should now be disposed of by the Board in accordance with law. The Rule is accordingly made absolute in part to the extent as above. Let a writ of Certiorari issue incorporating the above direction. As the said Rule is disposed of, the application for an interim relief becomes infructuous and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ment bonds was 3 at the relevant time. The appellant apparently has sought to misread Ex.A- 7. We are satisfied with the valuation of the rented portion of the house adopted by the High Court is correct. Shri Pillai argued in vain for an augmentation of the value on the potential user of the plot for a Cinema House. This story has been factually disbelieved by the Courts below and we cannot reopen the matter. We must also remember that the Court below has been indulgent enough to adopt a multiple of 27 despite the fact that the buildings acquired are over 30 years old. Nor does it come with grace from the appellant to contend against the belting method since he himself had asked for its application before the Collector and the trial Court. We are thus satisfied that there is no law, no fact, which comes to the rescue of the appellant and his appeal, virtually against concurrent findings of fact, therefore deserves to be, and is hereby, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot;the contractor being paid at the controlled rates". 11. We think that fixation of the maximum price at which an article shall be sold is the controlled rate for the supply of that article within the meaning of the agreement. The fact that sellers are free to sell the article at a price lower than the maximum fixed by the government would not show that there was no control of the commodity. We do not understand how an article can be controlled under Section 3 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance, except by a notification fixing the maximum price for the sale of the article. We think that the appellant's case is covered by the express term of the agreement and he was entitled to get the amount as decreed by the trial court. 12. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the Division Bench and restore the decree passed by the learned single Judge. As the respondent has not appeared in this Court, we make no order as to costs.
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1974 (9) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ering of foodgrains. It is further mentioned in this History-sheet that while committing the theft of wheat from the wagons on 10-9-72, the petitioner and his associates were carrying breaking implements, and when the Railway Staff warned the miscreants, the latter threatened the former with dire consequences. 9. This additional material which is given in the History-sheet and the contents of the F. I. R., which evidently weighed with the detaining authority in making the order of detention, were not communicated to the detenu. Thus. the solitary ground communicated to the detenu was so truncated and shorn of mate rial particulars on which the District Magistrate had based the order of detention, that the detenu was disabled to make an effective representation. The order of detention is therefore vitiated and illegal. 10. In the result, the petition is allowed, the order of detention is quashed and the Rule is made also lute. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith.
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1974 (9) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... after sending for the records, getting the paper books prepared, hearing both parties in the appeal and after appreciation of the evidence that it may be held that in some cases the dismissal, in fact, was ultimately justified. In many cases the appeals were even allowed. Long avoidable delay thus ensues during which the person convicted entertains a doubt about his conviction and has to suffer the anxiety caused thereby. We do hope and trust that the series of decisions over this long period disapproving of the practice of summarily dismissing by one word will be taken note of and this Court will not be ultimately burdened with such appeals arising out of summary dismissals which is really the function of the High Court at the first instance. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is remanded to the High Court for hearing for admission and disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the directions made here in above.
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1974 (9) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ask of public office, the national macrocosm will eventually magnify the vice; and once popular mistrust of democracy spreads, voices in the whispering gallery will be heard "Mischief. thou art afoot, take what course thou wilt." If this small municipality needs policemen to hold its meetings, periodically exercise its,- If in the fine art of defection and false minutes perhaps allows the interests of a Mill to sway its affairs and compels the holding of public meetings to command its elected representatives to behave themselves, political democracy is moving towards the evening of long shadows. Laws and Courts are not the remedy for this malady, but better men and basic mortality when ballots are sought. "Remember," said John Adams, remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and murders itself. There never was a democracy that did not commit suicide." The appeal we are dismissing is socio- legally sympathematic. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (9) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was outside the ambit of the Act. The Civil Court has jurisdiction in the subsequent suit which is the subject of this appeal. The appellant is not disentitled to any relief on the grounds of res judicata or estoppel or waiver. As one cannot confer jurisdiction by consent similarly one cannot by agreement waive exclusive jurisdiction of courts. The Civil Court and not the Rent Control possesses jurisdiction over the building in question. For these reasons the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The decree in favour of the appellant passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court is restored. The respondent wanted time to quit and vacate the building in question. The respondent is given time till 30 June, 1975 to vacate and deliver vacant possession to the appellant. The appellant will be entitled to costs of the trial Court, the First Appellate Court and the High Court. Parties will pay and bear their own costs in this Court. V.P.S. Appeal allowed.
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