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Showing 1 to 20 of 150 Records
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1975 (12) TMI 191 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dmitting the 1st respondent into the fold of Adi Dravida caste and not only was a purificatory ceremony performed on the 1st respondent at this conference" with a view to clearing the doubt which had been cast on his membership of the Adi Dravida caste by the decision of this Court in the earlier case but an address Ex. P-56 was also presented to the 1st respondent felicitating him on this occasion. 19. It is clear from these circumstances, which have been discussed and accepted by us, that after his reconversion to Hinduism, the 1st respondent was recognised and accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that community. The High Court was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that at the material time the 1st respondent belonged to the Adi Dravida caste so as to fall within the category of Scheduled Castes under Paragraph of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. 20. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the issue price. In essence what was sought to be recovered from the liquor contractors in Panna Lal's case (supra) was the shortfall occasioned on account of failure on the part of liquor contractor to fulfil the terms of license. It was pointed out in Panna Lal's case (supra) as follows - "To suggest that the license obliges the contractors to pay excise duty on undrawn liquor is totally misreading the conditions of the license. The excise duty is collected only in relation to the quantity and quality of the country liquor which is drawn. No excise duty can be predicated in respect of undrawn liquor". These appeals are, therefore, not of the type of Panna Lal's case (supra). These appeals are of the type of Bimal Chandra Banerjee's case (supra). These appeals relate to the demand of excise only in respect of undrawn liquor. The High Court rightly quashed the demands. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. Each party will pay and bear its own costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 189 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ars and it is that law which must govern the liability of the parties. Though Sub-sections (1) to (5) of Section 171 merely lay down the machinery for assessment of a Hindu undivided family after partition, Sub-section (6) of Section 171 is clearly a substantive provision imposing new liability on the members for the tax determined as payable by the joint family. The words "all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly" cannot therefore be construed as incorporating by reference Sub-section (6) of Section 171 so as to make it applicable for recovery of the tax reassessed on the Hindu Undivided Family in cases falling within Clause (ii) of Section 297(2)(d). This contention of the Revenue Authorities must accordingly be rejected. 12. In the circumstances we allow these appeals and issue a writ in each appeal quashing and setting aside the orders dated 13th August, 1974 and 3rd September, 1974. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners throughout.
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1975 (12) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at the view which the High Court took was not a possible view on the evidence, but so also was the view that the Additional Sessions Judge had taken. It is well settled that in an appeal against an order of acquittal, "if two conclusions can be based upon the evidence on record, the High Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. It would follow as a corollary from that that if the view taken by the trial court in acquiring the accused is not unreasonable, the occasion for the reversal of that view would not arise." (see Sethu Madhavan Nair and Ors. v. The State of Kerala (1) ). We have held that the view taken by the trial court in this case was not an unreasonable one, and no occasion for the reversal of that view had therefore arisen. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1975 (12) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er. In case the respondent does so, it would be for the Government to pass appropriate orders in the matter. Submission has further been made by Mr. Sibal that the respondent should not in view of the hardship suffered by him be compelled to make refund out of the salary which he has been drawing during the pendency of the appeal. This again is a matter which is entirely for the Government to decide and we are sure that the Government would pass appropriate order keeping in view all the circumstances of the case. We accordingly accept the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. We hold that the order of the Government abolishing the post of Panchayati Raj Election Officer does not suffer from any infirmity and as such is not liable to be quashed. We further hold that on the abolition of that post, the lien of the respondent on the post of Head Assistant stood revived. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs throughout. V. P. S. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (12) TMI 186 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and hold that for the acts alleged to have been committed there was absolutely no necessity for seeking the declarations as has been sought for by the plaintiff and the matters which have been alleged against the petitioner are all matters under the Companies Act and that being so, it is only the Court which has been mentioned in Section 10 of the Act that has jurisdiction to entertain any suit. The cases referred to by the learned Advocate for the opposite party, namely, A.I.R. 1972 Cal 19 and A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 436 do not lay down any contrary view. For the reasons stated above this application succeeds and the Rule is made absolute. The order passed by the learned Munsif on 26th of March 1974 is set aside. It is held that the learned Munsif has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In, the circumstances let the plaint be returned to the learned lawyer for the plaintiff for presentation of the same to the proper Court if he is so advised. There will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 185 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed period as no lease was executed for a longer period contemplated by the notice of auction by any instrument in writing. There is then the circumstance that after the expiry of the period of lease contemplated by the original auction, the defendant had continued in possession and the plaintiff accepted from the defendant premium for the subsequent period ending March 31 1964. Once the lease had come into existence, the defendant could be ejected only on the termination of the lease. As the lease has not been terminated decree for ejectment could not be passed. 8. In the result the appeal is allowed, the decree of the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. As the original auction mentioned the word licence and not the lease, it would not be fair to saddle the plaintiff with costs; accordingly, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. 9. The amount which has been deposited by the defendant will be paid over to the Municipal Board.
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1975 (12) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hostile witness, does not completely his evidence. The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. We are satisfied in this case that the evidence of Jagat Singh, but for whose prompt assistance the case would not have seen the light of day and whose statement had immediately been recorded by the D.S.P., is amply corroborated by other evidence mentioned above to inspire confidence in his. testimony. Apart from that the fact of recovery of the gold coins in the pocket of the appellant gave a seal of finality to the truth of the charge against the appellant. If Jagat Singh had accepted the bribe he would have been guilty under Section 161 I.P.C. There is therefore clear abetment by the appellant of the offence under Section 161 I.P.C. and the ingredients or Section 165A I.P.C. are established against him. 9. There is thus no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on this ground also, s. 195(1) (c) was not attracted in the present case. We must, therefore, hold that the High Court was entitled to proceed with the trial of the respondent in respect of the offence under s. 471 without any complaint in writing from the Company Judge before whom the proceeding in Matter No. 357 of 1957 was pending. We accordingly allow Criminal Appeal No.256 of 1971, set aside the judgment of Mr. Justice Bagchi discharging the respondent and remand the case to the City Sessions Court, to which the original criminal jurisdiction in Sessions cases has now been transferred, for disposal according to law. Since the case is a very old one, we would direct the City Sessions Court to take it up for hearing at an early date. In the view taken by us in Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 1971, Criminal Appeals Nos. 115 and 257 of 1971 do not survive for consideration and we accordingly dismiss them. P.B.R. Cr. A. 256 of 1971 allowed. Cr.As. 115 & 257 of 1971 dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... power could not be exercised without complying with the obligation to pass a speaking order. A Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat to which it was referred considered the question at great length. The conclusion arrived at was that the order was void because every order passed by a quasi-judicial authority should contain reasons on the face of the order. In this view, the High Court set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the Conciliation Officer. All this took place way back in 1969. 3. We are not persuaded that the proposition of law that appealed to the High Court is wrong. It follows that the order of the Conciliation Officer impugned is bad and the appeal must fail. 4. It transpires that the respondent Management has since reached a settlement of the dispute with the employee concerned and so the question itself has become purely academic. The respondent has not entered appearance either. 5. In these circumstances, the appeal is dismissed without costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 181 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n Penal Code also in our view the plaintiff, cannot get an ad interim injunction No property of the 6th defendant is in dispute or is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated nor is it pretended that the company or the other defendants intend to defraud the creditors and dispose of unauthorisedly the property of the company. As long as the resolution made by the company through its Board of Directors on 3rd December, 1975 is not questioned in the sense not questionable, the complaint about a future breach rests purely on a self-projected hypothesis of a family arrangement. The material before us is not sufficient to accept the contention of Mr. Parasaran that there is an enforceable family arrangement. There is time enough for the plaintiffs to establish the same. But as matters stand we agree with the learned Judge that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the ad interim injunctions as prayed for. The appeals are therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 180 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to hereinbefore, have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. So far as the decision in Anderson Wright Ltd. v. Moral and Co., 1955 1SCR862 (cit. supra) is concerned, it only lays down the conditions which should be fulfilled before a stay is granted under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The other two decisions, namely, The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, 1960 3SCR713 and Michael Goledetz v. Serajuddin and Co., 1964 1SCR19 (cit-Supra) deal with the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and that too, in altogether different context. Therefore, in my opinion, they are obviously distinguishable. 8. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the authorities below were right in coming to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act had no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. In the result, therefore, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 10. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 179 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ary the decree by providing for enforcement of the charge and that the decree passed by it was right. 6. In Gum Ram and Ors. v. Ramji Lal and Ors. (2) the Court said that in Order 41, Rule 33, the expression "which ought to have been passed" means "what ought in law to have been passed" and if an appellate court is of the view that any decree which ought in taw to have been passed was in fact not passed by the court below, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. 7. Therefore, we hold that even if the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial Court that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge. 8. There is no substance in the contention that all the payments made by the appellant have not been given credit to by the respondent in view of the concurrent findings of the courts. 9. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , he did not even make a provisional payment under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 for, as has been stated, he went to the extent of taking the false pleas that the respondent was a casual contractor and that the accident occurred solely because of his negligence. Then there is the further fact that he paid no need to the respondent's personal approach for obtaining the compensation. It will be recalled that the respondent was driven to the necessity of making an application to the Commissioner for settling the claim, and even there the appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and prevailed on the respondent to file a memorandum of agreement settling the claim for a sum which was so grossly inadequate that it was rejected by the Commissioner. In these facts and circumstances, we have no doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an order for the payment of interest and the penalty. 9. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 177 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and secondly this is not a case where winding-up has resulted in the final order of dissolution. Section 441 enacts how the commencement of winding up has to be construed. If it is a case under sub-section (1) wherein there is a resolution for voluntary winding up, then the date of passing of the resolution is the beginning, and in all other cases, if the winding up of the Company is by the Court, then the time of presentation of the petition for winding up is to be reckoned as commencement. In the body of sub-section (2) of section 536, there is no terminus quo stated of this period. The provisions of section 536 are themselves the part of Chapter V which is applicable to every mode of winding up. So while the proceedings of winding up are going on and the dissolution has not reached it is obvious that power under section 536 (2) can be exercised by the Court. 11. For all these reasons, we hold that there is no merit in the present appeal and the same will stand dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ay be the circumstances, however strange the coincidences, and however grave the doubts, suspicion alone can never take the place of proof. In our normal life we are sometimes faced with unexplainable phenomenon and strange coincidences, for, as it is said, truth is stronger than fiction. In these circumstances, therefore, after going through the judgment of the High Court we are satisfied that the appellant has not been able to make out a case of fraud as found by the High Court. As such the High Court was fully justified in negativing the plea of fraud and in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Cross objections have been filed by the plaintiff/respondent for disallowing the amount of excise duty paid by the plaintiff. After persuing the judgment of the High Court, we find absolutely no merit in these cross objections. The result is that the appeal and the cross objections are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 175 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt power in an appropriate case to extend time even in respect of deposit in proceeding under Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act On the facts of the case, however, the Court held that the delay could not be condoned and the order for striking out the defence against delivery of possession was allowed to stand. The circumstances referred to in that decision as would justify condonation of the delay were exceptional cases, which did not fall to be decided in the instant case. 13. In the circumstances discussed above, the instant application must fail and the Rule is accordingly discharged without any order as to costs. Janah, J. 14. I agree. The learned Advocate for the petitioner states that he has been instructed to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and accordingly prays for stay of the operation of this order. Pending filing of such an application let the operation of this order be stayed for a period of three weeks from this date.
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1975 (12) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... peal with costs. The appellants may if so advised, seek their remedy by a regular suit. 19. Before we part with this judgment we may note here in fair ness to Respondent 4, a concession made by Dr. Singhvi on behalf of the Coloniser. The concession is that all "open spaces" set apart for roads, streets, public parks, public lawns etc, and other services, as distinguished from "open sites." earmarked for schools, hospitals and other public utility buildings, shown in the sanctioned layout plans in these colonies vest in the Municipal Corporation free of cost and that his client has no objection to the transfer of such open spaces free of cost to the Municipal Corporation. If such transfer has not already been made. The Colonisers however reserve their right to dispute whether a particular plot in the sanctioned layout was set apart as an "open space" for a public park, road etc., or as an "open site" meant for a public utility building.
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1975 (12) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... before his purported termination of service, he was in employment only for a short period. That would be denying him security of tenure which the law seeks to give him in clear and unambiguous terms. But, in the present case, the circumstance which weighs most with me in refusing to exercise my discretion in favour of the first respondent is that if the relief of declaration and injunction is granted to the first respondent, it will involve the appellant in a financial liability of over Rs. One lakh and that would wipe out the educational institution of the appellant or in any event seriously cripple it and that, in its turn, would prejudicially affect the interests of the student community which is an important consideration which the Court cannot fail to take into account while determining what are the broad considerations of social justice which must guide its exercise of discretion. I accordingly agree with the final order proposed by my learned brother. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (12) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... assed on by inheritance to her husband's heirs who were none else than the brother and the nephew of the testator. There was no other heir of Mst. Jarian to inherit the property after her death. A Plenitude of absolute estate in favour of the wife will make the absolute bequest to Gokul void in law. No such repugnant interpretation detrimental to the interest of Gokul can be made in the light of the entire tenor of the instrument. Having regard to the context and the circumstances apparent from the will, we are clearly of opinion that the testator intended to bequeath in favour of his widow only a life estate and after her death an absolute estate to Gokul. That being the position the will by Smt. Jarian in favour of the appellant fails and her gift in favour of the appellant also similarly fails on her death. The respondent's suit is rightly decreed by the courts below. The appeal fails and is dismissed. We will, however, make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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