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Showing 1 to 20 of 96 Records
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1975 (3) TMI 153 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... awarded the sums mentioned therein. Since that finding is being set aside, the case has to go back again to the Claims Tribunal for ascertaining compensation payable to the appellants. However, the finding that such compensation is payable only by respondents 1 to 3 is accepted and cannot be agitated again after remand. The learned Claims Tribunal will only give a decision on the Quantum of compensation and that will be payable by the respondents 1 to 3. 7. The three appeals are allowed and the decision of the Claims Tribunal is set aside. The case is remanded to the Claims Tribunal for ascertaining the amount of compensation payable by the respondents 1 to 3 to the appellants. 8. This judgment is being given in F. A. O. No. 25 of 1972. (Mrs. M. J. Stone and three others v. National Carrier and three others) and shall be a Judgment in the other two connected F. A. Os. Nos. 27 of 1972 and 28 of 1972. A copy of this Judgment shall be kept on the record of the other two appeals.
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1975 (3) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch make the same unworkable. We are not impressed by this argument. From the scheme and machinery of the Act there is nothing to indicate that absence of rules will make the Act unworkable. The submission is devoid of substance. 21. Lastly it was submitted that the Notification under Section 8 was not published in the name of the President and was issued by the Under Secretary who was not authorised to do so. The Notification is not an executive order but is a piece of subordinate legislation made by die Central Government under Section 8 of the Act. It was A duly published in the Gazette of India over the signature of the Under Secretary who was authorised for the purpose. The question of violation of Article 77 does not arise. 22. Since the Act and the impugned provisions are Constitutionally valid, objection to the Notice of the Joint Registrar dated October 16, 1969, is also of no avail. 23. In the result the petitions are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 151 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t receipts would clearly show that fact. In this case, when the kist receipts stand only in the name of the defendant, the explanation given by the plaintiff is not acceptable. The explanation that he paid the kist amounts and. handed over the kist receipts to the defendant, is too big a pill to swallow. The defendant has also obtained a licence under Exhibit B-26 from the Rubber Board even in the year 1959. Thus, the previous conduct of the parties also supports the case of the defendant and belies the case of the plaintiff. 17. Thus, viewing the case from each and every angle, there is not even an iota of evidence to support the claim of the plaintiff. On an overall appreciation of the entire evidence adduced by both parties, in the light of all relevant and surrounding circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned sale deed Exhibit B-1 is not a benami transaction. 18. We accordingly confirm the findings of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 150 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hare the view of the Delhi High Court in Union of India v. Khalil Kacherim 1970 Cri LJ 417 (Delhi). To take a different view would introduce confusion in the matter of levy of duty under the provisions of the Act, More so, as we think, in the case of goods in the hands of transist passengers. So long as they were not taken out of the clearance line in the Customs office in the airport, they cannot be said to be imported within the meaning of the Act. (underlining is (nine). I am bound by this decision. Applying the principles of this decision, it cannot be said that the appellant Imported the diamonds into this country, as he had given a declaration unhesitatingly before P.W. 1 the Air Customs Officer. The conviction and sentence are set aside and Y the appellant is acquitted. Fine, if paid, will be refunded to the appellant 11. The appeal is allowed. 12. On the view I have taken in the appeal, Cr. R. C. No. 58 of 1972 filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs is dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 149 - DELH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... facts which they themselves had found on evidence. 41. To sum up on the facts proved Vishwa Nath was the tenant. He took the premises on rent in November 1962 in his own name. In 1964 he formed a company in which he had a controlling interest and of which he is the chief executive and the managing director. He is in possession of the premises His sons and wife are the other shareholders with him, in my opinion is no subletting or Parting with possession. 42. As regards the application under Section 45 the controller and the tribunal both found that the tenant was not- entitled to the use of the bathroom. They found no deprivation. This is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed in second appeal. I must, Therefore confirm the order of the controller and the tribunal dismissing the application under Section 45 of the Act. 43. For these reasons I would allow the appeal and set aside the order of ejectment. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. 44. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fore arise.' When action is taken against him under the relevant rules which enable the authorities concerned to terminate his temporary service without assigning any reason the Court would not go into the reasons which led to the appellant's services being terminated. The other point raised, in the writ petition is that action terminating the appellant's services was mala fide. We see no substance in this contention. The action is said to be mala fide because after the appellant's services were terminated certain other persons have been appointed. It is not alleged that those persons exercised their influence and had the petitioner's services terminated in order to provide them with posts. Naturally when a vacancy arises by the termination of services of an employee other persons would have to be appointed to take his place. This would no; show any mala fides. 5. The appeal K therefore dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 147 - KERLA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re is also no evidence to the effect that the income of the property during the relevant period was such that he would have been in the usual course assessed to agricultural Income Tax. On the other hand, it is the admitted case that the first respondent possessed only the property mentioned in Exts. A-1 to A-3. The pattom fixed under Ext. A-3 is only ₹ 1,500/-. If this was the sole agricultural income the first respondent was getting during the relevant period, it could not be said that he was liable to pay agricultural Income Tax. The appellant has not adduced any evidence to show that the income from agricultural properties which the first respondent was getting exceeded ₹ 5,000/- per annum. In the circumstances, there are no justifiable grounds for disallowing the first respondent relief under Act 31 of 1958 which has been now replaced by Act 11 of 1970. The Cross-appeal is, therefore, allowed to the above extent. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 146 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... accordance with law. It can be argued with considerable force that the provisions of Section 43-B(1) contemplate election petitions in cases where there has been an election in law. That provision does not apply when there has been no election in law. In a case, where the date of filing of nomination paper, scrutiny and that of holding of election had not been fixed in accordance with law it would not be possible to say that there has been an election in law. In view of the fact that we have held that Section 43-B(1) does not oust the Constitutional powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and that this is not a fit case in which exercise of that power should be refused, it is not necessary for us to pronounce finally on this aspect of the case. 16. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The entire election proceeding relating to election of Respondent No. 3 as President of Municipal Board Soron held on 1st October 1974 is set aside.
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1975 (3) TMI 145 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ry expenditure in connection therewith. There were no two independent agreements one for influencing the Ministers and the other for advancing monies. The agreement was one whole agreement and if it could not be enforced in part it could not be enforced as a whole. The whole of the agreement was tainted by the vice of being opposed to public policy. 30. In passing the learned Chief Judge appeared to hold that the agreement was also unconscionable. The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to several cases where agreements to give 1/4th share. 3/32nd share, 3/16th share had been upheld by Courts. In the present case, what Sajjid Yar Jung agreed to give was only a 1/16th share. It could not, therefore, be said to be unconscionable. That, however, makes no difference in our final conclusion. 31. In the result, we uphold the judgment and decree of the lower court and dismiss the appeal with costs. C.M.P. Nos. 4740, 4924/1974 are dismissed. 32. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to sell adulterated ghee it would be valid. If it is alleged, that at every one of the stages, that is manufacture, distribution-and sale the ghee was adulterated then it would be the same transaction and they could all be jointly tried. In the absence of an allegation that the ghee distributed by the appellant to the vendor Lakshmi Narain was adulterated both of them cannot be tried together. The manufacturer could also have been tried along with them only if it is alleged that the ghee he manufactured was adulterated. In the absence of this allegation there cannot be a joint trial. At the stage of considering the validity of the charge it is the allegation that is material; at the stage of considering the guilt of the parties it is proof that is material. In the present case it may be that the appellant could be prosecuted for giving a false warranty because he had issued a warranty and the food sold by the vendor to whom he issued the warranty was found to be adulterated.
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1975 (3) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e of Internal Security Act is that persons who are likely to imperil public order are not allowed to be free to indulge in this dangerous activity. We cannot understand the District Magistrate sleeping over the matter for well-nigh three months and then claiming that there is a real and imminent danger of prejudicial activity affecting public order. The chain of connection between the dangerous activities relied on and the detention order passed is snapped by this long and unexplained delay. If there were some tenable explanation for this gap we would have been reluctant to interfere with the detention order but none has been stated in the counter affidavit filed to-day many months after time was taken for filing a return. In these circumstances, we are not satisfied that there is any justification for the claim of subjective satisfaction put forward by the District Magistrate. The petition is allowed, the rule nisi confirmed and the petitioner directed to be set at liberty.
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1975 (3) TMI 142 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er the expiry of the orders of their detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, but they were continued in detention. As initial detention of detenus which was at Baroda is continued, the same furnishes a part of cause of action to the detenus which arises within the jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover the provisions of Article 19 Clauses (d) and (e) also indicate that this High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions under Article 226(1A) as a part of cause of action, namely, initial deprivation of liberty of the detenus took place within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is thus clear that a part of cause of action thus arises within the jurisdiction of this Court, and therefore, both these writ petitions are maintainable. That being our conclusion we order that these writ petitions shall be heard along with other writ petitions for the determination of other challenges which are made in these petitions. Orders accordingly.
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1975 (3) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch business can be carried on is a condition sounding only in the realm of regulation and control of that business. We therefore bold that Rule 7A is intra vires the rule making power and that it was open to the Commission to impose condition No. (ii) in the certificate of registration. It must follow that the condition impugned was valid and that the direction issued by the Commission to the respondent was justified. We are glad to find that the view which we have expressed has been taken by the High Court of Allahabad in Union of India & Another v. Bullion and Agricultural Exchange Ltd. (I.L.R. 1972 2 Allahabad 562), after, considering the relevant decisions including the one under this appeal. We set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal without any order as to costs. There was no appearance for the respondents. The Court acknowledges its indebtedness to Shri Bishamber Lal, Advocate, for the assistance rendered by him as amicus curiae. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 140 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the proviso to section 16(1), so far as the companies are concerned. Nor was it intended that the courts should merely convict the company and not pass any sentence. It is true that the sentence of both imprisonment and fine is mandatory in the sense that it has to be imposed where it can be imposed but it will be limited to fine where it cannot be imposed, as corporal punishment in the case of companies becomes impossible of execution. It is, therefore, held that a company as defined in Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, docs not enjoy immunity from prosecution when under the said Act it is alleged to have committed an offence to which the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 16 is not applicable; and, in case such a company is found guilty of such an offence, it can be punished with fine. The reference is answered accordingly, and the criminal appeal will now he posted before the Division Bench for disposal in the light of the aforesaid answer.
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1975 (3) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appellant for providing his charge were his own and that of two of his co-villagers. The appellant was not an eye witness of this meeting and his evidence was pure hearsay. The person who is said to have informed him was not examined. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 was not accepted by the High Court. The police officer concerned, who was examined as R.W. 8, as wellas the respondent (R.W. 10) have denied the allegation. After a careful examination of all the evidence the High Court held this charge not proved. We have gone through the evidence and see no reason to differ from the High Court on this point. An allegation of corupt practice being a serious one leading not merely to the consequence of the election of the successful candidate being set aside but also of his being disqualified to stand for election for a certain period should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and we find such proof lacking in this case, The appeal is dismissed with costs. P. B . R. Appeal dismissed
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1975 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... after condonation cannot be viewed apart from the conduct of the appellant after condonation. Condonation is conditional forgiveness but the grant of such forgiveness does not give to the condoning spouse a charter to malign the other spouse. If this were so, the condoned spouse would be required mutely to submit to the cruelty of the other spouse without relief or remedy. The respondent ought not to have described the appellant's parents as "wicked" but that perhaps is the only allegation in the letter Ex. 318 to which exception may be taken. We find ourselves unable to rely on that solitary circumstance to allow the revival of condoned cruelty. We therefore hold that the respondent was guilty of cruelty but the appellant condoned it and the subsequent conduct of the respondent is not such as to amount to a revival of the original cause of action. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and direct the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lly attacked the increase awarded in appeal, producing the additional evidence there. But maybes have no place in the merciless consequence of vital procedural flaws. Parliament, I hope, will consider the wisdom of making the Judge the ultimate guardian of justice by a comprehensive, though guardedly worded, provision where the hindrance to rightful relief relates to infirmities, even serious, sounding in procedural law. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence--processual. as much as substantive. While this appeal has to be allowed, for reasons set out impeccably by my learned brother, I must sound a pessimistic note that it is too puritanical for a legal system to sacrifice the end product of equity and good conscience at the, altar of processual punctiliousness and it is not too radical to avert a breakdown of obvious justice by bending sharply, if need be, the prescriptions of procedure. The wages of procedural sin should never be the death of rights. V. P. S Appeal allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ess to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge back-log of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. We dismiss the petition unhesitatingly, but with these observations, hopefully. Review petition dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it was ’obvious that the Court of Appeal failed to understand Lord Devlin’s speech. The per incuriam principle is of limited application. very few decisions have subsequently been regarded as having been reached per incuriam and in Morelle v. Wakeling (The English Legal System" by R.J. Walker & M. G. Walker, if Edn.Butterworths, 1972.) 1955 2 Q.B. 379) a Master of the Rolls stated that such instances should be ’of the rarest occurrence’, and should be limited to ’decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned’. Thus the doctrine will not be extended to cases which were merely not fully argued or which appear to take a wrong view of the authorities or to misinterpret a statute."(1) Now to costs. A compassionate submission was made by Shri Bindra that the parties do bear their costs in this Court. We direct accordingly. Appeal dismissed
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1975 (3) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Anr. v. State of Punjab (1972 FAC 549) and Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1960 SC 195) that as on facts no two cases could be similar, its own decisions which were essentially on questions of fact could not be relied upon as precedents for decision of other cases." "The standard fixed under the Act is one that is certain. If it is varied to any extent, the certainty of a general standard would be replaced by the vagaries of a fluctuating standard. The disadvantages of the resulting unpredictability, uncertainty and impossibility of arriving at fair and consistent decisions are great." It is extraordinary that an appeal with special leave under Art. 136 should have been filed, to get a declaration that a casual statement in a judgment of this Court which ex facie had no kinship with the question under decision, was not the ratio in the case. This. appeal was ill-advised, misconceived and unnecessary and merits dismissal. Appeal dismissed.
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