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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 79 of 79 Records
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1975 (4) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Enduring Benefit ... ... ... ... ..... was incurred for the purpose of facilitating the running of its motor vehicles and other means employed for transportation of sugarcane to its factories and was, therefore, incurred for running the business or working it with a view to producing profits without the assessee gaining any advantage of an enduring benefit to itself. Applying the ratio of this case to the facts of the instant case, if can safely be held that the expenditure incurred on the structural changes made in the shop did not bring into existence any capital asset for the assessee or any benefit of enduring nature. The expenditure was incurred for the purpose of facilitating the carrying on of its business and must therefore be held to be of a revenue nature. We, accordingly, answer the question by saying that the sums of Rs. 10,859, Rs. 9,865 and Rs. 1,000 were admissible allowance not under section 30(a)(i) but under section 37 of the Act. The assessee is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1975 (4) TMI 18 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Liability For Bonus, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... proposition. We respectfully do not agree with the view that a provision for bonus can become a debt even prior to the date when the payment of bonus is amicably settled or adjudicated upon under the Industrial Disputes Act. Such a view is contrary to the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Swadeshi Cotton and Flour Mills (P.) Ltd. It is true that bonus is no longer a matter of concession but workers can claim it as a matter of right but before the coming into force of the Bonus Act, 1965, the liability for the payment of bonus always arose when the claim was amicably settled or adjudicated upon by the industrial court. No employer could make a provision for the payment of bonus earlier than that date and claim it as a debt in the computation of his net wealth under the Wealth-tax Act. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1975 (4) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... tax Officer and which is now produced in the reassessment proceedings, which shows that the earlier assumption or consideration was wrong, it cannot be stated that the order is liable to be revised under section 147(b). There is no evidence to show that any fresh material, which was not available before the Income-tax Officer originally, had come to light after the order of assessment, which called for the invoking of the power under section 147(b) of the new Act. In fact, even in these proceedings, the assessee was contending that it is a credit society which is entitled to the exemption in respect of its entire business income. We are, therefore, of the view that the present opinion of the Income-tax Officer amounts only to a change of opinion and on that ground the Income-tax Officer was not entitled to invoke the powers under section 147(b) of the new Act. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the affirmative and against the revenue, with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Charitable Institution, Expenditure On Advertisement ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax 1968 69 1TR 379 (Cal). In that case it has been held that the expression commercial expediency is not a term of art and it means everything that serves to promote commerce and includes every means suitable to that end. Advertisements are issued to promote commerce and, therefore, in the absence of any improper or oblique purpose in issuing those advertisements in the souvenirs of those organisations it must be held that they were issued to promote the business of the assessee irrespective of their result because the advertisements facilitate the carring on of the business. Hence, it must be held that those expenditures were incurred or laid out by the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of its trade and, therefore, we overrule the contentions of Mr. Sengupta. In the premises, our answer to the question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.--I agree.
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1975 (4) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, High Court, Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... Estate Duty gave the order of assessment, no duty was payable. In other words, the setting aside takes effect from the date of the order of the Deputy Controller of Estate Duty. If so construed, no duty was payable in respect of the wakf property, so that, even on the merits, no penalty could be levied. A fortiori, the appeal filed against the penalty order could not have been dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the duty had not been paid, which was not legally leviable. The result is that the appeal before the Appellate Controller was maintainable and the view of the Tribunal that it was not maintainable is incorrect. We, accordingly, hold that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the appeal was not competent. We answer the reference as reframed in favour of the accountable person. The result of it is that the Tribunal will now go into the appeal on merits. The accountable person will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Religious Trust ... ... ... ... ..... mendment of the memorandum, which has been confirmed by this court by an order dated 16th April, 1971. It is in the amended memorandum that there is a prohibition against declaration of dividends by way of profit to the members. There is also a prohibition that on the dissolution of the association the surplus, if any, is not to be distributed among the members, but is to be transferred to some other institution or institutions having similar objects. In the absence of a similar prohibition in the years under consideration, we have to hold that the property of the association was not held under any trust or legal obligation for a charitable purpose. The property could be utilised in the relevant year for any non-charitable purpose and, therefore, it would not satisfy the conditions of sections 11 and 13 of the Income-tax Act of 1961. The first question is, therefore, answered in the negative and against the assessee. The department will have its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 13 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Delay In Filing Return, Law Applicable ... ... ... ... ..... month during which the default continued. The principle of the decision in Biswanath Ghosh v. Income-tax Officer 1974 95 ITR 372 (Orissa) would, therefore, apply to the penalty to be imposed for the year 1965-56. We wish to add only one more word. The year of assessment has no relevancy in deciding the quantum of the penalty to be imposed or in deciding which section, the original one or the section as amended, should be applied. In the light of the above, we answer the question referred to us by stating that penalty should be imposed under the original section 18(1)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 46 of 1964 and the Finance Act, 1969, for the assessment year 1964-65 and that section 18(1)(i) as it was amended by the Finance Act, 1969, must be applied for imposing the penalty for the year 1965-66. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1975 (4) TMI 12 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Cash Credits, Question Of Fact, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... (SC), dealing with the question whether the cash credits were not income of the assessee, in the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court came to hold that it was one of fact. Basically, the dispute in the present case is one of fact and having read the record and heard learned counsel for the parties we are not satisfied that the conclusion of the Tribunal on such a question of fact has been vitiated by any wrong application of law. Counsel for the assessee relied upon observations of this court in S.J.Cs. Nos. 83 and 84 of 1972 disposed of on October 31, 1973 Commissioner of Income-tax v. Deonarayan Jagdishlal 1977 108 ITR 8 (Orissa) , where, in similar, circumstances, this court refused to issue a direction to the Appellate Tribunal to state a case. We, accordingly, hold that no question of law emerges out of the appellate order of the Tribunal and, therefore, the application made by the revenue must stand rejected. We make no direction of costs. B. K. RAY J.--I agree.
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1975 (4) TMI 11 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Religious Trust ... ... ... ... ..... he court leans in favour of charity. There is no better rule said Lord Loreburn, than that a benignant construction will be placed upon charitable bequests . Where a bequest is capable of two constructions, one of which would make it void, and the other would make it effectual, that latter will be adopted. It is better to effectuate than to destroy the intention . The passage quoted from Tudor is about the construction of trusts and not about the construction of taxing statutes. In regard to taxing statutes, we have no doubt that in a welfare State dedicated to the securing of social, economic and political justice to all its citizens, several of the old and narrow rules of construction must yield to new and objective rules of construction. We wish to say no more for the present. We only wish to add that there is no danger of the present trust becoming extinct. The reference is answered in favour of the revenue who will get the costs of the reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 10 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Manufacture Or Production ... ... ... ... ..... manufactured by the assessee are iron and steel . The addition of the word metal within brackets after the words iron and steel , we do not think is intended to limit the scope and ambit of the entry. There is no justification for qualifying item (1) in the Fifth Schedule by insisting that the articles produced or manufactured or constructed for the purpose of the business of the assessee must be those produced, manufactured or constructed from materials which are not iron and steel. There is nothing in the Act or scheme or in the section which expressly or by implication indicates that the item must be limited in the manner contended on behalf of the revenue. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal.
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1975 (4) TMI 9 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Connection, Foreign Company, Jurisdiction Of High Court ... ... ... ... ..... al and intimate connection. Applying these principles to the present case we have no hesitation in holding that there was no business connection such as would justify the Indian company being treated as the agent of the Polish Company within the meaning of section 163(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act. The transaction between the Indian company and the Polish company was one between principal and principal. It is true that the Polish company agreed to render certain limited services. But those services were connected with the effective fulfilment of the contract of sale and were merely incidental to the contract, usually included in all such contracts, by way of guarantee of the efficient working of the products sold. They were not services which created an interest of the type seen in the case of Carborundum Company 1973 92 ITR 411 (Mad). We answer the question referred to us in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to the costs of the reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Textile Mill ... ... ... ... ..... pendently of those materials, come to the conclusion that the objects of the assessee-Association satisfy the test of general public utility. During the course of the arguments our attention was drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Sugar Mills Association 1974 97 ITR 486 (SC), wherein also a similar claim for exemption was agitated. In that case rule 64 permitted distribution of profits among the members on a resolution being passed for this purpose. This was construed as introducing an element of private gain, which was inconsistent with the object of general public utility. There is no such rule in the present case, so that the assessee s claim cannot fail because of any element of private gain. For all these reasons, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The second question does not arise for con sideration in view of this answer. The assessee will have its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 7 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Banking Company, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... ection to the assessee whose case was dealt with in the decision in Catholic Bank of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1964 KLT 653 (Ker). The absence or presence of such a direction from the Reserve Bank cannot determine the question whether there was accrual of income or not. The case on hand is identical with the case, I.T.Rs. Nos. 27, 28 and 29 of 1971. The only question that has to be considered here is, whether there was accrual of income or not This cannot be denied and, therefore, the assessee was not justified in not crediting the interest accrued on sticky advances. We, therefore, hold that there has been an accrual of income which is liable to income-tax. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. No costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1975 (4) TMI 6 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has admitted the fact that the assessee having had the necessity to maintain establishment for various activities enumerated in his order. We, therefore, direct acceptance of trading results disclosed by the assessee including the expenses claimed by it and delete the additions sustained in each of the years. At the hearing, learned standing counsel is not in a position to indicate any factual error in the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. We have already extracted the reason given by the Income-tax Officer to resort to estimates by rejection of the book results. Those were rightly vacated by the Appellate Tribunal and taking all aspects into consideration the Tribunal concluded as a fact that the assessee s claim for acceptance was acceptable and the book result should not have been disturbed. We are of the view that upon these findings of pure fact, no question of law arises. The applications are accordingly rejected. DAS J.-I agree.
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1975 (4) TMI 5 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Providing Credit Facilities ... ... ... ... ..... purposes of section 2 and also the First Schedule of the Finance Act, 1966. It follows from the foregoing discussion that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the assessee was not an industrial company as defined in section 2(7)(d) of the Finance Act, 1966. The correct position is that for the assessment year in question the assessee is entitled to be treated as an industrial company under section 2(7)(d) and is liable to be taxed only at the concessional rate of fifty-five per cent. as provided in Item I(A)(2) of Paragraph F of Schedule I of the Finance Act, 1966, for the assessment year 1966-67. Hence, we answer question No. (iii) in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these two cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (1) of section 260 of the Act.
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1975 (4) TMI 4 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Providing Credit Facilities ... ... ... ... ..... 5,000. There is thus no material difference between the proviso to section 81 (i) and clause (ii) of section 81. In either case, the society was entitled to exemption up to Rs. 15,000. As mentioned above, on the findings recorded by us, clause (a) of section 81 (i) is not applicable. The case is, therefore, covered by clause (ii) of section 81 and the Tribunal was right in relying upon clause (ii). Reference to clause (d), however, in the question appears to be inaccurate. The reference should be to clauses (a) to (f) of section 81(i). The second question is, therefore, re-framed in the following words Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally correct in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption of Rs. 15,000 under section 81(ii) and not under the proviso to section 81(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? and the same is answered in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1975 (4) TMI 3 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Balancing Charge, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... of either the individual or the association. We, therefore, do not see any force in the contention that because the present notice relates to the year 1964-65 and the previous assessment relates to the year 1965-66, the ITO is not precluded from assessing the association of persons. The impugned notice by which the officer seeks to assess the association of persons who has already exercised his option to assess the capital gain in the hands of the individual is, therefore, liable to be quashed. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary for us to deal with the various other contentions raised by Sri Panduranga Rao in regard to the notice issued. The writ petition is allowed with costs. W.P. No. 338/73 The writ petition relates to a notice dated March 17, 1972, in regard to the personal assessment of the petitioner. No serious arguments were addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of this notice. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
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1975 (4) TMI 2 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Amalgamation, Balancing Charge, Developement Rebate, Extra Shift Depreciation Allowance, Foreign Travel Expenditure, Property Tax
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1975 (4) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the profits of the two parts of the company's business should be treated as if they were the total income of the company for all purposes. In taking this view, the High Court overlooked the concluding words of Explanation 2 by reason of which the legal fiction has to be limited to its duly appointed purpose
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