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1975 (5) TMI 93 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... necessary delay. If I may put it, as fresh sale proclamation is not called for, the re-sale on the same day immediately following on the abortive sale should be encouraged if circumstances justify. 8. Regarding the material irregularity complained of, there is nothing on record to help the case of the petitioner. She has stated in her evidence that there is no evidence to prove that the property sold, was of the value of Rs. 10,000/-. This shows that the highest bid of Rs. 10,000/- offered by Mahabaleshwar at the first sale was not genuine offer. He was none other than the natural father of the adopted son of the petitioner. He had no interest in buying the property except to sabotage the sale. The Courts below were, therefore, right in holding that there was no material irregularity in conducting the sale. That finding cannot be disturbed in this revision petition. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed; but I make no order as to costs. 10. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (5) TMI 92 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the question of release of the security does not arise until the said claim has been adjudicated. (21) In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed partly, the portion of the letter (Annexure XXXI), dated August 20, 1973, In which the respondents purported to adjust or deduct the security amount of ₹ 54,900.00 and intimated the petitioner that the balance of ₹ 2,02,437.00 would be recovered from the pending bills, and also directed the Chief Pay & Accounts Officer to recover the aforesaid amount from the pending bills of the petitioner company in its other contracts is quashed, and the respondents are directed not to adjust or recover in any manner their claim of ₹ 2,57,337.00 from out of the security amount and pending or future bills of the petitioner company in its other contracts until the said claim of the respondents has been adjudicated in an appropriate forum in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.a
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1975 (5) TMI 91 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot;mortgagor." But this clause clearly shows that a mortgagor and the borrower are two separate entities and it is only when the context so demands that the word "borrower" may include the mortgagor. This clause does not, however, in any way modify or amend statutory provision contained in Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. Indeed, it would not be open to the parties to enter into a contract contrary to the statutory provisions. We have already shown above that for the purposes of Sections 31 and 32 of the Act the borrower and the surety could not be placed at par. The clause in question refers to the context of the agreement and does not refer to the context of the statutory provisions. 12. For all these reasons we answer the question by saying that the appellant Munna Lal, who mortgaged his property as surety to the Financial Corporation, could not be proceeded against under Section 31 of the Act. Let the case be now remitted to the Bench concerned for disposal.
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1975 (5) TMI 90 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he cheque has been cashed. There are, surely, many other provisions in the German Stock Corporation law which may be useful to us and be capable of adaptation, but it is needless for me to refer to them all at the present moment. I may. however, point out that even in England, from whom wo have largely borrowed our company law. efforts are currently under way to introduce reforms in the company law in effort to gear private effort also to national growth (see Lord Watkinson's Committee report). (33) I am directing a copy of this judgment to be sent by the Registry to the Company Law Board not only for considering what further safeguards may be provided than what have been provided so far, but also for the purpose of more needed action (I am not aware of the details of any action so far taken) being taken against the persons responsible for such a sorry state of affairs. (34) In the result, the petition is accepted, as stated above, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1975 (5) TMI 89 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n which are not excepted items under the schedule. In that view of the matter the impugned order has to be set aside. ( 7. ) The rule is accordingly made absolute and the order under challenge is set aside. ( 8. ) Mr . Das Gupta appearing for the opposite party has submitted that his client is ready and willing to relinquish the claim referred to in issue No. 6. If these claims are relinquished it appears and there is no dispute that the remaining claim for removing silted earth would be triable by the learned Munsif as it is obviously a claim in excess of ₹ 500.00. If any application relinquishing the claim as aforesaid is made in the trial court the same would be considered by it in accordance with law. ( 9. ) I feel that the suit should be heard with utmost expedition, preferably within three months from the date of the arrival of the records in the court below. ( 10. ) Let the records be sent down as early as possible. There will be no order for costs in this Rule.
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1975 (5) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e trade as a whole. Even if we could not, as we did not, find any additional restrictions on the silkworm and silk production business and industry in the amendments, the petitioners could show that they were unduly hampered by the impugned amendments from carrying on their business 10 SC/75-32 or trade by some unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental rights as individuals engaged in silk production industry or business. But, if that was their grievance, they had to demonstrate an unreasonableness of restrictions upon their activities falling outside Article 19(6) before they could succeed. They have not even attempted to do that. It is evident that they could not do so because the licensing fees for various activities to be licensed is quite nominal and they have not been denied any licences they wanted. Consequently, we dismiss these petitions with costs. C.M.P. No. 1929 of 1975 (in Writ Petition No. 137 of 1971) is also dismissed as not pressed. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (5) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... purpose for which the land is acquired has no bearing on the value to determined by the Court but our conclusion remains unaltered. We see no reason, no law nor justice, to interfere with the judgment under appeal. Maybe, the appellant is aggrieved that slightly inferior lands acquired simultaneously and adjoining his plot have been given the same value as has been awarded to him. It may also be that each court he has approached has improved upon the price awarded by he earlier one and therefore he might have obtained certificate hopefully. And looking at his lost land now, years later, when real estate has risen in price much more, he may sigh at what is fixed and strive to yet more. But a closer examination has disclosed no error in principle ,a the High Court's judgment nor has any of the limited ground on which this Court's jurisdiction can be legitimately exercised been made out. The appeal is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal dismissed
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1975 (5) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia means that the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform.
whether, the respondents, after having obtained the orders of injunction from the Court restraining the appellants from taking any proceedings could, thereafter, insist upon the notices within that period as a condition for their liability to file the returns or for the authorities for making the assessments,
whether the Commissioner could have issued the notices before the appeals were preferred
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1975 (5) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e certificate granted by the High Court is competent. As regards the appeal itself we must say that we have not been able to understand the order of the Deputy Director of Constitution which was sought to be quashed by means of the writ petition. We were invited by the respondent to look into the orders of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer in order to understand the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. As the order sought to be quashed was that of the Deputy Director Consolidation we do not feel called upon to do so. We are therefore in the dark as to the reasons which might have led the High Court to dismiss the appellant's petition in limine. We consider it necessary and proper therefore to set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the petition be dealt with by it and disposed of by a proper order. The High Court will bear the matter afresh and dispose it of by a reasoned order. There will be no order as to costs. Case remanded.
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1975 (5) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ed a fee is really in the nature of a tax on buildings and may be upheld as such. It is impossible to accept this contention. That the Permission Fee is not a tax on buildings is clear from the fact that the fee may be required to be paid even if a building does not eventually come into existence. The scheme under which the Permission Fee is attempted to be levied is that it becomes payable at the time when the permission to construct a building is applied for. The levy does not depend upon whether a building has been in fact constructed with the result that whether a building is constructed or not, the fee has to be paid. In other words, the Permission Fee is in the nature of a levy on a proposed activity and is not a tax on buildings. Thus, the levy of house-tax is lawful but the levy of Permission Fee has to be struck down as being illegal. Accordingly the appeal is allowed partly but since the success is divided, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 83 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... T.R. No. 195 of 1957 decided on 20th November, 1962 (Allahabad High Court). relied upon by the Judge (Revisions) is clearly distinguishable. The facts of that case, no doubt, are similar to the facts of the present case. But there the contention raised by the assessee was that the sales took place outside U.P. This clearly was an untenable contention and this court very rightly repelled that contention. The assessee then tried to raise the question as to whether the sales were exempt under the provisions of article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution and of section 27 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. This question was not allowed to be raised, as the same had not been raised before and decided by the Judge (Revisions). We, accordingly, answer the question by saying that the sales in question were exempt under article 286 of the Constitution read with section 27(1)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The assessee is entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (5) TMI 82 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... to allow the parties to go on litigating at the public expense indefinitely. On the basis of the facts alleged in the writ petitions and in the situation in which, due to the attitude of the State Government, the corporation has been put, there was every justification for the corporation to have approached this court under article 226 of the Constitution. The preliminary objection thus has no merit. For the reasons recorded above, I allow these writ petitions (C.W. Nos. 4065 and 4066 of 1973 and 5660 of 1974) with costs and quash- (i) the assessment orders, annexure F, and the demand notices issued thereunder in Civil Writ No. 4066 of 1973 (ii) the notices, annexures P-1 and P-2, and the demands created by respondent No. 5, annexures P-3 and P-4 in Civil Writ No. 5660 of 1974 and (iii) the assessment orders, annexure F, and the demand notices issued thereunder in Civil Writ No. 4065 of 1973. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 in each case. R. S. NARULA, C. J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 81 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ted earlier, we are in agreement with the learned Judge. We dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances, without costs. 4.. Issue carbon copy to counsel. O.P. No. 1709 of 1974.-This O.P. raises the same question as in Writ Appeal No. 160 of 1973. The petitioner s request to amend the certificate of registration by including certain articles of machinery specified in exhibit P-2, was declined on the ground that the dealer must have a pre-existing manufacturing or processing business. We have found in the judgment in W. A. 160 of 1973 that there is no warrant for importing this requirement. We, therefore, allow this writ petition, quash exhibits P-3, P-4 and P-5 orders, and direct the 1st respondent to deal with the petitioner s application (exhibit P-1) afresh in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment, and the other judgment in Writ Appeal 160 of 1973. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed and petition allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... back to the Commercial Tax Officer to make another assessment in accordance with law. Hence, this rule is made absolute without any order as to costs. Let a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the impugned order of assessment. Let a writ of mandamus be also issued setting aside the certificate proceeding started against the petitioner. I however make it clear that if any attachment of the petitioner s property has been made in pursuance of any other proceeding, such attachment shall continue and this order shall not have any effect upon such attachment. This order shall govern the other rules being C.R. Nos. 7660-62(W) of 1975. Let the operation of the order remain stayed for a period of four weeks from today. It is stated by Mr. Sircar appearing on behalf of the respondents that no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed in C.R. No. 7660(W) of 1975 and as such the respondents do not admit any of the allegations made in the petitions of the said rules. Ordered accordingly.
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1975 (5) TMI 79 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n the absence of sufficient material, we are not in a position to decide this question. That being the position and when there was no material before the revisional authorities on the basis of which they could have held that in this country lime is a heavy chemical, the order of the assessing authorities could not have been revised in exercise of the power conferred under section 21 of the Act. The revisional authorities were, therefore, in error in interfering with the assessment orders. On this short ground the Tribunal could have reversed the orders of the revisional authorities and restored the orders of the assessing authorities without expressing a final opinion as to whether lime is or is not a heavy chemical falling under item No. 79 of the Second Schedule to the Act. As stated earlier, since there is no adequate material for deciding that question, we leave it open. Accordingly, these revision petitions fail and are dismissed, but without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (5) TMI 78 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n of the assessee himself about the practice that is followed by him, which betrays a pattern of suppression in the maintenance of accounts. When, as stated above, entries are not made then and there or the accounts do not reflect the correct turnover on each day, it can only be for suppression of the actual turnover. In this case we are satisfied that there are materials to indicate suppression and a pattern of suppression. We therefore find that the Tribunal was right in rejecting the contentions of the petitioner. We are not impressed with the plea of the petitioner s counsel that, in any case, suppression should be limited to the actual suppression detected. Once we hold that there has been a pattern of suppression, we must also hold that the taxing authorities were justified in arriving at the turnover, on such pattern, for the whole of the year. In the result, the T.R.C. is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, we do not order any costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (5) TMI 77 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... case covered by sub-rule (1) of rule 35 or by sub-rule (4) of rule 35 would be the same. If a dealer makes an application on a particular date in person while, on the other, another dealer on that very date makes an application by registered post, the period deductible as the requisite time for obtaining the certified copy cannot be said to be different in either of the two cases. I would accordingly answer the question referred in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the time requisite for obtaining certified copy should commence from 6th June, 1968, the date of receipt of the application for the copy by the authority concerned and not from 3rd June, 1968, the date on which the application was posted by the applicant. In the circumstances of the case, however, I would make no order as to costs. S.N.P. SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (5) TMI 76 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... m, the partnership-firm has got no legal entity under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. It is true that a firm is a person within the meaning of section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. But firm has been specifically omitted within the definition of dealer in section 2(c) of the Act. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act begins by saying that the definition shall apply unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context of the Act. In view of the amendment of the definition of dealer , referred to hereinabove, in my opinion, such extended definition, would be repugnant to the subject and context of the Act. Therefore, in my view, the Commercial Tax Officer was within his jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notices for production of the books of account of the business of the petitioner. In the result, this application is dismissed. There will be no order for costs. Let the operation of the order be stayed for six weeks, as prayed for. Application dismissed.
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1975 (5) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the "sales tax" collected by these assessees under section 21-A of the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, can be treated as part of their total turnover?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is clear from section 21-A of the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, that the sales tax which the section requires the seller of foreign liquor to collect from the purchaser is a tax on the purchaser and not on the seller. This is what makes the authorities on which counsel for the appellants relied inapplicable to the cases before us. Under section 21-A the tax payable is on the price of the liquor and that tax is to be paid by the purchaser; the seller is required to collect the tax from the purchaser which he has to pay over to the Government. Section 21-A makes the seller a collector of tax for the Government, and the amount collected by him as tax under this section cannot therefore be a part of his turnover. Under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the dealer has no statutory duty to collect the sales tax payable by him from his customer, and when the dealer passes on to the customer the amount of tax which the former is liable to pay, the said amount does not cease to be the price for the goods although "the price is expressed as X plus purchase tax" but the amounts collected by the assessees concerned in these appeals under a statutory obligation cannot be a part of their taxable turnover under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
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1975 (5) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... espondent No. 4, is the director who is personally liable for misfeasance for bringing this company into ruination and for the sum of Rs. 83,700 which he must compensate with interest at 6 per annum from 1st February, 1971, up to realisation to the official liquidator of this company. The respondent No. 3, Ranadeb Chowdhury, is not liable for the said sum and the claim against him is dismissed. I also further direct that the official liquidator should initiate criminal proceedings against the said M.N. Mitra and hand over the investigation of this case to the Deputy Commissioner, Detective Department, Calcutta, for enquiry and bring the delinquent director, M.N. Mitra, and other persons or person who may be liable under the Indian Penal Code for such action as it may think just and proper. The official liquidator is entitled to get costs from the said M.N. Mitra. The official liquidator to pay the costs of this application out of the assets in his hands at the first instance.
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