|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 111 Records
-
1976 (1) TMI 189 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ecent view, therefore, appears to be that the Courts should have unfettered discretion and may entertain revision notwithstanding the prevailing practice if they feel justified on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. We may also add that there is no authority in support of the contention that the 'practice of convenience' recognised in Shailbala's case in respect of revisions is applicable to bail or anticipatory bail and that the discretion of the Court should be fettered by such a practice. 13. We are, therefore, of the view that the courts should have an unfettered discretion in the matter of bail under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure to be exercised according to the exigencies of each case. 14. We, therefore, answer the question under reference in the affirmative and hold that a bail application under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be moved in the High Court without the applicant taking recourse to the Court of Sessions.
-
1976 (1) TMI 188 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat ten drums could have contained more than five hundred gallons. "It is no doubt true that in the Order it is nowhere provided that the Petroleum Act would be applicable to it, but learned Counsel for the State has conceded that the Petroleum Act being a Central Act would prevail over the Order which is only issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. 5. Pursuant to what has been stated above and in view of the fact that the charge against the applicant is only that he possessed the said quantity of kerosene oil without having a licence, it fails, and if the case is allowed to proceed against the applicant it would, in my opinion, amount to unnecessary harassment to him particularly when a case against the applicant in respect of the said ten drums of kerosene oil being possessed by him for mixing it with diesel had proceeded and had ended in an acquittal. 6. Accordingly, the revision is &1-lowed, the proceedings against the applicant are dropped and he is discharged.
-
1976 (1) TMI 187 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... proved record of tenancy rights and if a decision of the Record Officer is taken up in appeal and a direction is given for modification, Section 8 provides for amendment to be made in the record of tenancy rights according to the appellate decision. Same thing applies also to a revision order. The Act, therefore, indicates and provides for the remedy to correct the record by following the procedure laid down. Until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor, the entry shall be presumed to be correct. It is perfectly clear and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. 3. The language of Section 16-A, as indicated by us, admits of no doubt that the civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly excluded in respect of any matter which the Record Officer, District Collector or other officer empowered by or under the Act has to determine. 4. The order of the Munsif in this case dismissing the suit is restored and the appeal is allowed. No costs.
-
1976 (1) TMI 186 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to admit and/or deny the document which cannot be adduced in evidence. Should a party instead of objecting, consent to admit, and admit the document, the court may be enabled to act upon it. But, this is a special procedure adopted in civil cases in the interests of justice, where consent of the parties cures the irregularity but not illegalities. However, where a party refuses to admit and/or deny any such improper document, which cannot be adduced in evidence, the court cannot call upon it to do so at the peril of facing the consequences. The application made by the party under Order 12 Rule 2 or Rule 3A must, Therefore, be dismissed. In the instant case, I do not find any jurisdictional or legal error in the impugned order and the order calling upon the petitioner to file certified copies of the documents is, in my opinion, legal and valid and does not call for interference. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Costs of the revision will abide by the result of the suit.
-
1976 (1) TMI 185 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... petitioners contention that the said rule is ultra vires. As already stated by us the earlier decision of the Madras High Court reported in Citadel fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs. District Revenue Officer (1973) I MLJ 99 concerning the validity of Rule 12 of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparation (Excise Duties) Rules is clearly distinguishable. 6. There cannot be any doubt that on the facts and circumstances of the present case respondents 1 and 2 were perfectly justified in invoking the power conferred by Rule 10A. Admittedly the petitioner had not credited to the Department the Duty payable in respect of the Polythene Lay Flat Tubings cleared from a the petitioners factory during the period between 1-5-1970 and 16-7-1970 even though the said article was not exempt from duty that time. The orders Exts. P-3, P-5, P-7 and P-8 do not, therefore, call for any interference. 7. The Original Petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
-
1976 (1) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cao stood repealed and no substantive right or obligation had been acquired or incurred under that repealed law within the meaning of the first proviso to S. 4(1) of Act 30 of 1965, the appellants cannot be debarred from canvassing in this appeal under Article 136, the plea of prescription notwithstanding the fact that they did not file any Reclamacao in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. We therefore negative the preliminary objection raised by the respondents." For these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the Additional Judicial Commissioner and hold that the decree passed by the Bombay High Court was clearly executable. The Executing Court will now proceed in accordance with the law as directed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed but in view of the somewhat uncertain legal position we leave the parties to bear their respective costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
-
1976 (1) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... st the company only ₹ 1 lakh more. The High Court found the extension of the benefit to the workers at the head office justified on the principle of uniformity which in this case serves to maintain industrial peace. In these circumstance's if the High Court refused to interfere on the ground that substantial justice had been done, we find no reason to hold that the High Court had exercised its discretion arbitrarily. this Court has refused to interfere in similar circumstances in more then one case, though the order comptainted of might suffer from some infirmity, (see Shree Balvantrai Chimanlal Trivedi v. N.N. Nagarshna C.A. No. 38 of 1958 decided on 29 October, 1959 and A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen (1957)ILLJ472SC . We are not therefore inclined to disturb the order made by the High Court which we consider reasonable and proper in the circumstances of the case. 4. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
-
1976 (1) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... orkers the very next day offered to be peaceful and resume work, the prolonged situation of cessation of work could have been saved. It is therefore a case which attracts Indian Marine Service, (1963)ILLJ122SC . In that case also this Court found it fair to direct that the workmen should get half the wages during the strike period. The Tribunal's view is certainly not unreasonable. Maybe, it is a just solution. We hope that both sides, after these long years, will bury the hatched and work for the better efficiency and greater status of a leading newspaper of India. 23. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is proper to direct that the appeal be dismissed but the parties will bear their respective costs. Before parting with this case we deem it our duty to record our appreciation of the thoroughness of preparation of Shri Kapil Sibbal, a young advocate of promise, who has assisted the Court as amicus curiae with presidential industry and persuasive felicity.
-
1976 (1) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... about the capacity of the executant to represent the family at the time of making the acknowledgement, he does so at his own peril. Disruption of the joint family status, as already noticed, puts an end to the representative capacity of the karta and any acknowledgement of a debt made by him after such disruption cannot save the creditors' claim from becoming time barred against the other members. The above enunciation of the law is in accord with the view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rangaswamy Ayyangar v. Sivprakasam Pillai (supra) and by a Division Bench consisting of Varadachariar and Abdur Rahman JJ. in Muthyala Ramachandrappa v. Muthyala Narayanappa (supra), and by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Pramod Kumar Pati v. Damodar Sahu (supra). We approve of the law enunciated on the point by the High Courts in these cases. No other point has been argued before us in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1976 (1) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nted out by this Court in Debabrata Bandhopadhyay's case (supra), penal action was not called for. We therefore allow R-3's appeal and set aside his conviction and sentence. No conviction for contempt of court has been recorded against the appellants in the companion appeals by the High Court. All that we would observe in their (R-1 and R-2) case is that the High Court has made sweeping observations with regard to the civil rights, which might prejudice them in establishing their claims by a regular suit. They shall therefore not be taken into account by any court before which the dispute with regard to this timber may come up for adjudication in due course. Similarly any adverse remarks made against the Police officer (R-4) will not by themselves be taken conclusive as to his conduct in handling this case. Subject to these observations we dismiss Criminal Appeals Nos. 195 and 196 of 1971. Criminal appeal 118 of 1971 allowed. Criminal appeals 195 & 196 dismissed.
-
1976 (1) TMI 179 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the notary public is produced, which expressly confers the power on the attorney to institute suits, the burden immediately shifts to the defendants, who dispute the execution of such a power of attorney. Therefore, instead of calling upon the defendants to give better particulars of their objections as to the proper, institution of the suit, I think, it is fit and proper, if issue No. 1 is divided and the burden regarding the proper institution of the suit by a duly authorised person, is placed on the defendants. Issue No. 1 is accordingly divided as under - 1. Whether the plaint has been signed and verified by a duly authorised person? O.P.P. I A. Whether the suit has not been instituted by a duly authorised person? O.P.D. (12) The application is allowed to this extent. The Original Power of Attorney is returned for the present to Counsel for the plaintiff. (13) Parties may appear before the Deputy Registrar for taking further directions in the suit on 4th February 1976.
-
1976 (1) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed on that circumstance that social justice has two sides and, occasionally, one party or the other makes r myopic mistakes resulting in further litigation. Subject to the above observations, the appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their costs throughout, although, in cases like this, where the law is not free from obscurity and needs this Court's pronouncement and one of the affected parties is weak, being a worker, the costs must come out of public funds as suggested in Trustees of Port, Bombay( 1974 4 S.C.C. 710.). The State, we hope, will constitute a suitors' fund which will take care of hardships and public interest in the area of necessary litigation. In C.A. 933 of 1975 the respondent has been re-employed by the appellant although in his case also we declare, for reasons already given and subject to the same term till his absorption that the retrenchment is invalid. The costs, in this appeal, will be borne by each of the parties. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
-
1976 (1) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... death of Smt. Menda. In these circumstances, therefore, the holding held by Smt. Menda would devolve on Ramadhin's brother's son, namely, Jit and thereafter on his heir who is now continuing the present proceedings. Thus the Tahsildar Maharajgunj was fully justified in mutating the name of Jit in respect of the lands in dispute instead of Smt. Phoola. the Revenue Courts as also the Division Bench of the High Court had taken a legally erroneous view in holding that the mode of succession would be governed by s. 174 of the Abolition Act as the interest left by Smt. Menda was her self-acquired property. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is hereby restored. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, and particularly having regard to the fact that the respondents have not appeared to contest the appeal before this Court, we make no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
-
1976 (1) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... llected to the staff as it is intended by the payer to be so distributed. It may also happen that more money comes in by way of tips into the pockets of the Management that is distributed by it. We cannot therefore consider the receipt of tips by the staff as anything like a payment made by the Management to its employees warranting consideration by the Tribunal to depress the award of dearness allowance. Of course, it is a factor which may perhaps be in the mind of the Tribunal when he finalised the actual figures. There is no reason for us to think that although not specifically put down in his order, the Tribunal has lost sight of this circumstance. For this reason, we think, there is no ground for inteference with the award of the Industrial Tribunal. Having regard to the fair way the case has been placed before us, we do not regard this as a case where costs should be awarded while dismissing the appeal. The appeal is dismissed but the parties will bear their own costs.
-
1976 (1) TMI 175 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t holder, soon after its receipt. The loss has occasioned to the parties because of the negligence of the plaintiff in the transaction itself. As such I would not grant interest to the plaintiff. I hold under Issue No. 32 that the plaintiff is not entitled in any case to claim any interest from the defendant. Issue No. 23 "Is the bank liable to the plaintiff in the sum claimed or any other sum by reason of any negligence or breach of duty or as for money had and received to the plaintiff's use ? " Issue No. 31 " Is the plaintiff entitled to the amount claimed or any other amount from the defendant on account of principal? " 51. As there is estoppel by negligehce, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any amount from the defendant and I hold issues Nos. 23 and 31 against the plaintiff. 52. The result of the above discussion is that the suit fails and is dismissed. On the peculiar facts of this case. I have to leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1976 (1) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y returns of deposits are submitted to the Reserve Bank of India. It could hardly be disputed that borrowings from other banking companies the amounts of bills issued by the Bank and the balance of profit and loss account are neither reserves nor deposits and they are not liable to be shown in the weekly returns of deposits submitted to the Reserve Bank of India. The Industrial Tribunal was, therefore right in excluding them from the category of 'working funds' and this round of challenge urged on behalf of the Bank must be rejected. We accordingly set aside the award made by the Industrial A Tribunal and remand the case to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to dispose it according to law in the light of the decisions given and observations made in this judgment. Since the workmen have partly succeeded and partly failed, we think that the fair order of costs would be that each party should bear and pay its own costs of these proceedings. Appeal allowed in part.
-
1976 (1) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Court held that by promulgating the validating and repealing ordinance of 1943, the legislative authority had not attempted to do indirectly what it could not do directly or to exercise judicial power in the guise of legislation. It was further held that the ordinance was not invalid on the ground that the legislative authority had validated by retrospective legislation proceedings held in courts which were void for want of jurisdiction as there was nothing in the Indian Constitution which precluded the legislature from doing so. The ratio of the above decision applies with greater force to the present case. For all the foregoing reasons, we negative all the contentions canvassed by Mr. Sanghi and dismiss this appeal leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1971 SARKARIA, J. For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 131 R of 1971 entitled I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this appeal fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
-
1976 (1) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... other words, the petition was only an intimation to the Revenue court or authority that the matters in dispute between the parties had been settled amicably between the members of the family and no longer required determination and that the mutation be effected in accordance with that antecedent family settlement. Since the petition did not itself create or declare any rights in immovable property of the value of ₹ 100 or upwards, it was not hit by s. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, and as such was not compulsorily registrable. The rest of the reasoning in the judgment of my learned Brother has also my concurrence except that I will reserve my opinion with regard to the alternative proposition, whether this petition-assuming it was compulsorily registrable under s. 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act-could be used to raise an estoppel against any of the parties hereto. Decision of this point, in my opinion, is unnecessary for the disposal of this case. Appeal allowed.
-
1976 (1) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o failed to consider the fact that a revisional application from the order refusing amendment had earlier been dismissed by the High Court. For these reasons we hold that the High Court had no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the order passed by the trial court in its discretion which was affirmed by the lower appellate court. As for the application for amendment that the respondent had filed in High Court about 19 years after the institution of the suit, there is no compelling reason why this belated application should be allowed we find that the High Court did not go into the merits of the appeal which remain to be considered. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court remanding the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the amendment applications, and remit the matter to the High Court for disposal of the second appeal on merits. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs upto this Court.
-
1976 (1) TMI 170 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... pplicable in the subject case because the refund was granted through error and hence it could be recovered within period of one year under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules. Rule 11 cannot be attracted in any case because it relates to refund of duty due to the claimant and not for recovery of the duty from the claimant. In view of the above facts of the case, the recovery of duty from the appellant is barred by time. The order of the Assistant Collector, therefore, is set aside the appeal is accepted.
........
|
