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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 129 Records
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1976 (12) TMI 198 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to entertain the suit, a transfer of the same to another court under the provisions of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is competent even though subsequently it is found that its real valuation was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of that court. We, therefore, confirm the finding of the learned single Judge on the issue of admissibility of the pronote and hold that the respondent is not entitled to any relief on the basis of the suit pronote. We also confirm the finding of the learned single Judge that the respondent has pleaded an alternative case for relief on the basis of original debt but we transfer the case from the file of the learned single Judge of this Court to the file of the Sub Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate) Jammu for its trial. To this extent the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. 15. Parties are directed to appear before the Sub Judge (C.J.M.) Jammu, on January 4, 1977. A.S. Anand, J. 16. I agree.
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1976 (12) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iable to fine which may extend to ₹ 500/-. The complaint does not allege as to which condition of the licence was broken by the club or the appellant in allowing a cabaret to be performed in the club premises. Nor could the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State point out any such condition of the licence. The allegations contained in the complaint manifestly did not constitute an offence under Section 57(c). 4. This was, therefore, clearly a case where the allegations contained in the complaint did not constitute any offence and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance of it. The High Court in the circumstances ought not to have rejected the application of the appellant for quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 5. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and quash the proceedings in Case No. 2(2) 76 Trial No. 285/76 pending in the Court in Mr. S.S.P. Yadav, Executive Magistrate, Sadar Patna.
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1976 (12) TMI 196 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her the order of the Controller was a nullity and the suit was maintainable, that is to say, whether a prima facie case existed. Before us also, during the hearing of the revision petition, learned counsel for the landlord did not urge that this Court should also address itself to the questions whether the balance of convenience was in favour of granting an injunction and whether the tenant would suffer irreparable loss if the injunction was not granted. No such argument was raised before us. Indeed, it seems that all along the parties confined themselves to the question whether the order of the Controller was a nullity and a prima facie case existed. It was in such circumstances that having held that the learned District Judge had taken an erroneous view, this Court set aside his order and, without anything more, restored the order of the learned Subordinate Judge. 9. We see no force in this review application and, accordingly, it is rejected. There is no order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 195 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the High Court and before the filing of this appeal. Learned Counsel for the respondent wants to utilise that event to highlight his argument that the cause of action cannot survive at least after her death, in view of the limited protection granted to the heirs of the original tenant by the amendment made to Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act by Amending Act 18 of 1976. We cannot accept this argument either. The suit filed by the respondent being incompetent and the Civil Court not having jurisdiction to entertain it, the decree passed by it is non est. The nullity of that decree can be set up at least by Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram who are entitled to defend and protect their possession by invoking the provisions pi the Slum Clearance Act. 21. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that the respondent's suit for possession shall stand dismissed. The respondent shall pay to the appellants the costs of this appeal.
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1976 (12) TMI 194 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t appeal to reason. It fails to draw the distinction between the negligent act of the driver in driving the vehicle which injures a pedestrian and the act of wrongfully giving a lift to third parties. As stated by Street on Law of Tort, 5th Ed., p. 429 'the employer will be liable to the pedestrian but not to the passenger'. 14. That apart, the decision in Amthiben Maganlal v. Superintending Geophysicist O. N. G. C., 1976 ACJ 72 (Guj) (supra) is also distinguishable on facts. There, the truck in question was driven by the Deputy Engineer of the O. N. G. C., who gave a lift to a person returning from the works. The distinction is brought out by Street on Law of Torts, 5th Ed. p. 429 stating, 'whereas giving a lift to hitch-hikers would be outside the scope, the giving of lifts to employees returning home from work was within the course of employment of the driver'. 15. In the result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 193 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uthority.If the District Court finds that the case is covered by Explanation (iv), there would be no question of examining comparative hardship of the appellant and respondent No. 3, and respondent No. 3 would straight away be entitled to an order of release of the rented premises in her favour. On the other hand, if the District Court comes to the conclusion that by reason of the omission of Explanation (iv) of the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 respondent No. 3 is not entitled to rely on it or that Explanation (iv) is not applicable on the facts of the present case, the application of respondent No. 3 would fail, since it has already been found by the District Court--and we do not’ propose to disturb this finding--that the appellant would suffer greater hardship by granting of the application than what would be suffered by respondent No. 3 if the application were to be refused. We accordingly remand the matter to the District Court with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (12) TMI 192 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nder section 6 of the Pensions Act was held not to bar a second suit on the same cause of action, and Pethaperumal v. Murugandi(18 Mad. 466) where rejection of the first suit for recovery of money for plaintiff's failure to produce succession certificate was held not to bar a second proceeding for the same relief. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the previous order passed by the Prant Officer being merely an administrative order and not having been passed on the merits of the case, it did not, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, impair the power of the Collector to pass the impugned order on the merits of the matter under proviso to section 63 (1) of the Act on the grant of the requisite certificate under rule 36(f) of the Rules. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below and dismiss the respondents' suit but in the circumstances of the ease without any order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (12) TMI 191 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... there is sufficient cause. The order of the Collector extending the time must prima facie show as to what that sufficient cause was. We are aware that no Court can sit in judgment and say that the cause shown by the Collector was not sufficient in the circumstances. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the sufficiency of the reason ; but the legal requirement remains that there should be a sufficient cause for extending time. That cause must be indicated in the trder. The order of the Collector, dated 16th December, 1970 is conspicuous by absence of any reference to any cause. This also vitiates the order of extension. For these reasons, we are in full agreement with our learned brother Gangadhara Rao, J., in allowing the writ petition, quashing the orders of the Deputy Collector and the Collector of Excise, and directing the return of the seized articles. ( 16. ) In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 150. Wrie appeal dismissed.
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1976 (12) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e us cannot be held to be concluded by that decision. The argument of implied repeal has also no substance in it because our reason for according priority to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Act is not that the Slum Clearance Act stands impliedly repealed protanto. Bearing in mind the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non-obstante clauses in the earlier law, we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of s. 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control Act must prevail over these contained in ss. 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act We understand that the view which we are taking has been consistently taken by the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court in various cases. They are right in their conclusion and accordingly, we uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (12) TMI 189 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d. The Government asked the High Court to issue advertisements and to invite applications for appointment to the posts. The High Court accepted that position and acted upon it. The High Court issued the advertisements. The attitude of the High Court has been peculiar. When the High Court decided to ask for fresh applications the High Court accepted the position that the original recommendations which had been made by the High Court were not accepted by the State Government and yet the High Court supported before this Court the appellant's case by pleading for the "candidature" of the appellants. The High Court should not take a partisan view by supporting the candidature of any person. We were a little surprised that the High Court supported the appellants. This is not proper particularly when the High Court dismissed the writ petitions of the appellants. For the foregoing reasons the appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (12) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ave to be enforced against the Union. The General Manager or any other authority acting in the Railway administration is as much a servant of the Union as the appellant was in the present case. (1) A.I.R. 1954 Nag. 166. (2) A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 417. The Union of India represents the Railway administration. The Union carries administration through different servants. These servants all represent the Union in regard to activities whether in the matter of appointment or in the matter of removal. It cannot be denied that any order which will be passed on an application under Article 226 which will have the effect of setting aside the removal will fasten liability on the Union of India, and not on any servant of the Union. Therefore, from all points of view, the Union of India was rightly held by the High Court to be a necessary party. The petition was rightly rejected by the High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (12) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt possessed total assets worth ₹ 55,732.25. The assets possessed by the appellant were thus in excess of the surplus income available to him. but since the excess is comparatively small - it is less than ten per cent of the total income of ₹ 1,27,715.43 - we do not think it would be right to hold that the assets found in the possession of the appellant were disproportionate to his known sources of income so as to justify the raising of the presumption under Sub-section (3) of Section 5. We are of the view that, on the facts of the present case the High Court as well as the Special Judge were in error in raising the presumption contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 5 and convicting the appellant on the basis of such presumption. 34. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit him of the offences charged against him. Since the appellant is on bail, the bail bonds will stand discharged.
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1976 (12) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, is not extinguished by a contract of sale of the mortgaged property entered into by a mortga- gee in exercise of the power of sale given to him under the mortgage deed. Until the. sale is completed by a registered instrument, the mortgagor can redeem the mortgage on payment of the requisite amount. The Madras decision reported in Meenakshi Velu and Ors. v. Kasturi Sakunthala and Ors.( 1.1 .R, (1967) 3 Madras 161) on which counsel for the appellant relied is contrary to the view expressed in Ellappa Naiker and others v. Sivasubramania Maniagaran,( (1936) 71 Madras Iaw Journal 607) and the aforesaid Bombay decision. We are entirely in agreement with the Bombay decision. The Madras decision Meenakshi Velu and Ors. v. Kasturi Sakun- thala and Ors. (2) which holds a contrary view on which coun- sel for the appellant relied is wrong. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs to respondent no 1. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (12) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... predictability has to be paved with well settled principles of construction and interpretation. We cannot let it develop into a slippery slope be-set with hazardous possibilities. The science of statutory construction and interpretation--I think can call it that--rests on certain systematised principles and rules of common sense, logic, and reason. It can not be transformed into a happy hunting ground for whatever may captivate the forensic or judicial fancy or become something akin to poetry without even the attractions of euphony. For the reasons given above, I find that, on an application of the ordinary and well recognised rules of interpretation, without resorting to any of the novel methods suggested by some of the arguments of learned Counsel for the appellants, the impugned part of Rule 155A(3) (D)(i) is valid. I, therefore, concur with nay learned brother Krishna Iyer, and hold that the connected appeals and petitions before us must be dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (12) TMI 184 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ties Ltd., the cardboard packing is done for the benefit of the Food Specialities and at their instance and cost. Metal containers are also not marketed in the cardboard boxes in which they are delivered by the appellants. It is the product which is manufactured by the Food Specialities which is marketed in the same cardboard boxes in which the appellants clear the metal containers. 4. From the above discussions it follows that in this particular case packing of metal containers in cardboard cartons cannot be said to be incidental or ancillary to the manufacture of metal containers and this packing is essentially a post manufacturing process. As a result of the above discussions the position emerges that it would not be permissible to include the cost of cardboard packing in the assessable value of metal containers, which are supplied by the customer buyers. The order of the Assistant Collector is accordingly set aside and consequential relief allowed to the appellants.
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1976 (12) TMI 183 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... fication was issued. The effect of the above notification was that woollen fabrics produced on Handloom and processed with the aid of power were not to be subjected to the duty under the above Notfn. w e.f. 14-2-1972. This mistake should have come to the knowledge of the appellants on 14-2-1974, which is the date of publication of the Notfn. in the Official Gazette. In view of above position with the refund will be due to appellants provided that they make a claim for the same within 3 years from the date on which the mistake was discovered by them. Since the appellants should have discovered the mistake on 14-2-1974, the refunds for which they submitted claim within three years from 14-2-1972 are due to them under the General Limitation Act because the subject goods were not chargeable to duty from 14-2-1972 as per the above notification. 1, therefore, set aside all the above 10 order of the Assistant Collector and allow consequential relief on the basis of my above orders.
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1976 (12) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
Whether cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 34 could not be taken by a Magistrate "except on his own knowledge or suspicion or on the complaint or report of an excise officer"?
Held that:- The High Court as well as the Court of Sessions, were therefore, clearly in error in affirming the order made by the learned Judicial Magistrate and it must be held that the charge-sheet was validly filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate by the police and the Judicial Magistrate was entitled to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of such charge-sheet.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the orders made by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sessions Judge and the High Court and remand the case to the Judicial Magistrate with a direction to him to deal with the charge-sheet filed by .the police in accordance with law in the light of the observations contained in this judgment.
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1976 (12) TMI 181 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e at the correct assessable value for the purpose of excise duty in accordance with law. 15. In the result, all these three writ applications are allowed. So far as C.W.J.C. 1252/74 is concerned, all the reliefs prayed for must be allowed for the petitioner has merely sought for a discretion to the respondents to make assessment in accordance with law. In so far as the other two writ applications are concerned, while quashing the orders of the respondents and the consequent demand notices as incorporated in Annexures 15, 16, 16/1 and 16/2 of C.W. J.C. 939/74 and those in Annexures 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of C.W. J.C. 1203/74, I remit all the three cases back in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution to the competent Excise Authority to go into the questions as indicated above and make his decision in the light of the directions given above and in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the cases there shall be no order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 180 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gory of post manufacturing expenditure, he is certainly entitled to claim deduction of the same while determining the wholesale cash price for the levy of excise duty under Section 4 of the Act. 13. The respondents have to ascertain whether the price lists submitted by the petitioner showing post-manufacturing expenses is correct or not In case it is found that the expenses incurred or part thereof are post manufacturing expenses further the petitioner is entitled to deduct the same, and the authorities shall levy excise duty after granting deduction of such expenses. 14. The result is that the petitioner succeeds and the order dated 30th July, 1973, 11th February, 1974, 3rd June, 1974, 7th February, 1974 and 4th February, 1974 are quashed. Respondents are directed to ascertain the expenses incurred by the petitioner on four heads and finalise the price list in the light of the observations made by us above. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1976 (12) TMI 179 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anufacturer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal. If on such scrutiny the Central Excise authorities are satisfied that the prices at which the petitioner company sells its goods to the five Customer Companies are not such normal prices, it would be open to the Central Excise authorities to ascertain such normal prices and to levy excise duty on the petitioner company on the basis of such normal prices. But the Central Excise authorities cannot treat the prices at which the five Customer Companies sell such products to wholesale dealers or to the public, as the value thereof for the purpose of levy of excise duty on the petitioner company. With these observations we allow this petition and issue a mandamus to the respondents to consider the price list submitted by the petitioner company in accordance with the aforesaid enunciation of law. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this petition.
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