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Showing 81 to 100 of 135 Records
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1976 (8) TMI 55 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... place on the section will clearly five effect to the intention of the Legislature in the majority of the cases. If the Legislature has not made provision for exceptional cases of this type, it is not for us to make good that lacuna. We accordingly hold that the Income Tax Officer was in error in rectifying the assessment for 1966-67 by recompution the development rebate to be carried forward from the year. The section authorises him only to recompute the total income. There is nothing so far as the total income is concerned to recompute and the Income Tax Officer has not recomputed it. Therefore, what he has done is not authorised by s. 155 (5) and his order is therefore without jurisdiction. We accordingly agree with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appeal is dismissed. 20. The cross objection which merely seeks to support the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and which does not seek any further relief is redundant and is dismissed as such.
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1976 (8) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Plywood for tea chests - Classification of goods - Criteria - Alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... on (Certification Marks) Act, 1952. The petitioners have produced as Exts. P10 and P11 the specification for tea chests prescribed by the Indian Standards Institution. Whether these have any relevancy in determining whether goods fell under Item 16B(i) or not is a matter for the authorities to decide. All that we would like to point out is that these specifications do not adhere to any rigid standard size because various sizes are mentioned and what is more important the size has also been made to depend on the requirements of the purchaser. Whether these specifications should be applied and if applied whether it could be said that the goods will fall or will not fall under Item 16B(i) are matters to be considered by the authorities. We allow this petition and set aside Ext. P9 series, Ext. P7 series and Ext. P5 series. Fresh modified lists should be prepared and duty payable determined in the light of what we have stated in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 53 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Limitation for initiating legal proceedings - Short-levy - Composite Mill - Connotation of ... ... ... ... ..... al Mills Co. Ltd. was a composite mill. The Government do not agree with this interpretation given to the term manufacturer in determining a composite Mill. The Government observe that the existence of one or more units owned by a manufacturer is clearly envisaged in the definition of composite Mill and a manufacturer who is engaged in two of the manufacturing activities enumerated for this purpose even if in various units, will be treated to be a composite Mill for the purpose of the relevant notification. Accordingly, M/s. Delhi Cloth Mill (Silk Mill) will have to be treated as a composite Mill only. 4. The petitioners have pointed out certain calculation mistakes. In this connection, the Government observe that if there be any calculation mistakes in determining the quantum of duty, the same should be sorted out by the Assistant Collector after verifying the various facts and figures of the case. Subject to this modification, the revision application is otherwise rejected.
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1976 (8) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in having included the value of the forest lands in the total value of the estate for the purpose of estate duty ?
Held that:- It is clear that the assessee, after having been given due opportunity to lead evidence to show that what was prima facie non-agricultural land, in the sense that it was covered by the spontaneous or natural growth of forests, was really agricultural land, had led no such evidence. It was not shown that the assessee or his predecessor-in-interest did anything to develop the forest in the sense that any particular trees were planted deliberately. It appears that the nature of exploitation of the forest lands was simply to give contracts for cutting of the trees. The assessee not having led any evidence of any intention to prepare or appropriate or earmark the land for any agricultural use or purpose, but, on the other hand, having contended that mere possibility of using such land for agricultural purposes in future was enough, could not be said to have discharged his onus of proof. After the assessee's admission that it was "forest land", which presumably prevented cultivation, no evidence was led, as we have already observed, to indicate any change of character of this land or its conversion into agricultural land. We, therefore, think that the Appellate Tribunal was correct in expressing the view it had taken and the conclusions it had recorded. And, no case is made out for sending the case back to the Tribunal for any fresh decision. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (8) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Companies Profits Surtax, Computation Of Capital ... ... ... ... ..... last of the lenders mentioned in item (v). There is nothing in the context of the proviso also to show that it was intended to be correlated only to any person in a country outside India from whom moneys are borrowed by the assessee. Even when the company borrows moneys from the Government or from the other institutions mentioned in item (v), the said borrowing may be for the creation of a capital asset outside India where the company may carry on its activities. Therefore, neither in item (v) nor in the proviso, there is anything in the subject or context to show that the proviso was intended to cover only the last class of lenders, namely, any person in a country outside India, and not the other institutions enumerated in item (v) of para. 1 of the Second Schedule to the Act. Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs of the reference. Counsel s fee is Rs. 500.
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1976 (8) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... on of the learned judges is adopted, 30 days of default would be completed only on March 17, 1975, and the assessee having filed the return on March 16, 1975, would escape liability to penalty. Therefore, in our view, this test of escape or non-escape from penalty to such a limited extent, cannot constitute a safe and sound basis for holding that there is something in the subject or context of section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act repugnant to the definition of the word month contained in section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, so as to exclude its application. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the word month occurring in section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act has to be reckoned according to the British calendar as provided for in section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and, consequently, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 500.
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1976 (8) TMI 49 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Insurance Company, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... nal, it may be pointed out, is supported by the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. S. Guruswami Gounder and K. S. Krishnaraju 1973 92 ITR 90 (Mad) and the decision of the Kerala High Court in M. P. Alexander and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1973 92 ITR 92 (Ker). Mr. G. K. Talukdar, the learned standing counsel for the department, referred to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Brij Bushan Lal. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1971 81 ITR 497 (Punj). We are, however, unable to agree with the view expressed in Brij Bushan Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1971 81 ITR 497 (Punj) and we respectfully differ from that view and we respectfully agree with the view expressed in Commissioner of income-tax v. K. S. Guruswami Gounder and K. S. Krishnaraju 1973 92 ITR 90 (Mad). Accordingly, the question of law referred is answered in the affirmative and against the department. There will be no order as to costs. D. PATHAK J.--I agree.
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1976 (8) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Valuation Date, Valuation Date, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the word belonging no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, it is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Webster belong to is explained as meaning, inter alia, to be owned by, be in the possession of . The precise sense which the word was meant to convey can, therefore, be gathered only by reading the document as a whole and adverting to the context in which it occurs. Consequently, what the expression belonging to occurring in a particular statute means has to be understood in the context in which it is used and, in the context in which that expression is used in section 2(m) of the Act, we are clearly of the opinion that it means only the full and absolute ownership. Under these circumstances, our answer to the first question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1976 (8) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... ed fact which obtains in the case with regard to the execution of the fresh contracts in the accounting period relevant to the assessment years under consideration, namely, that these were executed in a manner which was entirely different from the manner in which they were executed in the earlier years, it seems to us clear that the additional remuneration which was received by each one of the assessees under the second resolution passed by the limited company will have to be regarded as income taxable under the head Salary and not as income taxable under the head Business or profession . In this view of the matter, the question that has been referred to us is answered thus On the facts and circumstances of the case, the additional remuneration received by the respective assessees in terms of the resolution of S. B. Joshi and Company Ltd. dated June 20, 1959, was income liable to be assessed as income under the head Salary . The assessees will pay the costs of this reference.
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1976 (8) TMI 46 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
HUF As Partner, HUF Partner ... ... ... ... ..... one view and applied the principle laid down in Volkart Brothers case 1971 82 ITR 50 (SC) that the power of rectification under section 154 could be resorted to only where conceivably there cannot be more than one view. On the applications made under section 256(1) the Tribunal declined to state a case and refer the questions on the ground that the view taken by the Tribunal that section 154 of the Act cannot be invoked for the purpose of rectification is based on settled principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court and, therefore, there is no referable question of law. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal that there is no referable question of law as section 154 of the Act cannot be invoked where conceivably there can be more than one view and, according to one view, deduction of interest paid to the Hindu undivided family of which the partner is the karta, is allowable. Agreeing with the view of the Tribunal, we dismiss these petitions without costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Mercantile System, Sales Tax ... ... ... ... ..... that such remuneration should be paid to him. Our attention has also been drawn to a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. A. P. Annamalai 1970 75 ITR 109 (Mad), where the family consisted of an adult male member and his minor son. It was held in that case that as it was not possible to visualise an agreement with the other,member, who was a minor, no agreement was necessary in such a case, and as the remuneration paid was not excessive, it could be allowed as a deduction. In the present case, however, an agreement appears to have existed between the karta and the Hindu undivided family, which can be inferred from the fact that the claim for the salary has all along been made by the Hindu undivided family. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1976 (8) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital, Contingent Liabilities, Provision For Contingencies, Super Profits Tax
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1976 (8) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... followed the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above in regard to a reference made under section 26(1) of the Gift-tax Act. We have extracted the order of the Tribunal in full. There is no indication in the order that the revenue raised any such question as has been referred to us by the Tribunal, and, therefore, the Tribunal had no occasion to consider any such question. It is not the case of the revenue that such a question was raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal omitted to consider the question and give a decision thereon. Under these circumstances, the present case falls squarely within the fourth category enumerated by the Supreme Court in its decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. 1961 42 ITR 589 (SC) referred to above and, therefore, the reference itself is incompetent. In view of this, we decline to answer the questions referred by the Tribunal to this court in the present case. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 42 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Depreciation And Development Rebate, Question Of Law, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... Travancore Sugars case 1966 62 ITR 566 (SC). It is not necessary to deal with the ratio of the case because the conclusion ultimately turned upon following the Supreme Court decision referred to above. It is unnecessary to refer to certain other authorities which were placed before us, as we are satisfied that the stand of the revenue is correct and the payments in question in the respective years did not amount to revenue expenditure. Our answer to the question, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was not justified in deleting-- Rs. 3,08,012 (in assessment year 1962-63) Rs. 5,57,658 (in assessment year 1963-64) Rs. 5,79,336 (in assessment year 1964-65) Rs. 3,57,681 (in assessment year 1965-66) and Rs. 5,87,729 (in assessment year 1966-67) on the ground that the said capital expenditures were converted into revenue expenditures. As success is divided, we direct parties to bear their own costs of these references. MOHANTI J.-- I agree.
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1976 (8) TMI 41 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction Of Tribunal, Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... 971 82 ITR 50 (SC), it is clear that the provisions of section 154 were certainly not applicable. Here, the mistake could only be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there could conceivably be two opinions, namely, whether the case fell within the principle laid down in Kishanlal Haricharan s case 1971 82 ITR 660 (AP) or whether it could be distinguished on the line of reasoning adopted by Obul Reddi J. (as he then was) in Progressive Engineering Co. s case 1976 105 ITR 226 (AP). Hence, it is obvious that it was not open to the Income-tax Officer or any other authority functioning under section 154 of the Income-tax Act to rectify the earlier orders charging interest in respect of each of the three assessment years. In view of this conclusion, we must answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner of Income-tax.
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1976 (8) TMI 40 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Attributable To, Capital Receipt, Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... the profit or the income which the assessee made in connection with the business. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court appears to be on all fours with the facts of the present case. It is indeed a matter worthy of consideration that whenever a vehicle with a route permit is transferred to a third person, a substantial portion of the consideration represents the value attributable to the pecuniary gains derived by operating on the route. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the sum of Rs. 20,000 received by the petitioner-assessee in consideration of the transfer of route permit in the sale of truck is liable to tax under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as a revenue receipt and not as capital gains. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. Let a copy of the judgment along with the opinion as also the relevant record be sent back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for further necessary action. MUFTI BAHA-U-DIN FAROOQI J.-I agree.
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1976 (8) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
1961 Act, Actual Cost, Assessment Year, Res Judicata, Written Down Value ... ... ... ... ..... 962-63 to 1965-66 we have to proceed, as pointed out above, under the provisions of section 43, sub-section (1), of the Act of 1961. Under the definition as set out in section 43, sub-section (1), as pointed out above, even if the cost has been met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority, that direct or indirect meeting of the cost has to be deducted in order to ascertain the actual cost to that assessee. As a result of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the question referred to us is in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. That answer is as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, depreciation to be allowed for the assessment year 1963-64 in respect of the assets acquired by the assessee before April 1, 1961, should be determined by a reference to the written down value as determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (6) of section 43 of the Income-tax Act 1961. The assessee shall pay Rs. 200 as costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Of Company, Computation Of Capital ... ... ... ... ..... 72,153. For the year ending December 31, 1964, the directors recommended that a sum of Rs. 65,13,611 should be distributed as dividend if the same was approved of by the shareholders at the annual general meeting. Such approval was granted by the shareholders and the said amount of dividend was distributed. Thus, so far as question No. 2 is concerned, our answer is as under For the assessment year 1966-67, the dividend equalisation reserve should not be reduced by any amount as no amount had been transferred from the profit and loss account for distribution of dividend, but the amount of Rs. 1,47,43,658 was transferred to the dividend equalisation reserve account from the development reserve in the preceding year out of which the dividend was distributed. Thus, for the assessment year 1966-67, the whole of the sum of Rs. 1,47,72,153 should be included in the computation of capital for the purposes of surtax for the assessment year 1966-67. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty, Valuation Date, Valuation Report, Wealth Tax Return ... ... ... ... ..... ees on the respective valuation dates and as entered in the construction account was incorrect. Again, assuming that the department was right in rejecting the construction account maintained by the assessees and estimating the total cost of construction, still no principle or basis was brought to our notice to justify the action of the department in spreading the said total cost over the period of four years in question at the particular amounts on the respective valuation dates as it has actually done in these cases. If so, there was no scope for finding that the assessees had suppressed the real value as on the different valuation dates so as to render themselves liable to penalty. In view of these reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any error of law, and, therefore, the questions extracted already cannot be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal. Hence, these petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... at the Tribunal has not considered the statements of Daya Shanker and Sundera Devi recorded by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. As such Statements constituted material evidence in favour of the assessee, the appellate order of the Tribunal is, in our opinion, vitiated by non-consideration of material evidence. In the view we take on the first question, we do not consider it necessary to answer the second question referred to us. As a result of the foregoing discussion we answer the first question in favour of the assessee and as follows In coming to the conclusion that the assessee had failed to prove the sources of cash credits standing in the names of Daya Shanker and Sundera Devi, the Tribunal did not consider the evidence of Daya Shanker and Sundera Devi recorded before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and, hence, the order of the Tribunal is vitiated on account of non-consideration of such evidence. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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