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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 131 Records
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1976 (9) TMI 189 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... notice of termination of tenancy is not valid and the premises have been let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes and no permission has been obtained from the Competent Authority (Slum Areas)to institute the petition. The Controller has observed that no material has been placed on record to suggest that the premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes and that the defense about the validity of the notice of termination of tenancy and lack of permission from the Competent Authority (Slum Areas) were not available to the tenant in a petition under section 14A of the Act. In the view I have taken, the order of the Controller is correct. It was not open to the petitioner tenant to raise the objections about the letting purpose or lack of permission of the Competent Authority or the service of a valid notice of termination of tenancy. The revision has no merit and is dismissed and the order of the Controller is affirmed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 188 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rejecting the writ petition. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. He was right in not exercising the inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the appellants. They must fail on account of inordinate delay and laches on their part. Their earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 16-3-1972. They sat quiet for a period of nearly 1 1/2 years. There was unreasonable delay on their part in moving the Court. The delay remains unexplained. Merely because the Supreme Court held in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1973 SC 1150) that the public purpose stated in notifications, viz. for planned development of Jaipur City was vague, that would not furnish a ground to them to file a fresh petition. The petition must, therefore, fail on the ground of laches I. C. N. Sahakari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1974 SC 2085. 14. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and dismissed with costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 187 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is no State Appeal against the acquittal, that acquittal cannot be disturbed now. The only other person who can be held liable is the man who actually sold the said drug. Taking into consideration the fact that the offence was not committed deliberately and intentionally, I think that the fine should also be reduced to half. 7. In the result, the revision is allowed to this extent that while the conviction of applicants Abdul Majeed and Mohd, Fareed are maintained, Each of them is ordered to pay a fine of ₹ 175/- under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and ₹ 75/- under the Essential Commodities Act The conviction and sentence of Abdul Moid and Mohd. Amin are set aside. The fine, if already paid by them, shall be refunded. Abdul Majeed and Mohd. Fareed should deposit the fine as imposed by this Court within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the record by the court below and in case of default, they shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each.
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1976 (9) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt by the probationary measure. It may be pointed out that the Law Commission also in its Forty Seventh Report recommended the exclusion of applicability of the probationary process in case of social and economic offences and presumably in response to this recommendation, the Legislature has recently amended the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by introducing Section 20AA providing that nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under the Act unless that person is under eighteen years of age This amendment of course would not apply in the present case but it shows the legislative trend which it would not be right for the court to ignore. We cannot, therefore, give the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the appellants and release them on probation. 10. We accordingly confirm the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellants and dismiss the appeal.
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1976 (9) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... st of Tahsildar was amended by adding a proviso saying that "the requirement in regard to being an approved probationer and the exercise of powers of a Magistrate shall not apply in respect of those Deputy Tahsildars in the Telengana area for whom promotion to the category of Deputy Tahsildar was or is the first stage of promotion after the 1st November 1956". The notification states that the amendment shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st June, 1961. The amendment thus appears to cover the cases of the said 63 Deputy Tahsildars. However, the rule as amended does not arise for consideration in this appeal which is directed against the judgment of the High Court passed on the rule as it stood prior to the amendment and we do not express any opinion on the amended rule. o p /o p 11. The appeal is allowed, the Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1976 (9) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... evidence before the Court. It is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority. We do not therefore, see any reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court.42 2. We accordingly, dismiss the appeal but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we grant time to the appellant to vacate the premises on or before June 30, 1977. The appellant undertakes that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to Respondent 3 also by June 30, 1977 and Respondent 3 also undertakes that he will use the premises for occupation by himself and the members of his family and will not let out the premises or part with the possession or occupation of the premises in favour of anyone else for a period of three years from today. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion 48 (3) (xv), the impugned notification of the State Government was ultra vires. The second ground is what follows if the first is good. But, as we have already explained above, the first ground itself is not sound. There is no question of any special provision overriding the general. The provisions are complementary. Section 48 (3) (xv) is really meant to carry out the direction which can legally be given under Section 43 (1) (d) (i) of the Act. Therefore, although we allow the miscellaneous application and have permitted the grounds to be argued, we reject them as untenable. For the reasons given above, we agree with the views contained in the judgment of the Karnataka High Court against which this appeal has been filed. We hold that the impugned direction and notification by the Government was not invalid and that the Regional Transport Authority had not acted illegally in attaching the required condition to the permit. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ning compensation. The procedure under the unamended Act may have had relevance for acquisition proceedings begun before the amendment of the Acquisition Act in 1927 when it really existed. But, we think that it is a fair interpretation of the provisions of Section 23 of the Mysore Act to hold that compensation for acquisitions will be general provisions of the Acquisition Act as they exist on the date of a particular acquisition proceeding except to the extent to which a different procedure is expressly laid down in the Mysore Act. On the view we take, the market value of the property acquired had to be determined with reference to the date of notification under Section 16 of the Mysore Act. Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order of the Mysore High Court. We remand the case to the High Court for determination of the market value and disposal of the case in accordance with the law as declared by us. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 5, he shall. be punishable- (a) in the case of a contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1 ) of Section 5, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to a sum which exceeds the unlawful charge claimed or received under that sub-section by one thousand rupees, or with both." Hence, the case before us is completely covered by the concept of reasonableness of expectation of rent which must take the penal law of the State into account. It is not the expectation of a landlord who takes the risk of prosecution and punishment which the violation of the law involves, but the expectation of the landlord who is prudent enough to abide by the law that serves as the standard of reasonable- ness for purposes of rating. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court and dismiss this appeal. But, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... minimum period before the expiration of the period of the permit must be provided within which this procedure can be completed so that the, renewal can, if at all, be granted well in time before the permit expires. If an application for renewal could be entertained even if made at any stage, it would dislocate the procedural machinery set out in section 57 and that is why the Legisla- ture prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 58 that the delay in making an application for renewal may be condoned by the Regional Transport Authority only if it is of not more than 15 days. Here, the application made by the appel- lant for renewal of his permit was admittedly late by more than 15 days and hence the delay was not condonable and the Regional Transport Authority was right in rejecting the application for renewal as time barred. We must, in the circumstances, dismiss the appeal, but in view of the peculiar facts of the case we make no order as to costs. P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 179 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... person entitled to nominate the arbitrator. Or else the respondents would have objected to the appointment of the arbitrator and declined to participate in the arbitration proceedings or at any rate, participated under protest. We are, therefore, of the view that the arbitrator was validly nominated by the Secretary in charge of the Department of Food in the Minis- try of Food & Agriculture. This view renders it unnecessary for us to consider whether by participating in the proceedings before the arbitrator without objection or protest and taking the chance of obtaining an award in their favour, the respond- ents could be said to have waived the defect in the appointment of the arbitrator. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and while dismissing the application for setting aside the award, pass a decree in terms of the award. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circum- stances of the case, we make no order as to costs through- out.
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1976 (9) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below that the impugned order was not by way of punishment ignoring the well settled principle of law that a second appeal cannot be. entertained on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error might seem to be. (See Paras Nath Thakur v. Smt. Mohani Dasi & Ors.( 1960 1 S.C.R. 271); Sri Sinna Ramanula Jeer & Ors. v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. ( 1962 2 S.C.R. 509); R. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam() 1963 3 S.C.R. 604) and Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojappa(4). For the foregoing reasons, the contentions of Mr. Dixit are upheld and those of Mr. Garg are repelled. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and, decree of the High Court, restore the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the respondent's suit. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are, however, left to pay and bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly rejected the application for amendment and agreed with the trial court. We are told that the defendants proposed amendments to two other paragraphs of written statement. These are paragraphs 4 and l 9 of the written statement. These amendments were also rightly rejected. For the forgoing reasons the appeal must fail. The defendants, appellants cannot be allowed to amend the written statement in the manner suggested. The two alternative pleas of the defendants as alleged in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the written statement are there. The parties will be able to make their rival contentions on the pleadings as to the issues to be raised. The defendants wish to raise issues on those paragraph 25 and 26. Counsel for the plaintiff states that it is open to the defendants to apply for the framing of the issues. They will be at liberty to do so. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the appellants to the respondent. Record can be sent back to the trial court as early as possible.
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1976 (9) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
"all the three panchas are now not traceable in spite of great efforts" was not challenged in cross-examination-no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution.
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1976 (9) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and often to the dictates of the party at an advantage in the bargain. Mortgages are not always simple, English, or usufructuary or such other types as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. They are anomalous too and sometimes more anomalous than what is defined in the said Act. Even so, there is one most essential feature in a mortgage which is absent in a lease, that is, that the property transferred is a security for the repayment of debt in a mortgage whereas in a lease it is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property. We have seen that this essential feature of a mortgage is missing in the document in ques- tion. We are, therefore, unable to come to the conclusion that it is a mortgage and not a lease. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are not able to hold that the High Court is not right in holding that the document in question is a lease and not a mortgage. In the result the appeal is dismissed. We will, however, make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he Chairman that his services on behalf of the Port will not be required." That is to say, although on a retainer and with fixed fees for appearance in eases there is no absolute ban to appear even against the Port. This condition is not at all consistent with the position of an officer of the Trust. We agree with the opinion of the Tribunal that Shri Misra cannot be held to be an officer of the Trust. A lawyer, simpliciter, cannot appear before an Industrial Tribunal without the consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal merely by virtue of a power of attorney executed by a party. A lawyer can appear before the Tribunal in the capacity of an office bearer of a registered trade union or an officer of associations of employers and no consent of the other side and leave of the Tribunal will, then, be necessary. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Necessarily the Special Leave Petitions also fail and stand dismissed. Appeal and pettions dismissed
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1976 (9) TMI 173 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... in the price lists and charged to wholesalers while arriving at the assessable value of the products for the purposes of levying excise duty thereon. The exact extent to which the appellants would be entitled to relief of deduction of expenses under the above heads will have to be investigated and fixed by the Assistant Collector before the appellants claim for refund on this account is sanctioned. With regard to three other deductions claimed by appellants namely forwarding, packing, freight and the cost of the fan regulator, I have to disallow them on account the same reasons which have been given by me in order in appeal No. 820-821/76, dated 19-4-1976. 4. In the circumstances which have been discussed above I modify the order of the Assistant Collector to the extent that deductions from the list price will be allowed to the extent indicated above, and appeal in respect of deductions on account of packing, freight and the cost of fan Regulator is however disallowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 172 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eous Petition No. 477 of 1974 of this very petitioner company where the Maharashtra High Court had gone into the question of apportionment and had given directions for making such apportionment in the matters of advertisement expenses and freight expenses. Even though we have no foundation on facts and earlier indicated but as our interpretation of Voltas and Atic ratio is not as per the other High Court decisions and as petitioner’s own matter is decided differently on this question of principle, we would grant a certificate in this matter as a substantial question of law of general importance arises which, in our opinion, should be decided by the Supreme Court. The application is accordingly granted. 21. Interim stay extended for a period of one week from today on the same terms on condition that an effective Bank guarantee is furnished for the amount of ₹ 45 lakhs in respect of dues in question within a period of a fortnight before the second respondent,
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1976 (9) TMI 171 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... watel says excise duty was also being charged on 1/10th of the packing charges illegally. But it was not challenged before the excise authorities. The company did not contest the inclusion of 1/10th of packing charges in the prices quoted by it. There was acquiescence. It is not therefore, open to the company now to challenge the inclusion of 1/10th of the packing charges in the prices. As the counsel has not pressed this point l say nothing about it. 35. For these reasons I would accept the writ petition and quash the orders of the excise authorities on the glass shells and glass tubes manufacture by the company. I direct the respondents to refund the company forthwith the amount collected in excess of the correct duty of excise as pronounced in this judgment. The excise authorities are forbidden from recovering the excess duty claimed by them and which has not so far been paid to them. The respondents will pay costs to the company. Counsel’s fee ₹ 250/-.
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1976 (9) TMI 170 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the Assistant Collector and the orders passed by the Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur, in all the thirteen cases. The petitioner will recover costs of the petition from the Union of India. Counsel s fee Rs. 1,000/- it certified. The security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. 40. emsp I agree that this petition should be allowed for the reasons given by my learned brother, Singh, J. But I would like to reserve my opinion on the question whether the imposition of such a heavy penalty was in any case justified in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1970 SC 253. I am sure the Collector would keep in view the observations of their Lordships in that case whenever a question of imposition of penalty may arise, Raina, J. 41. emsp We allow the petition and quash the impugned show cause notices issued by the Assistant Collector and the orders passed by the Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur, in all the thirteen cases.
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