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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 122 Records
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1977 (1) TMI 171 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t before the court, the court would adjudicate upon the dispute between the revenue and the assessee on the rival contentions. That is not the situation here. In such a situation, the court would not be concerned as to the modality of avoidance of tax but there the tax cannot scheme of amalgamation. In other words, the judicial process is used or polluted to defeat the tax by forming an appropriate device or subterfuge. Such a situation can never be said to be in public interest. It is clearly opposed to public interest and on this ground the court would not sanctions the scheme of amalgamation. 39. Accordingly, Petition Nos. 10 of 1975 and 12 of 1975 are rejected. As the Central Government after notice did not appear, Mr. V. B. Patel was appointed by the court to assist it in unraveling the implications of law in this case and it is reasonable that he should be paid his fees by the petitioners. 40. Accordingly, the petitions are dismissed with costs. 41. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 170 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e lights of the Company, if any, came into existence on 16-6-1.969 by which time the revised policy of the Government had taken effect, secondly because even if it could be said that the Company acted in pursuance of the earlier representations, such representations were contrary to the decision dated 15-12-1966 of the Cabinet Sub-Committee and thirdly, because it would be opposed to the scheme and purpose of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act as well as general social and public policy. Letters Patent Appeal No. 368 of 1975 is allowed and Civil Writ No. 1588 of 1972 and Civil Writ No. 5653 of 1975 are dismissed. There will be no order ae to costs. 59. The Government had throughout expressed its readiness to refund Inter-State Sales Tax and Tax paid on direct sales to consumers. It will be open to the Company to approach the Government for refund of Inter-State Sales Tax and tax on direct sales to consumers. We do not propose to issue any writ directing the Government to do so.
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1977 (1) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dealing in only Telco vehicles are not pre judicial to public interest. The Commission found that exclusive nature of dealership of being confined to Telco vehicles is not prejudicial to public interest. The territorial restriction is also in public interest and the Commission was in error in thinking that it is not so. 57 . For the foregoing reasons the appeal is accepted. The decision of the Commission is set aside. We hold that the agreement in the present case is not within the vice of restrictive trade practice and is, there fore, not registrable. We make it clear that in a given case sale of commodities being confined to a territory may amount to a restrictive trade practice. In the special features and facts and circumstances of the exclusive dealership agreement between Telco and the dealers, the territorial restriction imposed on the sellers not to sell vehicles outside their territories is not a restrictive trade practice. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 168 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on the quantum of liquor sold by them and no excise duty was charged or chargeable on the undrawn liquor on the licence. The excise duty there was collected only in relation to the quantity and quality of the country liquor which was drawn, Pannalal v. State of Rajasthan (supra) is not of any assistance to the respondent. On the other hand B.C. Banerjee v. state of M.P. (supra), State of M.P. v. Firm Cappulal (supra) and Excise Commr. U.P. v. Ram Kumar (supra) apply to the facts of this case. 12. In the result we are of the view that R. 15 in so far as it enables the State Government to recover excise duty also as a part of the issue price in case of undrawn liquor in invalid and ultra vires the provisions of the Act. 13. It follows that the writ petitions have to be allowed in so far as the demand includes excise duty and the writ petitions are dismissed in regard to other matters. No orders as to costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 150/- in each case. 14. Order accordingly.
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1977 (1) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e have no hesitation in accepting the conclusion reached by the trial Judge that the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the respondents were evading their responsibility. The finding on this issue by the High Court is not supported by evidence or on the probabilities of the case. 12. In the result we allow the appeal on the ground that the respondents have failed to establish that the time is of the essence of the contract and that the appellant has succeeded in establishing that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the respondents evaded their responsibility. The judgment of the High Court is set aside, and that of the trial Court is restored. The appeal is allowed with costs. The appellant will deposit ₹ 20,000/- and the sale document in the Court of the Civil Judge, Agra within six weeks from today and the parties will take further directions in the matter from the Civil Judge, Agra.
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1977 (1) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... son merely that the need to review it is not clearly perceived. Be- sides, the manufacturers must know, in order that they may organize their business in their own interest as well as in the interest of the community at large, as to how long any particular embargo is going to be operative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court though on the ground only that the impugned Notification in so far as it prohibits the printing of any border or heading on sarees etc. for an indefinite period is ultra vires clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, since the aforesaid clause casts an obligation or a duty upon the Textile Commissioner to specify the period during which the prohibition shall remain in force. We express no opinion on the other points, including Point No. 6 urged before the High Court for its consideration. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The appellants will pay one set of costs of these appeals to the respondents. Appeals dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the property is compulsorily acquired. In considering market value the disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. There is an element of guess-work inherent in most cases involving determination of the market value of the acquired land. But this in the very nature of things cannot be helped. The essential thing is to keep in view the relevant factors prescribed by the Act. If the judgment of the High Court reveals that it has taken into consideration the relevant factors, the assessment of the market value of the acquired land should not be disturbed (see Thakur Kanta Prasad Singh (dead) by L. rs. v. State of Bihar(A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2219). After having been taken through the material on the record, we find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court as might induce us to disturb its finding. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he High Court. In their application dated 17-10-1964, under s. 18 of the Act, the appellants stated that similar land in the immediate vicinity had been sold at the rate of ₹ 1,250/- per acre and another plot at the rate of ₹ 1,350/- per acre. These lands are close to the area for which they had paid the diversion charges at the rate of ₹ 500/- per acre. They filed a map also, showing the location of those lands. On an over-all view, after taking into account the potential value of the land, we think it will be reasonable to award compensation to the appellants at the rate of ₹ 1,250/- per acre with interest at 6 per annum till payment, from the date on which the possession was taken over by the Collector. The appellants shall also be entitled to solatium at 15 on the compensation amount awarded for the land. Accordingly, we allow the appeal with proportionate costs and modify the decree of the High Court to the extent indicated above. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pinion at all upon the merits of the judgment of the High Court, based as it is upon documents containing admissions of the defendant-appellant, it seems to us that the appellant would have a very uphill task indeed in arguing his appeal even in the partition suit. We may mention here that the partition suit was instituted as long ago as 1947 and was only given a new number in 1957. If there is a case in which the principle that litigation should have an end ought to be applied, it is this on the face of facts of the case apparent to us. We, therefore, reject the Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8585 of 1976, the application for condonation of delay in the filing the Special Leave Petition. We dismiss the Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8586 of 1976 as well as the over-delayed special leave petition No. 2816 of 1976. The result is that this appeal must be and is hereby dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a." The legislation we uphold is an added responsibility on the State. it shall be vigorously enforced with sympathy for the victim class, lest the progressive measure. prove a paper tiger. The cadres charged with enforcement must have right orientation correct grasp and social activism, if this law is not to leave a yawning implementation gap. Hercics in court and hortation in the House must be followed by effective enforcement in the field. We state this not because the State is not in great earnest--it is--but because many a welfare legislation in the country reportedly remains a cloistered virtue or slumbrous in effect. The finest hour of the rule of law is when law disciplines life and matches promise with performance. On this note of hopeful valediction we wind up. We dismiss the appeals and the writ petitions, leaving. the parties to bear their costs, although we had at least on one occasion, sufficient provocation to make a different direction. Appeals dismissed
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1977 (1) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing to law about the status of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as protected tenants in respect of the portions of the land in dispute in their possession. 2. Separate payment of the rent by the respondents and acceptance thereof by Vasudeo Balwant Telang. 3. Application by Vasudeo Balwant Telang for declaration that respondents were jointly and severally responsible for payment of rent of the land in dispute. 4. Notices by Vasudeo Balwant Telang to the respondents terminating their tenancies on the ground that he required the portions of the land in their respective possession for personal cultivation. 5. Application filed by Vasudeo Balwant Telang against the respondents under Section 31 of the 1918 Act averring that he bonafide required the land for his personal cultivation. 4. In view of the foregoing, there is hardly any justification to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. In the result the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 160 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... before the court, the court would adjudicate upon the dispute between the revenue and the assessee on the rival contentions. That is not the situation here. In such a situation, the court would not be concerned as to the modality of avoidance of tax but there the tax cannot scheme of amalgamation. In other words, the judicial process is used or polluted to defeat the tax by forming an appropriate device or subterfuge. Such a situation can never be said to be in public interest. It is clearly opposed to public interest and on this ground the court would not sanctions the scheme of amalgamation. 39. Accordingly, Petition Nos. 10 of 1975 and 12 of 1975 are rejected. As the Central Government after notice did not appear, Mr. V. B. Patel was appointed by the court to assist it in unraveling the implications of law in this case and it is reasonable that he should be paid his fees by the petitioners. 40. Accordingly, the petitions are dismissed with costs. 41. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ge. The impugned Acts therefore fall within the purview of Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule as they are meant to avoid disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversion from one religion to another in a manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community. The two Acts do not provide for the regulation of religion and we do not find any justification for the argument that they fall under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. In the result Civil Appeals No. 1489 and 1511 of 1974 and Criminal Appeal No. 255 of 1974 fall and are dismissed while Civil Appeals No. 344-346 of 1976 are allowed and the impugned judgment of the Orissa High Court dated 24 October, 1972 is set aside. The parties shall pay and bear their own costs, in Madhya Pradesh appeals. The State shall pay the respondent costs in the Orissa appeal according to previous direction. C.As. Nos. 1489 & 1511 of 1974 and Cr. A. No. 255 of 1974 dismissed. C.As. Nos. 344--346 of 1976 allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on at all. It may be that a licence cannot be granted without making good the deficiency in fee which should accompany the application, but that does not mean that a bona fide application accompanied by an incorrectly calculated fee or a fee which is deficient by over-sight, could not be made at all, or, if made, must be treated as void or of no effect whatsoever. On this question, the view taken by the Central Government was, in our opinion, correct, just, and proper. On such a view, it is not necessary to discuss any of the cases on the kind of error which could be corrected by the High Court as there was no error of any kind in the Central Government's order for the High Court to be able to correct it. On the other hand the error, which we consider necessary to correct, is in the High Court's order. Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore those of the Central Government. The parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 157 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ories violated Article 301 or the Constitution. 33. In the result, these petitions succeed only in so far as they impugned levy of export duty on rectified spirit but in other respect these petitions fail. We quash the impugned notifications issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh in so far only as they seek to levy export duty on rectified spirit. We issue a writ restraining the State of Uttar Pradesh and its officers from levying and collecting export duty on rectified spirit exported to other States and Union Territories. We further direct the respondents to refund to the petitioners any amounts collected from them towards export duty on rectified spirit. Except to this limited extent, we dismiss these petitions. 34. The interim orders made in these petitions restraining the respondents from collecting export duty on liquors exported to other States and Union Territories are hereby vacated. In the circumstance of these petitions we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y the Government to perform the functions of a Deputy Commissioner The Assistant Commissioner does not require such separate empowerment or authorisation. The High Court thus erred in its construction of Section 3(c) of the Act. We set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeals. 4. We will be failing in our duty if we do not observe that the State should have, immediately on the judgment of the High Court against them, issued a notification empowering the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Sub-Division to perform the functions of a Deputy Commissioner so that while they were adjudicating the legal question in the High Court the urgent social objective of the construction of a Harijan colony need not be held up. Very often litigation becomes an alibi for official inaction. We hope that in this case the Harijan colony has come into being at least by now. 5. We allow the appeals but since the respondents are not represented, there will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... med to consider the approach of the a Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector to be erroneous because according to the Revenue Tribunal the burden was shifted to the respondent to rebut the entry in the record of rights and .that the respondent failed to discharge that burden. When the entire evidence is before the Court, it is well settled that the burden of proof becomes immaterial. Further the Revenue Tribunal fell into error of entertaining the Revision when there was no error of law on the face of the record. The presumption which was said to arise in the record of rights was before the Deputy Collector as well as the Mamlatdar. If the authority entrusted with adjudication goes into the question and assesses the same, the decision may be right or wrong but that will not go to show that there is any error of law on the fact of record. All the three contentions advanced by the appellant fail. The appeal is for the foregoing reasons dismissed with costs. P.H.P. Appeal dismissed
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1977 (1) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h contem- ners for the contumacious conduct for which we have adjudged them guilty, though we express our strong. disapproval of that conduct and hope that the indiscretion will not be repeat- ed". Counsel for the appellants did not justify the language of the resolution. There is no gainsaying that the members of the Bar did not act with dignity in regard to the resolu- tion. The language used by them was unfortunate. Counsel for the appellants rightly said that was not proper and it should not have been passed in that manner. It is the duty of lawyers to protect the dignity and decorum of the judiciary. If lawyers fail in their duty the faith of the people in the judiciary will be undermined to a large extent. It is said that lawyers are the custodians of civilisation. Lawyers have to discharge their duty with dignity, decorum and discipline. In view of the fact that the notices were discharged, the appeal is disposed of with the foregoing observations. Appeal allowed
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1977 (1) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ward of ₹ 1,87,500 made by the trial Court on account of estimated profits (it transpires that when the trial Court passed the decree the amount was recovered by the appellants with the result that there was nothing more to be paid by the State to the respondents herein). Of course, having regard to all the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear the costs in this Court. We may make it further clear that in regard to other items of claim we uphold what the High Court has awarded. In view of the fact that shortly after the decree was passed by the trial Court the decree amount appears to have been recovered by the respondents, we do not award any interest under the decree. 5. By the time we reached the concluding part of the judgment, counsel on both sides agreed that instead of making complicated calculations over small amounts, it would be better to leave the parties be quits neither party will have to pay the other any amount (inclusive of court fee).
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1977 (1) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... erely suspends the claim to salary. During suspension there is suspension allowance. See Khem Chand v. Union of 2-112 SCI/77 India(1) where this Court said that the real effect of the order of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the service he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary. Under Fundamental Rule 52 'the pay and allowance of a Government servant who is dismissed or removed from service, cease from the date. of his dismissal or removal.Therefore, there would be no question of salary accruing or accruing due so long as orders of suspension and dismissal stand. The High Court was correct in the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim for salary accrued due only on the order of dismissal dated 23 February, 1956 being set aside. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is dismissed. There will be costs only to the plaintiff respondent to be paid by the State of Madhya Pradesh. Appeal dismissed.
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