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Showing 1 to 20 of 109 Records
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1977 (10) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... under the standing orders of the Company. 17. In conclusion, we would like to make it clear that as charges Nos. 2 and 3 have been held by the Industrial Tribunal to have been established against the workman and they constitute major misdemeanours falling within the purview of Sub-clauses (a) and (m) of Clause (ii) of Standing Order 31 of the aforesaid Standing Orders, we think that the order of dismissal could have been passed by the punishing authority which in this case, as already stated, was the Plant Manager. We may also observe that it is not open to us to substitute the order of discharge with benefits of past service for the impugned order of dismissal. The workman may, if so advised, approach the Company in this behalf. 18. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the aforesaid award of the Ninth Industrial Tribunal. However, in view of the order of this Court dated June 1, 1977, the appellant shall pay the costs of the appeal to the respondents.
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1977 (10) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... advance intimation about the intention to terminate the settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start negotiation for a more favourable settlement immediately thereafter. The only condition that has to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two months from the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it. In a given case it may be even advantageous to the parties who do not want to continue the settlement to strike a new bargain without loss of time so that unnecessary bickerings and resultant industrial unrest do not take place. In an industrial matter we are not prepared to subject a notice under Section 19(2) to the irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 24. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the reference is incompetent and invalid. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The Tribunal will try to dispose of the case, expeditiously.
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1977 (10) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ponsive and hardly lives up to the Parliament's expectation in continuing Section 80 in the Code despite the Central Law Commission's recommendations for its deletion. An opportunity for settling the dispute through arbitration was thrown away by sheer inaction. A litigative policy for the State involves settlement of Governmental disputes with citizens in a sense of conciliation rather than in a fighting mood. Indeed, it should be a directive on the part of the State to empower its law officer to take steps to compose disputes rather than continue them in court. We are constrained to make these observations because much of the litigation in which Governments are involved adds to the case load accumulation in courts for which there is public criticism. We hope that a more responsive spirit will be brought to bear upon governmental litigation so as to avoid waste of public money and promote expeditious work in courts of cases which deserve to be attended to. Dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents referred to decisions of the various High Courts in 1976 Cr. L.J. 118. 1976 Cr. L.J. 288, 1977 Cr. L.J. 104, 1977 Cr. L.J., 394 and 1977 Cr.t,.T. 486. These decisions except Ram Pal Singh and Others v. State of U.P. are not on the point and therefore need no discussion. In Ram Pal Singh and Ors. vs. State of V.P. a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the bail under Section 167(2), Criminal Procedure Code has the same incidents as the bail granted under Charter XXXIII and is accordingly to remain valid till it is cancelled and the cancellation of a bail can only be on the grounds known to law and the receipt of the chargesheet in court can by itself be no ground for cancellation of the bail. The view expressed by the learned Judge is correct in law. 10. In the result we hold that the cancellation of the bail for the reasons stated by the High Court is not sound and direct that the appellants be set at liberty.
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1977 (10) TMI 124 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... upra). (2)The bailee or the pledgee agrees to restore the thing to the bailor or pledger in the same condition substantially as he received it. (3)If the bailee did an act entirely inconsistent with the terms of the bailment he incurs a liability. (4)Loss caused by an act not authorised by the terms of the bail- ment will fall on the bailee. (5)It is a tort for the pledgee to retain the goods after paymant of the Debt. So we hold that it was the bank's duty, obligation and responsi- bility to re-deliver the identical res (the plant) to the distillers. As the bank failed to do this the bank must pay the price of the res. (75) For the foregoing reasons we allow the appeal and pass a decree for ₹ 2,59,166/12.00 in favor of the plaintiff-appellant Jagatjit Distilling and Allied Industries Ltd. against the defendant- respondent Bharat Nidhi with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the suit till payment. The appellant shall be entitled to costs throughout.
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1977 (10) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The King 1935 AC 500. Lord Jowitt L.C. in Attorney General of Ontario v. Attorney Gen. of Canada 1947 AC 503 affirmed the same approach To such an organic statute the flexible interpretation must be given that changing circumstances require, arid it would be alien to the spirit with which the preamble to the Statute of Westminster is instinct, to concede anything less than the widest amplitude of power to the Dominion legislature under Section 101 of the British North America Act. 102. Legalism has to yield when spacious issues arise. "Whatever the legal aspect of the thing, there are moments when it is a feeble need to rely on," said Nehru, in the Constituent Assembly (I Constituent Assembly Debates, p. 61). 103. There is another stark possibility the Administration sliding back from the progressive constitutional values to protect private interests; and then the Court may be activate the 'welfare jurisprudence' of the Constitution by appropriate commands.
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1977 (10) TMI 122 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the other two conditions remain unaffected. 65. Since the sale has taken place there is no reason in view of the conclusions we have reached to disturb or interfere with the sale. 66. It has been urged before us that the respondent Saroj Kumar Bhotika cannot approbate and reprobate. He has declared in writing that he is not connected with a larger industrial house. Now he cannot be allowed to say that the condition is illegal. The answer is that there is no estoppel against illegality or legal un-enforceability vide (Diubai v. Dominion of India) at p. 77 para 9. 67. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. The rule is made absolute. There will be a Writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to the original petition to recall cancel and withdraw the impugned notices dated the 13th Feb. 1975 and the 14th Nov. 1975, respectively and to forbear from giving effect thereto in any manner whatsoever. There will be no order as to costs. Salil Kumar Datta, J. 68. I agree.
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1977 (10) TMI 121 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut any valuation. (58) Thus, the value of the suit for purposes of court-fees would be ₹ 45,000 plus the value of the relief for purposes of declaration and consequential relief in relation to cash which the plaintiffs may value. The value for purposes of jurisdiction in a suit, covered by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, would follow the value fixed for purposes of court fees. (59) The learned subordinate Judge rightly took the view that the suit for purposes of court-fees has to be valued under section 7(iv)(c) read with the second proviso but the second proviso is applicable only to the extent indicated above. (60) The learned Subordinate Judge was thus right in holding that the suit had not been valued properly for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction and was also right in ordering the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court. (61) For all these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
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1977 (10) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er the Courts from characterising the function as ministerial. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case by a writ of mandamus the said authority must be directed to perform its function. 15. For the reasons stated above, we allow these appeals and direct the Regional Transport Authority or Authorities, as the case may be, to implement the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, issue the permits to the appellants in all the cases. We would, however, Eke to make it clear that permits were to be issued for a period of three years only. Temporary permits were issued to the appellants or some of them from time to time in pursuance of the interim order made either by the High Court or by this Court. The total period of such temporary permits in the case of any of the appellants must be deducted and adjusted as in the present situation of the law it would be just to do so, from the period of three years. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs in any of the appeals.
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1977 (10) TMI 119 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... proceedings in OS No. 67 of 1924, Sub Court, Coimbatore (Ex. B. 25) and that she gave evidence as P. W. 4. Kaliammal did not agitate thereafter against the resultant decree and judgment of the above proceedings and that, therefore, Kaliammal herself or her legal representatives cannot reagitate a closed matter. We are not inclined in this action to go into the said controversy about the alleged right of Kaliammal or her heirs to the suit properties. Suffice it however to hold in this suit that the plaintiffs and the first defendant have no locus standi to institute the suit. We are however constrained to accept the contention that the decision of this court in A. S. No. 147 of 1926 Ex. B 26 has become final and binding on the plaintiffs in the present action. 24. In the result, therefore, the second appeal is allowed. In passing we trust that a curtain would be drawn at least now to this long drawn litigation and with that objective we are not awarding costs in this appeal.
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1977 (10) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ommodation on and from 1-1-1973 as a tenant, conveniently to be called statutory tenant, under the Act. Their occupation was not unauthorised or wrongful until a decree for eviction was passed by the First Appellate Court on 11-8-75. Their occupation became unauthorised or wrongful only from that date. They are not, therefore, liable to pay any damages or mesne profits for the period commencing from 1-1-1973 and ending on 10-8-1975. Decree for damages either in respect of the two months prior to the institution of the suit or for the subsequent period must therefore be set aside. The defendant-appellants will be liable to pay damages or mesne profits ₹ 125/ per month (the rate of damages could not be and was not challenged before us) from 11-8-1975 only, until the delivery of the vacant possession of the accommodation. 13. In the result the appeal is allowed in part only to the extent stated above. In the circumstances, we shall make no order as to costs in this Court.
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1977 (10) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... strate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 4. Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police, before taking cognizance under section 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under section 190 as described above. The present case is clearly covered by proposition No. 4 formulated, above. For these reasons, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... court a case which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an advocate is an officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. The Bar Council of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-operation of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the Bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts. A judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. We must appreciate Shri Ramasesh for his young candour and correct advocacy. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e. The High Court committed an error on law in holding that consent of the Government was necessary to give legal effect to the voluntary retirement of the appellant under F.R. 56 (c). Since the conditions of F.R. 56(c) are fulfilled in the instant case, the appellant must be hold to have lawfully retired as notified by him with effect from 2nd August, 1976. In this view of the matter the permission accorded by the Government to retire and its subsequent order of July 28, 1976, revoking the permission, are ineffectual in law and are therefore null and void. Since the appellant voluntarily retired in accordance with F.R. 56(c), the High Court’s order of July 31, 1976, on the administrative side, transferring him to Dhubri is invalid and is hereby quashed. In the result the judgment and order of the High Court of March 4, 1977, are set aside and the Writ Petition is allowed. The appeal is allowed with costs in this Court as well as in the High Court. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w that the trial court ,applied its mind and was satisfied that a valid decree under the M.P. Act could be passed. In the result the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the orders of the lower courts are restored. The appeal is allowed with costs. ORDER GOSWAMI, J. We have pronounced the judgment and order in this appeal. On the undertaking given by counsel on behalf of the respondents that they will voluntarily and peacefully vacate the portion of the premises in dispute in this appeal on or before 31st January, 1978 and hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the appellant, the execution of the decree will be stayed till then. Meanwhile, the respondents also undertake to pay ₹ 170/- p.m. as mesne profits to the appellant within the first week of the month due. Failure to pay mesne profits as aforesaid will enable the decree- holder to execute the decree without reference to this Court and the stay of the decree will automatically stand vacated.
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1977 (10) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The High Court could not have lightly interfered with the order of the Sessions Judge setting aside the, confiscation especially in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under s. 439 without making out any of the well recognised grounds for interfering in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and straightaway proceed to interfere with the order which would not be correct exercise of, its revisional jurisdiction. The facts are that the licensee is dead and he has left behind minor children and a widow. The, license having been cancelled, the business cannot be carried on. The security deposit is forfeited, though that by itself would not have, been a material consideration for our decision. But keeping in view all the factors, in our opinion the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of confiscation. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the order made by the High Court is set aside and the one made by the Sessions Judge is restored. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 112 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e instant case as the previous objection had been dismissed in default. As such there could be no application of the principles of constructive res judicata and the execution court erred in holding to the contrary. 18. It has been urged on behalf of the decree holder respondent that in view of the provisions of Section 99, C. P. C. the errors, defects or irregularities in the execution application are such as do not affect the merits of the case, or the jurisdiction of the court. As has been held above, the defect in the execution application is such as to render it not maintainable in law. Therefore, the provisions of Section 99, C.P.C. do not help the decree holder respondent. This argument is accordingly rejected. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the orders of the lower appellate court and of the execution court are set aside, and the execution application is dismissed. However, in view of the special circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (10) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tiose. Does it stand to reason, then, that an accused will have no remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a complaint or otherwise and which is fit to be quashed on the face of it. The legislature left the power to order further inquiry intact in 'section 398. Is it not, then, in consonance with the sense of justice to leave intact the remedy of the accused to move the High Court for setting aside the order adversely made against him in similar circumstances and to quash the proceeding. The answer must be given in favour of the just and reasonable view expressed by us above. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and remit the case back to it to dispose of the appellant's petition on merits, in the manner it may think fit and proper to do in accordance with the law and in the light of this judgment. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sent from work only from 16th of August. So even under the Standing Orders the workman was not absent for "more than eight consecutive days" on 24th August, 1965. The order is, therefore, clearly untenable even on the basis of the Standing Orders. It is not necessary to express any opinion in this appeal whether "eight consecutive days" in the Standing Orders mean eight consecutive working days. Striking of the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. Such termination of service is retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(00) of the Act. There is nothing to show that the provisions of section 25F (a) and (b) were complied with by the management in this case. The provisions of section 25F (a), the proviso apart, and (b) are mandatory and any order of retrenchment, in violation of 'these two peremptory con- ditions precedent, is invalid. We do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.
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1977 (10) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e King 1935 AC 500). Lord Jowitt L.C. in Attorney General of Ontario v. Attorney Gen. of Canada (1947 AC 503) affirmed the same approach "To such an organic statute the flexible interpretation must be given that changing circumstancesrequire and it would be alien to the spirit with which the preamble to the Statute of Westminster is instinct, to concedeanything less than the widest amplitude of power to the Dominion legislature under section 101 of the British North America Act." Legalism has to yield when spacious issues arise. "Whatever the legal aspect of the thing, there are moments when it is a feeble need to rely on," said Nehru, in the Constituent Assembly (I Constituent Assembly Debates, p. 61). There is another stark possibility the, Administration sliding back from the progressive constitutional values to protect private interests; and then the Court may be activate the 'welfare jurisprudence' of the Constitution by appropriate commands.
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