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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 117 Records
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1977 (4) TMI 186 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or bodies of persons to whom the writs can be issued. 122. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the questions extracted by us earlier are answered by us as follows Question No. 1 In the affirmative. Question No. 2 In the negative for the first part; the Court shall have power to make necessary interim orders. Question No. 3 In the negative, but the jurisdiction is ousted in a case where the other remedy is adequate, efficacious, convenient and beneficial having regard to the redress sought. Question No. 4 In the affirmative if the suit falls within the description of other remedy as, in answer to question No. 3. Question No. 5 Provisions of Article 226(4) to (6) apply to all petitions which fall in Article 226(7). Question No. 1 in appeal In the negative. Question No. 2 in appeal Does not arise. 123. This petitions shall now be placed before the appropriate Benches for disposal according to law. 124. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appellant's construction of the provision were correct, and incumbrance meant any kind of fetter, any attachment, injunction or decree or order restricting the use of the property would be included in "all other incumbrances" and it would have been quite unnecessary to mention them separately. This makes it clear that fetters on the property like attachment, injunction or decree or order of any court restricting the use of the property which are deemed to have been withdrawn upon the property vesting in the Central Government are not really incumbrances within the meaning of the word as used in Sub-Section (2) of Section 4. We therefore agree with the High Court that the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are not incumbrances and cannot be held to have become inoperative on the land in question vesting in the Central Government. 5. The appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 184 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... rima facie case is made out both of Invasion of fundamental rights and the order of the authorities being ex facie without jurisdiction or a purported order when even without hearing the petitioners; as per the essential principles of natural justice, the additional excise duty is sought to be recovered from them Therefore, on both the grounds urged by Mr. Sorabji, the petitioners were entitled to approach this Court at this stage and the fetter created under Art. 226(3) does not come in the way of the, petitioners so far as the present group is concerned. We are clarifying that our observation& are only to determine the prima facie case and they should not be construed as being on the merits of the question before us. 34. We, therefore, hold that all these petitions do not abate as contended by the respondents-authorities, and the petitions shall now go before the Division Bench for final disposal accordingly. Costs shall be costs in the petitions. 35. Order accordingly.
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1977 (4) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d specified in Clause (hhh) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Bombay Rents Control Act, 1947. Moreover the submission made on behalf of the appellants conveniently overlooks the provisions of Section 507 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 whereunder the landlord can get an order against the tenant to allow him (the landlord) reasonable facilities to enter the leased premises in order to enable him to comply with the notice issued by the Municipal Commissioner. 35. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in any of the points raised by the respondents. Consequently, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in view of the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. The respondents shall not, however, as agreed to on their behalf, evict the appellants till the end of the year, 1977 A. D. unless they are required by the Municipal Commissioner at any time before that date to pull down the premises in question in implementation of the scheme.
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1977 (4) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ment to decide and work out.' All that we need make clear is that all agreements which are operative and binding between parties will be so interpreted now as if clause 9 was not there at all and clause 5 was there only in the ,modified form which omits the last sentence from clause 5 as it originally stood. However, if the company wants, to complete any formalities for bringing each individual agreement into line with the law as declared by this Court it may do .so; and, it will file, within six months from today an affidavit showing that it has done this. The requirement to file such an affidavit showing compliance will ensure that the company has taken due steps to inform each stockist of the correct legal position. The time given for doing this wilt not, however, authorise it to act under those parts of the agreement which this Court has declared to be illegal.- Subject to the observations made above we uphold the Commissions order and dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aggravating factors (vide E. Annamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1974CriLJ683 . The appellant had two other assailants with him who have been awarded life imprisonment. Moreover it is evident from the records that there was an exchange of abuses between the parties viz., Shiv Singh and the accused party. It is also apparent that there was no motive for the appellant to kill the innocent child who died, a circumstance which has influenced the courts below in awarding the capital sentence. The other circumstances present also indicate that there is no particular reason why the appellant should have been given the severer sentence and we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be met by awarding life imprisonment. We accordingly direct that the sentence of life imprisonment should be substituted in place of death sentence awarded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. We allow the appeal to this extent. 7. Cr. Appeal No. 367 of 1976 is dismissed as not pressed.
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1977 (4) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ub-section (1) of Section 7 all the assets and liabilities of the insurers relating to their life insurance business vest in the corporation on the appointed date. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 states that the liabilities include obligations of whatever kind existing on the appointed day. The debts due to the insurers in these two cases were liable to be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of the Madras Act, which was a liability or obligation appertaining to the debts on September 1, 1956, the appointed day. This liability or obligation annexed to the debts must be held to have been transferred to and vested in the corporation along with the assets of the insurers under Section 7 of the Act, and the corporation in seeking to recover the mortgage does cannot ignore the litigations of the insurers in respect of the transactions. In our opinion the view taken by the High Court was therefore correct. 5. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.
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1977 (4) TMI 179 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rarian relations, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal under S. 45 of the Land Reforms Act. Since the appellant, on the basis of his own Pleadings before this Court, does not base his rights founded on agrarian relations. There is, in our judgment, no case to go before the Tribunal for adjudication. Bhimiah, J. would have been right in allowing the Writ Petition and refusing to remand the matter to the Tribunal on the ground that on the admitted pleadings of the appellant there is no case of agrarian relations for adjudication to go before the Tribunal. We do not express any opinion on the question whether the appellant or the respondents are in actual possession of the disputed lands which question has necessarily to be decided by a competent Civil Court, 32. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the appeal, though for reasons different from those given by Bhimiah, J. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. 33. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 178 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... endant in the form of a preliminary decree for sale under R. 4, 0. 34, C.P.C. for the sum of ₹ 1,90,565-48 with costs and interest at 9J% per annum granting six months' time to deposit. It shall be a condition in both the decrees that if any realisations are made under 'the decree against the appellant-second defendant, the sum of the extent to which the decree is so satisfied shall also be given deduction to and pro tanto satisfaction entered in the decree against the first defendant and, likewise, if any realisations are made under the latter decree in so far as such realisations exceed ₹ 24,334 and proportionate interest thereon, such realisation shall correspondingly be given credit to in the decree against the appellant. In the result, this appeal except to the extent the decree of the court below stands modified as indicated above, is dismissed. in the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal. 16. Order accordingly.
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1977 (4) TMI 177 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed and the likelihood of the plea of common or concurrent user being raised by a later stage would be the irreparable injury to the appellant. (23) We, therefore, accept this appeal, reverse the judgment of the learned Single Judge and issue an interim injunction against the respondents restraining them from using the trade mark described by us earlier on any voiles that they may manufacture or market or process. We are restricting this injunction to voiles only, as is claimed by the appellant. (24) Before we part, we may notice one other submission on behalf of the respondents and that is that voiles is textile goods and the trade mark is registered or accepted under the Act for textile goods. The contention is irrelevant, for the present suit is confined to an action regarding voiles only. Rule 137 of the Rules framed under the Act is relevant in this behalf. (25) The appeal is disposed of with the above observations but we do not make any order as to costs at this stage.
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1977 (4) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ovisions of the Act the Central Government alone was competent to prefer the appeals under Section 377(2), Cr.P.C. However, the High Court also dealt with the merits of the appeals and held that there was no justification for interfering with the sentence in all the three cases. 4. We have delivered our decision today in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra Criminal Appeal No. 577 of 1976 where an identical question about the scope of Section 377(1) and (2), Cr.P.C. was considered. These appeals will be governed by the said decision for the identical reasons. The High Court was, therefore, not right in holding that the appeals by the State were incompetent. We, however, agree with the High Court that there was no justification for interference with the sentence in all the three appeals. 5. The judgment of the High Court with regard to the maintainability of the appeals is set aside but the rest of the order in each appeal stands. The appeals are thus dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n disposing of the appeal. The learned Judge ignored the decision of another single Judge of the same court (J. M. Gandhi, J.) who had earlier held m a similar case that the appeal by the State was not competent under section 377(1) Cr.P.C. It is true that the decision is pending. before, this Court in appeal by special leave. That, howev- er, cannot be sufficient reason for the learned Judge to ignore it and observe that it is "unnecessary to keep back this matter till the Supreme Court decides matter". When there was a decision of a coordinate court, it was open to the learned Judge to differ from it but in that case the only judicial alternative was to refer it to a larger bench and not to dispose of the appeal by taking a contrary view. Judicial discipline as well as decorum should suggest that as the only course. In the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside. The appellant shall be discharged from his bail bond.
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1977 (4) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... involved in the present case--together with the appartement space. The appellant has agreed to pay a sum of ₹ 250/per month by way of rent for the adjacent three-room apartment into which he will move, within one month from today and surrender possession of the 4-room apartment simultaneously. In case the parties are able to adjust their differences and the 1st respondent makes over the additional space attached to the 4-room tenement for the use of the appellant, he will pay an extra sum of ₹ 75/per mensem or other negotiated figure. On these terms agreed to before us by counsel on both sides, after taking instructions from their parties, we direct that the 1st respondent do make over possession of the three-room dwelling house on the first floor and take in exchange the 4-room dwelling house which is the subject matter of the present eviction proceedings. We record this undertaking as indicated above and with this modification, allow the appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ransferable vote. Both these conditions do not exist in the present case. As already discussed, Shri Subramanyan appellant was not the sole surviving continuing candidate left in the field, after exclusion of the disqualified candidate, Shri John. The election in question was not held by mode of single transferable vote according to which a simple majority of votes secured ensures the success of a candidate, but by proportional representation with single transferable vote, under which system the success of a candidate normally depends on his securing the requisite quota. However, the principle underlying the obiter in Viswanatha v. Konappa, which we have extracted, is. applicable to the instant case because here, after the exclusion of the disqualified candidate, two continuing candidates were left in the field. For all the reasons aforesaid, the appeals fail and are dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the ease the parties are left to their own S.R. Appeals dismissed
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1977 (4) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r conclusion of the trial in a heinous case of this magnitude, the police should be well-advised to pursue clues and for missing links to unearth 'the yet undiscovered guilty ones and should not rest satisfied with 'the result of these cases. There is yet room for a wider probe into men and matters in connection with these ghastly crimes. Counsel drew our attention to a very disquieting feature in the attempt of the police to see that the accused did not get the assistance of the local Bar. The suggestion has of course been denied by the police officer. If there is any truth in this unholy move for denying proper defence to the accused, no matter how heinous the offence, it is highly obnoxious to the notions of fair play and all that justice stands for. Such ideas should be banished. I hasten to add that the accused before us could not have been better defended as has been done by the three conscientious young counsel who impressed us with their industry and ability.
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1977 (4) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing the power of appointment to posts in Class III Services, has been placed before us. We have therefore no alternative but to hold that on 24-6-1971, Brig. Naresh Prasad, Zonal Chief Engineer, North Western Zone, Chandigarh, was not competent to remove the accused-respondent, Tandon, from the post of Superintendent, B&R Grade I, Chandigarh and as such, the order sanctioning the prosecution of the respondent was bad in law. In view of this finding, we do not think it necessary to examine the alternative contention advanced by Shri Hardy. The case fails because there is no valid sanction, as re- quired by the law. Obviously, this does not preclude a fresh prosecution for the same offence--but it is a matter for the State, in the circumstances of the case, to consider whether prosecution should be launched against the respond- ent or not. We make this observation only to remove a possible misapprehension. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mstances beyond its control. On the other hand, while all the articles were stolen from the trunk kept in the Guard Room of the police station, except the formality of a report having been lodged, no action seems to have been taken by the State against the Sub-Inspector or the officers who were responsible for the loss of the property, even to this date. In these circumstances, therefore, the State cannot be allowed to successfully resist the application filed by the appellant. The appellant is entitled to receive the cash equivalent of the property lost which has been held by us to be ₹ 10,000/-, and this amount should be paid to the complainant by the State. 8. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the orders of the High Court as also of the two Courts below are hereby set aside and the State is directed to pay a sum of ₹ 10,000/-to the complainant/appellant. In the circumstances of the case, the appellant shall be entitled to costs throughout from the respondent.
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1977 (4) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... General of Police. It is also not in controversy that that was an important plea which was within the knowledge of the re- spondent and could well have been taken in the writ peti- tion, but he contented himself by raising the other pleas that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the Case against him in the departmental inquiry and that the action taken against him was mala fide. It was there- fore not permissible for him to challenge his dismissal, in the subsequent suit, on the other ground that 'he had been dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. That was clearly barred by the principle constructive res judicata and the High Court erred in taking a contrary view. The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High 'Court dated March 27, 1968, is set aside and the respond- ent's suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall pay and bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d by clearly misinterpreting the provisions of the Act as they stand, we have to allow these appeals. A Division Bench of the High Court, in the judgment under, appeal, had purported to follow an earlier Division Bench decision of the High Court in Beli Ram v. The Assessing Authority(1960 P.L.R. 846.), which had interpreted the provi- sions of s. 3 of the Act as the Act stood before the amend- ment of s. 2 in the manner indicated above. As the High Court had not decided the question of validity of the amend- ment these cases cannot be disposed of without deciding that question. We do not propose to express any opinion on this question as we do not have the benefit of the High Court's views on it. In the circumstances mentioned above, we set aside the judgments and orders of the High Court on these cases. We send the cases back to the High Court for deciding the question of validity of the amendment to s. 2 of the Act. The parties will bear their own cost Appeals allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 167 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... because the chemical is not normally kept open to atmosphere and secondly it is not a hygroscopie chemical. Stearic acid is a comburtible chemical and cannot be exposed to atmosphere. The plea of excess of Stearic acid being due to absorption of moisture is therefore rejected. About the shortage of 1 kg. of Liquid Paraffin (Levy) because of handling losses I observe that it is an unsubstantiated statement and hence rejected. The plea that the quantity of Liquid Paraffin (liquid) was recovered on 18-8-1975 is a post seizure evidence and cannot be accepted. The appellants have not produced any evidence to show when it was transferred to their back Godown and why. They also cannot explain why it was re-packed. Their plea that the appellant unit has a very high reputation and cannot be suspected of indulging in malpractice is not relevant to the issue and is an extraneous issue. In view of my above observations I uphold the order of the Assistant Collector and reject the appeal.
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