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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 137 Records
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1977 (8) TMI 182 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rly the nationalised banks. This question is whether once the bank is convinced of the justice of the claim, it should immediately admit the claim without dragging the customers to litigation. Simultaneously, it should take action against its erring employees. The practice of postponing action against the erring employees or shielding them against an. honest customer should be abandoned. We think, it would be worthwhile if the question is considered as one of general policy by the Department of Banking, Ministry of Finance, Government of India and by the Reserve Bank of India who would be able to place it before a representative body of all the Indian, banks for consideration. They would be rendering national service if they would persuade the banks to change the present practice and to adopt the general policy of frankly admitting a just claim of a customer and avoiding such unnecessary litigation thereby. (14) With the above observations, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1977 (8) TMI 181 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Division Bench decision of this Court in Mt. Kulsoomun Nissa v. Noor Mohammad (AIR 1936 All 666). The submission made is supported by two decisions cited above and must consequently prevail. 6. For the reasons given, this revision is allowed and the order of the court below is set aside. Accepting the position that Banwari Lal had died on the 5th of February, 1962 the application dated 9th July, 1962 having been made within 150 days excluding the period of the summer vacations, the question of condoning the delay in making the application for setting aside the abatement will not arise. The case will now go back to the appropriate court for deciding as to whether the material on record justifies condonation of delay in making the application for substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Banwari Lal. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. The record of the case will be sent dpwn to the appropriate court at an early date.
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1977 (8) TMI 180 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in this Court, usually after a prolonged battle, he should not be left with a feeling that he still does not get expeditious redress of his grievance. That apart, in Government which is ruled by laws there must be complete awareness to carry out faithfully and honestly lawful orders passed by a Court of law after impartial adjudication. Then only will private individuals, organizations and institutions learn to respect the decisions of Court. In absence of such attitude on the part of all concerned, chaotic conditions might arise and the function assigned to the Courts of law under the Constitution might be rendered a futile exercise. It is hoped that we shall not have to deal with any such case hereafter. 12. In the result, we accept the unconditional and unqualified apology tendered by the second respondent in this case and discharge the rule. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, however, we direct the respondents to pay the costs of this petition to the petitioners.
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1977 (8) TMI 179 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of Ss. 34 and 36 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. The procedure followed by the Tribunal is clearly illegal and that illegality has vitiated the entire proceedings resulting in substantial injustice to the petitioners whose property rights have been adversely affected by the decision of the Tribunal. 5. Therefore, I allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 24-7-1975. I also quash the entire proceedings including the enquiries made at the inspection held on 24-7-1975. Proceedings shall be commenced afresh by the Tribunal. Shri K. R. Honnappa, who is closely related to the applicant before the Tribunal, shall not participate from the commencement of the proceedings before the Tribunal. The Members of the Tribunal, excluding Shri K. R. Honnappa, are directed to make a fresh adjudication in accordance with law after affording all parties a reasonable opportunity of leading fresh evidence and of being heard. Ordered accordingly. No costs. 6. Petition allowed.
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1977 (8) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ied, whichever first occurs. As regards the second category, namely the "other cases", the alteration takes effect as if it had been made on the earliest day in the current official year on which the circumstances justifying the entry or alteration existed."The discussion of this sub-section at page 890 of the report is in respect of the second category of cases in regard to which there is anexpress statutory provision that the amendment takes effect only fromthe earliest day of the official year current when the amendment ismade. We do not think that there is any parallel between s. 82(3) of the Bombay Act and S. 67 of the Punjab Municipal Act. For these reasons we allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The writ petitions filed by the respondents will, as a consequence, stand dismissed, The appellant will be entitled to its costs in one set which shall be recovered from the Life insurance Corporation of India. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (8) TMI 177 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here unlike the City Civil Court at Bombay which has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Act, the City Civil Court of Madras as then constituted had exclusive jurisdiction over the matters in dispute. Therefore, the question of considering the conflict of jurisdiction did not at all arise in that case. That authority also therefore has no application to the facts of our case. 27. Differing therefore from the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, I hold that for the purpose of executing the decree in question, it is the City Civil Court which is the District Court within the meaning of Section 44A of the Civil P. C. 28. The result, therefore is the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court dated 6th April 1976 setting aside his order dated 17th Feb. 1976, is set aside and his order dated 17th Feb. 1976 making the notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Civil P. C. absolute is restored with costs in both the Courts. 29. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (8) TMI 176 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t want to oblige the defendant Company to shut down its business during the pendent of the proceeding Initiated to alter its name which by its very nature is likely to take some the. We do not want the defendant-Company to go out of business meanwhile or , its business to suffer. So aim we do not want the employees of the defendant Company to be laid off. We, therefore grant six month time commencing from today to the defendant-Company to altes its name so that it does not offend or violate the injunction being issued by this Court. 10-A. Subject to the aforesaid modification, the appeal tags and is dismissed with costs. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant prays for grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 of constitution of India. The matter does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which in our opinion requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. We accordingly refuse the request. 12. Order accordingly.
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1977 (8) TMI 175 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to ₹ 1,50,000 and the same is allowed at that stage. A has in his own name deposit of rupees two lakhs with a bank. He again makes a claim under s. 5(1)(xxvi) and gets a deduction of ₹ 1,50,000. This would mean that the same assessee would avail of the benefit twice over which could not have been contemplated under the scheme of the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the assessee's stand and the view that has prevailed with the Tribunal. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is that-- On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a true interpretation of section 5(1A) of the Wealth-tax Act and the Wealth-tax Rules, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing deduction to the extent of ₹ 91,400 in respect of the exempted assets held by the firm in which the assessee was a partner in computing his net wealth. Assessee would have his costs of the reference. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred. PANDA J.--I agree.
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1977 (8) TMI 174 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dismissed the suit as against the relief undertaking. These cases have now been posted before us again at the request of counsel for the appellants in O.S.A. No. 49 of 1975 because of the apprehension apparently felt by him that the dismissal will preclude any action against the relief undertaking if and when the ban imposed by the notification is removed. There is no need for any such apprehension. But we do not mind clarifying the position. We make it clear that the dismissal of the suit as against the relief undertaking is only in the reference to the state of affairs obtaining at the time of judgment. If the ban is ever removed, certainly an action would be maintainable subject to the provisions regarding limitation and in light of the provisions in Section 1 of the Act to which we have referred. 10. The other point raised in the case relates to costs. The matter has been concluded by the judgment and we are unable to make any alteration in the judgment regarding costs.
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1977 (8) TMI 173 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his question not to be agitated in public forum. 19. I, therefore, hold that in view of the nature of the allegations made, the allegations are as such which are not arbitrable under the arbitration clause in the instant case. I am further of the opinion that in view of the nature of the suit, it would not be desirable to try the allegations whether there was a valid contract or not in the application under Section 34 of the Act. I am further of the opinion that in view of the fact that the respondent No. 5 is not a party to the arbitration agreement, it would not be proper to exercise the discretion in the facts and circumstances of the case to grant stay of the suit. The nature of the allegations of fraud made, in the instant case, also is a fact which is against the grant of the stay. 20. For the reasons aforesaid, this application for stay must be refused. The application, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Costs of this application will be costs in the suit.
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1977 (8) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... offences under Sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code, has become final in view of the limited leave of appeal referred to above, it is not permissible for counsel for the appellant State to contend that the protection of Article 20(1) of the Constitution should not have been given merely because what was once a rule of evidence in the form of the earlier sub Section (3) of Section nfba 5 /nfba was amended by the Legislature and a distinct offence was provided by the insertion of Clause (e). This has to be so because the fact remains that the newly added offence under Clause (e) was not in existence at the time when the accused was found to be in possession, for himself or any person on his behalf, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known resources of income. o p /o p 8. There is thus nothing wrong with the view of the High Court that the accused was entitled to the protection of Article 20(1) of the Constitution and the appeal is dismissed. o p /o p
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1977 (8) TMI 171 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... is huge haul of silver. It does not appeal to us that a person who is mere carrier is much less involved in this nefarious trade of smuggling than the person at whose instance the goods are carried. In fact, unless there are carriers available the smuggling itself would be difficult. ( 15. ) Ordinarily we would have allowed this appeal and impose a sentence of six months imprisonment upon the respondent-accused. However, we are apprised of the fact that he was already in custody for 2 1/2 months, Even though technically that may not be done which would fall Under Section 428, Cr. PC and of which the respondent-accused could not get the benefit under that section, we are inclined to think that we cannot afford to lose sight of that fact. If he has already been in jail custody over 2 1/2 months in those peculiar circumstances, we think that this is a case in which no enhancement of sentence be awarded. ( 16. ) For these reasons we do not accept the State appeal and dismiss it.
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1977 (8) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the house of Ram Narain Singh but he did not search the house of Ram Dularey Singh as he clearly admits in the following terms at page 48 of the paper book The search of house of Ram Dularey accused was not taken at all, as I did not think it necessary. Thus a very valuable clue which may have clinched the issue was lost because the Investigating Officer was grossly negligent in conducting the investigation. 22. Taking therefore an over-all picture of the entire case it is difficult for us to hold that the view taken by the Sessions Judge on the evidence and circumstances of the present case was not reasonably possible. This being the position the High Court even if it chose to take a different view, was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 23. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and the appellants are acquitted of all the charges framed against them and are directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1977 (8) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to work within the law as it now stands. And we cannot impose what is not sanctioned or is not accepted by the State. So we have couched what would have been binding man dates in terms of hopeful halfimperatives. Subject to the observations regarding imprison and parole treatment of the appellant, we dismiss the appeal. GOSWAMI, J.-I agree that there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. My learned Brother has dealt with both the lethargy in law making and indifference and indolence in implementing laws in and attractive and trenchant manner. So far as the post-sentencing aspects are concerned, my learned Brother has gone into depth on matters which he has studied extensively. These will appertain to law reforms as well as prison forms which the I legislature and the implementing executive can profitably undertake. I hope and trust that my learned Brother’s earnest and anxious observations in this judgment will not be a cry in the wilderness. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (8) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the sum of ₹ 25,734/- which is kept in a fixed deposit account in the names of respondent 4 (Dayal Singh), respondent 5 (Harbhajan Singh) and respondent 6 (Harbans Singh) in the Punjab National Bank, Amritsar, may be, withdrawn unconditionally by these respondents, together with the interest which may have accrued on the aforesaid amount. Mr. Sikri, on behalf of the three respondents, gives up all the rights and contentions in the matter and agrees that his clients shall have no right to participate or share in any further or higher amount which may be granted by way of compensation for the acquired land. The appellant, on his part, agrees that be will not be entitled to recover from respondents 4, 5 and 6 any amount by way of arrears of rent. Since respondents 4, 5, and 6 have given up their contentions in the suit, their rights shall stand transferred to the appellant. The appeal shall stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (8) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oid transaction which clearly falls within the four corners of Section 4 of the Act and is not covered by Section 53 of the Act so as to deprive the Insolvency Court of its jurisdiction to determine the question of title of the transfer. 13. For these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that in the present case the Additional District Judge was right in holding that the. Insolvency Court had complete jurisdiction to decide the validity of the transfer when it was challenged on the ground that it was a sham and a fictitious transaction which need not have been set aside and a declaration that the transfer was void was sufficient. The view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and is not in consonance with the correct interpretation of Section 4 and 53 of the Act. 14. We, therefore, allow? the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remit the case back to it for a fresh disposal of the appeal on merit Section We make no order as to costSection
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1977 (8) TMI 166 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... opriate steps to adjust its decision under S. 260(1)in the light of the answer of this Court. As observed by the Supreme Court in C.I.T. vs. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd., if the Tribunal is directed to submit a supplementary statement of the case, it will be restricted to the evidence on the record and it may not be entitled to take additional evidence and the same may result in injustice. Following, therefore, the course adopted in the said decision, we decline to answer the question and leave it to the Tribunal to adjust its decision under section 260(1) in the light of the observations made in this judgment. We wish to make it clear, however, that we should not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the main controversy between the parties and that it would be for the Tribunal to adjust its decision on the point bearing in mind the views expressed by us on the question of law. 62. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to the cost of this Reference.
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1977 (8) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . The impugned Act makes no unjust discrimination. It promotes public welfare and is a beneficient measure of legislation. If we strike down the Act, we shall be giving a free charter to unauthorized occupants and to officers squatting on public premises after they have vacated their offices to continue in occupation for an indefinite time until they are evicted by dilatory procedure of a title suit. The Act does not suffer from any blemish and we uphold it. In Seth Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner( 1963 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 760.), the Court up- held a law prescribing two procedures one for every one and the other if the disputants agree to follow it. The Court did not say that a law cannot allow a choice of procedure to an aggrieved party. We would accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellants is made absolute with costs.
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1977 (8) TMI 164 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... iness of each other. This interest is also pecuniary. Therefore, the sale of the goods, is, in fact, made by M/s. Panna Lal Girdhar Lal, Sadar Bazar, Delhi. Therefore, the price at which M/s. Panna Lal Girdhar Lal of Sadar Bazar, Delhi, sell the goods would form the basis for assessment because the goods enter the first stream of trade at the level. 2. In the above view of the matter, the order of the Assistant Collector is correct on facts and in law. The same is, therefore, upheld and the appeal against the same is rejected.
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1977 (8) TMI 163 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... place of manufactured tobacco. The goods receipt describes transport of manufactured tobacco, in place of which unmanufactured tobacco was found. 4. I further observe that there has been no denial of natural justice as pleaded in the written memo of the appeal because the copy of the Panchnama and the statement of Shri Anil Kumar Gupta, Shri Sukhbir Singh, driver, Shri Prag Chand and Shri Ravi Kumar Gupta, truck owner, were duly supplied. In the personal hearing Shri Bhasin stated that the copy of the statement of the representative of the Transport company was not supplied. However, on verification in his presence, it was found that no such statement had been recorded and no reliance on any such document had been placed while issuing the show cause notice. 5. In view of the above discussions, the impugned order against M/s Kumar Tobacco Co., Shahdara is also maintainable on facts and in law. 6. In view of the above consideration both the appeals are rejected.
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