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1978 (3) TMI 217
... ... ... ... ..... by the Advocate-General if the Court declines to take cognisance and to initiate proceeding for contempt, the order is not an order initiating contempt proceeding. Surely, it is not appealable Under Section 19. But there are no observations by this Court nor on the facts of that case there can be any, to show that an appeal would lie to this Court from an order of the High Court merely initiating the proceeding by issuance of a notice. We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the order does decide some disputes raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the proceeding on one ground or the other. But unless and until there is some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it by the parties, affecting their right, the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable. 6. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed as being not maintainable. Purshotam Dass Goel vs. Hon'ble B.S. Dhillon and Ors. (17.03.1978 - SC) MANU/SC/0050/1978
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1978 (3) TMI 216
... ... ... ... ..... nable cause' for non-occupation of the building continuously for six months is on the tenant, and 'reasonable cause' would only be such cause as would enable the court to come to the conclusion that the tenant has not abandoned the premises and that he still retains de facto possession of the same though he is not physically present thereon. 4. The only fact constituting an outward expression of the de facto intention the civil revision Petitioner is said to have entertained, that is sought to be pressed into service by his learned Counsel is that, as spoken to by P.W.2, the tenant occasionally cleaned the premises. This, at the most, may suggest that he had an intention to use the room (for what purpose? it is not clear) at some future time, as and when it suits him, but would not indicate that he is in occupation of the building. He failed to establish any reasonable cause for his non-occupation of the room for over six months continuously. Dismissed. No. costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 215
... ... ... ... ..... in many of its branches on account of the absence of the non-gazetted staff on strike, including the clerks and peons, ordinarily indispensable who are parts of the machinery of justice, as it functions on a lower but day to day practical level in our country. 25. For the above reasons I hold that the learned Judge erred in rejecting the application as barred by time under Article 127 at the Limitation Act, 1963. 26. The second order confirming the auction sale is also set aside. Special Darkhast No. 8/74 and the applications, at Exhs. 18, 21, and the stay at Exh. 26 are, therefore, restored to the file of the Executing Court of the Civil Judge, Bhir, for disposing of the application made by the judgment-debtor on merits., in accordance with law and the observations made hereinabove and in accordance with the finding that the application is within time. 27. The First Appeal is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 28. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (3) TMI 214
... ... ... ... ..... or "sufficient cause" an appeal which would otherwise be barred by limitation. It has referred to Kattu Bakheh v. Daulat Ram (1888) Pun Re 183 and observed that the true guide is whether the appellant has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal. It has further observed that the appellant ought to be deemed to have so acted where, after deducting the time spent in prosecuting with due diligence a proper application for review of judgment, the period between the date of the decree appealed from and the date of presenting the appeal does not exceed the period prescribed for preferring an appeal. The learned District Judge ought to have followed this rule and exercised his judicial discretion. He had failed to do so. Therefore, the order of the learned District Judge is set aside and the matter is remanded to him for fresh consideration. The civil revision petition is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. 4. Revision allowed.
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1978 (3) TMI 213
... ... ... ... ..... rson and a variety of other circumstances must be gathered before grant or refusal of permission. In the present case I have noticed the petitioner and his friend who is to represent him, come together with mutual confidence. The party somehow has not shown sufficient confidence in advocates he has come by. This bodes ill for him. I should have suspected the association of the private person as having sinister implication of exploitation of a guideless party but suspicion by itself should not be the basis of a conclusion. Therefore, I think it right to give the party, who appears to be unable to represent his own case, an opportunity to present his grievance through his friend. That friend, judging by the note prepared and put in, seems to be familiar with law, although quacks can prove fatal friends. I grant the petitioner permission to be represented by a private person as prayed for, with the condition that if this latter proves unworthy, the permission will be withdrawn.
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1978 (3) TMI 212
... ... ... ... ..... al infringement a continuing offence. 18. By virtue of the Explanation to Section 405, Indian Penal Code, which has been added by Section 9 of the 1973 amendment of the Act, an employer can be prosecuted for the offence of criminal breach of trust. The question of non-applicability of Section 468(2)(b) would arise only if complaints are lodged against an employer under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code in respect of any defaults being made under the provisions of the Act or the Scheme. 19. In view of what has been stated above, the complaints in all these cases having been filed beyond a period of one year they would be time barred in accordance with the provisions of Section 468(2)(b) of the Code and the cognizance taken on the basis of such complaints would be without jurisdiction. 20. The rules are accordingly made absolute and the proceedings pending against the petitioners in all the cases covered by these rules are quashed. Sunil Chandra Majumder, J. 21. I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 211
... ... ... ... ..... , the rule in Erusian Equipment's case (ibid) will be attracted with full force. While conceding that the State can enter into contract with any person it chooses and no person has a fundamental Tight to insist that the Government must enter a contract with him, this Court observed (in the said case) "Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the black list." The above enunciation squarely covers the case before us. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and quash the impugned order. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (3) TMI 210
... ... ... ... ..... ndant the first option to retain the whole property on payment of 13/16 share of that valuation (including the increase) to the plaintiffs within a period of three months or such further period that may be granted by the Court of first instance, facing which the plaintiffs will be entitled to be allotted and put in possession of the whole, of the suit property. on payment to the defendant of 3/16 share of the value of the property determined by the Subordinate Judge, Patna, in the manner aforesaid. For the foregoing reasons, we allowed this appeal and send the case back to the Subordinate Judge, Patna, with the direction that the should take such further evidence with regard to the increase in the value of similar properties in the locality since 1963. as the parties may wish to produce, and then and after hearing the parties, dispose of the case in conformity with the observations made in this Judgment. There shall be no order as to costs in this Court. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (3) TMI 209
... ... ... ... ..... n the second case the accused pleaded guilty on 23rd December, 1971 and the judgment was pronounced on 24th January, 1972 and in the third case the plea of guilty was on 26th June, 1972 and the judgment was pronounced on 17th August, 1972. The High Court observed "While exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226, we are not concerned with the adequacy of evidence. All that we have to see is whether there is evidence on which a reasonable inference could be drawn." In the circumstances of the case, the High Court was of the view that it was not called upon to interfere. As already stated, as we have come to the conclusion that the disciplinary action cannot be taken after the date of his retirement, we refrain from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the decision taken by the appointing authority. In the result the appeal is allowed and the impugned order and the judgment of the High Court are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed
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1978 (3) TMI 208
... ... ... ... ..... ollector has not disputed the contention of the appellants that the usual practice in factories producing Formaldehyde is to store the finished product in tanks and as and when despatches are to be made, the same is filled in customer’s containers and despatched. It is also seen that this product is cleared in lorry, tankers, and, therefore, it has to be held that even the Formaldehyde in the Storage Tank is in fully manufactured condition ready for despatch. It is, therefore, seen that it is not necessary that in all cases Formaldehyde should be filled in containers viz. Carboy or mild steel special drums for sale and, therefore, filling the product in Carboy or mild steel special drum will not constitute a process of manufacture and therefore, the fully manufactured product in the Storage Tank should also be treated as ready for despatch and accordingly this quantity should be exempted from payment of duty. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with consequential relief.
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1978 (3) TMI 207
... ... ... ... ..... officer to seize the documents on the basis of suspicion, but such suspicion has to be on the basis of reasons to be recorded in writing. In the impugned order, no reasons are recorded on the basis of which the respondent came to entertain suspicion that the petitioner is attempting to evade the tax excepting incorporating the words contained in the said provision. Therefore, the impugned order made without recording reasons in the exercise of power under sub-section (3) of section 28 of the Act is illegal and liable to be quashed. (See Bani Roy Chowdhury v. Competent Authority, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax 1978 112 I.T.R. 111 at 121, 122. 5.. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the respondent (exhibit A) is quashed and the respondent is directed to return all the seized articles, documents, photostat copies and negatives and all notes made therefrom to the petitioner within two weeks from the date of this order. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 206
... ... ... ... ..... der section 5, a dealer has to pay tax only on the sales or purchases in one year and it is the very same sales or purchases that are sought to be taxed with the additional rate under section 5-A........ In ascertaining the true nature and character of the additional tax under section 5-A it is legitimate as well as necessary that both the sections should be read together in order to ascertain the true character of the tax sought to be imposed. We are satisfied that the tax sought to be imposed under section 5 as well as the additional tax sought to be imposed under section 5-A partake of the same character, viz., a tax on the sale of goods or purchase falling within entry 54 of List II. We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judges in that case. We, therefore, hold that the turnover in question is liable to tax under section 5-A of the Act. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 205
... ... ... ... ..... as the dictionary meaning is concerned, all articles of convenience or decoration used for the purpose of furnishing a place of business or an office are articles of furniture. So far as shelving rack is concerned, it is used in an office or an industrial organisation for the purpose of keeping files, papers, etc., and, therefore, is an article of convenience, which is used for furnishing a place of business or an office. It is, therefore, an article of furniture, and since it is manufactured from iron and steel, it is an article of steel furniture within the meaning of entry 44H of Schedule C. In the result, trestles manufactured by the assessee must be held to be articles of furniture. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs, which is assessed at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 200. Order accordingly. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (3) TMI 204
... ... ... ... ..... bliterate the section or produce a result different from that contemplated under the Act. We have, therefore, to look at the relevant sections, section 3(1), section 7-A, as well as the definition of the term total turnover under the Act. If we look at these provisions, it is clear that the Rs. 50,000 limit has been exceeded. The total turnover takes within its ambit taxable as well as non-taxable turnover. Admittedly, Rs. 14,717.50 is taxable turnover. Assuming that the sum of Rs. 43,000 and odd is a non-taxable turnover, that has also to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the total turnover . Section 3(1) talks of the total turnover exceeding Rs. 50,000. So, the two have to be added together for determining the liability. When they are added, clearly the assessee is liable to be taxed on the sum total of the two turnovers. Rules, as we said, cannot have the overriding effect on the provisions of the Act. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 203
... ... ... ... ..... notice under section 7(3) is a condition precedent to the passing of a valid assessment order. It appears that the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, did not go into this question as he took the view that the assessment was time-barred. However, inasmuch as this question was neither canvassed before the Judge (Revisions), nor has been dealt by him, we decline to answer the question. In view of our conclusions on the first question, the revising authority was not justified in upholding the annulment of the assessment. We, accordingly, answer the first question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee, and decline to answer the second question. The third question is consequential and is answered by saying that the Judge (Revisions) was not justified in upholding the annulment of the assessment for the year 1964-65. The department is entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 202
... ... ... ... ..... material by the use of physical labour or by mechanical process (b) The articles produced either by physical labour or by mechanical process will be on large scale and will pass as a commercial commodity from hand to hand. In our view, the Board of Revenue is right in holding that the commodity, i.e., the tendu leaves, remained the same there was no alteration in the nature and character of the goods. The word manufacture generally means the bringing into existence a new substance and does not mean merely to produce some changes in the substance, however minor in consequence the change may be. 8.. The result, therefore, is that the references are answered against the Commissioner. It must accordingly be held that the Board of Revenue was right in holding that the drying of tendu leaves and packing them in bundles does not involve any manufacturing process. The assessee shall get his costs of these references. Hearing fee Rs. 100 in each case. References answered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 201
... ... ... ... ..... stand of the learned standing counsel that the documents appearing in the statement of the case are not part of the record. That being the position, we are of the view that a sufficient explanation had been placed before the appellate authorities as to why these documents could not be brought to the record before the assessments were completed and, therefore, the same should have been accepted. We are inclined to hold, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the assessee had given sufficient explanation in the matter of furnishing the declarations in form C and the certificates in form E-1 for the first time before the first appellate authority and the same should, therefore, have been acted upon. In the view, we have already indicated, there is no justification for answering the first question. Accordingly, the second question is only answered in the manner indicated above. There would be no direction for costs. MOHANTI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 200
... ... ... ... ..... or other instrument made thereunder or (c) for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice..... Apparently, what is taxable under the Act is tax on sales and, if there is any tax levied which does not fall within the ambit of sale, it will be in contravention of the provisions of the Act. It could not be disputed that this has resulted in an injury to the petitioner. Thus, the petition squarely falls within the ambit of article 226(1)(b) of the Constitution. 17.. In the light of the discussion above, therefore, the petition is allowed and the assessment with regard to item No. (2) quoted above is set aside. The petitioners shall be entitled to the costs of this petition counsel s fee Rs. 200 (two hundred), if certified. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners after verification. Petition allowed.
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1978 (3) TMI 199
... ... ... ... ..... edies available to him under law for recovery of the tax due. We do not agree with the construction placed by the learned Magistrate on section 13(3)(b) of the Act. What that provision says is that an application could be made to a Magistrate for recovery of sales tax due from a defaulter without prejudice to the other remedies open to the applicant. It does not mean that he can approach the Magistrate only after exhausting the other modes of recovery available under law. The orders passed by the learned Magistrate against which these petitions have been filed are, therefore, set aside. He is directed to take the applications back on his file and to dispose them of in accordance with law. Petitions allowed
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1978 (3) TMI 198
... ... ... ... ..... s and skins is attracted immediately on the last purchase having been effected. Even if those raw hides and skins are tanned thereafter, we are not able to discern any provision in the Act or the Rules which would enable the assessee to contend that the tax chargeable on the purchase of raw hides and skins on the basis that the dealer was the last purchaser in the State can be removed or substituted. We, therefore, negative this contention put forward on behalf of the assessee. In the above discussion, in respect of all the three points raised by the revision petitioner, we have held in favour of the assessee on the first point relating to freight and we have held against the assessee in relation to the turnover represented by what we call scrap and with regard to the liability to tax by the purchase of hides and skins. The revision petitioner has won on one point and has lost on the other two points. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
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