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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 177 Records
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1978 (4) TMI 245 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... these authorities were set aside, the plaintiff cannot get the order of wrongful dismissal set aside. This point has been raised for the first time in special leave in this Court. The point was undoubtedly one which was a mixed question of fact and law and if raised at the first possible opportunity at the Trial Court, could have been repelled by the plaintiff amending his plaint and including a relief for setting aside the cruder of the revisional authorities. To allow the appellant to raise this point at this age, would result in grave and substantial injustice to the plaintiff and to defeat his claim on a most technical ground which could not be pleaded because of gross negligence on the part of the appellant. For these reasons therefore, we do not permit the appellant to raise this point at this stage. No other point was pressed before us. The appeal is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed but in she circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.
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1978 (4) TMI 244 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... It may also be pointed out that in a case of this nature, it will not be possible for one co-promisee to give up his rights so as to prejudice the rights of the other co-promisees. Therefore, the first defendant also would not be entitled to claim that he will execute only with reference to half of the suit properties on the ground that if the conveyance is executed in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3, defendants 2 and 3 would be entitled to half of the properties conveyed. The rights as between the plaintiffs and the defendants would have to be worked out with reference to the agreements between them and it is not open to the first defendant to plead that the second and third defendant's right should be separated from that of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is correct and does not call for interference. The second appeal fails and it is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. 4. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 243 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... possession and respondent's admission that small coins of ₹ 500 or ₹ 700 belonged to him did no' take the matter a long way out of the arena of suspicion. As long as the prosecution was not able to establish by cogent evidence the extent of small coins recovered, no burden lay on the accused to offer any reasonable explanation and the prosecution cannot succeed. No explanation is forthcoming as to why denomination-wise the seizure had not been specified even though it is conceded that all the seized coins had been counted. Counting appears not to have been hurriedly done. In fact, coins which could not readily be counted were heaped up and sent to the Bank where counting was done several months after seizure. 8. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that acquittal of the respondent by the lower appellate court is justified and no interference is warranted. I would accordingly sustain the appellate decision and dismiss the appeal. The bail bond be cancelled.
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1978 (4) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... case. It is also not disputed that the Commissioner of Police issued Order No. 2036 dated September 19, 1967, authorising all Assistant Commissioners of Police working under him to issue search warrants Under Section 6 of the Act to any Police Officer working under them not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police. As has been shown, this was legally permissible, and it is futile to contend that the High Court erred in rejecting the appellant's contention to the contrary. 22. It however appears that in a matter like this, when a period of more than 7 years has gone by since the appellant's conviction, it would not be necessary to send him back to prison. While therefore the appellant's conviction is upheld, the sentence is reduced to the imprisonment already undergone by him without, however, making any change in the sentence of fine and the imprisonment which has been ordered in default of its payment. With this modification the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 241 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 475), this Court observed as follows - "Thus two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to meet the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purpose". In view of the long course of decisions of this Court, the view taken by the High Court was absolutely correct and we are unable to, find any error of law. We understand that the notification has not been amended and a maximum fee of ₹ 100/- has been fixed. Thus the point becomes more or less academic except for cases arising during a particular period. For these reasons, therefore, we find no merit in this, appeal which fails and is accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 240 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be inconclusive merely for the reason that the investigating officer, when he submitted his report in terms of sub-section (2) of S. 173 of the Code to the Magistrate, still awaited the reports of the experts or by some chance, either inadvertently or by design, he failed to append to the police report such documents or the statements under S. 161 of the Code, although these were available with him when he submitted the police report to the Magistrate. 21. In the result, Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 5812--M and 6077--M of 1977 and 169--M and 293--M of 1978 are dismissed and the bail prayed for is declined, while Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4766--M of 1977 filed by the State is allowed and the order of the Additional Sessions Judge is set aside and cancelling the bail bonds of the accused--respondents therein, they are ordered to surrender to custody forthwith. Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, J. 22. I agree. Gurnam Singh, J. 23. I also agree. 24. Order accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 239 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rection to incur expenses for the Puja in the Samadhikovil has failed. The income from the properties after feeding the Agathies and paradesies that visit the Matam will be utilised for feeding the poor boys and girls of the schools of the village. It will be open to the Subordinate Judge to utilise the surplus income from the properties allotted to Anandana choultry and Sachidanandaswami Matam for feeding the poor school-going- boys and girls in the village. We are satisfied that the settlement is predominantly for a charitable purpose and as the direction regarding feeding of the Brahmins in the Annadanam choultry and for Agathies and Paradesies in the Matam cannot be duly carried out as intended by the settlors, applying the Cypres doctrine we direct as indicated above that the, funds may be utilised for a purposes which are as nearly as possible with the intention of the donors. There will be no order as to cost& S.R. Appeals allowed in part. Appeals allowed in part.
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1978 (4) TMI 238 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titioner-assessee from the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, A-word, Moradabad, to the Income-tax Officer, District-1 (2) Additional, New Delhi. The grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner was not communicated the reasons, if any, which were recorded to sustain this order. Reliance has been placed on Ajantha Industries vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes, where the Supreme Court held that the requirement of recording reasons under S. 127(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the transfer of a case from one Income-tax Officer to another, is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof to the assessee is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file, although not communicated to the assessee. This case is applicable to the petitioner on all fours. The impugned order was potently erroneous in law. 2. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 19th July, 1975 is quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 237 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... plaintiff demanding the money from them on the assertion that the goods were despatched by the plaintiff and the defendants should pay the money, clearly showed that a direct contract which in law is called an implied contract by conduct was brought about between them. Whatever may be the jural relationship between the plaintiff and Rabim, Rahim and the defendants and in whatever manner be acted as a go-between- man, between the plaintiff and the defendants, what is clear is that eventually and finally the supply of the goods by the plaintiff was to the defendants on its own account and not on account of Rahim. The defendants clearly and unerringly accepted the goods as such and became liable to pay the whole of the price directly to the plaintiff. A part was paid and the liability to pay the balance was definitely incurred by them. For the reasons stated above, we hold that there is no substance in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 236 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... I.P.C. should not be unsheathed too promiscuously and teasingly to tense lay people into vague consternation and covert compulsion although the proper, office of Section 179 I.P.C. is perfectly within the constitutional limits of Art. 20(3) The appellant, through her counsel, undertakes to abide by the above directions to answer all police interrogations relevant but not self-incriminatory (as explained earlier). The police Officer shall not summon her to the police station but examine her in terms of the proviso to section 160(1) of the Cr.P.Code. The appellant shall, Within ten days from today, file a written undertaking on the lines directed above, although, regardless thereof her counsel's undertaking will bind her. Indeed, we direct her to answer in accordance with the law we have just clarified. The prosecution proceedings in complaint case No. 2(c) 388 of 1977 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate Sadar, Cuttack, are hereby quashed and the appeals allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 235 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ry steps, including the preparation and issue of distress warrants for realisation of outstanding fine. The Fines clerk made entries in the Fines Register in accordance with the intimation sent by the Bench Clerk. This practice continued till March 1951, when Mr. Gorden, the then District Magistrate directed that all fine records must be made over to the Fines Clerk by May 14, 1951. The fine amounts in question, were evidently recovered in execution of a distress-warrant, issued by the Magistrate. In view of what has been said above, it is clear that this was not a case of no evidence, but of evidence which was not adequate enough to carry conviction at a criminal trial. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the impugned orders did not suffer from any error of law which may warrant an interference in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the result, the appeal meets with failure and is dismissed without any order as. to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... brought home the charges to the appellant,. The crimes were committed in a most brutal and dastardly fashion. The victims were taken unawares when they were asleep. Two of them were blind persons. His Neronian conduct even after-the occurrence in languishing in the stricken premises, looking for something to eat in the kitchen, drinking water, smoking Bidis, bringing water and bathing himself, mindless of the specter of the slain and the groans and gasps of the dying, betrays an extreme depravity of character. The grisly and gruesome nature of the murders, the hapless and helpless state of the victims, the fiendish modus operandi of the appellant to first kill and then steal-all, steel the heart of law to call for its extreme penalty. For all the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal, affirm the judgment of the High Court and maintain the conviction of the appellant and the sentence of death awarded to him for the murders of Kartar Singh and Mada Singh. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 233 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Now, Smt. Gopikabai, Respondent 1 is admittedly the daughter of the sister of the last male holder, Punjya; whereas the appellants are his remote agnates. Neither party falls under Class I of the Schedule. ’Sister’s daughter’ is Item 4 of Entry IV in Class II of the Schedule; while agnates do not figure anywhere in Class II. Thus, Smt. Gopikabai’s case will come in clause ’(b) Secondly’, of Section 8 and, as such, she will be a preferential heir of the husband of Smt. Sarji, if he bad died the moment after her death on November 6, 1956. In this view, she would exclude the defendants-agnates from inheritance even according to ’personal law’ which, within the contemplation of Section 151 of the Code, will include the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in force at the time when Smt. Sarji died and succession opened out. In the result, we affirm the judgmentand decree of the High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 232 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of electrical goods manufactured by them were held liable only to the concessional rate of tax under Sec. 3(3) of the Act. 7. In the case on hand item 72(3) uses the expression ‘component parts of the machinery’. lt also uses the words ‘use of the article as component parts should be essential’. Almost all the factors referred to in item 72(3) are present in this case. The projection bulbs are not only component parts of the machinery and they are also found to be of a special shape and quality which would not be essential for their use for any other purpose. Therefore, in view of the findings given by the third respondent in his order dated 11th April, 1974, the projection bulbs have to be taken to be covered by item 72(3) and hence they cannot come under the residuary clause under item 60(2). The writ petition is therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The result is, that the petitioner is entitled to the refund claimed by him.
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1978 (4) TMI 231 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the insurance charges. The definition of turnover has already been extracted. That excludes the cost of freight or delivery in cases where such cost is separately charged. We agree with the counsel for the assessee that the cost of freight or delivery should include the cost of insurance of the goods, when general insurance has become so much of a part of the commercial activity of this country and the risk and insecurity attendant on the delivery of the goods is so great as to make insurance. of the goods an almost necessary part of the bargain in the transactions relating to them. On these grounds, we uphold the decision of the Tribunal on this aspect of the matter. 8.. In the result, we dismiss all these tax revision cases, except T.R.C. Nos. 25, 27 and 28 of 1977, which are allowed to the limited extent of vacating the direction of the Appellate Tribunal to afford the assessee an opportunity of producing the C forms. We make no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 230 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s go to make-up the finished product. We, therefore, hold that the goods sold by the petitioner are also component parts of the finished product manufactured inside the State by the purchaser. Since the finished product also falls under item 61 of the Second Schedule, it has to be held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the concessional rate of taxation under section 5(3A) of the Act. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Binny s Engineering Works Ltd. 1975 35 S.T.C. 260., the High Court of Madras has also taken the same view and has held that the fuse switch boxes are component parts of electrical goods. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the turnover in respect of the goods in question is not covered by section 5(3A) of the Act. The order of the Tribunal is set aside. The Commercial Tax Officer is directed to revise the assessment in accordance with this order. The petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 229 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ertificate duly filed under this Act and, in my opinion, it is a condition precedent to the issue of a valid certificate that the public demand should be due and payable by the certificate-debtor and if, at the time when the certificate is signed by the certificate officer, there is no public demand due from the certificate-debtor, the certificate is ultra vires, and all the proceedings founded upon it are null and void...... On the authorities indicated above, there can be no second opinion that the amounts due to the sales tax department were not a public demand when the requisition was sent to the certificate officer, inasmuch as the conditions precedent to make the amounts a public demand had not been satisfied and the civil court has, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the suit and interfere in the matter. The judgment of the lower appellate court is, therefore, unexceptionable. The appeal must accordingly fail and is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 228 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 398 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1826., the Government of India was carrying on the same activity through the agency of the Directorate of Supplies and Disposals and it was held that the said transactions were not effected in the course of the business of selling goods within the meaning of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. In our view, the controversy in this case is covered by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. If the principal, that is, the Government of India, cannot be said to carry on a business of selling goods in disposing of its surplus material, it cannot be held that its agent, by carrying on the same activity on behalf of its principal, is carrying on such a business. In the facts and circumstances and for the reasons as aforesaid, the assessee s contentions have to be accepted and we answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BANERJI, J.-J agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (4) TMI 227 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed rice. They have no direct connection with paddy. Paddy has first to become rice before chirwa and kheel can come into existence. In our opinion, chirwa and kheel are only different forms of rice. They are not a commodity which will fall outside the purview of cereals as understood in common parlance. Looked at from either view, the turnover of chirwa and kheel was rightly held taxable at 1 frac12 per cent. It could not be taxed under the unclassified items. In Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 1978 41 S.T.C. 394 (S.C.) (1978) XX Supreme Court Notes 56. , the Supreme Court has held that the term rice is wide enough to include parched and puffed rice. They overruled the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 226 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e facts of the present case are concerned. In fact, it appears that, in view of this situation, now the rule has been framed, which is sub-rule (4) of rule 33 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, which has been made effective from 1st November, 1968. It reads Any declaration or certificate required to be filed under the Act or the Rules or any notification issued thereunder, shall not be rejected as invalid on the ground that it lacks in certain material particulars or is defective until the dealer is given a reasonable opportunity to supply the omissions or to remove the defects occurring in such declaration or certificate or to furnish a fresh declaration or certificate. 9.. In this view of the matter, therefore, in our opinion, the view taken by the Board appears to be right and, consequently, we answer the question in the affirmative. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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