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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 188 Records
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1978 (7) TMI 241 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted food is to be made, the steps to be taken are statutorily prescribed. Even then the events that are likely to take place cannot be reduced to a formula or cannot be expressed in predetermined words. The process of obtaining the samples of foodgrains, the observation of the same by the panchas, the weighing of the samples, the conduct of the person selling the samples at that time, steps taken to comply with the rules-all these are happenings and not an experiment under the control of a food inspector. These happenings cannot take place in the same manner in two cases and, therefore, if the panchas are made to sign upon a printed panchanama which contains the predetermined narration of what they are expected to see and to depose to, then that panchanama, in my opinion, will be absolutely valueless. When the food inspector says that all this was recorded in the panchanama, he is obviously making an incorrect statement. The rest of the judgment is not material to the report
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1978 (7) TMI 240 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... nd if the intention of the Legislature is clear and beyond doubt, the court has to carry out that intention. Suffice it to state that we have adopted a reasonable construction of the relevant provisions and the construction is in favour of the assessee. Therefore, though the force of the above-mentioned contentions urged by Shri Dastur is undeniable and it is well settled also that in respect of the provisions placing a restriction on expenditure which is otherwise admissible, it is for the department to show that the relevant expenditure is caught squarely within the restriction of the relevant provision, we find that for the reasons discussed earlier, the contention of the assessee has to be accepted. 18. We hold, therefore, that the addition in the present case has to be made under the provisions of section 40(c) only and in the sum of ₹ 85,705 and the result is that we direct that the disputed addition of ₹ 4,295 is deleted. The appeal is deemed to be allowed.
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1978 (7) TMI 239 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icial Gazette (extraordinary) dated 1-1-1978. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the rules have not come into force as they have not got the approval of both the Houses of Legislature. In our view, the effect of S. 54(3) is that all rules made under the Act by the rule making authority shall be placed on the table of both the House of Legislature and shall be subject to such modification as the Legislative Assembly may make within a particular period. That provision cannot in our view postpone the operation or enforcement of the rules until after the legislative approval of the rules as made by the rule making authority. Hence the above contention cannot be accepted as tenable and the writ petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the rules have not come into force. 29. In the result, all the contentions advanced by the petitioners fail and the writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 30. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 238 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ns on the real employer, based on Articles 38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the Constitution. The court must be astute to avoid mischief and achieve the purpose of the law and not be misled by the maya of legal appearances. If the livelihood of the workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefits and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make-believe trappings of detachment from the Management cannot snap the real-life bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off. Of course, if there is total dissociation in fact between the disowning management and the aggrieved workmen, the employment is, in substance and in real-life terms, by another. The Management's adventitious connections cannot ripen into real employment. Here, on the facts, the conclusion is correct and leave must be refused. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 237 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntial adjustment which the Tribunal shall, therefore, be required to make in view of our answer which we propose to give is to determine whether the entire amount of Rs. 6,361.31 is liable to be forfeited which will depend on the examination of various aspects of the question as indicated in the majority view of the Supreme Court in Ajit Mills case 1977 40 STC 497 (SC) expressed by Krishna Iyer, J., and the relevant part of which has been set out above. The Tribunal in adjusting this decision shall bear in mind the broad guideline prescribed by the Supreme Court in Ajit Mills case 1977 40 STC 497 (SC). The result is that this reference is accepted and the question referred to us is answered in the negative, that is, against the assessee, that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 6,361.31 collected by the assessee was not by way of tax. Having regard to the facts of the case, there should be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (7) TMI 236 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ar Industries Ltd. 1964 52 I.T.R. 443 (S.C.) 1964 6 S.C.R. 846., the court observed It would be impossible to lay down any definite time-limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution. That initially there was a valid geographical classification of regions in the same State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed must be accepted. But whether the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained the plea of unlawful discrimination in view of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry into the continuance of the grounds on which the inequality could rationally be founded, and the change of circumstances, if any, which obliterated the compulsion of expediency and necessity existing at the time when the Reorganisation Act was enacted. All the objections urged in these writ petitions fail and they are dismissed with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 235 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and escaped assessment . We consider it unnecessary to examine the subtleties of this distinction. The language and the pharaseology of section 35 of the Sales Tax Act, 1963, or the corresponding provision of the earlier Act had also come in for notice before the Supreme Court on more than one decision. These would be found referred in a recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sales Tax Officer v. C.C. Transport Co.1963 K.L.J. 769. These decisions have strictly no application to the case on hand except for emphasising the wide and comprehensive language of the section under which reassessment proceedings are pursued. Having regard to the language of the section and scope and content of the power as explained by the judicial decisions, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in these cases was correct and calls for no interference. We dismiss these revision cases, but, in the circumstances, without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 234 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her or not. It is the use of covering human body which gives content to the word. Besides articles such as mufflers or caps normally constitute an outer covering. A cap is no doubt a headgear as held by the Additional Judge (Revisions) but it is covered in the expression garment as it is an article of clothing used for covering the outer part of the body. The learned standing counsel appears to be right that if the notification intended to confine it to ready-made clothes then the entry would have read ready-made dresses . The use of the word garment is in the widest sense. Socks, topas and mufflers may be hosiery goods and liable to tax under a separate notification but all the same they are ready-made garments as they are used to cover the body. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (7) TMI 233 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that this case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In the circumstances, therefore, we reject the prayer for certificate of fitness. Mr. Manohar submitted that the stay order which has been granted by this Court may be continued for a period of three weeks in order to enable the petitioner to file an appeal in the Supreme Court and obtain necessary orders therefrom. By order dated 11th April, 1978, this Court had allowed the Deputy Commissioner to proceed with the hearing of the revision and only delivery of final orders had been stayed. We feel that it is not necessary to stay the delivery of the final order and ends of justice would be met if the execution of the order which may be passed by the Deputy Commissioner is stayed for a period of six weeks from today in order to enable the petitioner to take appropriate steps before the Supreme Court for obtaining stay, if he so desires. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 232 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were spare parts of bullockcarts. In Bajoria Halwasiya Service Station v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1970 26 S.T.C. 108., a question arose whether bus bodies were spare parts of motor vehicles. Gulati, J., who spoke for the court, put the test to be applied pithily, when he observed that, in the popular sense, the term spare part , when used with reference to motor vehicles, is a duplicate part of motor vehicles kept in readiness to replace loss, breakage, etc. Motor batteries are not normally kept as an extra to replace an existing battery. In fact keeping an extra battery would be an useless surplusage, as in due course of time there will be diminution in its voltage and it cannot be utilised in the case of loss or breakdown of the existing battery. Motor batteries are thus not a spare part of a motor vehicle. Question referred is answered by saying that motor batteries are not spare parts of motor vehicles. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (7) TMI 231 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hedule of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act in respect of the amendment of section 6(2) thereof and the withdrawal of exemption under the Second Schedule by the Government. The petitioners knew that the decision of the single Bench was liable to be reversed by a Division Bench. They also knew that the legislature could take action to retrospectively validate the levy, assessment and collection of sales tax on commodities, which the petitioners maintain continued to be exempt from sales tax under the Second Schedule. The retrospective legislation in the form of the validating Act could not, therefore, be said to be contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution Kodar v. State of Kerala 1974 34 S.T.C. 73 (S.C.). For these reasons, this Writ Petition No. 166 of 1977 and the connected Writ Petitions Nos. 167 of 1977, 168 of 1977, 291 of 1977, 304 of 1977, 350 of 1977 and 77 of 1978 are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 230 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... again and agreeing with the Division Bench, we overrule the single Bench judgment in Malwa Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assessing Authority (Excise and Taxation Officer), Sangrur 1976 38 S.T.C. 39. Lastly, we may notice the recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Tarsem Lal Sham Lal v. State of Punjab 1978 42 S.T.C. 428.(Civil Writ Petition No. 6780 of 1976 decided on 21st July, 1978), wherein also an identical challenge directed against the very provisions of sections 8 and 9 of the Act has been repelled. It calls for specific mention that not the least argument was raised to assail the validity of section 5 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 2145, 2459 and 2191 of 1978. There is no merit at all in any of these writ petitions. All the four writ petitions are hereby dismissed. However, in view of the very fair stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners, we are disinclined to burden the petitioners with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 229 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m by the judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as also by the Full Bench of this Court. It is not disputed that the vires of section 8(2)(b) and of section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act were upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Sitalakshmi Mills Ltd. 1974 33 S.T.C. 200 (S.C.). An earlier judgment reported as State of Madras v. N. K. Nataraja Mudaliar 1968 22 S.T.C. 376 (S.C.). had similarly repelled the challenge of unconstitutionality against section 8(2), (2A) and sub-section(5) of the said section. Again a Full Bench of this Court in Tek Chand Daulat Rai v. Excise and Taxation Officer, Ferozepore(1), has upheld the constitutionality of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act as a whole. In view of the aforesaid binding precedents, there is no merit in these petitions which are hereby dismissed. In view of the fair stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 228 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d even if the manufacture of such goods without the above items is theoretically possible, it would be commercially inexpedient to do without them. They either form part of plant or equipment. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in disallowing the inclusion of the above five items mentioned in para 2 for the purposes specified against each of them excluding those relating to the construction or maintenance of buildings as stated above. We accordingly allow S.T.R.P. No. 6 of 1976 and direct the Commercial Tax Officer to include in the registration certificate of the assessee for the year 1971-72 in addition to what is already directed by the authorities below, the five items mentioned in para 2 above for the purpose specified against each of them excluding the purposes relating to the construction or maintenance of factory buildings as indicated above. S.T.R.P. No. 9 of 1976, filed by the department, is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (7) TMI 227 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aring the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner which finds full support from the judgment in South Punjab Electricity Corporation s case(1). It may be observed that Mr. Naubat Singh very fairly conceded that a question of law did arise and that the Tribunal acted illegally in refusing to refer the aforesaid question for decision to this Court. Consequently, we allow this petition and direct that a statement of case be drawn up by the Sales Tax Tribunal and the following question of law be referred to this Court for decision Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the goods of the value of Rs. 1,42,457.45 transferred from the branch office to the head office at Delhi could be deemed to be inter-State sales within the meaning of section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act? In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1978 (7) TMI 226 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iding the question whether refund of the tax paid under the State Act could be claimed by the person who had paid the tax under the Central Sales Tax Act or by the person who had paid the tax under the sales tax law of the State. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held Looking to all the facts, we are of the view that the appellant-firm is entitled to be paid the amount of sales tax levied under the State Act in respect of the goods sold by it in the course of inter-State trade provided the appellant has paid the sales tax under the Central Act in respect of those sales. It is thus clear that the above decision is of no assistance to the petitioner. The Commercial Tax Officer was, therefore, right in rectifying the order of assessment passed earlier and levying tax under sub-section (4) of section 5 of the State Act. The petition is dismissed. We, however, make it clear that any other remedy open to the petitioner under law remains unaffected by this judgment. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 225 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... manufacturer of spectacles as found by the learned Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. Accordingly, he is not liable to be taxed for a gross turnover of Rs. 10,000 or above, but he will come within the provision of section 4(5)(c), i.e., if his gross turnover is above Rs. 50,000 he will be liable to be taxed. Apart from this, relying upon the decision cited above, I hold that the learned Assistant Commissioner erred in not completing assessment under section 11(2) before fixing the liability of the petitioner to pay tax under section 4(2) of the said Act. Accordingly, I set aside the impugned order of the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, dated 31st July, 1972, affirming the order passed by the learned Commercial Tax Officer dated 7th April, 1970, with some modification, i.e., making him liable under section 4(2) of the Act with effect from 1st January, 1967. The rule is thus made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1978 (7) TMI 224 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... azar s case 1977 40 S.T.C. 437.does not appear to lay down any different principle. The assessee. there had sold copper wires to a manufacturer of electrical transformers and the question was whether copper wires fell within the First Schedule. After construing entry 26 of the First Schedule, which alone was relied on by the assessee, the Division Bench held that copper wire was not covered thereby. For the application of section 5(3), both the goods sold and the goods manufactured should fall within the First Schedule and it was held that the assessee was not entitled to the concessional rate. The point considered was thus entirely different. 10.. For the foregoing reasons, we come to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal was right, on the facts and circumstances of the case, in vacating the Deputy Commissioner s order and restoring the orders of the assessing officer. The tax revision cases are, therefore, dismissed, but with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (7) TMI 223 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... of reasons and this is not an idle formality and for this the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. Rai Singh Deb Singh Bist and another(3) is an authority. 9. Since the re-opening of the assessment is invalid we cancel the reassessment as made. 10. The learned Departmental Representative had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Jaganmohan Rao and others vs. CIT(4). We agree that where an assessment is validly re-opened any other amount can be brought to tax even if the amount for which the assessment was originally re-opened is held to be not taxable. But in the present case the re-opening of the assessment is not valid. That being the case the question of the ITO bringing to tax an entirely different amount which was considered by audit which did not weigh with him at the stage of issuing notice under s. 148 does not arise. 11. In the view that we have taken, we do not go into the merits of the addition made. 12. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (7) TMI 222 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... lition Act. On the issue of that notification, the Act came to be repealed and all the rights of the jahgirdar and the members of his family in jahgir came to be vested in the State Government. Any compensation paid in lieu thereof, was received by the deceased on behalf of himself and the members of his branch. We are of the view, that on the repeal of the Act, all the restrictions which were introduced by it, came to an end and all the original incidents of ordinary joint family property revived. Since the deceased died after the repeal of the Act and the vesting of the estate in the State Government, the Tribunal was right in holding that the compensation which he had received belonged to the joint family of the deceased and the members of his branch, and, therefore, it had to be dealt with under s. 7(1) of the E.D. Act. The question referred to us, is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the department. The department shall pay costs. Advocates fee Rs. 250.
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