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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 189 Records
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1979 (2) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d consideration has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (fourth edition) to mean such as is founded on natural duty and affection , and would amount to consideration within the meaning of Section 32FF of the Act. But even there it has been clarified that good is generally used in antithesis to valuable consideration , which has necessarily to be excluded in the case of a gift by virtue of its definition in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument of learned Counsel becomes untenable on a reference to 17 C.J.S. Contract 91-92 on which he has placed considerable reliance. We have also gone through James Newton v. Robert Hargreaves 135 E.R. 905 but it cannot avail the appellants for there the conveyance was by the father to his two sons in consideration of natural love and affection and the law acknowledged that to be a good consideration, which is not so in the cases before us. 8. There is thus no force in these appeals and they are dismissed with costs.
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1979 (2) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ose such punishment as a measure of social necessity, as a means of deterring other potential offenders. Failure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases where it is a crime against the society-particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme brutality, will bring to nought the sentence of death provided by Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. To allow the appellants to escape with the lesser punishment after they had committed such intentional, cold-blooded, deliberate and brutal murders will deprive the law of its effectiveness and result in travesty of justice.246. I would, therefore, for these reasons dismiss the appeals. The appellants are at liberty to apply for reprieve for commutation of their sentence which is an executive act of clemency .ORDER 247. In the light of the opinion of the majority the death sentence in each of these appeals is commuted to a sentence of imprisonment for life. Rajendra Prasad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (09.02.1979 - SC)
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1979 (2) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... timate the exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for accounts which is adequate and reasonable. The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief. A full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a decision in Chillakuru Chenchurand Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchurand Reddy I.L.R. 1969 A.P. 1042 after elaborate considerations of the case law on the subject has rightly observed that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate his relief and that the estimate should not be a deliberate under-estimation. 8. On a consideration of the entire circumstances of the case we are not satisfied that the estimate of the relief as given, by the plaintiff is inadequate or unreasonable or & deliberate under-estimation. In the result, we allow the appeal set aside the Judgment of the Madras High Court and remit it back to the High Court for disposal of all the issues arising in the appeal. The cost will abide by the result.
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1979 (2) TMI 212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the land vested in the said three persons only so long as they were not dispossessed of it at the instance of Bai Vajia in accordance with the terms stated therein. As soon as Bai Vajia took possession of the land, no rights of any kind whatsoever in relation thereto remained with them and thus they ceased to be the owners for the span of Bai Vajia's life. 7. Following Tulsamma's case we hold that Bai Vajia became a full owner of the land in dispute under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act and that Sub-section (2) thereof has no application to her case, the land having been given to her as a limited owner and in recognition of her pre-existing right against property. In the result therefore, the appeal succeeds and is accepted. The judgment and the decree of the High Court are set aside and the suit giving rise to this appeal is" dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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1979 (2) TMI 211 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e them of that possession. Probably the learned Judge was under the impression that non-applicant No. 1 would not be able to retain the possession of the field if the applicant's are allowed to stay in the hut. That cannot be reason for ousting them from possession under the guise of temporary injunction. In my opinion, therefore, the learned trial Judge was not right in deleting the condition and it appears that the appellate Judge has also not applied his mind to this aspect of the case. The order passed by the Courts below will have to be modified in so far as the cattle shed or hut is concerned. 16. In the result, the revision application is partly allowed and the order passed by the Courts below with regard to the temporary injunction is modified to the effect that it shall not apply to the cattle shed or residential hut which is in occupation of the applicants. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. 17. Appeal partly allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 210 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... We are unable to accept this contention. There is no evidence that the defendant No. 1 purchased the disputed property at a low price. In our opinion, the defendant No. 1 was not at all obliged to disclose the source of the money with which she purchased the disputed property. It may be that there is no mention in the sale deed that she purchased it with her own stridhana money, but that will not necessarily raise any presumption about the benami nature of the transaction. By the sale deed, she has acquired title to the disputed property and in the absence of positive evidence, it cannot be held that the purchase made by her was benami. The onus lay on the appellant and he has not been able to discharge the same. 13. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are affirmed and this appeal is dismissed. In view, however, of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs in this appeal. Sharma, J. 14. I agree.
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1979 (2) TMI 209 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee was a dealer in dry fruit, ice and fire works. No cash memos were issued by him and entries were made by him after counting the cash received at the end of the day. No purchase vouchers were also available in respect of ice purchased by him. It was held that although in certain lines of business, absence of such document may be a relevant consideration for rejection of accounts, principle was not one of usual application, and did not apply to the line of trade of the assessee. Section 8-A (3) applies to all dealers irrespective of their line of trade, and if I had taken note of this provision, the view might have been otherwise. Keeping in view Section 8-A (3) the Revising Authority was justified in not accepting the accounts, in the absence of cash memos and credit memos. The order passed by the Revising Authority does not call for any interference. 7. The revision fails, and is dismissed. The Department is entitled to its cost, which is assessed at ₹ 200/-.
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1979 (2) TMI 208 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of liability of a director etc. on the grounds mentioned in the said Sub-section would arise, and not otherwise. 10. The prosecution, therefore, against the respondents-accused in the absence of the company having been prosecuted, was not legal and any plea of guilty by them to the charge as aforesaid would not entitle the learned Magistrate to record a finding of guilty against them, because the condition precedent viz. the company having committed the offence and having been prosecuted for the offence and the same having been proved against it, is missing in this case. Mr. Mehta, therefore, succeeds in challenging the order of conviction passed against the respondents-accused and the result will be the following order Appeals fail. However, in view of the accused having succeeded in challenging the orders of conviction, the orders of conviction in both the cases are set aside and accused are acquitted of the offence with which they were charged. Fine, if paid, be refunded.
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1979 (2) TMI 207 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... had satisfied myself that the consent terms would be for the benefit of the minors. It is true that I have not expressly recorded that these consent terms are for the benefit of the minors. But, in my view, it is not necessary to make such a record. I have already passed a decree in terms of the consent terms which have been signed and handed in. And, in my view, it is not open to me to set aside this order unless both sides agree to its being set aside. The only grounds on which consent orders may be set aside are the grounds on which an agreement may be set aside. It is nobody's case that in the present case the consent terms should be set aside for any reasons which would invalidate an agreement. Hence the application of the Respondent to set aside the consent order is rejected. 7. Mr. Thakkar applies for a stay of the operation of the consent order dated 31-1-1979 till 7-2-1979. P. C. Operation of the order is accordingly stayed till 7-2-1979. 8. Ordered accordingly.
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1979 (2) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dd that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges, in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya and Ors. would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray. 7. In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v. Sriramamurty (1958) 1 A.W. R. 420. Where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as is otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. Under the Act, old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta, when a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act. 8. In view of the above discussion the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 205 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would be possible. It goes without saying that arbitration depends for its authority and validity on consent of parties and there cannot be compulsory arbitration. Arbitration only works out an earlier agreement of parties that they would rather resort to an adjudication by a process different from that of an adjudication in Civil Court. That would not be possible in a case where the parties had not agreed to submit to arbitration. Additional defendants 2 and 3 are not parties to any arbitration agreement and what is sought to be done now is to have an arbitration with them on party array so as to arrive at an arbitration award binding on them. In other words they have been subjected to compulsory arbitration unknown to the rule of arbitration and foreign to the very concept of arbitration. When once appellants who are strangers to the arbitration agreement were impleaded in the suit as additional defendants the Court was not well advised to refer the matter for arbitration.
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1979 (2) TMI 204 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... designedly used in the said Section 41 not to confine the section only to a suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property situate in Greater Bombay but also to permit to be included within the ambit of such a suit all other reliefs which the plaintiff can claim in a suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property on the termination of a licence or a tenancy. 12. For the reasons set out above, we hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the plaintiffs suit, and we answer the issue framed by us in the negative. 13. In the result, under Rule 269-A of the Rules and Forms of the Bombay High Court (on the Original Side), 1957, we order the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff to be presented to the Presidency Small Cause Court at Bombay. 14. The costs of the suit and heaping in this High Court, fixed at ₹ 300, shall be costs in the suit which the Plaintiff may file in the Bombay Presidency Small Cause Court. 15. Order accordingly.
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1979 (2) TMI 203 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. Moreover, the appellant in his statement under Section 342 has denied the recovery of the mosey and has stated that he had been falsely implicated. The High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant had admitted either the payment of money or recovery of the same as this fact is specifically denied by the appellant in his statement Under Section 342 Cr. PC Thus mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the appellant, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the appellant voluntarily accepted the money. For these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. We, therefore, allow the appeal set aside the conviction and sentences passed against the appellant. The appellant will now be discharged from his bail bonds.
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1979 (2) TMI 202 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he better in point of law". Jessel M. R. in a like circumstance said in Baker v. White (1877) 5 Ch D 183 at p. 190 that he was left with liberty to say which was not sould law. It seems to us, therefore, the High Court would be well advised to consider which of the interest of the administration of justice and it ought to follow that which is better in point of law than in point of time. OPINION OF THE FULL BENCH 12. In view of the majority opinion, the answer to the question referred to this Full Bench, is as follows - "If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a larger Bench, the decision of the larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Court. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other Courts". 13. Answered accordingly.
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1979 (2) TMI 201 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pay the arrears is entirely without substance. Each of the bills mentions the total amount payable including the arrears. The bill separately mentions the amount which the consumer may pay in view of the orders of the Supreme Court. The bill also mentions the amounts of arrears which would have to be paid if the appeals were to be eventually rejected by the Supreme Court. The bill also informs the consumers that in the event of rejection of the appeals by the Supreme Court surcharge will have to be paid. It is impossible to hold that the consumers were not called upon to pay the arrears. In the result both the appeals are dismissed with costs. 7. It was brought to our notice that in Civil Appeal No. 292 of 1970 the respondent Electricity Board was set expert for failure to pay the requisite Court fee on the statement of case. The order of the Registrar is recalled and the respondent is permitted to pay the requisite Court fee on the statement of the case. Appeals dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e plaintiff by the Courts below. We do not agree. The Courts below could not have been oblivious of the fact that defendant 3 has since died and the respondent is his widow. We, therefore, do not want to interfere with the discretion of the Courts below in the matter of costs. 61. For the foregoing reasons, we partly allow the plaintiff's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1969) to the extent indicated above, with proportionate costs. We will dismiss the defedant's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 466 of 1969) except to the extent that the defendant shall be allowed a. set off in the sum of ₹ 14,000/-, being the interest on the sum of ₹ 50,000/- for the period from August 19, 1953 (the date of the withdrawal of the deposit by the plaintiff) to the date when he redeposited it. Interest on the outstanding amount at 6 per cent per annum shall be payable till the date of payment. In Civil Appeal 466 of 1969, however, the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
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1979 (2) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dust. The horrendous increase of highway casualties and the chronic neglect of rules of road- safety constrains us to recommend to the Central Law Commission and to Parliament to senitize this tragic area of tort law and overhaul it humanistically. Another aspect must be noticed before we part with this petition. In many States, for want of judicial manpower or other pathological causes, the accident claims pend before tribunals in heartless slowness. Courts must give this bleeding class of cases high priority, adopt simplified procedures without breach of natural justice, try out pre- trial settlements and narrow down the controversy and remember, that 'wiping every tear from every eye' has judicial relevance. For, law must keep its promise to Justice. While we dismiss the petition for leave, we hope the Haryana State will hasten to frame rules under the Motor Vehicles Act to enable claimants for compensation to be free from payment of court-fee. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ich it is draped, the Agreement (Ex. I), in substance and in fact, is a ’lease’ in the accepted legal sense of the term and not a ’licence’ as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. If this be the correct construction of the document, and we think it is so it is doubtful whether Section 6(1) (i) could cover the appellant’s case and give him a right to retain the land in dispute eve if Section 28 was out of his way. o p /o p In sum, we may reiterate that even on the assumption that the respondent was a licensee, the appellant will not be entitled to retain the holding because he was not directly working the mine immediately before the date of vesting, and as such, will not be entitled to retain, due to the overriding operation of Section 28. o p /o p For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. o p /o p V.D.K. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1979 (2) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in 'business' was affective to start the son in medical practice. The learned Judge held that it did, observing that the word 'business' was capable of including the practice of a profession and that it plainly included the profession of a Doctor. We may refer to just one more case i.e. Taramal v. Laxman Sewak Surey Ors( 1971 M.P.L.J. 888) where this very question whether the practice of law was a 'business' within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act came for consideration before A. P. Sen, J. The learned Judge held that in the context of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the word 'business' had to be given a wide meaning so as to include any profession. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that the practice of law is 'business' within the meaning of that expression in Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 196(). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
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1979 (2) TMI 195 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d discharged. In the event of the appellant's failure to make the deposit, the Chief Judge is enjoined by the section to make an order of dismissal. The pending appeal concludes, whether or not the requisite deposit is made, in a judicial order. 17. Mr. Makhija pleaded that the provisions of the amended Section 217 were harsh and left no discretion to the Chief Judge to condone the deposit, either fully or in part, in cases of undue hardship. This is undoubtedly true; but the court cannot test the validity of statutory provisions upon the touchstone of harshness or stringency. 18. Finally, Mr. Makhija suggested that the provisions of Section 217 were penal in nature and could not, therefore, be retrospective in operation. He, rightly, did not pursue the argument. 19. In the result. I hold that the amended Section 217 is valid. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs in two sets, one set to respondents 1 to 3 and one set to respondent No. 4. 20. Petition dismissed.
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