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Showing 181 to 200 of 200 Records
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1979 (7) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF Property, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... then ascertain the share of the deceased. If the value of the share of the deceased exceeded rupees one lakh, then rupees one lakh would be eligible for exemption under S. 33(1)(n). If the value of the share of the deceased was less than rupees one lakh, then the entire value would be exempted from the estate duty assessment under s. 33(1)(n). It is this formula that will have to be applied in the present case. As there was some dispute as to what actually represented the value of the residential house, because each authority has given its own value it is necessary to direct the Tribunal to consider the question of exemption in the light of what we have discussed above. Question No. 2 is accordingly answered in the following manner -The exemption provided in S. 33(1)(n) should be computed after the value of the share of the deceased is determined and in the light of the decision in CED v. Estate of late R. Krishnamachari 1978 113 ITR 200. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 19 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ved, the AAC and the Appellate Tribunal recorded firm findings of fact that Smt. Kailash Wati did not lay claim to the partition of the property on the basis that she had not been given any share from the Property when her sons got their share in the property during the partition. Smt. Kailash Wati, of her own right, has no right to claim partition of the HUF property and thus the findings arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal, on the facts and circumstances of the case, have rightly been returned. In view of our above findings, the answer to the question referred by the Tribunal in Wealth-tax References Nos. 1 to 5 of 1973 is returned in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Similarly, the answer to the additional question of law referred to this court in Wealth-tax References Nos. 12 to 16 of 1975 is also returned in the affirmative in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. However, there will be no order as to costs. GUPTA J.-I agree.
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1979 (7) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Deduction, Priority Industry, Profits And Gains Attributable To ... ... ... ... ..... erial for us. The Supreme Court further held that the Legislature has deliberately used the expression attributable to which has a wider import than the expression derived from and has thereby shown its intention to grant the relief in respect of receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of the business of the specified priority industry. Applying the same reasoning in the present case, the profit by the sale of imported spare parts would have also to be brought within the scope of royalty under s. 80-I of the I.T. Act, 1961. In fact, in the present case, these spare parts were sold only to the purchasers of automobile trucks for the purpose of servicing their vehicles and is, therefore, intimately bound up with the priority industry established by the assessee. The result is that the second question in the second set of references is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1979 (7) TMI 17 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... assessee-company and on that basis it was held that the residue out of the excess royalty was a permissible deduction. As the amount of royalty paid by the assessee-company to the State Govt. in excess of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 was an expenditure of revenue nature and the same is permissible deduction on the basis of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gotan Lime Syndicate v. CIT 1966 59 ITR 718, and the amount of the royalty paid, even in excess of the minimum royalty of Rs. 1,50,000 under cl. 18 of the lease agreement is a permissible deduction. However, the amount said to have been paid in lieu of income-tax, super-tax, etc., being not expenditure of a revenue nature cannot be held to be a permissible deduction in the relevant assessment years, although the same formed part of royalty paid under cl. 18 of the lease agreement. We answer the question accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... one of the partners, on her income from the firm, there was no jurisdiction to assess the assessee. The result was that the assessment made on the assessee in the status of association of persons was cancelled. This order of the Tribunal has given rise to the present reference. We have considered an identical question in CIT v. Blue Mountain Engineering Corporation 1978 112 ITR 839 (Mad). We have held therein that with reference to the provisions of the 1961 Act, the assessment made on the firm as an unregistered firm, after the assessment made earlier in the case of one of the partners, was not legal. Though, in the present case, the status taken is association of persons , there is nothing in principle which would differentiate it from the principle enunciated in the said decision. The reference is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative in the sense that no assessment could be made on the assessee-firm after the assessment on Manibai. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 15 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e fact that the penalty was imposed in respect of defaults committed at the time when the old Act was in force, is of no consequence, as, under the provisions of s. 271(1)(a) of the new Act, which are clearly attracted to such case, a specified amount is leviable by way of penalty, namely, 2 for every month of default subject to a maximum of 50 of the tax payable and the ITO or the Appellate Tribunal had no discretion in the matter and could not reduce the quantum of penalty imposable under the provisions of s. 271(1)(a) of the new Act, merely on the ground that no rigid rules prescribing quantum of penalty to be levied was in force at the time when the default was committed. We, therefore, hold that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the present case was in error and was not justified in reducing the quantum of penalty from Rs. 13,399 to Rs. 2,000. Thus, the question referred to this court is answered in the negative. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... hat for the cesser of an interest to give raise to the charge for duty, it must be possible to say of the interest that it extended to the whole income, or to a definite part of the income. This notion Of definite extension is, in my opinion, vital to the understanding and working of section 2(1 )(b) and consequently of section 43 of the Act of 1940. This principle had been referred to and applied by this court in the case of Alladi Kuppuswami v. CED 1970 76 ITR 500 (Mad) FB . But this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in CED v. Alladi Kuppuswami 1077 108 ITR 439 on a different point. The result is that it is not possible to evaluate the interest, if any, of the deceased in this property since the interest is not capable of valuation, it is not an interest contemplated by s. 7 of the Act . The result is, the question referred to us be and is answered in the negative and against the revenue. The accountable person will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (7) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Definite Information, Excess Profits Tax, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... l while disposing of the two appeals preferred by the private companies. In answer to the petition, on behalf of the respondents, a return has been filed and what is disclosed as definite information are only the observations of the Tribunal which are quoted hereinabove. In my judgment, by no stretch of imagination, the observations made by the Income-tax Tribunal, while disposing of the appeals to which the petitioner was not a party, can be said to be a definite information. Even the observations, in no way, support the action taken by respondent No. 1 in issuing notices under s. 15 of the Act and in my judgment, the exercise of jurisdiction by respondent No. 1 by issuing the notices was totally misconceived and irregular. The notices issued by respondent No. 1 deserve to be quashed. In the result, the petition must succeed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of para. 14 of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Escaping Assessment, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... On the other hand, where the Act remedies are not of such wide amplitude but only for orders under the Act, in cases of such purported orders, the appeal remedy could not come in the way of the petitioner as it could not be said to have been provided for such purported orders which are null and void and which it would not be obligatory for the petitioner to exhaust for the simple reason that such an appeal remedy would not be able to cure the defect even if the appeal confirms the original order bearing this indelible mark of nullity. Having regard to these three decisions, I hold that there is no provision in the Act for challenging the notice issued under s. 59(b) thereof and that this is a fit case where the notice will have to be quashed in proceedings under art. 226 of the Constitution of India. For the reasons mentioned above, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to the issue of a writ of prohibition as prayed for. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 11 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Withdrawal ... ... ... ... ..... a trustee. No doubt, under sections 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, if the declarer of the trust is himself the trustee also, there is no need that he must transfer the property to himself as trustee but the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him, and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacity as trustee are different and, after the declaration of trust, he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of Property Act, there can be a transfer by a person to himself or to himself and another person or persons. In our opinion, there was in this case a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee, though there was no formal transfer. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned judge and we think that the authorities, noted supra, support the said conclusion. We see no ground to interfere. We dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Receipt, Capital Receipt, Compulsory Acquisition, Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... mpany which has a number of such agencies. The second category covers those cases where the receipt is not for the loss of an agency but for certain restrictive covenants preventing the assessee from carrying on business to that extent. While the learned counsel for the revenue proceeded as if the case on hand fell within the ambit of the first of the two propositions, the attempt of the learned counsel for the assessee was to bring it in the latter category. In view of the finding of the Tribunal, which we have already extracted, that in the present case the receipt is referable to a restrictive covenant, we have to hold that the principle of the decision in CIT v. Best and Co. (P.) Ltd. 1966 60 ITR 11 (SC) in so far as it considers the restrictive covenant and the receipt therefor, will be applicable here. The question referred to us, is accordingly, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (7) TMI 9 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... d upon the Allahabad High Court judgment in CIT v. Security Printers of India (P.) Ltd. 1972 86 ITR 210, in which it was held that the provision for taxation and provision for proposed dividends by company are entitled to be treated as reserve for the purpose of r.1 of the Second Schedule to the S.P.T. Act, 1963, and included these amounts in the computation. We are not inclined to agree with the views taken by the Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts and, relying upon the judgments of this court and other High Courts, we hold that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the amounts of Rs. 2,40,966 and Rs. 2,09,999, respectively, for provision for taxation and provision for dividends should be treated as a part of the reserve for the purposes of r. 1 of the Second Schedule to the S.P.T. Act, 1963. Accordingly, this question is answered in the negative, i. e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The references are disposed of accordingly. B. S. DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1979 (7) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business, Firm, HUF, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... nly under s. 9 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, as income from property. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court and held that the services rendered by the assessee to its tenants were the result of its activities carried on continuously in an organised manner, with a set purpose and also with a view to earn profits and that those activities were business activities. It was also held that the income arising therefrom was assessable under s. 10 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, as business income. In a way this decision would appear to support the case of the assessee that in the present case there was continuous, and organised activity with a set purpose with a view to earn profits, in the matter of letting out the furniture and other articles. Under these circumstances, the second question also is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs from the revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred only).
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1979 (7) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... visions of section 271 (1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in this case? The Tribunal, in cancelling the penalty, has observed in its order as follows As the assessments in question have been set aside the penalties as imposed at present cannot Stand. The orders imposing penalty are also accordingly set aside.. In view of the fact that the assessments no longer hold the field, the penalty already levied under s. 271(1)(a) of the I.T. Act, 1961, cannot stand. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in setting aside the penalty imposed. However, whether any penalty can be levied in the course of the proceedings to be finalised as a result of the remand by the Tribunal will have to be considered by the ITO. Hence, we answer this question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. This answer does not in anyway prevent the ITO from considering the question of penalty in the assessment proceedings now before him, if he can do so under the law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 6 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Loss, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... entire facts, has found that the assessee maintained only one set of accounts for both money-lending and commission business and both activities were carried on at the same place and there was interlacing and intermingling of funds and one activity cannot be disassociated and considered separate from the other in ascertaining the profits from each. It is further found that the assessee carried on only one business consisting of two activities, viz., money lending and commission business, which were inseparable from each other and there was intermingling and interlacing of funds. In this view, we have no hesitation to agree with the Tribunal that the assessee is entitled to have the deduction in the year of account for the assessment year 1962-63. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question must be and is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Commissioner shall pay the costs to the respondent-assessee. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
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1979 (7) TMI 5 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 1978 are answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. We may only point out that question No. 1 in T.C. No. 485 of 1978 is not happily worded but the purport is whether there are materials to treat the transaction as a colourable transaction. It is this aspect that we have been asked to consider. One of the points that was sought to be urged by the learned counsel for the assessee was that at any rate, with reference to the amounts that belonged to the ladies and to Muthurajan and which remained to their credit in the firm of Shanmugha Nadar, there could be no disallowance. It is common ground that the entire amount was actually available for withdrawal and could have been withdrawn and reinvested in the firm of Shanmugha Nadar. However, the question referred does not admit of our going into this aspect but we are sure that the Tribunal would go into it to the extent possible in the appeals, before it. The Revenue will be entitled to the costs of Rs. 500, one set.
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1979 (7) TMI 4 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion had taken into account the information contained therein while framing the original assessment. May be that it is the fault of the department on account of which the aforesaid letter has been lost. But on account of such slip on the part of some income-tax employees it cannot be said that so far as the assessee was concerned, he had done his duty and placed the true and full facts before the Income-tax Officer as known to him. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case, no question of law arises on this point. . The prayer of the assessee for calling a reference on question No. 2 as framed by him is, therefore, rejected. In the result this reference application is allowed and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, is directed to state a case and make a reference of the two questions mentioned above for being decided by this court. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs of this reference application.
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1979 (7) TMI 3 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... istinct share in the property and they purchased only such a separate share. It appears that Kanakarathinam purchased from the executors of one Rengamma who had died executing a will in respect of her 5/8ths share. Similarly, Yeshodammal purchased it from her father who was originally a co-owner with a 3/8ths share along with Rengamma in respect of this very property. This is also an additional factor which goes to emphasise that the respective co-owners had no common intention of combining together for the purchase of the property and exploiting it as such. Though as stated earlier the sale deed itself has not been annexed to the statement of the case, we were able to gather the facts only from the copy of the lease deed, which was available to the Tribunal and which was placed before us. The result is, that the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessees will be entitled to their costs. One set counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (7) TMI 2 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xecuted between the partners of the new firm in Veeraraghavulu Chetty s case 1975 100 ITR 723 (AP). The existence of the aforesaid two documents and the other material on record has rightly made the Tribunal hold that there was dissolution of the old firm by June 30, 1969, and the new firm had come into existence on July 1, 1969. Each case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of that particular case and we, therefore, see no legal flaw in the decision of the Tribunal. For the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue holding that two separate assessments have to be made, one for the period commencing from October 22, 1968, to June 30, 1969, and the other from July 1, 1969, to November 9, 1969, but not a single assessment, as the provisions of section 188, but not section 187(2), would be applicable to the case on hand. The Department shall pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
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1979 (7) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Assessment is completed before the seizure is effected and while the assets are still in the custody of the court, the appropriate remedy for the revenue is to make an application under s. 226(4) - After assessment, money of assessee lying in court custody cannot be seized under s. 132 and adjusted against tax arrears
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