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Showing 1 to 20 of 135 Records
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1980 (11) TMI 175 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere is an observation that the real question is one of true construction to be placed upon the writing and it would be useless to refer to decided cases. After my careful consideration, I am of the view that promise to pay must be an express promise and there must be some indication in writing itself to show that the writer agreed to pay the debt though it may the barred by time. The courts below, it seems to me have erred that there was a promise to pay the barred debt. The words of endorsement are plain. I do not find any indication that there was any promise to pay the debt by the defendant. This appeal relates to the question of interpretation of the writing in suit. The courts below have erred in interpreting this writing as a promise to pay within the meaning of Section 25(3) of the Act. I, Therefore, set aside the decree of the courts below and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff-respondent. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
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1980 (11) TMI 174 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of a payment made by, or by the agent of, any other or others of them. Consequently, even if the recitals in the surety bond,Ex.43 elevate the present surety to the status of a joint promisor, even then, in the light of Section 20(2) of the Limitation Act, the decision has got to be against respondent No, 1 bank, for the simple reason that even if defendant No. 1 might have acknowledged or partly paid the dues of the bank, the said acknowledgement or part-payment will not extend the period of limitation against defendant No. 1- the present appellant . Under these appellant has got to succeed. 26. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Judge are set aside and instead, the decree of the trial court is restored. 27. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and as respondent-Bank loses only on the technical plea of limitation, proper order as to costs is that there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.
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1980 (11) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Petitions 4228 to 4230 of 1978 are also allowed partly, to the same extent as Writ Petition No. 266 of 1979. The High Court will readjust the seniority of the petitioners and respondent No. 3 therein by the application of the aforesaid principles and in accordance with the Haryana Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 as in force on, or as given effect to from April 1. 1970. The seniority list will be drawn by the High Court on the basis of the dates of confirmation without applying the rule of rotation and in the light of the directions given by us in the Punjab Writ Petition, in so far as relevant. The High Court will also comply with the other directions therein given regarding the review of the promotions to Selection Grade and the consequential orders. 82. These directions in the aforesaid Writ Petitions from Punjab and Haryana shall be complied with as soon as possible, preferably within a period of three months from today. 83 Parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1980 (11) TMI 172 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... Therefore, the interest element which is deemed to stand deducted in arriving at the commercial profit has to be added back and the add-back of interest to partners of ₹ 4,999 would, on the facts of the case, be in order. 15. To elucidate the matter a little further, suppose there were large interest payments to partners. Then it would have been a case for urging that the normal profit rate of 12½ per cent should not be taken but, only a lesser profit rate should be adopted. If that is found acceptable, the ITO would only adopt a lesser profit rate of say 12 per cent or 11½ per cent etc. After applying a lesser profit rate, he would arrive at the commercial profit in such cases. Then, to the income arrived at on the basis of lesser profit rate, he would of course, have to separately add-back the interest paid which is hit by provisions of section 40(b). 16. In the light of our aforesaid conclusions, the appeal of the revenue is treated as allowed in part.
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1980 (11) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... so challenged the reservation of the twenty-seven vacancies on the ground that the vacancies pertain to selection posts. On this point, we find ourselves bound by the decision of this Court in General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari(1) where it has been held that Article 16(4) of the Constitution extends to selection posts. C Finally, learned counsel for the petitioners challenges the reservation of vacancies on the ground that they are irrational, inhibiting and do not provide for healthy growth of the services besides offending the equality provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Having regard to the percentage of vacancies reserved under the office memorandum dated 20th July, 1974, we consider that the case falls within the. principles laid down in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore.(2) The majority view in State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas(3) supports the validity of the reservation. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
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1980 (11) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re to be misunderstood." Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood. And yet, I hold to what I have earlier stated in Ambika Prasad Misra. (1) What the learned Chief Justice has in mind, if, with respect, I may venture to speak is that in constitutional issues over-stress on precedents is inept because we cannot be governed by voices from the grave and it is proper that we are ultimately right rather than be consistently wrong. Even so, great respect and binding value are the normal claim of rulings until reversed by larger benches. That is the minimum price we pay for adoption of the jurisprudence of binding precedents. I leave it at that because the learned Chief Justice has held the impugned Act good in its own right. Enough unto the day is the evil thereof. Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 169 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appellant-company would have been more effectively and with greater emphasis hurled against the petitioning-creditor to make his petition an abuse of the process of this court. By reason of the aforesaid, in my opinion, the petitioning-creditor cannot, under any circumstances, reconcile this document, being the letter dated June 7, 1977, with his petition for winding up. That being so, it must be held that the defence made out by the company was a bona fide one and that the petition for winding up was an abuse of the process of the court and, as such, could not have been admitted at all. 19. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed. The petition for winding up is dismissed as an abuse of the process of this court. The security furnished by the order of the appeal court is discharged. All other interim orders are vacated. The petitioning-creditor is to pay the costs of the appellant-company both of the court below and of this court. C.K. Banerjee, J. 20. I agree.
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1980 (11) TMI 168 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... junction, it appears that the plaintiff is debarred from instituting a fresh application unless there has been change of circumstances since the date of dismissal of the previous injunction application. Section 141 of the Code makes the procedure applicable to the suits to all proceedings in court of civil jurisdiction. The proceedings for the grant of temporary injunction are proceedings in a civil court. Thus reading together O. 23 and Section 141 of the Code it appears that the present application for temporary injunction filed on 16th April, 1980 decided by the impugned order dated 15th July, 1980 is barred under sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code. On this ground alone I do not find any merit in the present appeal and I hold that the application of the plaintiffs-appellants for the grant of injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding with arbitration proceedings is not maintainable. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs.
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1980 (11) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inance in every case the murderer may deserve, in a given set of circumstances, no more than a six months’ period of incarceration while a thief may have to be trained into better ways of life from the social point of view over a long period, and the death penalty, the vires of which has been recently upheld by a majority of four in a five Judge Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others would have to be exterminated from Indian criminal law. The argument based on the object of reformation having to be in the forefront of the legislative purposes behind punishment must, therefore, held to be fallacious. 6. I conclude that the contents of section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (or, for that matter any other penal provision) cannot be attacked on the ground that they are hit by article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as they are arbitrary or irrational because they ignore the reformative aspect of punishment. Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... were shouldered by the Terminal Managers. This is evident from the fact that Asstt. Apron Controller is to assist them in carrying out the responsibilities. The post of Terminal Manager was abolished and persons holding these posts were made to undergo a fresh interview and given specialised training at CATC, Allahabad. New persons with requisite qualifications were inducted in the newly created post of Airport Officer (Operations) and on the basis of the marks obtained in the interview board, their seniority was decided upon. Since there has been delay in implementation of the Apron Control and the Airport Officers (Ops.) have been managing the duties of the Terminal Manager, it cannot be said that the duties of the Airport Officers (Ops.) are the same as those of the Terminal Managers. 6. We are therefore, unable to see any force in the submissions of Smt. Shyamla Pappu. In the result the Writ Petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.
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1980 (11) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the foregoing discussion is that Civil Appeal No. 2299 of 1979 has to be dismissed in its entirety. We have already indicated that we agree with our brother Pathak, J., that the appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2300 of 1979) filed by the workmen should also be dismissed. While we find lot of force in the submission of Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the workmen that Dearness Allowance linked to cost of living index is ordinarily the best and the most scientific method of computing dearness allowance, it cannot always be said that an illegality warranting interference under Article 136 is committed if some other method is adopted. The Tribunal has given satisfactory reason for adopting a different mode and we are not disposed to interfere with the award of the Tribunal. In the result both the appeals are dismissed without any order as to costs. ORDER In view of the opinion of the majority both the appeals are dismissed and there is no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 163 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... produced. It was mentioned by assessing authority that assessee maintained coal vouchers. This was not taken to be a ground for rejecting account books of assessee even by assessing or appellate authorities. In absence of any finding that from the coal purchased vouchers maintained by assessee, the consumption of coal was not verifiable or consumption of coal was not in proportion with the amount of bricks produced the account books could not be rejected particularly when this was not considered sufficient by appellate and assessing authority. There was thus no material on which account books of the assessee could be rejected. 3. In the result both the revisions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by Additional Judge Revision is set aside. The question of law raised by assessee is decided by saying that there was no material for rejection of account books of assessee for 1972-73 and 1975-76. The assessee is entitled to costs which is assessed at ₹ 200/- one set.
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1980 (11) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ranking constitutional authority, and can be expected to act according to the needs of the service and without arbitrariness. He is the constitutional head of one of the most important departments of the State, and is expected to know what the department requires and how best to fulfil those requirements. We are unable to hold that the power conferred on him under the Rules violates the principle against excessive delegation. The writ petition No. 4367 of 1978 must also be treated on the basis that the petitioners are not, in the fixation of their seniority, entitled to weightage with reference to their length of service. Both writ petitions must, therefore, be dismissed. Civil Appeals Nos. 1584-1588 of 1973 are allowed, the judgment and order of the Madras High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. Writ Petition Nos. 357 of 1979 and 4367 of 1978 are also dismissed. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs. Appeals allowed and Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion 312 implies that the land must be utilised in accordance with the lay-out plan. If the land has been utilised to any degree by the appellant before 20th April, 1967, the utilisation must conform to the original sanctioned lay-out plan. No utilisation by the appellant in the manner subsequently proposed is permissible unless and until sanction is accorded to the revised lay-out plan. If such sanction is refused, it is the original sanction which will continue to operate, and the lay out plan to which such sanction was granted is the one that matters. In the circumstances, we direct the first respondent, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, to refer the application dated 20th April, 1967 along with the lay-out plan accompanying it to its Standing Committee and the Standing Committee will dispose of the application expeditiously in accordance with law. The appellant is not entitled to any further relief at this stage. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs.
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1980 (11) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re the due representation of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the public Services. There is no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential treatment in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes though generally reservation may not be far in excess of fifty percent. There is no rigidity about the fifty percent rule which is only a convenient guideline laid down by Judges. Every case must be decided with reference to the present practical results yielded by the application of the particular rule of preferential treatment and not with reference to hypothetical results which the application of the rule may yield in the future. Judged in the light of this discussion I am unable to find anything illegal or unconstitutional in any one of the impugned orders and circulars. Each order and circular has been individually discussed by my brother Krishna Iyer J with whose reasoning and conclusions I agree and to which I wish to add no more. PBR Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... erty for a period of ten years from the commencement of the Act, in relation to vacant land or building thereon, within the ceiling limits. 105. Having struck down sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 23 and the opening words and'subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) and' in Section 23(4) of the Act, I would declare the remaining provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, including sub-section (4) of Section 23 thereof as valid and constitutional. 106. In the result, the writ petitions, except to the extent indicated, must fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ORDER (Per Chandrachud C.J. and Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer, JJ.) 107. We hold that the entire Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976 is valid save and except Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or of a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area.
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1980 (11) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l-being. The democratisation of judicial remedies which is the thrust of our separate opinion, induces us to conclude with a quote It was the boast of Augustus that he found Rome of brick and left it of marble. But how much nobler will be the sovereigns boast when he shall have it to say that he found law dear and left it cheap; found it a sealed book and left it a living letter; found it the patrimony of the rich and left it the inheritance of the poor; found it the two-edged sword of craft and oppression and left it the staff of honesty and the shield of innocence. Having sought to illumine the half-lit zone of access jurisprudence, we wish to make it clear that we are not dealing with the likely application Art. 19(1) (f) or of Art. 14 which have been raised in the present case because the learned Chief Justice has held that on the merits the action of the Corporation is above board. The question which we reserve may well be considered when an appropriate occasion arises.
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1980 (11) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s case that the 1974 settlements contain any such provision and regulation 2, therefore, does not come into play at all. 28. In the result appeal No. 2275 of 1978 succeeds and is accepted. The impugned judgment is set aside and the petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India decided thereby is dismissed along with transfer case No. 1 of 1979. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties are left to bear their own costs. ORDER In view of the opinion expressed by the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs to the first, second and third respondents, and the Transfer Petition No. 1 of 1979 stands allowed insofar that a writ will issue to the Life Insurance Corporation directing it to give effect to the terms of the settlements of 1974 relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation. Costs in respect of the Transfer Petition will be paid to the petitioners by the second respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 155 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS NEW DELHI (APPEAL CASE)
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... ... ..... to their case also. 8. It was also pointed out by the consultant that no samples were drawn from the PTFE Sheets manufactured by them for testing these in accordance with the standard methods and there is no evidence in this case to indicate that the goods manufactured by them were rigid plastic sheets. 9. The Board has carefully considered the submissions of the appellants and also examined the records of the case. The Board observes that there is no conclusive evidence in this case to show that the goods in question which were manufactured by the appellant and removed upto 1976 could be termed as rigid plastic Boards, Sheetings, Sheets and films either by a generally acceptable or technical standard or according to the ordinary or dictionary meanings of the term (in absence of a statutory definition of the term “rigid” during the material period). 10. The Board accordingly allows the appeal and sets aside the Collector’s order under appeal.
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1980 (11) TMI 154 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... . authorities and the Customs House should allow clearance when they are satisfied that the goods could meet the requirements of prescribed end-use has considerable force. It is therefore, not necessary to go into the strict scrutiny of the classification of the end-product for categorising it as heavy chemical depending upon its classification as synthetic resin, as broadly synthetic resin can also be classified as heavy chemicals. In case of doubt it is always open to the Customs House to alert the I.T.C. authorities for carrying out necessary verification and in this case such a course should have been the proper course in the interest of expeditious clearance of the goods. In this view of the matter the appeal is allowed with the direction that the fine be refunded. The Customs House is at liberty to refer to the I.T.C. authorities the question of appropriate classification of end-product in the context of this particular clearance, for suitable action by that authority.
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