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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 236 Records
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1981 (1) TMI 295 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eyond the period of three years envisaged by Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 468 of the Code, the Court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence, unless it availed itself of the powers under Section 473 of the Code which is in the following terms 473. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. In the present case, one looks in vain for the existence of any order indicative of the satisfaction of the trial Court, as admittedly no such order had been passed by the Court concerned. 7. For the reasons aforementioned, this petition is allowed and the proceedings against the Petitioners pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kharar, are quashed.
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1981 (1) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pon in the order of detention pari passu the order of detention, etc. etc.) or, at any rate, an explanation from the authorities concerned must be called for by the Central Government so that in future persons against whom serious acts of smuggling are alleged, do not go scot free. In the instant case, not only were the documents and materials not supplied along with the order of detention, but there has been a delay of about 25 days in disposing of the representation of the detenu and no explanation for the same has been given. These are matters which must be closely examined by the Government. 9. For the reasons given above, we hold that the continued detention of the detenu is void. We allow the petition and direct the detenu to be released forthwith. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministers of all the State Governments, Hon'ble the Home Minister of the Government of India and also the Hon'ble Finance Minister, Government of India for necessary action.
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1981 (1) TMI 293 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid, besides duty and penalty, as required by Section 35, nothing prevented the Legislature from stating so. In the absence of such a provision, it is illegal to insist upon the payment of levy of transfer duty. It is under these circumstances that I have no hesitation to hold that there is no bar for receiving a document in evidence even if surcharge on the duty is not paid under Section 73 (1) (b) of the Gram Panchayats Act. Hence the view taken by the lower Court is unsustainable and it has to be set aside. I, therefore, set aside the order of the lower Court. The lower Court is directed to receive the document in evidence for the limited purpose for which it is tendered. The defendant is at liberty to raise all the contentions as to the genuineness of the document. Further, the other pleas taken by him in support of his case are not at all prejudiced by the receipt of the document in evidence. 24. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, but without costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hree instalments on November 8, 1980, November 17, 1980 and December 20, 1980. Thus the detenu was deprived of the opportunity of making an effective representation as held by this Court. It is manifest that the order of detention is rendered void and this case is clearly covered Page 18 by a series of decisions of this Court particularly in Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 531, 1981 SCC (Cri) 25 and also in Kamla Kanyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 1 SCC 748. 2. For these reasons the writ petition is allowed and the continued detention of the detenu being void the detenu is directed to be released forthwith.
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1981 (1) TMI 291 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re is a difference and a distinction, where, in reality, none that matters, really exists. In this situation therefore, we would abide by the principle of stare decisis and follow the ratio of Manni Lal's case, and in the result, hold that the acquittal of the appellant in appeal prior to the pronouncement of the judgment by the High Court in the election-petition had the result of wiping out his disqualification as completely and effectively as if it did not exist at any time including the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers and that his nomination paper was properly accepted by the Returning Officer. The challenge to the election of the appellant on the ground under Clause 100(1)(d) (i) must, therefore, fail. 39. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the election-petition of the respondent. In view of the law point involved, we will leave the parties to pay and bear their own costs throughout.
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1981 (1) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ccordingly quashed. 29. All the other contentions including those relating to the alleged infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners raised in these petitions are left open. 30. Before concluding, we propose to advert to the last submission made before us on behalf of the State Government. It was submitted that the cashewnut industry in Kerala was a labour-oriented industry and if the declaration and the Order were struck down, a number of workmen would be adversely affected. It was also submitted that the entire economy of the State of Kerala which largely depended on the export trade in cashewnuts would be disrupted. If any such serious problem arises, it can always be set right by the competent Legislature or the appropriate Government taking needful remedial action in the light of Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 31. The petitions are accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 289 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l tribunal as also the order of the High court and remand the appeal to the Rent Control tribunal and direct that the appeal may be heard on merits. The parties are directed to appear before the Rent Control Tribunal on 2.02.1981 and the Rent Control tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal within six week from today. There will be stay of dispossession in the meanwhile.
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1981 (1) TMI 288 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... the detenu on 27-11-1980 which was rejected by the State Government on 30-12-1980. It is, therefore, clear that the order of detention suffers from two infirmities; first, that the documents and materials were not supplied pari passu the grounds of detention and secondly, that there is delay of more than a month in disposing of the representation which itself is fatal to the order of detention. For these reasons, therefore, the petition is allowed and the continued detention is held void. The detenu is directed to be released forthwith.
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1981 (1) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ention when the same was served on him, the order is rendered void as held by this Court in Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India 1981 1SCR640 and in Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India 1980CriLJ1487 . Moreover, the order of detention suffers from another infirmity, namely, that the representation made by the detenu was disposed of by the detaining authority more than a month after the representation was sent to it. No reasonable explanation for this delay has been given which violates the constitutional safeguards enshrined under Article 22(5) and makes the continued detention of the detenu void. For these reasons, therefore, . we allow this petition and direct the detenu to be released forthwith.
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1981 (1) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... attempt to disclose the contents of the documents or the statements of the witnesses exposed himself to a prosecution on a charge under Section 5 of the Act. 27. For the reasons given above, we overrule the view of the High Court and the reasons given therefore that Section 14 of the Act prohibits the giving of copies of the statement concerned to the accused or that the lawyer is prohibited from taking the statements in extenso and had a duty to show the same to the court. We also overrule the view taken by the High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act. We do not agree with the High Court that the case should be tried by some other Magistrate but as lot of time has elapsed surely the Magistrate against whose orders revision was taken to the High Court must have been transferred by this time. therefore, the case will now be inquired into by a Magistrate who is available in the light of the observations made by us. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1981 (1) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat the Corporation is a Government department The reason is that the F.C. Act has given the Corporation an individuality apart from that of the Government. In any case the Corporation cannot be divested of its character as a 'Company' within the meaning of the definition in Clause (e) of Section 3 of the L.A. Act, for it completely fulfils the requirements of that clause, as held by us above. 6. The Corporation being a 'Company', compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the L.A. Act had to be made, in order to lawfully acquire any land for its purpose. It is not denied that such compliance is completely lacking in the present case. 7. As a result of the foregoing discussion it must be held that the land in dispute has not been acquired in accordance with law, although our reasons in that behalf are different from those forming the basis of impugned judgment, this appeal is thus found to be without merit and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 284 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plaintiffs would be entitled to claim interest under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under Section 80 of the Act, where no rate of interest is specified in an instrument, interest shall be calculated at the rate of 6 per annum from the date on which the money should have been paid by the party concerned until realisation of the amount due or until such date as the Court directs. Where the instrument is silent regarding interest, it is a case where no rate of interest is specified in the instrument. Hence interest could be ordered at the rate provided under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. We direct that in the two suits, the respective plaintiffs will be entitled to interest from the dates of promissory notes till recovery. In the result, the two decrees and the common judgment of the trial Court are set aside. The two suits are decreed as prayed for with costs. The appeals are accordingly allowed with costs. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1981 (1) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lleged offence is such that the defect may be removed by the possessor of the drug or cosmetic seize the stock of such drug or cosmetic." Rule 54A of the Rules framed under the Act provides "54A. Prohibition of sale.- No person in possession of a drug in respect of which an Inspector has made an order under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act shall in contravention of that order sell or otherwise dispose of any stock of such drug." Rule 54A prohibits contravention of a prohibitory order made under section 22(1) (c) and section 27(b) itself makes such contravention punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with both Section 22(1) (c) does not provide for a separate punishment. Accordingly we set aside the conviction of the appellants purported to be under section 22(1)(c) of the Act and the sentences passed in respect of the said 'offence'. Subject to the modification indicated above the appeal is dismissed. Appeals partly allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 282 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e form of Section 24(2) which, keeps alive the rights and liabilities regarding the action taken under the old law. As noticed earlier, on a proper interpretation of the provisions of the various statutes, we have come to the conclusion that the Civil Court did have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit out of which this appeal arises at the time when the suit was instituted. If the argument raised by Mr. Mohunta were to be accepted, then we would be annulling a valid decree passed by a Civil Court by placing a somewhat dubious interpretation on the statutory provisions. This we are not entitled to do because it is our solemn duty to zealously guard the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. 16. For reasons aforementioned, we are firmly of the view that the suit out of which the present appeal arises was validly entertained and decreed by the learned Courts below against the Appellant. We find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. 17. I agree.
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1981 (1) TMI 281 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... cated, the question of construction of section 5(1)(iv) arises, and could at all arise, only in the context of the assessee’s claim for an exemption. It does not, and cannot, arise in the context of a claim for deduction of the mortgage debt over the house, under section 2(m)( ii) of the Act. The present reference is limited to the question of deductibility of a debt, and does not cover the question of exemption of an asset such as the residential house. Furthermore, exemption had already been granted up to the value of a half-portion of the house in the assessment order itself on an application of section 5(1)(iv). The line of argument now addressed, which has the effect of altogether ruling out the exemption in such a case cannot, in reason, be addressed at this stage. Having regard to all the considerations set out above, we answer the question of law in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will have her costs. Counsel’s fee ₹ 500.
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1981 (1) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the Code. Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P. It is true that the prohibition in s. 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is "otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force". Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail. The High Court, in our opinion, is right in declining to entertain the application. The appeal must be dismissed. But we may observe that anything said by the High Court in the criminal proceeding against Kailash Chandra Jain should not be allowed to influence the judgment of the court in the civil suits mentioned above or in any proceeding arising therefrom. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 279 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t. The bar under s. 40 does not come in the way of the Court of Small Causes exercising jurisdiction under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act to stay a proceeding pending before it. If authority is necessary for this proposition it may be found in Chadha Motor Transport Co. (P) Ltd. Delhi v. R. N. Chopra and Basanti Cotton Mills v. Dhingra Brothers. The submission that there is no identity of dispute is also without substance. As already pointed out by us the dispute is between the licensor-landlord and licensee-tenant about the right to possess two studios and other premises. The identity of the dispute is clear from a perusal of the pleadings in the suit in the Court of Small Causes and the petition for reference to Arbitration filed in the High Court. In the result both the appeals are allowed with costs. The arbitration clause in the agreement dated March 28, 1970 is declared to be inoperative . The application for reference to Arbitration is dismissed. P.B.R. Appeals allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 278 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... being taken of the salary earned by the appellant elsewhere or of any income derived by him from any source whatsoever, between the period from September 19, 1976 till the date of reinstatement. The appellant had a duty to mitigate his loss and it cannot be that during the aforesaid period he remained idle throughout. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the State Government for reinstatement of the appellant in service is restored. We remit the appeal to the Government to decide as to whether the appellant is entitled to all his arrears of pay and allowances upon his reinstatement in service, and direct that while dealing with the question, it shall afford the parties full opportunity to raise all such contentions as they may be advised and lead their evidence thereon, for determination of the amount payable. There shall be no order as to costs. S.R. Appeal allowed and matter remitted to Government.
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1981 (1) TMI 277 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... sought to be assessed by the impugned notices in fact belonged to Ram Prasad, individual, and not to Ram Prasad (HUF) in whose hands the impugned income was sought to be assessed or the condition precedent for issuance of notices under section 148 were not available and 'all' other allied questions that the petitioner may like to raise during the course of the assessment proceedings and will require a decision on appreciation of material that may exist on record or may be brought on record in due course. In this view of the matter, we leave it to the petitioner to seek redressal of its grievance before the hierarchy of authorities contemplated under the Act including before the Assessing Officer of the petitioner. 10. For what has been stated above, we do not feel inclined to interfere with the impugned notices in these proceedings at this stage. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. The stay order shall stand discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 276 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... displace the basis of these decisions that the Parliament enacted Sec. 5(A) in order to make it clear that even if one of the grounds is irrelevant but the other grounds are clear and specific that by itself would not vitiate the order of detention. Mr. G. A. Shah appearing for the detenu frankly conceded that he is not in a position to support the view taken by the Gujarat High Court on the interpretation of Sec. 5(A). He also stated that he does not want to challenge the vires of Sec. 5 (A) of the Act. Mr. Phadke has frankly stated that he only wants the law to be settled in the peculiar circumstances of this case and the order of the High Court quashing the detention need not be disturbed. We, therefore, hold that the view taken by the High Court on interpretation of Sec. 5(A) is legally erroneous and is hereby overruled. With these observations the appeal is disposed of without disturbing the order of the High Court quashing the order of detention. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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