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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 233 Records
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1982 (2) TMI 328 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the application under Section 18(2A) according to law on the basis of relevant considerations, it is imperative for the authority to state reasons for its decision. The authority must act fairly. It is a fundamental rule that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The rule is applicable in a proceeding under Section 18(2A). 7. These are some of the reasons why giving of reasons is a must in a proceeding under Section 18(2A) of the Act . We hold that the impugned order suffers from absence of any reason for the decision and as such the impugned order must be quashed which we hereby do. 8. In the result, therefore, the petitions are allowed and the matters are remitted to the learned Commissioner for due disposal of the applications according to law. There is no order as to costs. 9. Before parting, we would observe that we have derived considerable assistance from the judgment of Hansaria J. in Sardar Kartar Singh v. CWT ITR 379.
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1982 (2) TMI 327 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... nding in several other matters in the High Court, this petition is also directed to be heard on merits along with those petitions. In the meantime, the guarantee furnished pursuant to the orders of this Court will continue to operate till the disposal of the petition by the High Court.
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1982 (2) TMI 326 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Board to Rs. 20,000. The penalty of Rs. 10,000 levied against Basheer does not call for any interference as there are no extenuating circumstances. 10. In the result, Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 288 and 290 of 1980 are dismissed and Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 289 of 1980 is partly allowed and the aggregate penalty levied on the appellant therein is reduced to Rs. 23,000. There will be no orders as to costs in any of these appeals. 11. These appeals coming on this day for being mentioned in the presence of Mr. M. Ravindran, advocate for the appellant in all the appeals and of Mr. K. Swamidurai, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondent in all the appeals, the Court made the following order 12. This matter has come up for being mentioned today. The appellant in C.M.A. No. 289 of 1980 states that he may be granted some time for payment of the penalty amount. He is granted two months' time from this date for payment of penalty levied.
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1982 (2) TMI 325 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is intended to cover cases of payments received by order or on behalf of an authorised dealer in which case further proof that the receipt was without a corresponding inward remittance from any place outside India is necessary. In this case the Explanation does not come into play for the amount has not been received by order or on behalf of an authorised dealer. Here the amount has been received on instructions from a person outside India and the same has not been received by the appellant by order or on behalf of any authorised dealer. Once the Explanation is not found to be applicable in respect of the violation complained of under Section 9(1)(b) the further contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in respect of the violations complained of under the new Act the Explanation also should be satisfied does not arise. All the three contentions therefore fail and the civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 324 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... IT, Madras 1961 41ITR645(Mad) and CIT, Lucknow v. Vikram Cotton Mills Ltd. (1971) 106 ITR 829. 6. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions as follows M.C.C. No. 39/78 (1) Without applying the correct test the Tribunal was not right in holding that the rental income was income from house property. (2) The answer to question No. 2 will depend upon the answer the question No. 1 after applying the correct principles. M.C.C. No. 34/78 Without applying the correct principles the Tribunal was not right in holding that the rental income was not assessees business income and losses incurred in the earlier years could not be carried forward. The Tribunal will rehear the appeals and decide the aforesaid question after applying the correct principles in the light of the observations made above. It will be open to the Tribunal to give the parties opportunity to produce fresh evidence or material relevant to the questions. There will be no order as to costs of these references.
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1982 (2) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... allotment in favour of any person without giving an opportunity to the landlady or the landlord to exercise her/his privilege of nominating a tenant. 13. We have already pointed out that the object of the Act seems to be to arm the owner with the power of nomination so as to protect him/her from unpleasant tenants or indecent neighbours who may make the life of the owner a hell. Moreover, the conduct displayed by the appellant in this case clearly shows that if he was thrust on the respondent without her being allowed an opportunity to nominate a tenant, it will violate the very spirit and tenor of Section 17(2) of the Act. 14. As we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court has to be upheld we refrain from making any further observations on the merits or any aspect of the matter which have to be gone into afresh as directed by the High Court. 15. We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only.).
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1982 (2) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion different from the one which we have reached in this appeal. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Dadarao Kashiram's case (supra) cannot be considered as a correct one and we, therefore, overrule it. The High Court was right in the present case in holding that the proceedings commencing with the return filed by Bhikoba could not be dropped merely because he died before a notification was issued under section 21 of the Act. The proceedings have to be continued and the surplus land in the hands of Bhikoba as on the appointed day should be determined and taken possession of in accordance with law. The heirs of Bhikoba are entitled to participate in the said proceedings representing the estate of Bhikoba. They would be entitled as heirs at law only such land that may remain after surrendering the surplus land as may be determined under the Act. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where this Court should entertain the present petition of Harbans Singh and this Court should interfere. In the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court would have been justified in commuting the death sentence imposed on the petitioner to one of life imprisonment. As, however, the case of the Petitioner had earlier been considered by the President of India to whom the petitioner had presented the petition for mercy, I am of the opinion that propriety and decorum require that the matter should be referred back to the President instead of this Court deciding to commute the death sentence of the petitioner to one of life imprisonment. With these observations, I respectfully agree with the order passed by the learned Chief Justice.
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1982 (2) TMI 320 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this was indicative that the transaction was a transaction of mortgage by way of conditional sale. This recital is not indicative either way. A man may, when he is in need of money, sell his property or be may mortgage it. Mr. Dhorde also submitted that it was the appellant's case that the property had been transferred at an undervaluation, which was indicative of a mortgage, but the trial Court rejected that contention, It had done so quite rightly since it was sought to be established by nothing more than the appellant's bare word. 13. In the result, I am inclined to take the view, having regard to the text of the deed interpreted in the light of surrounding circumstances, that it is a deed of sale with a condition repurchase. 14. In the view of the matter the appeal must fail and is dismissed. Having regard to the enormous litigation to which I have earlier made reference, the fair order is that the parties shall bear and pay their own costs. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 319 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... idance of the District School Board. Moreover, the Advisory Committee or the Selection Committee has no authority to limit the total number of candidates to be empanelled. We, therefore, overrule the contention of the appellants in this regard. 18. The last point that has been urged on behalf of the appellants is that the candidates approved for appointment in one circle should not be appointed to the posts or primary teachers in any other circle. We do not think that we are called upon to decide this point. All that we say that the appointments should be made in accordance with the provision of Rule 3(2) of the Rules, which has also been directed by the learned judge. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellants. 19. For the same reasons as in the said appeals being F.M.A.T. No. 1380 of 1980 and F.M.A.T. No. 1499 of 1981 and also for the reasons as aforesaid, we dismiss these appeals. There will, however, be no order as to costs. M.K. Mukherjee, J. 20. I agree.
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1982 (2) TMI 318 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... who may be alleged to be guilty of a corrupt practice may indeed be very large, with the consequence that all of them may possibly be joined as respondents. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the opinion that no one may be joined as a party to an election petition otherwise than as provided by Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act. It follows that a person who is not a candidate may not be joined as a respondent to the election petition. The appeal is therefore, allowed with costs and the names of the appellants and the seventh respondent in the appeal are directed to be struck out from the array of parties in the election petition. We may mention that in arriving at our conclusion we have also considered the following decisions cited before us S.B. Adityen & Anr. v. S. Kandaswami & Ors.,(1) Dwijendra Lal Sen Gupta v. Herekrishna Koner,(2) H.R. Gokhale v. Bharucha Noshir C. & Ors.,(3) and S. Iqbal Singh v. S. Gurdas Singh Badal & Ors.(4) Appeal allowed
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1982 (2) TMI 317 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lour is his own performance and not the exhibition, performance, amusement, game or any sport offered by the petitioners. The payment made by a person to another to provide him with tools for deriving pleasure from his own performance with the help of the tools cannot be held to be payment to that' another for 'admission to entertainment' as contemplated by the Act. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be held that the petitioners receive 'payment for admission to entertainment', when they collect amounts inserted by the persons in the slot. No duty is payable by the petitioners under Section 3 of the Act in respect of the payments so received. The notices of demand issued by the respondents are, therefore, quashed. 8. For all these reasons, the notices of demand issued by respondent No. 2 are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of the petition. The amount of security, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners.
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1982 (2) TMI 316 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appear as a witness about the same. It is more so in the admitted position that there is no statutory requirement whatsoever to this effect. It has been authoritatively said though in the realm of contracts under seal that there is no magic in a water. Perhaps it may be said in the present context also that there is no magic in the wax for sealing samples or the custody of seals used therefor. 26. To conclude, it must be held that there is neither a statutory requirement nor a precedential mandate for handing over the seal used by the police officer in the course of an investigation to a third person forthwith. It necessarily follows therefrom that even where it has been so done, the non-production of such a witness cannot by itself affect the merits of the trial, 27. The twin legal issues having been answered in the above terms, both the criminal revisions would go back for decision on merits, before a Single Bench. D.S. Tewatia, J. 28. I agree. K.S. Tiwana, J. 29. I agree.
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1982 (2) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it. It may be possible, in course of time, to process rice bran by the use of advanced food technology in order to make it a common article of food for human consumption. Our attention is drawn by Shri Bhagat, who appears on behalf of the Haryana Government, to a decision of this Court in M/s Sachdeva & Sons & Ors v. State of Punjab & Ors (Civil Appeal No. 817 of 1980 decided on May 7, 1980) in which it was held that rice bran is "cattle fodder" within the meaning of section 2(a)(i) of the Act. We need not go into that question since we are of the view that rice bran, being a foodstuff, is an essential commodity. The decisions in The State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah(1) and Shriniwas Pannalal Chockani v. The Crown(2) which were cited by Shri Maheshwari and Shri Bhagat respectively do not bear upon the question in issue before us and need not, therefore, be discussed. For these reasons we dismiss the appeal, but without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the Writ Petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the drivers-constables of the Delhi Police Force atleast on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The scale of pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect. Petition allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 313 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... which does not contain either cellulose derivates or other plastic materials, is a separate class of fabric known to the Trade. It has a distinct use and appearance different from the normal coated, impregnated or laminated cotton fabrics. 10. In the BS 419 1956 (for varnished cotton ‘sheet and tape for electrical purposes’) “yellow varnished cloth” is described as usually manufactured with a clean insulating varnish consisting of a drying oil in combination with a resin. 11. The classification of the material received by the applicant from others is not the question under consideration here. 12. It is also not in dispute in this case that a type of “varnish” comes into being before it is used for coating cotton fabric. (The question of its duty-ability or otherwise is also not under consideration in this case). 13. In the circumstances the Board allows the appeal and sets aside the Collector’s order under Appeal.
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1982 (2) TMI 312 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... present case because we are concerned with the clearances for the year 1979-80. Clause (a) (ii) pertains to the clearances made subsequent to the financial year 1978-79 and would be applicable to the present case. Clause (aa) would also be applicable to the present case. The correct construction of the notification is that in the present case the petitioners should satisfy the conditions in both clause (a) (ii) as well as clause (aa). Even if one of the conditions is not satisfied, the petitioners would not be eligible for the notification. Thus, even if the petitioners satisfy the condition in clause (a)(ii), they would not be eligible for the benefit of notification if they do not satisfy the conditions in clause (aa). In the present case the petitioners admittedly do not satisfy the condition in clause (aa). This fact has not been disputed in their submissions either. 5. In view of the above, Government uphold the order-in-appeal and reject the revision application.
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1982 (2) TMI 311 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... use they had referred to some latest research regarding the use of the product orally apart from its use as injections as mentioned in the pharmacopoeia. They further contend that this additional information which is of a general nature did not in any way detract from their character as a pharmacopoeial preparation nor make the goods a patent and proprietary medicine. The fact of supply of this additional information of a general nature should not therefore be used against them for levy of duty. 4. Government consider that the mere fact of certain additional information regarding the use of a particular medicine based on the latest developments and research being mentioned in the literature accompanying the medicine does not change its character so as to lead to its classification as P.P. medicine when the product is otherwise made in accordance with the British Pharmacopoeia. Government accordingly accept the party’s contention and allow the revision application.
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1982 (2) TMI 310 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... cally included as a process of manufacture. 4. The Government agree with the petitioners that dyeing of duty paid grey woollen yarn per se does not bring into existence a new commodity having a different name, character and use. Government therefore hold that once the woollen yarn has paid duty at its grey stage at worsted woollen yarn under Item 18B of the Central Excise Tariff, and has been cleared from the factory of production, there was no scope for levying on the said yarn duty again under the same Tariff Item on processing of the same by a processor nor does the definition of manufacture in the Central Excise law encompass dyeing of woollen yarn. In other words the yarn manufactured by a manufacturer whether grey or dyed, has to discharge duty only once (and not twice) depending on the form in which the yarn is cleared from the factory of its manufacture. 5. The Government accordingly set aside the impugned order-in-appeal and allow the revision application.
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1982 (2) TMI 309 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... equently on another gate pass and an amount of duty of ₹ 867.90 was again debited in the PLA. When they claimed this amount of refund of duty paid twice on the said engine, their claim was rejected on the ground that they had failed to send intimation of the cancellation of the gate pass on the same day and further that the refund claim was time barred under Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. They have contended that under Rule 173G intimation regarding cancellation of gate pass could be given within 24 hours of cancellation and need not be given on the same day. Their main plea is, however, that this was a clear case of double payment and for refund of such amount time limit under Rule 11 would not apply. They had relied on Government of India order-in-revision No. 616 of 1978 in support of this contention. 3. Government find considerable force in the petitioners contention. Their contentions are, therefore, accepted and the revision application allowed.
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