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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 160 Records
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1982 (5) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nal judgment. 2. In the instant case as the amendment of the written statement was sought at the time of framing issues and it vitally affects the right of the parties and seeks to work some injustice to the Plaintiff, it merits serious consideration by the appellate court on the question whether or not amendment should be allowed. It would certainly not be a purely interlocutory order against which no appeal before the LPA bench would be maintainable. More than this we would not like to say at this stage as we intend to send the case back to the division bench for admitting the appeal and disposing it of according to law on merits. The order of the division bench date April 1, 1982 set aside and the division bench is directed to admit the appeal and decide it on merits in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above. We would request the High Court to decide the appeal as early as possible as the suit is still pending. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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1982 (5) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... if necessary or desirable, have them treated at the Mansik Arogyashala, Kanke. We would direct the State Government in the cases of these prisoners to have half-yearly reports about their mental condition submitted by the Superintendent, Hazaribagh Central 23'" Jail to the State Government. We would also like to make it clear that we are not finally disposing of this writ petition in regard to Gomia Ho, Bhondua Kurmi, Hiralal Gope, Raghunandan Gope, Francis Purti, Gulam Jileni, Kamla Singh and Hiralal whose cases we have examined in some detail, because the question would still remain to be considered whether these prisoners are entitled to compensation from the State Government for their illegal detention in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution. That is a question which we shall proceed to consider at the next hearing of the writ petition. The writ petition will stand adjourned to 26th July, 1982 for directions when We shall fix the next date of hearing.
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1982 (5) TMI 196 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shares without allowing deductions regarding expenses incurred by them during the said period for the maintenance and welfare of the family and education of the plaintiffs. Here again equity and fairness demands that the other members should also render accounts if they had joint assets in their possession. We can see hardly any reasonable objection to this finding. (30) We also agree with the learned Judge that the plaintiffs are liable for account for the transfer of shares made after May, 1963 and pay interest at 6 per cent per annum. It is incorrect for the respondents to say that the shares were not transferred by them. (31) Last of the objections is that costs should have been awarded to defendants 2 to 4 but they are non- contesting defendants and costs could not be awarded to them. (32) Having considered all aspects and features of the case we dismiss the appeal and the cross-objections except that the shares of the members shall be 1/7th each in place of 114th each.
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1982 (5) TMI 195 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich issued the injunction". (49) Mr. Ramachandran in his Contempt of Court (4th ed.) at page 646 says that the principle in Seaward v. Paterson that persons aiding and abetting the principal offender are also liable in contempt, has not been followed in India. He refers to Maharaj Pratap Udai Nath v. Sara Lal AIR1949Pat39 and the Privy Council in S. N. Bannerjee (supra) in this connection. I have come to the conclusion that for the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to determine the parameters of Seaward v. Paterson or to decide how far that case can be followed in India. (50) For these reasons I would dismiss the application but make no order as to costs. I make it clear that if the plaintiff desires he may move an appropriate application to the subordinate judge under Rule 2A of Order 39, Code of Civil Procedure for disobedience of the order of injunction. The subordinate judge will decide the application according to law. I say nothing on the merits of the case.
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1982 (5) TMI 194 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on would stand rebutted." 7. The ratio in Anwar Ali's case (supra) and Khoday Eswarsa and Sons case (supra) no longer holds the field as in those cases s. 28 of the IT Act, 1922, was interpreted by their Lordship of the Supreme Court, which did not contain any explanation similar to that as is contained under s. 271(1) of the Act. The Tribunal, while deciding the matter, took into consideration the above-said two cases. In that situation, the question of law as contained in question No. 2 does arise which should have been referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this Court. 8. As regards question No. 1, Mr. Ashok Bhan has fairly conceded that in view of the fact that cash credits of ₹ 17,200 have been treated as the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources, in the assessment order, so this question does not arise. 9. Consequently, we partly accept the petition and direct the Tribunal to refer question No. 2 to this Court for its opinion. No costs.
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1982 (5) TMI 193 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inion, is baseless. (39) We were referred to an unreported judgment in Rajh Match Works v. Union of India, W.T.P. 6129 of 1981 (6) decided by the Madras High Court by- Ramaswamy and Singaravalu JJ. We do not , this decision of any assistance to us. On the facts of the present case we have come to the conclusion that there is no estoppel against the statutory provisions contained in section 193(2). As regards the fiction imported by section 193(3) we are of the view that the deeming fiction shall apply to a case of "omission and neglect" and can be availed of by a party in the living present. So far as the past is concerned it is dead and gone. (40) For these reasons, this writ petition is allowed partly. We direct the Government to give permission for permanent change of purpose on the basis of the rates prevailing in 1970, i.e. at the rate of ₹ 600 per sq. yard. The petition against the Ndmc is dismissed. The parties are however left to bear their own costs.
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1982 (5) TMI 192 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e done either by furnishing a declaration or by leading evidence to the satisfaction of assessing authority. It may be examined from another angle. For instance 'A' sells to 'B' and 'B' furnishes the necessary declaration form but they are lost or destroyed in fire. Could the assessee be denied exemption only because the forms are lost or destroyed in fire. What is fundamental is sale to registered dealer. It appears the intention was that proof was not confined to only furnishing the declaration form but also proving the same to the satisfaction of the authority concerned. 3. In the result this revision fails and is dismissed subject to the observation that assessing authority while determining the question whether sale of foodgrains etc. was made by assessee to unregistered dealer or not shall examine other evidence also to come to the conclusion whether requirement of Section 3-D (7) (b) was satisfied or not. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (5) TMI 191 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Co. Ltd. v. Alice M. Hart, AIR 1929 PC 185, it was held that when once a contract has been executed, then apart from cases where rescission on the ground of fraud is sought, there remains nothing to attract the equitable jurisdiction and interest cannot be allowed on equitable principle. Consequently interest on equitable principle cannot be allowed. Even otherwise, it is not a case of hardship inasmuch as the remedy of the plaintiff-creditor for the balance amount would still be available against the principal debtor under the decree passed by the Kanpur court. 103. The result is that the plaintiff is entitled to recovered only ₹ 60 lakhs from the defendant. Issues are decided accordingly. 104. In conclusion, a decree for ₹ 60 lakhs (rupees sixty lakhs) with proportionate costs and future interest at 12.5% per annum on ₹ 55 lakhs (rupees fifty-five lakhs) from the date of the suit till realisation is passed in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant.
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1982 (5) TMI 190 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndered to him before that date. That was not done in the instant case and, therefore, as from November 7, 1969, the civil right to get back the seized goods accrued to the petitioner." It may be noted that the notices in the Gujarat case were under Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and Section 110(2) of the Customs Act. 10. In our opinion, no notice having reached the petitioner or having been tendered to him within the period of six months, he earned a civil right of return of the articles seized, 11. The petitioner had raised these questions specifically and pointedly before the appellate and revisional authorities. It is unfair of them to have sidetracked the issue and not recorded findings. 12. On the aforesaid analysis and findings, we allow the writ petition quash Annexures 9, 11 and 12 and direct the opposite parties to return the articles seized. Let a mandamus issue. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200 (Two hundred only), Naba Kumar Das, J. I agree.
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1982 (5) TMI 189 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... rs which were part of the plant necessary for the manufacturing process of the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted this argument and directed that depreciation at the rate of 15 per cent should be allowed on the value of the pond. Since the main pond was being used for more than one shift along with other plant, the Commissioner (Appeals) directed the ITO to grant extra shift allowance in respect of the pond also and he further directed development rebate in respect of the pond. 13. Though the revenue has taken this ground before us for two years, viz. assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77 no material has been placed before us on behalf of the revenue to show that any of the facts recorded by the Commissioner (Appeals) in this connection are erroneous and, therefore, we see no reason to interfere with order of the Commissioner (Appeals) . 14. In the result, the appeal for the year 1974-75, will be treated as partly allowed. The remaining three appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (5) TMI 188 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... i, J. in the earlier decision of this very assessee. It is, however, not necessary to decide it as prima facie the Tribunal,, appears to have been inclined to have same view. The controvery shall be decided when the matter is taken up by Tribunal under Section 11 (8) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. 5. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by Tribunal is set aside. The question of law raised by Commissioner of Sales Tax is decided by saying that in a case where there are two notifications, one granting exemption and other levying tax then the notification which grants exemption should be applied. Further the finding recorded in earlier assessment year in respect of applicability of a particular notification does not operate as res-judicata in subsequent years. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Tribunal to pass appropriate order under Section 11 (8) of the Act. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which are assessed at ₹ 300/- .
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1982 (5) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... become victims of organised crime. There is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant vigil over the movements of such persons. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order. The contention that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention did not furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and further that they were vague, irrelevant or lacking in particulars, cannot be accepted. A bare perusal of the grounds of detention along with the particulars of the 36 cases furnished in the accompanying chart, shows that the grounds furnished were not vague or irrelevant or lacking in particulars or were not adequate or sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In the result, the petition must fail and is dismissed. N.V.K. Petition dismissed.
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1982 (5) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
constitutional validity of ss. 1(2), 3 and (5) of U.P. Excise (Amendment) ordinance No. 4 of 1979 - the constitutional validity of ss. 1(2), 3 and 5 of U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 1979 (which replaced the said ordinance No. 4 of 1979)
(br) (br)
"assessed fee" in addition to the "fixed fee"
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1982 (5) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the order of detention, we sent for the original files and we have perused them. We are satisfied that the matter was examined thoroughly at various levels and the detaining authority applied his mind fully and satisfactorily to the question whether the petitioner should be detained under the COFEPOSA. The passage of time form the date of initial apprehension of the detenu and the making of the order of detention was not occasioned by the laxity on the part of the agencies concerned, but was the result of a full and detailed consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case by the various departments involved. We find from the file that the very question whether the passage of time had made it unnecessary to order the detention of the detenu was also considered by the detaining authority. We are unable to hold in the circumstances of this case that there was any tardiness on the part of any one or that the detention is in any manner illegal. The petition is rejected.
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1982 (5) TMI 184 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as held by the respondent. If the appeal is held to have been lodged on 14-3-1977, it follows that the same was in time and the conclusion reached by the respondent to the contrary is manifestly illegal and the inpugned order rejecting the appeal on that ground is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 8. As I have reached the conclusion that the appeal filed by the petitioner was in time, on the very period of time stated to have been allowed by law, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of Sri Manjunath that there is no period limitation prescribed for filing an appeal in the scheme itself. 9. In the light of my above discussion, I quash the impugned order of the respondent and direct it to restore the appeal filed by the petitioner to its file and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law. 10. Rule issued is made absolute. But, as the respondent has remained absent and has not contested the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1982 (5) TMI 183 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erned, they themselves constitute plastics material out of which articles of plastic are manufactured, so both, the plastic sheets and plastic tubes, cannot be considered to be articles made of plastic. On this construction, as well, both these manufactured products, that is, A.P. sheets and A.P. tubes, do not attract excise duty under Tariff Item 15A, sub-item (2). Manufacture of A.P. sheets and tubes is an intermediate stage in the process of manufacture of plastic bangles. 7. In view of the above construction placed on Tariff Item No. 15A(2) in relation to the products of the petitioners, it is unnecessary to examine the question as to whether their products are exempt under the amended notification No. 38/73. 8. In the result, all the above writ petitions are allowed and it is declared that acrylic plastic sheets/tubes and plastic bangles do not attract excise duty under Tariff Item No. 15A(2) and the respondents are restrained from levying excise duty on these products.
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1982 (5) TMI 182 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... e since the goods were classifiable under Central Excise Tariff. The refund claim was filed on 28-12-76 and therefore the claim for the period 1-3-75 to 3-11-75 is clearly time-barred. As regards the claim for the period 20-7-71 to 28-2-75, it is clear that the speciality oils were not classifiable under any item of the Central Excise Tariff and hence the provisions of Limitation Act and not limitation prescribed under Rule 11 of Central Excise Rules, would apply. Therefore, having regard to the above legal position and the fact that the petitioner would already have passed part of the burden of the indirect tax to the customers, Government direct that refund should be given to the petitioners for the duty paid in the period 29-12-73 to 28-2-75. The case is accordingly remanded to the Assistant Collector for necessary sanction provided the refund is otherwise in order. The revision application is accordingly allowed in part with the above direction and is otherwise rejected.
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1982 (5) TMI 181 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... found classifiable under Tariff Item 68 of Central Excise Tariff, the duty under the aforesaid T.I. 68 ibid would be chargeable right from the time Tariff item 68 came into force i.e. 1-3-75. It, therefore, follows that the demands for duty where due should be modified accordingly and excess duty, if any, charged should be refunded on that basis. As already observed, some samples of Ion Exchange Resin manufactured by one of the parties, namely, M/s. Tulsi Fine Chemical Industries, are said to have been tested by the Chief Chemist and found to have no resinous properties. In their case also it shall be ensured that all varieties, types and brands of Ion Exchange Resin manufactured by thenare tested by the Chief Chemist for their resinous properties/ characteristics. The D.V.B. beads would however be classifiable in each case under Tariff Item 15A (1)(ii) of Central Excise Tariff. The review proceedings and revision application under consideration are disposed of accordingly.
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1982 (5) TMI 180 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... resume that all the ‘hair beltings’ or the ‘goods’ were processed cottion beltings. 17. As regards the sample tested on 7-6-1980 the Board observes that the result of the test could apply in respect of the hair beltings of the same lot from which the sample was drawn. 18. The result could not be adopted for further clearances of the hair beltings of the same type only in case there was a practice of drawing prospectively until the next sample was drawn. 19. The Board observes that there was no such practice in existence. 20. Even otherwise, the Board observes that after 7-6-1980 there was no clearances of “hair beltings” of more than 15 CM width which could be deemed to be “cotton beltings” and on which duty could be demanded. 21. In the result the Board finds that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 22. The Board accordingly allows the appeal and sets aside the order under appeal.
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1982 (5) TMI 179 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the detention continued to be justified on the date of the report of the Advisory Board, even if it was justified on the date of the making of the order of detention?
Held that:- The order of detention was made on 7.1.82 and the consideration by the Advisory Board was on 8.2.82. The passage of time was not so long nor had any circumstances intervened to justify any compartment-wise consideration of the justification for the detention on the date of the making of the order of detention and on the date of the report of the Advisory Board. In the circumstances of the case, I think that the report of the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for the detention of Richard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki necessarily implied that the detention was found by the Board to be justified on the date of its report as also on the date of the making of the order of detention. Petitions dismissed
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