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Showing 1 to 20 of 218 Records
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1983 (10) TMI 298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... admit him to the M.S. course and thus granted a relief to the respondent which he himself never prayed for and could not have prayed for. Such a gross discrimination made in the case of a person who had obtained lowest aggregate and lowest position seems to us to be extremely shocking. Although much could be said against the view taken by the High Court yet we would not like to say more than this that the High Court had made a very arbitrary, casual and laconic approach to the case and based its judgment purely on speculation and conjectures swept away by the consideration that Dr. Sinha possessed a diploma when in fact other candidates also had obtained diploma but that could not be taken into consideration, because the rules did not so provide. 28. For these reasons, therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court issuing mandamus to the State to admit the respondent to the M.S. course. His writ petition in the High Court thus stands dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 297 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in S.O. 22 can be punished under S.O. 23 must be rejected. 25. That leaves for our consideration Clauses 16 and 30. They from an integral part of a code and the setting and purpose underlying these two Clauses 16 and 30 must receive the same construction which Clauses 10 received. therefore, for the reasons herein indicated, the heads of charges 2(c) to 2(h) would not be comprehended in Clause 10, 16 and 30 of the S.O. 22 applicable to the appellant-Company. We broadly agree except for one aspect specifically mentioned with the conclusion of the High Court. Accordingly, no case is made out for interfering with the interpretation put by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High Court on relevant standing Order. The appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000. (1) Sec Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition Vol. 44 paragraphs 909-910 at page 560,
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1983 (10) TMI 296 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rtment or the examples cited therein cannot convert a cinema, private enterprise to a public institution. The word "et cetera" therein on which the petitioner's counsel stressed cannot also advance his cause. "Et cetera", according to the Oxford Dictionary means, "And the rest and so forth and so on, indicating that other things which can be inferred are included in the statement; usual additions." "Etc." therefore does not share the character of an inclusive definition and cannot therefore enlarge the scope of the expression, "institution". Cinemas are not comprehended within the expression 'public institution' for the purpose of allotment of telephone. 8. The petitioner has to stand in queue along with the rest of the applicants unless he desires to own one under the "Own your Telephone" (OYT) Scheme. No rights of the petitioners are infringed and no merits in the O. P. The O. P. is dismissed. No costs.
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1983 (10) TMI 295 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Kerala State arresting the petitioner in connection with their Crime No. 185/83 they are hereby directed to release him on bail on his executing a bond in a sum of ₹ 3,000/- with a surety in a like sum to their satisfaction. The petitioner is directed to approach the appropriate Court in Kerala State within 20 days from the date of his arrest by the Cannanore police. In case he makes any such application within the time referred to above this order of anticipatory bail will be in force till such time as that court passes an order. In case the petitioner does not make any such application this order ceases to be in force thereafter i.e. from the 21st day of his arrest. He is also directed to appear before the Cannanore police if and when he is required in connection with this case. He will not interfere with their investigation and he will also not leave this country without the prior permission of this Court as long as this order remains in force. 20. Order accordingly.
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1983 (10) TMI 294 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xtension of the period of limitation. In such a state of affairs, when there us further delay and the proceeding is filed beyond the statutory period of limitations the court should not ordinarily countenance an application for condonation of delay, unless the same is properly and justifiable explained. 5. It may also be pointed out that the Leave Petition was filed on 26-7-1982. Paragraph 6 of the same states that the petition was within time. The notice of motion for condonation of delay was taken out a week late i.e. on 2-8-1982. It is thus clear that on the day on which the Leave Petition was filed, the application was not aware that he was beyond time by over 50 days. 6. In our opinion, when the totality of circumstances considered, no cause is made out for condonation of delay of this magnitude. 7. In the result, the notice of motion must fail and will stand dismissed with costs. 8. The office must now treat this petition as barred by limitation and also as disposed of.
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1983 (10) TMI 293 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... ection 40(b) of the Act. Clause (8) of the partnership deed provides for payment of interest on the credit balances of the partners. Therefore, this is a case in which the capital at interest is substituted by borrowings from a third party at interest. The overall position being that the withdrawals made by the partners is correspondingly matched by the borrowings from a third party. It is merely a case of conversion of one catagory of borrowing, namely, on capital account to another category of borrowing from a third party as stated above and therefore, having regard to the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the disallowance of interest was not called for except in regard to the overdrawing of the partners. Since the overdrawing by two partners is less than overall credit balances of other partners, applying the test in Kishanchand Chellaram’s case (supra) we do not see any reason to disallow any interest on the said borrowings also. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1983 (10) TMI 292 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court reopens. In a decision reported in AIR 1973 SC 313 (Amar Chand Inasi v. Union of India), their Lordships have held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 if the suit is not presented on the reopening day in the proper Court. In this case, the Court of Munsif, Berhampur was not the proper court for filing of the suit. Therefore, the plaintiff would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 so as to extend the period of limitation till 2-4-74. 10. In view of the aforesaid position of law, the suit is bound to be held to be barred by limitation even though the plaintiff had succeeded on merit in both the Courts below. Hence this appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed as barred by limitation. In the peculiar facts of this case, there would be no order for costs.
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1983 (10) TMI 291 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... the statutory Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-section (7) of Section 41A provides that all arbitration proceeding relating to a dispute of the nature specified in Sub-section (1), on or before the date of commencement of the Act in which no award has been made by the said date i.e. March 21, 1982 which is the date of publication of the Act in the Official Gazette, shall stand transferred to and disposed of by the said Arbitration Tribunal. 11. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Orissa High Court dated November 6, 1980 as also the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack dated March 26, 1980 are set aside and the dispute is referred to the Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Sub-section (2) of Section 41A of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as amended by the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1982 as enjoined by Sub-section (7) of Section 41A of the Act. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1983 (10) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ase rule and has fixed the compensation for other lands on the above basis. The High Court has affirmed it. Since we have held that the proper basis of fixing compensation in these cases was fifteen years' purchase rule, the compensation awarded for lands in these cases should be reduced by one-fourth i.e. for lands of the first category compensation payable should be ₹ 750 per kanal instead of ₹ 1,000 per kanal. Similarly in the case of other lands also there should be a reduction of the compensation awarded by one-fourth. The claimants shall get solatium of 15% on the compensation computed on the above basis and they shall be paid interest at the rate ordered by the District Judge on the aggregate amount from the date of taking possession of the land till the date of payment. The orders passed by the High Court in all these cases shall stand modified accordingly. 19. The appeals are accordingly allowed in part. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
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1983 (10) TMI 289 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... solitary stand in support of the reference, therefore merits rejection. 17. It deserves pointed notice and indeed redounds to the credit of the learned counsel for the appellant. Mr. J. R. Mittal that when faced with the aforementioned precedents and unable to the contrary, he in the end conceded his inability to support the reference. 18. To finally conclude, it has to be inevitably held that the ratio of the Full Bench in Smt. Kailash Wati's case (1977-79 Pun LR 216) 9supra) was binding upon the learned single Judge and he was obliged to follow the same. No question for its reconsideration could therefore arise before the single Bench. In this situation it follows logically that the present reference does not arise and the case has consequently to be sent back to a single Bench foe a decision on merit in accordance with the law laid down in Smt. Kailash Watis case (supra). Prem Chand Jain, J. 19. I agree. S.C. Mittal, J. 20. I agree. 21. Reference answered accordingly.
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1983 (10) TMI 288 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iting of the person who has been exmained by the defendant himself as his onw witness. Mr. Reis appearing for the defendant however, has protested that this payment is not covered by Sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. He has referred us to Sant Lal v. Kamal Prasad, and Harkubai v. Shankerbhai, AIR 1944 Bom 37. These two authorities lay down that an acknowledgement or a payment must be in writing. There is no difficulty in accepting this propositions of the Limitation Act itself. But on a proper appreciation of the evidence which is on record we have no difficuity in holding that the payment which was made on 15th of April 1968 was made on behalf of the defendant and the said payment is evidenced by the writing of the accountant who was working in the firm of the defendant and who had been examined as defendnat's witness. The decree of the court below. Therefore can be sustained on merits. In the result this Letters Patent appeal is dismissed with costs. 24. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vement of coal. If consistent with this planning, the railways have stopped booking of coal in wagon load from wayside station, it cannot be said that this action has imposed such an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental freedom of the petitioners to carry on their trade as to be violative of Art. 19(1) (g). We cannot part with this judgment without recording our uninhibited appreciation of thorough study of the knotty issues, research and analysis of historical background, and scientific and painstaking presentation of the facts and issues of law involved in these petitions by Shri Gupta learned counsel, who appeared for the various railway administrations. The intense labour put in by him in collecting the most useful material and elucidating the same before the Court in a very able manner helped us considerably in disposing of these petitions. These are the reasons which persuaded us to make the order set out at the commencement of the judgment. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ks from today and he shall be paid, future pension commencing from October 1, 1983 at the rate of ₹ 198/- per month. In awarding lump sum amount of ₹ 50,000/- we have taken into account pension arrears and all other computable benefits upto and inclusive of September 30, 1983 and no claim shall be made by the appellant and shall be entertained in this behalf. Appellant should be issued his Regular Pension Payment Order within the same period of 4 weeks so that he is in a position to receive pension which will fall due on November 1, 1983. We understand that pension of ₹ 198/- is basic pension and if there is any interim relief and other benefits that can be made under judgment of this Court or otherwise under the liberalised pension rules that may come up in future, he would be entitled to the same. The amount of ₹ 50,000/- shall be paid to the appellant by an 'Account Payee' cheque drawn in his name. 10. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1983 (10) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... us of judicial opinion in the High Courts of the country is thus in accord with the view expressed by this Court. It is not necessary on that ground to quash the impugned order of March 1982 as by efflux of time it has already ceased to be effective. It is appropriate to take note of the fact that the impugned order under s. 144 of the Code did not ban processions or gatherings at public places even by Ananda Margis. The prohibition was with reference to the carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls. Even performance of tandava dance in public places, which we have held is not an essential part of religious rites to be observed by Ananda Margis, without these, has not been prohibited. The writ petitions have to fail on our finding that performance of tandava dance in procession in the public streets or in gatherings in public places is not an essential religious rite of the followers of Ananda Marga. In the circumstance there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 284 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Tribunal. We have carefully gone through the said judgment and heard the learned counsel for the revenue at some length. We are of the view that the findings recorded by the Tribunal pertaining to this question are findings of fact. The Tribunal has held that the expenses incurred by the assessee are integral part of the business activity of the assessee and do not constitute entertainment expenditure. The Tribunal has, therefore, held that section 37(2B) of the Act is not attracted. 5. Having regard to the facts of this case we are satisfied that the Tribunal was right in reaching the conclusion that the expenses in question did not constitute entertainment expenditure. No case is made out for interference with the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal. We, accordingly, answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, i.e., against the revenue. 6. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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1983 (10) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r and left it cheaper; found it a sealed book and left it a living letter; found it the patrimony of the rich and left it the inheritance of the poor; found it the two edged sword of craft and oppression and left it the staff of honesty and the shield of innocence." It is only in a country of that order that the common man will have his voice heard. ( 26. ) The dream can become a reality if every citizen becomes aware of his duty and before asking for enforcement of his right, volunteers to perform his obligation. ( 27. ) And before we part, we must record our appreciation of the performance of the petitioner. He has taken great pains to high light his stand - collected a lot of relevant material and argued his case quite well - a doctor by profession though. As this was a public interest litigation, we direct that he shall be entitled to consolidated costs ₹ 5,000/- recoverable from the Railway Ministry of the Union Government unless paid within two months hence.
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1983 (10) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Registrar shall either himself or through an Officer in the Cooperative Department designated by him call a general meeting of the society at such time and place at the headquarters of the Central Cooperative Bank and to require the society to elect a new Board of Directors. We further direct that neither the members of the first Board of Directors constituted by the Registrar of July 22, 1981, nor the so-called Board of Directors reconstituted by him on September 6, 1983, shall interfere with the affairs of the society. In compliance with these direction, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies will issue immediate instructions for taking over the management of the Central Cooperative Bank and may designate an Officer in the Cooperative Department to discharge the duties and functions of the Committee of Management till a new Board of Directors is constituted in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (10) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Chandigarh as brought out in our recent judgment in M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co. Chandigarh etc. v. The Central Government & Ors. The question whether new legislation should be initiated to exempt newly constructed buildings for a limited period of time on the pattern of similar legislation undertaken by different States or to exempt such class of buildings for a given number of years from the provisions of the Act by the issue of a notification under section 26 of the Act is one for the State Government to decide. In the result these petitions succeed. Clause (b) of section 32 of the Act is hereby declared as unconstitutional and it is quashed. We, however, make it clear that this declaration would not affect the validity of any proceedings in which the decree for eviction passed by a civil court has become final and the landlord has already taken possession of the building in question pursuant thereto. The petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1983 (10) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing meetings and conducting its business in accordance with the procedure laid down under section 11 of the Act which has specified a time limit or seven weeks from the date of detention for the submission of the Board's report to the appropriate Government. It is, therefore, wholly wrong to interpret the words "place before" as meaning anything more than forward to or submit before the Advisory Board the relevant papers relating to the detention of the detenu. In the present case, the Advisory Board has disposed of the petitioner's case well within the period of seven weeks specified in sub- section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. This contention of the petitioner is also, therefore, devoid of substance. The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that there is no ground whatever justifying any interference with the order of detention passed against the petitioner and the writ petition is, therefore, only to be dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 279 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee in order to be binding on the assessee. Communication of the order on the facts of this case may be only technical requirement as the assessee's representative was present. However, the limitation for filing of an appeal would run from the date of communication of order. The assessee may or may not have appealed but the starting point of the limitation would be the date of communication of the order in the manner contemplated by sub-rule (10) of Rule 25-A. By the non-communication of the order in the manner specified in sub-rule (10) of Rule 25-A the assessee may have been deprived of his right to appeal as he had to file a copy of the amendment order along with his appeal. As the order of amendment was not operative in law the assessee was certainly entitled in assessment proceedings the urging that the recognition certificate did not stand amended. 9. In the result I find that there is no error in the order of the Tribunal. The revision is accordingly dismissed.
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