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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 266 Records
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1983 (11) TMI 301 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d production’ in Section 3 of the Central Excises Act is used in juxtaposition with the word manufacture’ and obviously refers to finished and semi-finished article made from raw material. Therefore, any by-product or intermediate or residual product in the manufacture of particular goods will be covered by the word production’. Saw dust is, therefore, liable to duty. The fact that the appellants sold saw dust to outside parties lends further support to the conclusion that it was marketable goods. We, therefore, hold that the appellants were liable to pay duty on saw dust under Item 68 of the Tariff. However, we direct that while re-calculating their duty liability in relation to saw dust, benefit of exemption Notification No. 118/75-C.E., dated 30-4-1975 should be given to the appellants in respect of the quantity of saw dust consumed within their factory during the period when this notification was in force. 7. The appeal is disposed off accordingly.
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1983 (11) TMI 300 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e for which they were to be used. Since, however, it refers to “Animal feed”, the expression must be interpreted as covering such tapioca chips as were particularly suited for use as animal feed in contrast to the other established uses of tapioca chips. The reference to the CCCN and the McGraw Hill Encyclopaedia given by Shri Chandramouli do not help the Department’s case, because they refer to preparations of a kind used in animal feeding, or to compound animal feeds, and tapioca chips by themselves would obviously not fall under either of these descriptions. 17. In the result, we consider that having regard to the nature and specifications of the particular goods under consideration they could not appropriately be termed as “Animal feed” falling under Item 21 of the Export Tariff Schedule. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the demands for export duty confirmed by the Assistant Collector and uphold by the Collector (Appeals).
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1983 (11) TMI 299 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... jority decision in the case of International Conveyors Ltd. We have nevertheless, for the reasons given earlier, considered it expedient to examine in detail the important arguments advanced. Having done so, we find no reason to take a different view from that which was taken by the Tribunal in two orders relating to International Conveyors Ltd. In other words, we consider that the goods in question in this case were properly classifiable under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. We accordingly direct that the goods be re-classified under Item 68 and the duty payable, if any (after taking relevant exemptions into account) be calculated accordingly and the demand for duty made in the Collector’s order be consequently withdrawn or reduced, as the case may be. We also, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and the fact that the appeal is substantially allowed, set aside the penalty of ₹ 5 lakhs imposed on the appellants. 26. Announced in open Court.
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1983 (11) TMI 298 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... se, M/s. Multiple Fabrics Co. (P) Ltd., against the appellant in this case, namely the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta. The manufacturer is the same, the product is the same and the question for consideration is also the same, namely, whether the product was classifiable under Item 22(3) or under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. Both sides therefore adopted the arguments respectively advanced by them in Appeal No. ED (SB) 1255/83-D. 8. In Order No. 745/1983-D, dated 24-11-1983, we have considered this issue in detail and have held that the goods in question were correctly classifiable under Item 68. Following our decision in that case, we hold that the decisions of the Collector (Appeals) in the two orders which are the subject matters of the present appeals were correct. We accordingly confirm the two orders of the Collector (Appeals) and reject the two appeals filed by the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta, against them. 9. Announced in open Court.
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1983 (11) TMI 297 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... short landing, but of pilferage after landing and before the clearance for warehousing. 6. Shri Sethna then submitted that it was necessary for the petitioners to produce evidence to establish that the pilferage took place after the unloading of the goods. It is impossible to accede to this submission. The petitioners had no access to the goods and it is not possible to expect that the petitioners should lead evidence to establish the pilferage. The order passed by respondent No. 4 is entirely incorrect and cannot be sustained in the circumstances of the case. 7. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute and the impugned order dated August 29, 1979, copy of which is annexed as Exhibit H’ to the petition, is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 8. The Prothonotary and Senior Master to refund the amount deposited by the petitioners in accordance with the interim order dated September 25, 1979.
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1983 (11) TMI 296 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that of the petitioners. Shri Chinoy also points out that the petitioners had paid the demurrage charges without any protest, but those firms had approached the Court before clearance of the goods and the facts in those two cases were totally different than that in the present petition. There is considerable merit in the submission of Shri Chinoy, and even on merits I was not inclined to grant relief to the petitioners. At the most I might have considered granting some relief to the petitioners in respect of the two consignments which were released by the Customs on January 21, 1978, that is during the strike period, but taking into consideration the small amount which the petitioners might have been able to recover back, in my judgment, it is not fair to disturb the decision of the Port Trust authorities in writ jurisdiction. The petition, therefore, must fail. 6. Accordingly, rule is discharged, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 295 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nd unscanned by the adjudicating authority himself. Indeed, it is almost as if his opinion is the final word on the question of identity of the handwriting in the disputed documents. Nor do we know what reasons, if any, he had given in his opinion. Strangely enough, his opinion is not on record; (e) further, mere entries in account books, even if genuine and thus relevant and admissible in evidence, require to be corroborated by independent additional supporting evidence which may consist of vouchers, bills, or oral evidence proving the transactions in the account books. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that there is no material to sustain the penalty under Section 74 of the Act. We, therefore, allow the appeal and direct that the penalty in a sum of ₹ 5000, if paid, is to be refunded to the Appellant. Needless to say that the order of the adjudicating authority, in so far as the seized gold and gold ornaments are concerned, is not interfered with by us.
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1983 (11) TMI 294 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... of their memorandum of appeal it has been stated “The said Unit produced among other varieties of cotton fabrics, grey-markin (Medium A and Medium B) for use of the coated abrasive industry”. We have already held for the purpose of levy of handloom cess the term “cloth” should be taken as synonymous with the term “fabrics”. Since the goods are “fabrics” as described by the appellants themselves, we see no reason, in the absence of any specific evidence, to hold that they were not “cloth”. 21. In the result, we find that the goods in question were clearly liable to handloom cess. However, the present appellants were not liable to pay handloom cess for the period prior to 1-4-1974. We accordingly allow appeal No. 100/79 to the extent of setting aside the demand against the present appellants for duty for the period prior to 1-4-1974. The appeal is otherwise rejected. The other three appeals are rejected in toto.
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1983 (11) TMI 293 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... mputation could surely not be a satisfactory basis. If there is no record or other evidence about the first half year, the proper thing would have been to ignore that half year. Again, it is seen, the Collector has accepted the assessee’s plea of double accounting under various heads and given due allowance for the same. This would tend to show that the assessee’s plea was prima facie tenable and should have been investigated more thoroughly. (iv) If it is held, as we must, that the department has not established beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged clandestine production and removals did take place, the other allegation of deficiency in duty on the ground that Notification No. 137/60 (slab exemption) would not apply, must also fall to the ground. 7. Having regard to the foregoing discussions, we are inclined to give the benefit of doubt to the appellants and, consequently, we set aside the impugned order with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1983 (11) TMI 292 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... tem 15A neither an artificial definition under Section 2(f) has been prescribed for nor the tariff entry split up in the stages of levy in relation to the same product by way of different sub-items. Therefore, the Bombay High Court judgment has erroneously been relied upon in the majority decision. This is without prejudice to the admitted position that if an article after processing is classifiable under a different sub-item of the same Tariff Item, it will amount to manufacture as well as change in taxable description but neither of the criteria has been satisfied in this case to attract fresh levy. Thus the majority decision on this score does not seem to be correct. The proforma credit under Rule 56A is not set off duty because correlation between the raw material and the finished product is not necessary under this rule. Therefore, proforma credit cannot be taken as a set off of duty and would not in any way dilute the challenge to levy on the ground of double taxation.
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1983 (11) TMI 291 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... xes with a metal that is sufficiently fusible to be melted in a common ladle is not always so much for the purpose of securing anti-fraction properties as for the convenience and cheapness of forming a perfect bearing in line with the shaft without the necessity of boring it. Boxes that are bored, no matter how accurately, require care in fitting and attaching them to the frame or other parts of a machine.” We have also referred to pages 12-43 (especially pages 42 and 44) of the book Kent’s Mechanical Engineers’ Handbook, Editor ‘Colin Carmichael’ Twelfth Edition. From the drawings given on pages 42 and 44 of this book the argument of the learned SDR is borne out. Illustration numbers 72, 82 and 83 show how Journal, Bearing and Shaft are connected together. On a perusal of these we are of the opinion that the imported goods are bearing housing and therefore were correctly assessed under Item 84.63 CTA. In the circumstances we dismiss the appeal.
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1983 (11) TMI 290 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uo;ble the Chief Justice and Padmanabhan J. in W.A. 501 of 1983, which was also dismissed. It is brought to our notice that an appeal has been filed against the judgment in W.A. 501 of 1983, before the Supreme Court in petition for Special Leave to appeal (civil) No. 8835 of 1983 and the same is pending for final decision before the Supreme Court. 52. Before parting with this judgment, we feel that we would be failing in our duty if we do not place on record our appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the learned Advocate General, Mr. M.R.M. Abdul Kareem. Mr. P.M. Jumma Khan, Mr. K. Rangavajjula, Mr. P. Rajamanikkam, the learned Public Prosecutor, and Mr. R. Thiagarajan, the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for their excellent preparation and presentation of the case and for their lucid analysis and masterly presentation of the various proposition of law touching on this point, which have been of immense help to us in rendering this judgment.
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1983 (11) TMI 289 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ncerning to valuation or rate of duty. Since a larger Bench was constituted to hear an appeal of the Western Regional Bench, therefore, no question of valuation or rate of duty can be said to have been involved. Further, in view of the Divisional Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court 1969 (71) I.T.R. 279 the entire proceedings before this larger Bench are abinitio void and illegal because of the illegality in the constitution of the Bench which deprives it of any jurisdiction or authority of law. The provisions of the Excise and Customs Act do not authorise the President of the Appellate Tribunal to constitute Larger Benches or Full Benches merely because important questions are to be decided. No inherent powers can be presumed in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 129C(2). Since the subject requires a detailed comments and analysis which is not possible in this short note we, therefore, propose to deal it in a broader perspective in our forthcoming Editorials.
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1983 (11) TMI 288 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... However, the provisions as to the levy of fine in lieu of confiscation are mandatory viz., the fine cannot exceed the value of the thing. In the instant case, the Collector of Customs has mentioned that the value of the gold confiscated is ₹ 6370 approx. He has not mentioned whether it is the international price or domestic market price. As per the price mentioned in the order the value of the gold per tola works out to ₹ 118 approx. I, therefore, reduce the redemption fine to 100% of the value of the gold confiscated. Approximately 4 tolas of gold had been confiscated and its value is approx. ₹ 472. The Revenue is directed to refund the balance amount of fine if already paid by the appellant. After getting delivery of the gold after payment of fine, the appellant is directed to get the gold converted into ornaments through a certified goldsmith or registered gold dealer within thirty days. This option should be exercised within one month of this order.
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1983 (11) TMI 287 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ed by the Department is also liable to dismissal because they have come up against that part of the order of Collector (Appeals) whereby allowance was made for the period commencing from November 1976 on the basis of knowledge of the Excise authorities. In the view we had taken, that this knowledge extended back even to March 1975, making Rule 9(2) inapplicable for this period, the appeal of the Department does not retain any force. 36. We, therefore, dismiss Appeal No. ED (SB) 1942/83-D Collector of Central Excise, Bombay v. M/s. Rishi Enterprises, Bombay, whereas Appeal No. ED (SB) 116/83-D M/s. Rishi Enterprises, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay is allowed partially, setting aside the demand for the period from March 1975 up to 10-4-1977, with the result that it will be open to the Excise authorities to enforce the demand for the earlier period, namely, 13-2-1973 to 6-3-1975. Penalty amount already being almost nominal, that is, ₹ 250 is confirmed.
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1983 (11) TMI 286 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... meaningless. The respondents are correct in saying that during the material period, the Textile Control Order of 1964 defined “Drill” while the Textile Control Order of 1968 defined “Controlled Drill”. The first Order remained in force till it was specifically superseded by another Order dated 17-12-1979. The proposition of implied supersession of the Order of 1964 on 2-5-1968 propounded by the Department’s representative is also, therefore, not acceptable. Since the subject 4-harness Drill manufactured and cleared by the respondents satisfied both the conditions of proviso (v) - it conformed to the Textile Control Order definition of 1964 and no maximum ex-factory price for it was specified by the Textile Commissioner under the said Order - it was entitled to the concession given by the proviso. The impugned order of the Board is, therefore, correct and is upheld. The show cause notice issued by the Central Government is discharged. Announced.
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1983 (11) TMI 285 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ble under T.I. 14E. As submitted by the learned Counsel, this re-classification would entitle the appellants to proportionate refund. We, however, do not find it feasible to accept the contention convassed by the learned Counsel that the case of being of mistaken payments, provisions of general law of limitation giving them three years would apply. The Tribunal has already taken a considered view in the matter in case reported as Miles India Ltd. (supra). In that view of the matter, which view the learned Counsel rightly did not further seek to contest before this forum, the matter is thus governed by Rule 11, which prescribed period of one year at the relevant time, for making refund claims, and only that would be available in this case. The appeal is allowed to that extent, with the direction that consequential refund ensuing upon re-classification as now determined, be allowed to the appellants within a period of three months, from the date of communication of this order.
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1983 (11) TMI 284 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ential duty or for claiming recovery of the amount erroneously refunded was the normal period of 6 months provided by Rule 10(1) of the Rules. In this view of the matter, the demand raised by means of the notice dated 6-1-1979, is, on face of the record, barred by time, because the refund had been allowed by means of letter and the accompanying cheque dated 23-8-1977, and the duty exemption availed around the same time, pursuant to order dated 4-11-1976. Both these events having occurred long before 6 months of the time of giving of the show cause notice; the demand made by means thereof, is certainly barred by time, and liable to be struck down on that account. The orders of the lower authorities are thus liable to be set aside on this account alone and the appeal merits acceptance on this score. It is allowed accordingly. 25. In face of the view, we have taken on the preliminary point of limitation, it has not been felt necessary to examine the other issues on merits.
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1983 (11) TMI 283 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... annot agree that it is a varnish simply because it is said to have the characteristics of the varnish, a description apparently given because it contains many ingredients that varnishes contain. But the presence of rosin which has not been disputed by the department and whose absence in varnishes has been vouched for by the I.S.I. throws doubt on the theory that S.K. Industries leather dressings are varnish. Preparations containing shellac are used in leather finishings and it cannot be said that this preparation, because it may contain shellac and other ingredients, is a varnish. The appellants declares at the hearing before the Tribunal that the dressings are applied to finished shoes to impart a gloss and a good surface; this has not been refuted by the department. All the evidence and all the authorities confirm us in our opinion that these leather dressings cannot be classed as varnishes. 25. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Collector.
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1983 (11) TMI 282 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... cushions, cinema seats, scooter seats, bus seats etc. under the broad description “Latex Foam Sponge Brand M.M. Foam’”. There has, therefore, never been any doubt that all these articles were only different varieties of latex foam sponge and the entry 16A(1) covered them specifically. We were informed by the respondents that their subject seats are moulded as such from latex and are not cut from any bigger piece of latex foam sponge. The Explanation added to Item 16A(1) on 1-3-1983 to include thereunder “articles made of latex foam sponge” is, therefore, hardly relevant for classification of the subject seats. We hold that the original entry “Latex foam sponge” covered latex foam sponge in all its forms and varieties and hence the subject seats too were covered by it. 7. Accordingly, we allow this appeal of the Department. The order passed by the Appellate Collector is set aside and the order of the Asstt. Collector is restored.
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