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Showing 1 to 20 of 216 Records
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1983 (7) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er will also give an undertaking to the Court in the form of an affidavit that the petitioner will inform the High Commissioner for India in Canada every three months commencing from 1.11.1983 about her whereabouts and address in Canada and we would also request the High Commissioner for India in Canada to forward such information to the Government of India through the Foreigners Regional Registration Officer, Delhi. If the petitioner commits any breach of this undertaking a sum of Rs. 50,000/-out of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- (mentioned above) will be liable to be forfeited. There will be liberty to apply. 3. The trial of all the accused in the above mentioned courts need not be held up on account of the absence of the petitioner. We may make it clear that we are making this order only in view of the, fact that the petitioner is suffering from cancer which is in the secondary stage and we feel that in circumstances it is necessary for her to be with her parents and relations.
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1983 (7) TMI 342 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Courts also for the first time. In this sense we are inclined to say that there does arise a substantial question of general importance in this group of petitions and it is required to be decided by the Supreme Court in order to put a quietus to the whole controversy once for all. The leave is, therefore, granted as prayed for. 40. In order to enable the O.N.G.C. to have a proper interim relief or any other relief from the Supreme Court, we direct that the interim relief operative so far shall continue to operate for the period of two months from to-day, on assurance by the learned Advocate General for the O.N.G.C. that if the Supreme Court by interim order makes any other provision or ultimately the petitioners' grievance is upheld by the Supreme Court, whatever overpayments can be found out will be adjusted towards the future claim from the respective petitioners. 41. Certified copies, if applied for urgently, shall be made available to both the sides on priority basis.
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1983 (7) TMI 341 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ustification in interfering with the orders passed by the Tribunal. The learned senior standing counsel for the department relied on the case of CIT v. Parmanand Advani 1979 119 ITR 464 (Pat.) and on the case of Vishwakarma Industries v. CIT 1982 135 ITR 652 (Punj. & Har.) (FB). All these cases have been considered by this Court in Tax Case No. 62 of 1974 decided on 16-3-1983. Furthermore the principle is fully discussed and settled by the cases of CIT v. Patna Timber Works 1977 106 ITR 452 (Pat.), CIT v. Tata Services Ltd. 1980 122 ITR 594 (Bom.) and Tax Case No. 35 of 1975 decided on 23-3-1983. 8. We accordingly answer the question referred to the Court in affirmative and hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the orders of the departmental authorities imposing penalty on the assessee under Explanation to section 271(1)(c). 9. In the circumstances of this case, however, we shall make no order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ain of being thrown out of court on this technical ground. Justice cannot be a playground by kicking the ball from one court to other depending upon which of the conflicting views will ultimately prevail leaving a litigant on the tenterhooks and ultimately to be told that he acted according to the view taken by a Full Bench of a High Court which did not find favour with the learned Single Judge of the High Court of the State in which he resided. This is not justice. This is legalese which ought to be "avoided. 8. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the trial court as well as the order in revision petition by the learned Addl. Distt. Judge as also the decision of the High Court and grant the application made by the appellant for setting aside the ex parte decree and set aside the ex parte decree. The trial of the Suit shall proceed from the stage where the suit was decreed ex parte. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 339 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s that the view taken by the Claims Tribunal was not the correct view, this court would be fully justified in reading the entire record, appreciating the evidence and reaching its own conclusions. This is what has been done by me. 8. Normally, such a finding would require remand of the case to the Claims Tribunal for further decision. Fortunately for us, the Tribunal has calculated a sum of ₹ 2,700 payable to the claimant on account of injuries and damages caused to him and the learned counsel for the appellant seems satisfied with this amount and did not make any grievance. It is, therefore, held that the appellant-claimant is entitled to receive a sum of ₹ 2,700 on account of injuries and loss caused to him by the accident. The respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay this amount. He is also entitled to interest at 6% per annum from the date of this order till realisation. 9. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, but without any order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 338 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... certificate in respect of the rape seed oil and there was no attempt by the assessee to evade tax. A categorical finding has been given that there was no mens rea on the part of the assessee. 4. The facts in this case are identical to the case of the assessee pertaining to the year 1973-74 reported in 1983 U.P.T.C. 439, Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Prag Ice & Oil Mills, Aligarh, in which the Commissioner's revision against an order of the Tribunal setting aside the penalty was dismissed. 5. In view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal as also the decision in the aforesaid case, the revision is dismiised with costs which are assessed at ₹ 200/- one set.
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1983 (7) TMI 337 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tinue even after a decree on the mortgage either under the express terms of the decree or by operation of law. But that does not convert a decree on a mortgage into a mortgage, much less a mortgage created by the company. Such a decree is not affected by s. 125 of the Companies Act. 9. Mr. Nain, learned counsel for the official liquidator, pointed out that under s. 529 of the Companies Act, the same rules shall prevail in winding up of insolvent companies as the rules applicable under the law of insolvency to the estates of insolvents. He submitted that a decree passed against an insolvent company can be reopened if it is unconscionable or collusive. There is, however, nothing in the present case which would indicate that the decree is collusive or unconscionable. A decree on admission is not per se collusive. No grounds have been made out for going behind the decree, assuming that it is open to do so. 10. In the premises, the present chamber summons is dismissed with costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 336 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trial Judge was perfectly justified in accepting the evidence of the plaintiff and in recording the finding that bailee and the sub-bailee had not taken such care of the car as was expected of the prudent man in respect of his own goods of the same quality and value. Therefore, the bailee is liable for the loss suffered by the plaintiff the bailor. 23. The last point which this Court directed the High Court to o determine was about the value of the destroyed car. The plaintiff has given the value of the Motor Car at the, time of its loss at ₹ 7,000, and that is the measure of the loss suffered by the plaintiff on account of the loss of the car. The trial Court had decreed plaintiff's suit to the extent of ₹ 7,000. The finding is confirmed. 24. For the reasons herein mentioned, this appeal must succeed and it is accordingly allowed. The Judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the one passed by the trial Court is restored with costs throughout.
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1983 (7) TMI 335 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not entered in the Satti Bahi upto the time of survey which should have been entered in the Satti Bahi. In the normal course of business the arrival of goods should be entered by the close of the business hours. However, the fact is that 58.50 quintal of Gur had not been entered in the books of account at 9.35 A. M. was no ground for drawing an inference that the assessee was entering transactions which were not entered in the assessee books of account and I am reinforced in the view I am taking by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Ratnesh Chand Kailash Chand v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1983 UPTC page 306. 4. In the result the revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set asid and the Tribunal is directed to accept the books of accounts and to make appropriate orders. The papers will now be sent back to the Tribunal in accordance with Section 11(8) of the Sales Tax Act. The assessee is entitled to his costs which are assessed at ₹ 200/-.
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1983 (7) TMI 334 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on whether the Circular issued by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports can validly amend the Import Policy, 1981-82. On a perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the Import Policy, 1981-82 mentioned above we agree with Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Senior Advocate for the appellants that the condition mentioned in the third respondent's impugned letter dated 15.10.1981 is not there in paragraph 138(1) of the Import Policy, 1981-82, that the Circular dated 31.8.1981 is invalid and that the rejection of the petitioners' request made in the letter dated 23.9.1981 by the third respondent in the letter dated 5.10.1981 is unwarranted, and the request should have been complied with. We are unable to agree with Mr. M.M. Abdul Khadar, Senior Advocate for the respondents that the condition mentioned in the letter dated 15.10.1981 is to be found in paragraph 138(1) of the Import Policy, 1981-82. Accordingly, we allow the appeal with costs and the Writ Petition without costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... same time it is to be realised by the appellant that he belongs to a noble profession, which has very high traditions and those traditions are not to be sullied by malpractices of this nature. Accordingly it declined to interfere with the punishment. We however feel that the punishment of suspension from practice for a period of three years to a junior member of the bar like the appellant is rather severe. The lapse on the part of the appellant was perhaps due to the fact that in the struggle for existence he had to resort to such malpractices. We strongly deprecate the conduct of the appellant but take a lenient view because he was an inexperienced member of the bar, and the fact that the incidents took place in 1971. In all facts and circumstances of the case, we feel it would meet the ends of justice if we reduce the period of suspension from three years to one year. We order accordingly. 8. Subject to this modification, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 332 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the court, will amount to material alteration. Obviously, the permission was granted without prejudice to the contentions of the defendants. Therefore, there is force in the contention of the defendants that they were having dealings with the plaintiff-firm who were also dealing in the same stainless steel goods business and so, the plaintiff or his partners have taken blank promissory notes from the defendants and filed the suit without even filling up the date under the authority given to them under S. 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Now, the position is the alteration affects the very contract itself and no decree can be passed on such an instrument which had no legal existence on the date of the filing of the suit. 11. The result is, both these issues are answered against the plaintiff and consequently the instrument is not valid in law and the suit based on it has to be and is hereby dismissed. I direct each party to bear his or her own costs. 12. Suit dismissed.
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1983 (7) TMI 331 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no penalty could be imposed by the Sales Tax Officer ; from perusal of the order of the Tribunal it is amply clear that this contention was accepted by the Tribunal and even then the case was remanded to the lower authority. When the Tribunal agreed with the assessee that no penalty could be imposed unless there was a finding that a given turnover has been suppressed or concealed by the assessee, then the Tribunal ought to have cancelled the penalty By remanding the order, the Tribunal has given a fresh inning to the S. T. O., which is not permissible under law. The order of the Tribunal, remanding the case is liable to be quashed for this very reason that the Sales Tax Officer has been given another opportunity to plug the loopholes that have already arisen in the penalty order. For the reasons, I hold that the penalty cannot be sustained and the order of the Tribunal is cancelled. 3. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 330 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... lity of inclusion of the value of packing in the assessable value of other excisable goods is tantamount to assessment of wrapping paper by itself once over; nor is there any ban or inhibition in the levy of duty on goods more than once. What is not acceptable is the assessment of the same goods to duty under the same tariff entry twice over-and that is not the position in the present case. 9. The wording of Rule 56A is clear that it is intended to cover certain finished products to enable their more convenient distribution. It is common ground that wrapping paper in the present case is used not for its own convenient distribution but for the distribution of other varieties of paper. In this view of the mater we find that the order of the Appellate Collector is contrary to the provisions of Rule 56A. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and restore the order C. No. V/17/30/5/82-MP. I, dated 26-4-1982 of the Assistant Collector.
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1983 (7) TMI 329 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ule 10A will apply. We do not traverse these points as we are disposing of the appeal on another legal issue. 7. The advocate for the appellants argued that in terms of Rule 56A(5) if proforma credit has been availed of due to error, inadvertence etc., a notice should be served on the assessee to whom such credit has been allowed within six months from the date of such credit. It is common ground that the notice in the present case was not served within the period of six months. We note, in passing, that there is no factual data to justify the extension of the period of six months to five years. We, therefore, find that the demand, though made in terms of Rule 56A(5) read with Rule 10A and confirmed under Rule 10A should really be one under Rule 56A(5). In that event, it is barred by limitation. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Assistant Collector confirming the demand for a sum of ₹ 21,.696.27; the demand, if paid, shall be refunded.
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1983 (7) TMI 328 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rement of temperatures as part of process control instrument for boilers and pipelines. We also take note of Shri Vaidya’s logic that every conductor is not a resistor and that resistance is not the main function of these elements. In fact, the appellants have stressed that these are the sensing element of the thermometers and not a resistance element. In the face of the explanation on page 1645 of the Notes to the CCCN that sensitive elements for various instruments, even when incorporating resistors, are classifiable under Heading 90.29, it would be difficult to rule out this classification in the present case. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the contentions of the Department. Since these elements are parts for use solely or principally with thermometers falling under Heading 90.23 and have not been elsewhere specified, they are correctly classifiable under Heading 90.29(1). We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and allow the appeal.
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1983 (7) TMI 327 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... It is not also in dispute that these dies are tools to be fitted into machine tools. Item 51A(iii) reads as follows - “Tools designed to be fitted into hand tools, machine tools or tools falling under sub-item (ii), including dies for wire drawing, extrusion dies for metals and rock drilling bits.” From the plain reading of the above entry it is clear that all tools designed to be fitted into machine tools would fall under the sub-item. This could include dies also which are in the nature of tools. The fact that dies for wire drawing and extrusion dies for metals have been specifically included in the tariff entry would not, in our view, lead to the conclusion that other types of dies would not be covered by the sub-item even if they are in the nature of tools designed to be fitted into machine tools. In this view of the matter, we hold that the subject goods have been correctly classified under Item No. 51A(iii) by the lower authorities. The appeal is rejected.
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1983 (7) TMI 326 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... Notification in this Order because in the two cited cases of this Bench itself, the same has been discussed. 7. Shri K.P. Jagadeeshan, Advocate, for the appellant submitted that the necessary workings of the rebate has been given along with the Revision Application. We do not propose to involve ourselves with such detailed workings as such. Since we have held in more than one case that exemption rebate as contemplated in the Notification No. 146/74-Supra was on excess production and not on average production, we are following the same approach in this case. 8. If the Excise Authorities are satisfied with the mathematical workings given by the appellant, the same should be accepted. Therefore, by following our decision as also the various Judgments of the High Courts noted in this Order, we allow the Appeal with direction that effect to this Order be given not later than three months from the receipt of this Order by the concerned Excise Authorities. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (7) TMI 325 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... pter Note saying that the term “glass” shall extend to fused quartz. In Chapter 70 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 which is large based on CCCN and which also relates to glass and glassware, there is a similar Note 3 which says that for the purposes of the Customs Import Tariff, “glass” is to be taken to extend to fused quartz and fused silica. It would be reasonable to infer that but for these Chapter Notes in the CCCN and the Customs Tariff, fused Quartz and fused silica would not ordinarily be regraded as glass. There is no corresponding extension clause or deeming fiction included in Item 23A of the Central Excise Tariff. No other evidence has also been laid before us to show that in commercial parlance articles of fused quartz are regarded as glassware. In the circumstances, the demand for duty made under Item 23A of the Central Excise Tariff in respect of articles of fused quartz cannot stand and is set aside. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed.
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1983 (7) TMI 324 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s in terms of Notification No. 62/72-C.E. which liability had to be discharged only at the time of clearance of the fabrics and that denying such benefit would be doing violence to the whole scheme of the compounded levy procedure. 5. The Department has cited no contrary judgment or order on the interpretation of Rule 96Q and we find no reason to disagree with the ratio of the earlier Tribunal Order. We would like to add that even if it were to be argued that the compounded levy scheme ceased with effect from 24-7-1972 and from that onwards the normal rules including Rule 9A became applicable, still the normal rate of duty effective from 24-7-1972 could not be applied retrospectively to the yarn which had been authorisedly removed (that is, taken for captive use in the manufacture of fabrics) much earlier. The date of clearance of fabrics was irrelevant for computing the normal duty for yarn. Accordingly, we allow this appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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