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1985 (3) TMI 318
... ... ... ... ..... e action the plaintiff may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiff's claim. In that view of the matter the plaintiff is not entitled to final judgment on the summary application and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. 20. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. The defendant is given leave to defend the suit unconditionally. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion as to the merits or the ultimate result of the suit. The defendant shall file the written statement within 3 weeks from date. Affidavits of documents shall be filed by both the parties within 2 weeks thereafter and inspection be given forthwith thereafter. Let the suit appear in the appropriate prospective list 6 weeks hence. It is desired that the suit should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this order. There will be no order as to costs. M.M. Dutt, J. I agree.
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1985 (3) TMI 317
... ... ... ... ..... have not been able to place before us various factors which may come in the way of the applicants to grant anticipatory bail of a limited time. In view of this position, we intend to exercise our powers under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by granting anticipatory bail for a period of one month i.e. till the end of 12th April 1985 so as to enable the applicants in both the applications to move appropriate Courts for seeking appropriate orders. It is made specifically clear that this anticipatory bail shall stand automatically vacated and cancelled on 13th April 1985 if in the intervening period no orders about the grant of bail from the appropriate Courts (i.e. the Courts where cases are likely to be filed) are obtained. In the event of the arrest of the applicants in the territory of this State each of the applicants be released on bail up to 12th April 1985 on each of them executing a personal recognizance bond of Rs. 2,000/- and a surety in the like amount.
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1985 (3) TMI 316
... ... ... ... ..... nce or in the suit for recovery of possession of the property instituted after the revocation of the licence to set up title to the property in himself or anyone else. It is his plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licensee and seek his remedy separately in case he has acquired title to property subsequently through some other person. He need not do so if he has acquired title to the property from the licensor or from some one else lawfully claiming under him, in which case there would be clear merger. The respondent has not surrendered possession of property to the appellant even after the termination of the licence and the institution of the suit. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to recover possession of the property. We accordingly allow the appeal with costs throughout and direct the respondent to deliver possession of the property to the appellant forthwith failing which it will be open to the appellant to execute the decree and obtain possession.
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1985 (3) TMI 315
... ... ... ... ..... rdingly, we hold that it is proper for the Department to have deducted an amount equal to the duty leviable on flush doors under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff with effect from 16-4-81 to 7-8-81. (Though the classification list was submitted in August 1981 and approved then, as both the appellant and the Department have stipulated that it is effective from 16-4-81, we do not go into the question of the correctness of such approval with effect from a date earlier to the date of submission of the list itself). 25. Accordingly, we allow the appeal in part. In so far as it relates to the sum retained by the Department in terms of a so-called assessment under Item 68 up to 15-4-81, we allow it but reject it in so far as the period after 16-4-81 is concerned. 26. The Assistant Collector is directed to work out the amount due in terms of the above orders within another four months from the date of this order and make refund of such amount within the said period of four months.
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1985 (3) TMI 314
... ... ... ... ..... . Thus respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 as well as respondent No. 12 are all amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 226. Petitioners were clearly entitled to admission. We, however, would not like to disturb respondents Nos. 4 to 7 and 9 for they cannot be held responsible for their wrongful preference. The course has commenced and we do hope and trust that there will not be any further delay in giving to these meritorious students what is legitimately due to them. 17. To conclude, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute in the above terms. Respondent No. 1 is directed to grant registration to petitioner No. 1 in post-graduation course in M.D. Medicine or Paediatrics and to petitioner No. 2 in post-graduation course in M.D. Obstetrics and Gynaecology for the current term, if necessary by creating supernumerary posts and without disturbing registration given to respondents Nos. 4 to 7 and 9. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 313
... ... ... ... ..... rs of the Tribunal and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. 23. (ii) We remit the cases to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner with a direction to him to restore the proceedings to its original file and redetermine the proceedings initiated by him with due regard to the orders to be made by the Commissioner on the applications made by the appellants under the 1976 Act, the law regulating the same and the observations made in this order after recording all such further evidence as may be placed before him and to be collected by him. But we, however, direct the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner not to permit the appellants to urge any contention on the validity of Chapter XX-A of the Act or on the validity of the proceedings initiated by him on the ground urged before the Tribunal or before us and found against them in this order. 24. Income-tax Appeals are disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 312
... ... ... ... ..... ith the prior permission in writing of the Textile Commissioner. Permission of the Textile Commissioner is not. therefore. an idle formality. No one can be heard to say that as penalty and prosecution is provided if there is contravention of the provisions of Clause-3 of the Control Order, the agreement for sale of spindles which, in the present case, is without any prior written permission of the Textile Commissioner, could be given eflect. (16) The issue regarding jurisdiction was not pressed before me by the defendant. But for the legal bar, I would have decided all issues in favor of the plaintiff except issue relating to interest on which there appears to be no evidence. (17) I would, therefore, dismiss the suit. But, as observed by the Supreme Court in Firm of Pratapchand Nopaji v. Firm of Kotrike Venkata Setty and Sons etc. (supra) "inasmuch as both sides to the unlawful agreements are in 'parii delicto", I would leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 311
... ... ... ... ..... not be given effect. In the absence of any other valid principle of seniority it is well established that the continuous officiation in the cadre, grade of service will provide a valid principle of seniority. The seniority lists having not been prepared on this principle are liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly these writ petitions succeed and the rule is made absolute. The impugned seniority lists challenged by the petitioners have been drawn up in violation of the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and therefore they are quashed. The first respondent is directed to draw up fresh seniority list in the light of the observations made in this judgment within a period of three months from today. All promotions granted since the filing of the petitions are subject to the decision herein given and they must be readjusted to be brought in consonance with this judgment. It the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 310
... ... ... ... ..... ssary to point out on the desirability to amend section 13 of the Act. 46. We have earlier found that the term "penalty" had to be construed as "interest". In the neighboring State of Tamil Nadu, that State has suitably amended a similar provision in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. We are of the view that a simple amendment to section 13 of the Act by substituting the term "interest" to "penalty" would end all this needless litigation before courts. We are of the view that sooner it is done, it would be better for the State. 47. In the light of our above discussion, we hold that this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule with costs of the respondents. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. 48. Let this order be communicated to the respondents within 10 days from this day. Let a copy of this order be also furnished to the learned Government Advocate within the same time.
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1985 (3) TMI 309
... ... ... ... ..... t shall be reinstated in service forthwith, with full back wages from the date of his dismissal until reinstatement. The Government of India will pay to the appellant the costs of the suit, the First Appeal, the Second Appeal, the Letters Patent Appeal and of this Appeal which we quantify at Rupees five thousand. The appellant will report for duty punctually at his former place of work on April 1, 1985. 9. In this brief judgment, we have referred to many unhappy facts. We must mention one more. We had adjourned this appeal after hearing it a while, in order to enable the Government to consider whether the appellant could be reinstated in service with a reasonable adjustment in the payment of back wages. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India showed us a letter written by a Deputy Secretary stating that the Hon'ble Minister of Agriculture desired him to say that the Court should decide the case on merits. We have done our modest best in that regard.
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1985 (3) TMI 308
... ... ... ... ..... on which the High Court reversed the decision of the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. But as these reasons are unsustainable, these appeals will have to be allowed. Accordingly these three appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the decision of the State Transport Authority granting all-India tourist permits to the appellants is restored. As the appellants surrendered their all-India tourist permits when they lost in the High Court and they plied their vehicles on temporary permits, it must be held that if the duration of the original permits has expired, they have to make a fresh application for all-India tourist permit but in that event they will be treated as applications for renewal of all-India tourist permit as contemplated by Sec. 58 of the Act and not as fresh applications under Sec. 63(7) read with Sec. 49. the appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 307
... ... ... ... ..... rmissible under Sec. 14(1) at double the ordinary wages by invoking Sec. 31. For these reasons, both these sets of appeals will have to be allowed and the common Judgment of the High Court governing all the five writ petitions as well as the common orders of both the Labour Courts will have to be quashed and set aside and the applications made by the employees under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D, Act will have to the dismissed. (23) Accordingly, all the appeals in both the batches succeed and are allowed and the judgment of the High Court from which these appeals arise is quashed and set aside as also the applications made by various employees under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act are dismissed. (24) While granting leave this Court directed that the appellants irrespective of the decision in these appeals will have to pay costs to the respondents in one set only. In accordance with this direction, the appellants shall pay costs to the respondents in one set only. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 306
... ... ... ... ..... raned in law. In the result, this Appeal must succeed and is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the Division Beach of the Allahabad High Court under Appeal is reversed and the order passed by it is set aside. The writ petition filed by the Respondent in the Allahabad High Court, namely, Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 84 of 1977, is hereby dismissed. Before parting with this Appeal, we would like to observe that the alleged incidents in respect of which the Respondent was tried before the general court-martial took place nearly ten years ago. We, therefore, feel that the Chief of the Army Staff should take into account the conduct and behaviour of the Respondent during the intervening period and if they have been in conformity with good order and military discipline and the high traditions of the Indian Army, he may consider the desirability of proceeding further in the matter. In the circumstances of the Case, there will be no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 305
... ... ... ... ..... a confession cannot be the foundation of a conviction but can only constitute 'a fourth leg to a tripod'. This statement has been repeated again in paragraph 30, where the High Court has observed "the confession alone and by itself cannot prove the guilt of an accused." We are not a little surprised that such a statement should have been made by the High Court. We wish to make it clear and this is only to repeat what is so well established that a retracted confession by an accused may form the basis of a conviction of that accused if it receives some general corroboration from other independent sources. It cannot however, be the basis for convicting co-accused though it may be taken into consideration against co-accused also. It is entirely wrong to think that a confession can lead nowhere. We are sorry to find such careless statements in the judgment of a High Court. o p /o p Special leave petition is dismissed. o p /o p N.V.K. Petition dismissed o p /o p
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1985 (3) TMI 304
... ... ... ... ..... the corporation and it provided for two separate activities, viz., to give to the said corporation the expertise and technical assistance of consultants and technical assistance in connection with construction and assembly of hulling, drying and processing factories and plants and also for management services thereof. The bid evaluation and engineering services are said to be connected with inviting tenders and for other process but the ultimate aim for those tenders and process is the construction of the corporation processing factory and plant and in this view of the matter, the step-in-aid included in these services, viz., engineering and bid evluations, has to be held as a step-in-aid for construction of factories and plants of the Corporation, hence, under section 9(1)( vii) read with Explanation 2 attached thereto the income is not taxable. We hold and direct accordingly. ₹ 84,456, as such, stands deleted from computation. The appeal succeeds and stands allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 303
... ... ... ... ..... ssee committed a breach of the provisions of Section 28-A it was liable to penalty. He submits that it is not necessary to record a finding for imposition of penalty that the breach was committed to cause any loss to the revenue or there was any element of evasion in committing the aforesaid breach. The very purpose of incorporating Section 28-A in the Act by the legislature was to check the evasion of sales tax. It was for this purpose that the importers were required to carry Forms 31 with them, and they were required to produce those forms at the check post. In view of the categorical finding that the assessee never intended to cause any loss to the revenue or any element of evasion was established the mere breach of provision of Section 28-A would not be sufficient for imposition of penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) of the Act. 4. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is quashed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 302
... ... ... ... ..... meal worms the sample was unfit for human consumption. 'Therefore, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has not established by any satisfactory evidence the requirement of s. 2(1)(f) of the Act. Consequently, no interference is called for with the judgment of the High Court which, as stated above, has dismissed the criminal revision in limine. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. In my opinion, the true meaning of Section 2(ia) (f) has been brought out in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia (supra) and the conclusion that 'it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption' is a correct statement of the law. I agree with my learned brother that the evidence led by the prosecution is inadequate to warrant interference with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trying Magistrate and upheld by the High Court. I, therefore, agree that the appeal has to be dismissed. Appeal dismissed,
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1985 (3) TMI 301
... ... ... ... ..... affidavit-in-reply. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer, as contended by these petitioners, that this unreasonable restriction has been imposed on the video cinemas in order to oblige those permanent cinemas and Rule 15(2) is required to be set aside as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10. In above view of the matter, we allow all the three petitions by declaring Section 6A of the Gujarat Entertainments Tax (Amendment) Act, 1984 and Rule 13(2) of the Gujarat Cinemas (Regulation of Exhibition by Videos) Rules, 1984 as ultra vires to the Constitution of India. Rule is made absolute in all the petitions with costs. At this stage, Mr. Vin seeks orally for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. We see that this is not a fit case to be so certified. The prayer is rejected. The operation of this judgment is stayed for a period of six weeks from today in order to enable the State of Gujarat to take recourse in accordance with law, if any.
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1985 (3) TMI 300
... ... ... ... ..... he disciplinary authority felt that the gravity of the charges proved warrants that the appellant should be removed from service it was open to the authorities to make an order either dismissing or removing him from service. But they could not have made an order reducing him to the lower post of Daftarband-Attender. 4. Hence this appeal is allowed, the order of the Learned Single Judge is set aside and the orders of the "divisional Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner imposing penalty are hereby quashed. The finding recorded by the Deputy Commissioner that the appellant is guilty of the charges proved stands affirmed. We remit the case back to the Deputy Commissioner only for the limited purpose of examining the question of imposing appropriate punishment commensurate to the charges held proved against the appellant. The Deputy Commissioner is directed to dispose of of the matter expeditiously after taking into consideration the explanation offered by the appellant.
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1985 (3) TMI 299
... ... ... ... ..... uation, the learned Counsel for the Director of Enforcement has argued that the respondent had impleaded the Director of Enforcement in the appeal which was filed by him before the Appellate Board and therefore the respondent cannot raise this argument now. Once it is held that this appeal is incompetent, then this argument cannot be decided here. The Director of Enforcement should have raised the argument before the Appellate Board. A reading of the order of the Appellate Board shows that no such argument was raised before it. 5. However, nothing said in this order would come in the way of the Central Government if it wishes to impugne the order of the Appellate Board in proceedings under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, or by resorting to any other remedy available to it under the law. 6. For the reasons recorded above, the preliminary objection is upheld and it is held that the appeal was not filed by a proper authority and the same is dismissed. No costs.
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