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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 190 Records
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1985 (5) TMI 258 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of service of the transferred employees and to standardise and rationalise the conditions of service of such transferred employees immediately upon and as a part of the process of such transfer and integration. (ii) Ext. P2 did overstep the above statutory process and was hence beyond competence. (iii) Ext. P3 was not invalid, since the Central Government had the necessary power to issue policy directions to the Corporation under Section 21 of the Act. (iv) Exts. P2 and P3 did alter the conditions of service of the petitioners to their prejudice without compliance with Section 9A of the I.D. Act and were therefore invalid ab initio. (v) Exts. P2 and P3 are not ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. and (vi) Act 1 of 1981 validated Exts. P2 and P3 with retrospective effect from the date of their promulgation. In view of our conclusions on the last point, we have to and do hereby dismiss this Original Petition. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 257 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t them in accordance with the directive principle contained in Article 46 of the Constitution. There are in all castes and communities poor people who if they are given adequate opportunity and training may be able to compete successfully with persons belonging to richer classes The Government may provide for them liberal grants of scholarships, free studentship, free boarding and lodging facilities, free uniforms, free mid-day meals etc. to make the life of poor students comfortable. The Government may also provide extra tutorial facilities, stationery and books free of cost and library facilities. These and other steps should be taken in the lower classes so that by the time a student appears for that qualifying examination he may be able to attain a high degree of proficiency in his studies. 155. The State Government shall now proceed to redetermine that whole question of reservation of seats/posts under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) of the Constitution in this judgment.
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1985 (5) TMI 256 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Lal Gupta or whether it introduces a new provision altogether. We have decided upon the constitutionality of the Explanation on its own terms. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the pre-Explanation decisions of this Court in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, Ram Dayal v. Brijraj Singh and Magraj Patolia v. R.K. Birla, except to extract a passage from the last of these three cases, which reads thus Now coming to the corrupt practice of incurring expenditure beyond the prescribed limit, in several decisions this Court has ruled that it is not sufficient for the petitioners to prove merely that the expenditure more than the prescribed limit had been incurred in connection with the election, he must go further and prove that the excess expenditure was incurred with the consent or under the authority of the returned candidate or his election agent. 21. In the result, the Writ Petition and the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ird paragraph of that order. It appears from that order that the Sub-Judge had consolidated both the applications and disposed them of together by the same order though he failed to apply the provisions of Section 17(2) of Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949. Hence it cannot be accepted that no fresh application had been made after Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 had come into force. 16. In the result, we affirm the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and dismiss the appeal. 17. We, however, make it clear that the setting aside of the court sale does not come in the way of any other remedy open to the decree-holders in the instant case to recover the amount which may be due to them under the decree from the judgment debtor or the Custodian or any other authority. Any proceedings that may be initiated by the decree-holders for realising the amount due to them, shall be disposed of by the concerned authority in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 254 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , Sub-section (1) of the Act, and interest at the rate of 9% instead of 6%, as originally contained in the un-amended Act, from the date of taking possession of the land acquired. Since the decision in this case has been given after one year, it is manifest that under the said Act, respondents would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% out of which they have already got 6%. 2. With the above observation, we dismiss the appeal.
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1985 (5) TMI 253 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t all stages and in all walks of life. He wanted to convince me on merit that it is a fit case where the company should not be made to suffer since it has not insured the vehicle. In fact, being attracted with a contention, I directed on 10-9-1984 to issue notice to New India Assurance Company Limited under which it is claimed that the vehicle is insured. However, I find that more injustice would be caused in condoning the delay in this case when the clear finding is that the claimant is entitled to compensation. 8. In view of my finding that the delayed decision to prefer an appeal was on account of routine and leisurely inter-departmental consultations and no clear picture is given as to at what stage the negligence crept in covering a period of about two months for such a decision the delay cannot be condoned. 9. In the result, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay. The Misc. Case is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 252 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable. 7. Once we are satisfied that the order of termination of service is unsustainable, we decline to go into the larger question raised on behalf of the appellant that even though Section 11A was introduced in the statute after the date of the termination of the appellant, yet when the matter was before the Labour Court, it was obligatory upon the Labour Court to consider whether the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct charged, even though we find considerable substance in this contention. 8. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the order terminating the service of the appellant is quashed and set aside and it is hereby declared that the appellant continues to be in service and shall be re-inducted in the post where he was working and from where he was removed. He must be paid ₹ 15,000/-as and by way of back wages . The appeal is allowed to that extent with no order as to costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 251 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Swami Thevar's case(1) and A.R. Sanjeevi Naicker's(2) case has held that now there is no machinery available under the Madras Act to have a determination of the dispute between two rival claimants regarding their title as to who would be entitled to the patta and s. 11 does not contain machinery for deciding disputed questions of title. Whatever be the position in regard to dispute concerning rival claims or titles, the ratio of the two decisions of this Court on which counsel placed reliance is inapplicable to the issue raised in these appeals for our determination. Having regard to the above discussion we confirm the High Court's view that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate on the real nature of the land is not ousted under s. 64-C by reason of the Settlement Officer's decision to grant or refuse to grant a patta under s. 11 read with the proviso to s. 3(d) of the Act. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed but with no costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1985 (5) TMI 250 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... puts a premium on the inability or unwillingness of a debtor to honour his legal obligation. (8) Learned Counsel for the parties relied on a number of decision but Lahore 58 unfortunately none of these cases dealt with the question before me. It is, therefore, unnecessary to dilate on these cases. (9) The petitions are, by and large, based on the ground of deemed inability of the Companies to pay the claims which became barred by time during the pendency of the petitions even though in one or two petitions there is the additional ground of "commercial insolvency" but the additional ground in no case goes beyond the use of that expression and it was not seriously disputed that the real ground on which the Company was sought to be wound up was the deemed inability to pay the claims which have, during the pendency of the petitions, become barred by time. (10) In the result, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 249 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o s. 1 of the Interest Act, 1839 to award interest on equitable grounds. In all the facts and circumstances of the case, the reasonable rate of interest would be 6 per annum on the compensation amount of ₹ 25,000 from August 13, 1951, the date of dispossession till August 31, 1959, the date of judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, and thereafter at 9 per annum thereon till realization. It more or less works out to ₹ 95,000 which is a multiple of 20 times the actual investment of the appellant in purchasing plot No. C/91 in C Scheme in the city of Jaipur. The result therefore is that the appeal partly succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the High Court and those of the learned Subordinate Judge are modified by decreeing the plaintiff's claim for compensation at ₹ 25,000 with interest as indicated above. The appellant will be entitled to recover and be liable to pay costs in proportion to success and failure. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 248 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... few extra duties would hardly be relevant to determine his status. The words like managerial or supervisory have to be understood in their proper connotation and their mere use should not detract from the truth. 17. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the award of the Labour Court declaring the appellant not to be a workman is quashed and set aside. The judgment of the High Court is also quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Labour Court for disposal according to law. The Labour Court must dispose of the matter within a period of three months from today and it shall not entertain any more preliminary objections even if raised, on behalf of the employer. 18. The employer shall pay salary for a period of six months at the rate of last pay drawn by the appellant and the acceptance of it would be without prejudice to any contention on either side. The respondent-employer shall also pay the cost of the appellant which is quantified at ₹ 3000.
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1985 (5) TMI 247 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the grounds all material details necessary for making an effective representation. The fourth ground accepted by the High Court in support of its order is also not tenable in law. As all the grounds accepted by the High Court for its conclusion are not sustainable for reasons discussed above, the order of the High Court quashing the detention is not supportable. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. In course of the hearing, Mr. Jethmalani had drawn our attention to the fact that many detenus like the respondent have been and are being released, and the respondent who has already under gone more than two-thirds of the period should be released. That is a matter entirely for the detaining authority to decide and we hope and trust that notwithstanding the reversal of the decision of the High Court, the State Government will proceed to review the matter expeditiously and make such appropriate directions as it consider fit. N.V.K. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 245 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lated by section 246(1) of the Code. On the contrary, the other side of the coin is properly established that even on the basis of such an item it can be said that it is a situation where there is no case against the accused has been made out so much so that even if that item remains unrebutted it would ever warrant a conviction. 18. Having taken a survey of the situation in the context of the decided cases and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Customs Act, the result in inspectable that no charge could be framed against the petitioner only on the basis of the so-called confessional statement of accused No. 2. Consequently, the impugned order is un-sustainable and deserves to be set aside. 19. Rule made absolute. 20. The impugned order recorded by the learned trial Magistrate and endorsed by the learned Sessions Judge framing charge against the petitioner-original accused No. 1 is set aside and the petitioner is discharged. His bail bond stands cancelled.
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1985 (5) TMI 244 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appellants within three months from that day, i.e. May 3, 1985, in the appropriate cadre of Assistant Engineer or Junior Engineer, as the case may be, and such appointments were to be on probation for a period of two years as required under the rules. In regard to seniority the appellants have to rank below permanent and temporary recruits to regular posts of engineers held under the Board prior to 1983 and they shall be assigned seniority above such recruits pendente lite. We have now indicated the reasons by our judgment. The appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is reversed and the Board is directed to give effect to the directions indicated above within the specified time. We hope and trust that the Board will not conduct itself in such an embarrassing way in future and land itself in difficulty again. The appellants shall have their costs throughout. One set of hearing fee assessed at ₹ 5,000 shall be admissible in this Court. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 243 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at an unduly large number of candidates were called for interview and the marks allocated in the viva voce test were excessively high, it is possible that some of the candidates who might have otherwise come in the select list were left out of it, perhaps unjustifiably. We would therefore direct that all the candidates who secured a minimum of 45 per cent marks in the written examination but who could not find entry in the select list, should be given one more opportunity of appearing in the competitive examination which would now have to be held in accordance with the principles laid down in this Judgment and this opportunity should be given to them, even though they may have passed the maximum age prescribed by the rules for recruitment to the Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) and other allied services. We would direct that in the circumstances of the case the fair order of costs would be that each party should bear and pay his own costs throughout. Appeals allowed
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1985 (5) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the same to a tenant. The legislature in its wisdom did recognise this fact and the Legislature has provided that bona fide requirement of the landlord for his own use will be a legitimate ground under the Act for the eviction of his tenant from any residential premises. This ground is, however, confined to residential premises and is not made available in case of commercial premises. A landlord who lets out commercial premises to a tenant under certain circumstances may need bona fide the premises for his own use under changed conditions in some future date should not in fairness be deprived of his right to recover the commercial premises. Bona fide need of the landlord will stand very much on the same footing in regard to either class of premisses, residential or commercial. We therefore, suggest that Legislature may consider the advisability of making the bona fide requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial premises as well. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (5) TMI 241 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly because the said words were subsequently added, and, as such, the said receipt cannot be taken into consideration. 32. Learned counsel for the appellant had, in the end, contended that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit for want of territorial jurisdiction. Learned counsel urged that the loan was taken in district Basti and not at Sekseriya Sugar Mills, district Gonda. We are unable to agree with this contention as well. 33. It is well established from the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 that the loan was advanced to the defendant at Sekseriya Sugar Mills Private Limited, and as such part of action had accrued to the plaintiffs within the territorial jurisdiction of Civil Judge, Gonda. There thus appears to be no substance in the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the appellant and it is accordingly rejected. 34. No other point is pressed before us. 35. In the result, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1985 (5) TMI 240 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... er of the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Cochin, dated 18-1-1982 in C. No. XVII/8/3/81 G.C. Adj. imposing a penalty of ₹ 2 lakhs on the appellant under Section 74 of the Act. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant did not advance any further arguments in this appeal and merely adopted the arguments advanced in CD(T) 197/82 referred to supra. 14. The appellant admittedly is not a gold dealer or a person entitled under law to possess primary gold in the shape of gold bars of 24 ct. purity. The gold bars under seizure are admittedly primary gold of 24 ct. purity. Nevertheless for the reasons given by us in appeal CD 197/82 we hold that there is no evidence on record to prove that the appellant acquired ownership and control of the gold bars under seizure in contravention of Section 8(1) of the Act. We accordingly giving the appellant the benefit of doubt vacate the findings of the adjudicating authority under the impugned order and allow the appeal.
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1985 (5) TMI 239 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... is clearly indicative of a genuine apprehension in the mind of the appellant that he would not get a fair deal by reason of a pre-conceived bias on the part of the adjudicating authority. Since I feel that justice must not only be done but must manifestly seem to be done and non-observance of this rule of natural justice by itself would cause prejudice to the appellant without any independent proof of prejudice, the impugned order is not sustainable. 6. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order on the above preliminary point without going into the merits of the appeal or other issues and remit the matter back for readjudication by a competent authority other than the officer who has passed the impugned order as per law, and the adjudicating authority would be competent to take into consideration the materials and evidence already on record and such other materials relevant and necessary that may be produced by the appellant or the Department for disposing of the case.
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1985 (5) TMI 238 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... proceedings had been initiated by the authorities as per law, issuance of separate show cause notices in respect of each transaction of sale would not arise at all under the provisions of law. 13. At this stage, the learned Counsel submitted that he is not pressing the points he has urged and would merely pray for reduction of the penalty. It was urged that the appellant has never been involved in any offence in the past and this being the first time, the contravention may be viewed with leniency. I find from the records that the Board has persuaded itself to take a lenient view and reduce the penalty from ₹ 50.000/- to ₹ 25,000/-. However, taking into consideration the background and facts and circumstances of the case, the status and antecedent of the appellant, I feel interests of justice would be met if the penalty is reduced to ₹ 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only). Except for the above modification, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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