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Showing 1 to 20 of 214 Records
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1987 (5) TMI 383 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hereas out of the 12 respondents 10 have already retired from services as it appears from the affidavit sworn by appellant No. 1 Mr. G.C.. Gupta in accordance with the directions of this Court. We are also told that out of the remaining 2 respondents, 1 has already retired from service. So, only 1 respondent is at present in service. In these circumstances I think that the cause of justice will be served if the authorities concerned consider the case of the said respondent for promotion in accordance with law. 32. For the reasons aforesaid the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. 33. I also make it clear that henceforth seniority of the employees in service in question will be determined from the date when an employee has become a member of the service being appointed substantively to a post in the cadre of service, no matter whether the said post is permanent or temporary as I have held hereinbefore.
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1987 (5) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Judicial Duties but the Administrative functions which a High Court Judge is expected to discharge. Secondly, whether an Advocate applying for recruitment to the Administrative Tribunal has sufficient administrative potential can be examined and Judged during the process of selection. We, therefore, do not propose to interfere with the observations made by Bhagwati, CJI in his Judgment. 3. The Learned Attorney General then prays that the time fixed in the Judgment for setting up additional Benches of the Administrative Tribunal should be extended to December 31, 1987. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the administrative requirements of the situation, we have no hesitation in granting the time prayed for. 4. The learned Attorney General also prays that time may be extended up to July 31, 1987 for introducing legislation to give effect to the observations made by the Court in these cases. We grant time accordingly. 5. The Review Petitions stand disposed of.
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1987 (5) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... one to the toilet with half written sentence. Evidently he must have come back from the toilet and started copying from the manuscript. While so copying, he was evidently caught red handed. That is obvious from the contents of answer sheets. 11. In our opinion the conclusion reached by the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner used unfair means is fully justified. No amount of denial could take him away from the hard facts revealed. The conduct of the petitioner is undoubtedly unworthy of judicial officer. Judicial Officers cannot have two standards, one in the Court and another outside the Court. They must have only one standard or rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy. The second contention urged for the petitioner also fails and is rejected. 12. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. The Transfer Petition No. 189 of 1983 is also dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 380 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ears that the Advocate on record by inadvertence or otherwise failed to take out the Summons within the time prescribed. It is settled law by now that for the laches of the Advocate the client of such Advocate should not suffer. (See Rafiq v. Munshilal, ). In the instant case, the appellant did everything what it was supposed to do under the law. The appellant verified the petition for setting aside the abatement and the affidavit verifying the same has been duly affirmed within the period prescribed. Therefore, in our view, there is sufficient cause for not making an application for setting aside the abatement within the time prescribed. 26. For the reasons aforesaid, both the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the learned trial Judge made on 11th Sept., 1975 are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. 27. There will be an order in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Masters' Summons dated 4th Feb., 1969. R.N. Pyne, J. 28. 1 agree.
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1987 (5) TMI 379 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... m the Dictionary for this purpose. The expression "terms of service" clearly includes tenure of service. We regret, we cannot help the appellant on this plea either. 8. In view of the peculiar facts of this case, we do not think it necessary to consider the various authorities cited before us regarding the violation of Article 311(2) and violation of natural justice. We are extremely up happy that such a situation has come to pass. Perhaps, the appellant's grievances are well founded. He left his prestigious post and joined the Board expecting to be there for two years when he had a raw deal at the hands of the authorities. However, on an application of the provisions of the Haryana Board of School Education (Amendment) Act, 1980 we find it difficult to rescue the appellant from his predicament. We trust and hope that the Punjab University will be generous enough to accommodate him properly. The appeal has to fail and is dismissed without any orders as to costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 378 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... asonable doubt. o p /o p 14. Applying the above principles to the facts of the instant case we do not find any deliberate or wilful disobedience to this Court's order and, as such we do not hold the officers guilty of contempt. We also take into consideration the apologies tendered by the Superintendent and the Jailer and the frank statement made by the Assistant Jailer. We are, however, of the view that because of undue detention in jail beyond the due date of his release the ex-convict Ahmed AH is entitled to reasonable compensation from the State. We accordingly order that ₹ 2,000A (Rupees two thousand) be paid to him by the State as a measure of consolation, if not compensation. We are also inclined to express that such instances should not recur in future and, if recur, will be severely dealt with. The administration of justice should not be clogged by such instances at any level. o p /o p In the result, the petition is disposed of, Order accordingly. o p /o p
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1987 (5) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... representative' for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and that would effectively carry-out the purpose of social justice underlying Chapter VIII of the Act, to which the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was the nearest approximation. This recommendation was made after referring to the divergent views expressed by the various High Courts on the meaning of the expression 'legal representatives' in section 110-A of the Act. The fact that Parliament declined to take any action on the recommendation of the Law Commission of India suggests that Parliament intended that the expression 'legal representatives' in section 110-A of the Act should be given a wider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse, parent and children of the deceased. We, therefore, do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the Gujarat High Court against which this Special Leave Petition has been filed. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (5) TMI 376 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... duty that these rules be laid, as soon as may be, before each of the house of legislature for a period of 14 days so that the legislature may, in its wisdom, if necessary, make any requisite modification therein. Now that the matter has come up for pointed notice, the least that can be expected from the respondent State is to proceed with the utmost expedition to act under Section 7 for the proper governance, management and development of the elementary education within the State. It goes without saying that this provides the foundation of the educational system and if the very base remains on the shifting sands of contradictory and ambivalent instructions purporting to issue from the unwarranted source of Section 8, then there can be little hope to build any meaningful super structure of higher and technical education thereon. We hope that these observations will be well heeded and will meet prompt compliance. B.P. Jha, J. 18. I agree. Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 19. I agree.
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1987 (5) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cers Grade II, provided they complete six years of service in Grade-I. Apart from this, the Probationary/Trainee Officers have been fitted to the higher scale of pay in the Scale-I of the Junior Management Grade, although they have not been formally included in that Grade. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Probationary/Trainee Officers have been prejudiced by the Order. We are sure that the Bank will take immediate steps for applying the order to the Probationary/Trainee Officers. No other point has been urged on behalf of the parties. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is set aside and the Civil Appeals are allowed. The judgment of the Delhi High Court is affirmed and the Special Leave Petition is dismissed. All the Writ Petitions filed by the Probationary/Trainee Officers are also dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs in any of these Appeals or in the Special Leave Petition. Appeals allowed & Petition.
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1987 (5) TMI 374 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , had no other recourse except to file a writ petition praying for setting aside the prohibitory order. 9. For the reasons above mentioned, we are of the opinion that the prohibitory order dated 3.10.1985 by reason of which the petitioner was prevented from operating the bank account in question should be quashed. We direct accordingly. In view of the order of this court dated 4.5.1986 we further direct respondents 1 to 3 to pay the petitioner interest 18 per annum on the amount of the balance which stood to her credit on the date of the prohibitory order, namely ₹ 42,770.14 from 4.5.1986 till the date of this order. 10. Counsel for the petitioner states that he is also entitled to the costs of this petition. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been awarded interest during the pendency of the writ petition, we are of the opinion that we should make no orders as to costs. 11. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arguments the appellant glibly stated that he had contested the election for the offices of President and Vice-President and that he would be contesting each and every election as an independent candidate with a view to reform the society and the election law. This is not uncommon as a number of other persons have been contesting elections as independent candidates for the high office and some of them filed election petition disputing the election. These factors have given cause for anxiety to us and we hope that the Parliament will take these matters into consideration to devise ways and means to meet the on-slaught of independent candidates who are not quite serious about their business. o p /o p In view of our discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court rightly exercised its power in rejecting this petition under Order VII Rule 11. The appeal fails and accordingly dismissed with costs which we quantify at ₹ 2,000. o p /o p P.S.S. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1987 (5) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is letter dated February, 14, 1987 has declined to grant consent to intuition of the proceeding in question. Elaborate reasons have been state by the learned Solicitor General in support of his concussion that it would not be in the public interest to give his consent to the initiation of the contempt proceedings. After scrutinising the reasons given by the learned Solicitor General, we are of opinion that the grounds stated by the Solicitor General for declining to grant consent cannot be said to be irrelevant in the eye of law nor can the view expressed by the Solicitor General be characterised as arbitrary, illegal or unreasonable. 9. In the circumstances it has to be held that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed in his prayer for revival of the contempt petition since neither of the conditions precedent specified in the order dated December 19, 1986 for maintainability of the prayer for revival can be said to be fulfilled. We accordingly dismiss these applications.
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1987 (5) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the judgment of the High Court disallowing the appellant's claim cannot be supported. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances. 5. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed with costs. We set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller directing eviction of the respondent from the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The respondent is given four months' time to vacate the premises subject to filing of the usual undertaking within four weeks from today.
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1987 (5) TMI 370 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave increased the solarium and liberalised the interest provisions, the petitioners may find it preferable to have the lands taken possession of and the compensation paid, if otherwise the acquisition proceedings are legal now rather than a few years hence. We leave it to the petitioners to consider this aspect of the matter and put forward such contentions as they may consider advisable, when the writ petitions come up before the Division Bench for final disposal. 42. Before we conclude, we would like to place on record our appreciation of the assistance given to us by Sarvashri R.S. Narula, K.L. Rathee, B.R.L. Iyengar, N.S. Vashisht, Mukul Rohatgi, A.M. Singhvi and Sunil Malhotra appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Sri R.K. Anand appearing on behalf of the Union of India and Shri K.C. Dua appearing on behalf of the D.D.A. 43. We dispose of the reference as above indicated. The writ petitions may now be listed before the appropriate Division Bench for further arguments.
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1987 (5) TMI 369 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... definition of forest produce under the Act, the only notification issued under the Act in respect of any specie of forest produce was in respect of sal seeds, an item in respect of which no notification whatsoever was necessary if what was stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons was correct. We are not a little surprised that the only occasion for using the machinery of Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 was to issue a notification in respect of sal seeds and not in respect of other forest produce, leaving an uneasy feeling with us that the notification was issued only with the object of putting an end to these contracts solemnly entered into by the Orissa Government for the avowed purpose of encouraging the setting up of certain industries in the State of Orissa. The allegation of the appellants is that this has been done with a view to help certain industrialists outside the State. We desire to express no opinion on this allegation. Appeals allowed.
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1987 (5) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a true construction of Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Sahayata Upkram (Vishesh Upbandh) Adhiniyam, 1978 Act, execution of the exparte decree obtained by the respondent against the petitioner at Bombay can be instituted, commenced or proceeded with by the respondent against the petitioner, even though the petitioner's textile undertaking is admittedly a State Relief Undertaking under the Act?
Whether Section 5 of the aforesaid Act is substantive law or procedural law?
Held that:- High Court completely overlooked the purpose of the Act and the limited period of operation of Section 5 to held that there was no bar against execution of the decree after considering the effect of Section 5 quoted above on the general law governing decrees and their execution as provided in the Civil Procedure Code.
A contention was raised that Section 5 cannot apply to post notification liabilities but the reading of the Sections does not permit such an interpretation. The object of Section 5 is to protect the relief undertakings from all suits and legal proceedings. This protection is to end on 18-11-1987. We hold that the High Court was in error in allowing execution to proceed. Set aside the order of the High court and allow this appeal.
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1987 (5) TMI 367 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mate computation or assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has thus the power to correct the error in the way most suitable in the circumstances of the case , provided he acts within the frame work of section 34 of the Act. He can correct such errors when he is seized of the appeal filed by the assessee. We are fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court (see Commissioner of Income-tax v. McMillan and Co. 1958 33 ITR 182). 8.. For the reasons stated above we are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal has rightly held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in entertaining the F forms and granting appropriate reliefs to the assessee based on the said documents. 9.. The questions raised in the tax revision case accordingly are answered against the State and in favour of the assessee. The tax revision case accordingly is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (5) TMI 366 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Mohanty, on a decision of the Gauhati High Court reported in 1973 88 ITR 234 (Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam v. Nathmal Tolaram). Mr. S.C. Roy, the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue, relied upon the decisions of the Kerala High Court reported in 1974 97 ITR 152 (L.J. Patel and Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala) and of the Bombay High Court reported in 1986 162 ITR 556 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tata Chemicals Limited). Each of the decision is correct on its own facts. Accordingly, they are not required to be discussed. 7.. Thus, on analysis, it can safely be concluded that the assessee who maintains regularly the mercantile system of accounts can claim deduction in the year when the liability to the sales tax was finally determined by the Sales Tax Tribunal in the second appeal. 8.. In the result, the question is answered in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. R.C. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1987 (5) TMI 365 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 60A(2)(b). Section 60A for all intent and purpose reproduces section 6 of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. In terms of the aforesaid amendment, there cannot be any doubt that the taxes which were illegally assessed in view of the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court as also of this Court as referred to hereinbefore now have got the statutory sanction in terms of section 60A(2)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 read with section 6(2)(b) of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. 5.. In the result, these petitions are allowed and the order of assessment as contained in annexures 3 and 3/A in C.W.J.C. No. 843 of 1980 (R) and as contained in annexures 4/A and 4/B in C.W.J.C. No. 845 of 1980 (R) are hereby quashed. 6.. The concerned respondent will now proceed to decide the case in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Writ applications allowed.
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1987 (5) TMI 364 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he foodgrains under the Levy Orders which should have been taxed but even the liability of such procuring agencies or the State while making the first purchase has been passed on to the petitioner as the provision is in respect of sale and purchase of foodgrains procured under the Levy Orders. Such foodgrains are meant for distribution through fair price shops that helps in feeding millions of poor people. Such a commodity should not have been chosen for tax. We are afraid, it would not be possible for this Court to hold imposition of tax upon such a commodity, namely, the foodgrains, invalid on the ground urged on behalf of the petitioner as it is a matter of policy which is decided by the State. The State is free to choose a commodity for tax as well as the manner and rates of tax over such commodity. In view of the discussion held above, we find no merit in the petitions and the same are dismissed with costs. The order of interim relief is discharged. Petitions dismissed.
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