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1987 (8) TMI 458 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sion shop while upholding the contention of the petitioner by confining shop to a place where goods are actually stored and delivered pursuant to a sale. We agree with the decision of the High Court that while construing a welfare legislation like the Act and the notification issued thereunder a liberal construction should be placed on their provisions so that the purpose of the legislation may be allowed to be achieved rather than frustrated or stultified. There is no doubt that the establishment of the petitioner at Secunderabad is a shop where selling activity is carried on and by virtue of the notification issued by the State Government the Act became applicable to it. The petitioner is bound to comply with the provisions of the Act as admittedly at all relevant times the petitioner had engaged more than 20 persons for wages at its place of business. There is no ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. 5. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 457 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is nothing on the face of the order made by the learned District Munsif, which indicates as to on the basis of what circumstances he has determined Rs. 10,000/-, as the upset price. It is obvious that he had accepted the ipse dixit of the decree-holder. As already pointed out, the decree-holder himself had estimated the price of the property at Rs. 15,000/-. To say the least, the order made by the learned District Munsif, is wholly arbitrary in nature and deserves to be set aside. 8. The learned District Munsif is directed to apply his mind to the question as to what should be the proper upset price which he may determine after making such enquiry as he may deem fit. Accordingly, this revision petition is allowed. The order reducing the upset price to Rs. 10,000/- is set aside and the executing Court is directed to take fresh steps to have the upset price fixed and proceed with the execution proceedings in accordance with the law. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1987 (8) TMI 456 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ngs as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order of termination is vitiated as it is a non-speaking order and does not contain any reason. When by the impugned order the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reason given by him, the question of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice does not arise. It is also incorrect to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order. 9. There is, therefore, no substance in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 10. In view of the fact that it is the first offence of the appellant, who is said to be the father of five minor children and has no other means of livelihood, the respondent may consider the re-employment of the appellant to the post of Conductor or to any other post, to which he may be found to be suitable.
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1987 (8) TMI 455 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is clear that the question about anyone else being instrumental in getting the prosecution launched or questions which are foreign are not to be considered in a revision where the issue of process is being challenged and therefore the further question as to whether the party against whom an allegation is made is or is not a necessary party in the proceedings also is of no avail. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court as we have discussed earlier clearly indicates that the High Court is only expected to see the legality, correctness or the propriety of the order, which is an order of issue of process, these things could only be seen by looking into the complaint and the accompanying papers and evidence if any which were before the court below. In our opinion, the High Court was right in deleting the names of the two respondents. 16. We see therefore no substance in this appeal. It is therefore dismissed and the order passed by the High Court is maintained.
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1987 (8) TMI 454 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eement of sub-tenancy. Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in M/s Girdbar Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Matbur and Others, 19681 2 SCC 237 where considering similar provision of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it was held that where the landlord had in fact consented to the sub-tenancy and as such the sub-tenancy was valid and landlord was bound by it. But in the present case, there was no sub-tenancy created by the agreement mentioned herein. Hence the consent and knowl- edge of the landlord do not help. Our attention was also drawn to section 2(4) on the expression 'tenant' in West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. That definition does not affect the position of the petitioner in the instant case as there was no sub-tenancy in the present case. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took. The Special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. S.L. Petition dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 453 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on. This reasoning is quite contrary to the well-settled proposition. Absence of consideration of these material documents or brushing them aside as irrelevant, to my mind amounts to non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority rendering the detention order invalid. (34) The sum and substance of the discussion leaves no doubt in my mind that it is a case of non-application of mind by the detaining authority to the most relevant and important documents/facts and circumstances having a direct bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. On that score also ,the petition is liable to succeed. All the three grounds collectively and severally are weighty enough to set aside the impugned order of detention. (35) As a result of the above discussion, the petition succeeds and the impugned order of detention is set aside. The petitioner be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained under the orders of a competent court or authority.
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1987 (8) TMI 452 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... end and the order of restoration of the said case would not affect any alienation made before the restoration although such alienations might have been made during the subsistence of the attachment. We may mention that our attention was drawn to the amendment of Rule 57 of Order 21 made by the Calcutta High Court, but in our view that amendment merely provides that although under Rule 57 of Order 21 the attachment would cease on an order dismissing the application for execution it is open to the Court to make an order to the contrary. which would mean that the Court could make an order to continue the attachment for some time. The amendment, however, is of no relevance in the case before us. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment set aside and the order of First Subordinate Jude at Alipore in Misc. Case No. 8 of 1978 which was set aside by the Calcutta High Court restored. The respondents must pay to the appellant the cost of the appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 451 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd filing of the petition. To now direct the petitioner to move the more appropriate court, would mean that time spent up to now has all gone waste. The detenu is a lady and inasmuch as the Court does not totally lack inherent jurisdiction, it would be too harsh a measure to drive petitioner to the remedy of a fresh petition. To sum up, Ulhasnagar being the place where the detenu was taken into custody and where she was served with the order and grounds of detention, suffice to attract the jurisdiction of this Court. We would however like to make it clear that convenience of the detaining authority and the factor of greater suitability of another forum are not to be ignored. In appropriate cases, a direction to the person questioning a detention to move other Courts also having jurisdiction, may be required to be given. For reasons given earlier, such a direction is not to be given in the present case. This case shall now proceed to a hearing on merits. 6. Order accordingly.
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1987 (8) TMI 450 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dated the 11th July 1986 are set aside. The application of the appellant's for sanction under sections 391(2) and 394 of the Companies Act is allowed. There will be an order in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) (f) and (g) of the petition, made before the first Court. There will be a further order in terms of prayers (h) and (i) of the said petition. The Official Liquidator is directed to file his return in terms of prayer (h) within 3 months from the date this judgment and order is effective and serve copies of the report in terms of prayer (i) within 2 weeks form the date of filing of the return in Court. There will be an interim order in terms of prayers (j) and (k). On the oral application of the Advocate-on-record appearing for the Regional Director, Company Law Board, there will be a stay of the operation of the judgment for a period of 4 weeks from date. The parties and the Officer Liquidator to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of the judgment.
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1987 (8) TMI 449 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of 13 to 15 times the amount of effluent discharged in order to reduce the extent of pollution. In view of the subsequent events the learned counsel submits that this was a fit case for dropping the proceedings. The averments made by the respondents in the various affidavits have been controverted by the affidavit-in-rejoinder sworn by Chandra Bhal Singh, Law Officer of the appellant-Board showing that there is little or no progress in the matter of establishment of the effluents treatment plant. We need not enter into this controversy. These are all matters to be dealt with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and that of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directing issue of process to the respondents are restored. The learned Magistrate shall proceed with the trial as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 448 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ich was justiciable in the application before the court. It was an error of law and not mistake of fact committed by the arbitrator which was amenable to corrections by this Court. The grievances of Mr. Ganguly's client even if true, which as at present advised we are not inclined to accept, do not amount to error apparent on the face of the record. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are unable to sustain, the objections to the award. There will, therefore, be judgment in terms of the award, there will no interim interest. There will, however, be interest on judgment at 9 . The objections are dismissed and the workers' objections are disposed of by stating that there are sufficient provisions in the award to meet the claim of the gratuity of the workers and they should have the right to be met out of the award. In that view of the matter the award is made the rule of the Court and the judgment be in terms of the award. No order as to costs. Petitions disposed of.
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1987 (8) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ndoned by the defendant. On the other hand 83-C also expressly refers to 13-C. 83-C is a reiteration and revival of 13-C with emphasis on the objection relating to s. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act. Looking to the substance of the matter and ignoring technicalities, we are firmly of the view that the defendant sought a stay of the suit before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the suit and that he never abandoned his right to have the suit stayed. The appeals, therefore allowed with costs and the suit No. 127 of 1982 in the court of Mirzapur stayed under s. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act. In the view that we have taken we do not think it necessary to consider the further question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the amendment of the plaint introducing a substantially new cause of action gave the defendant a fresh right under s. 3 of the Foreign Awards Act. H.L.C. Appeal allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 446 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... under the Government order but with effect from 29.8.1984. In the result we hold that paragraph 7 of the Government order cannot be used against persons in the position of the petitioner to deny them the benefit of the past service for purposes of computing the pension. We, therefore, direct the respondents to revise the pension payable to the petitioner in accordance with the Government order by giving him the benefit of the service rendered by him in the Central Government while computing his qualifying service for pension. We, however, make it clear that the petitioner is entitled to recover the difference between the pension which he is entitled to get in accordance with the Government order and the pension which is already disbursed to him with effect from 29.8.1984, i.e., the date of the Government order only and he is not entitled to get any relief in respect of the period prior to August 29, 1984. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1987 (8) TMI 445 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r it could not be disputed that the petitioner-appellant is expected to pay rent from month to month and that rent has to be paid in the succeeding month before the end of the month and in this view of the matter it is not disputed that on the day when the appellant tendered the rent in the court in addition to what he had deposited he was in arrears of rent atleast for two months which he did not tender and in this view of the matter the courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the landlord was entitled to a decree for eviction on that ground. 8. In our opinion, the courts below were right in holding that the appellant tenant was in arrears of rent and on the first day of hearing he did not tender or pay the whole amount of arrears and therefore the courts below were right in granting a decree for eviction. We therefore see no reason to entertain this appeal. It is therefore dismissed with costs. The respondents shall be entitled to the costs of this appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 444 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the survey on 25th April, 1977. From the information of the Beldar, who was available on the aforesaid date, it is clear that no activity was going on at the kiln and, therefore, the assessee might have removed the books from the kiln to a safe place, The non-availability of the books at the time of survey is one thing and non-maintenance of the books is quite a different thing. When the books are maintained by the assessee, it was the duty of the assessing officer to investigate them at the stage of assessment and find out if there was any defect and if no defect was found out in the books then they could not be rejected merely on the basis that they were not produced at the time of survey. I, therefore, do not see any good ground to reject the book version in this case. 3. The revision is allowed. The Tribunal's order dated 20th May, 1986, is set aside. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal to pass an order under Section 11 (8) accepting the book version.
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1987 (8) TMI 443 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s also clear that so far as the structure in the building is concerned it is not disputed that that is one of the ownership of the respond- ent. It is also not in dispute that the premises mainly stand on plot No. 34 about which there is not even a shadow of doubt about its title either of the property or of the land and in this view of the matter, on the basis of the two documents put together in the context of the circumstances as they stand it could not be said that the respondent- landlord has ceased to be the owner thereof, in view of broad meaning of term 'owner' as has been discussed and considered above. In our opinion, it could not be said that the landlord is not the owner of the premises and therefore we see no substance in the contention advanced by learned counsel for the appellant. No other question was raised. We therefore see no reason to entertain this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed. The respondents shall be entitled to the costs of this appeal.
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1987 (8) TMI 442 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ignificance. There is no magic in that expression. The expression "as the case may be" has been properly construed in the judgment mentioned hereinbefore. It was lastly contended that comparative hardship in the instant appeal has not been properly considered. It appears that there is nothing in this point. The appellant is an affluent businessman and it is not difficult for him to get alternative accommodation. On the other hand, the respond- ents have no other residential house than the one in ques- tion will find it extremely difficult to get residential accommodation in the same locality and as such they will be put to immense hardship if they are not allowed to occupy the additional portion in their house which has been leased out to the tenant. The Court has observed that there is no question of balance of convenience. In that view of the matter this appeal must fail and is, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (8) TMI 441 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on it must be the State. We, however, do not want to saddle the State with costs for two reasons-firstly, we do not want the employees to have a feeling that in the fight their employer has been vanquished and secondly we entertain a fond hope that there will be no reoccurrence. In course of arguments we had suggested to learned counsel for the parties to furnish recast Gradation List on the basis of claims advanced before us -(1) showing how it would be when full claim of the promotees is granted and (2) how different it would look when the total claim of the direct recruits is allowed. Such charts have been prepared and furnished and we find that the proc ess of pushing up and down would be inevitable but would be within reasonable limits and no irreparable prejudice was apparent. The appeals and writ petitions of the direct recruits are allowed, and the appeals by the promotees are dismissed. There shall be no order for costs throughout. Appeals and Petitions disposed of.
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1987 (8) TMI 440 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Ltd. v. New Burnswick Electric Power Commission, AIR 1928 Privy Council 287. We are of the opinion that from the period from March 7, 1975 to February 28, 1985 being the date on which the judgment of the High Court was pronounced in this case the appellants are entitled to the interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6% per annum and from the period from August 87 1985 to July 31, 1987 and for that period only at the rate of 12% per annum. Interest will be payable only on the balance amount which remained to be payable to the appellants i.e. the amount due minus what has been paid from the respective dates. The appellants are entitled to the costs of this appeal. The amount is directed to be paid within three months from this date by the respondents. In case, there is any difficulty in calculating the amount, the parties will be at liberty to apply to the High Court of Calcutta. The appellants are entitled to costs of this appeal. The appeal is thus disposed of.
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1987 (8) TMI 439 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g, Bambino vermicelli is not consumed straightway. It is used as one of the ingredients either in preparing a sweet or upma or pakoda or any other such or similar preparations. In view of this, we find it difficult to say that vermicelli is food. It is only an ingredient which goes into preparing a food. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to go into the first contention urged by Mr. Venkatarama Reddy, viz., whether vermicelli undergoes processing or whether the processing should be an elaborate one. For the above reasons, we hold that vermicelli manufactured and sold by the petitioner under the trade name Bambino vermicelli cannot be taxed under entry 129A. It is only maida and nothing else, taxable under entry 60, as held in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Karnatakam Govindayya Setty and Sons 1984 55 STC 160. In the result, we allow this writ petition and direct the assessments to be modified accordingly. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Writ petition allowed.
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